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.Q.BEDIENCE AS A THEME IN THE DOCUMENTS OF THE SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL 
This thesis is an analysis of Vatican II 1 s handling of 
the theme of obedience, conducted from the standpoint of systematic 
theology. It is not a study of the development of ideas about 
obedience during the course of the Council; it treats Vatican Il 1s 
documents as a finished corpus, using earlier magisterial statements 
as historical background against which to discern shifted emphases in 
the theology presented by the Council. 
In Chapter I we establish obedience as a pivotal idea in 
relation to which the co-ordination of Vatican II's ecclesiology, anthro-
pology, ana doctrine of God may be examined. Chapters II-V consider the 
place of obedience in the Council's ecclesiology; we find obedience 
correlated with a view of authority rooted in the concept of the 
1invitatory sign'. This view modifies the formerly predominantly 
jurisdictional emphasis in the Catholic perception of authority, by 
integrating jurisdiction more closely with kerygma and sacrament. How-
ever, although the jurisdictional element of authority is thus modified 
and relativised, it remains important. We find that Vatican II's ideal 
of obedience is generally logically consistent with its view of 
authority, but is not necessarily socially plausible. In matters of 
doctrine, issues are made more complex still by the Council's shift in 
epistemology. This, together with the fresh kerygmatic and sacramental 
perspectives, made it inevitable that infallible teaching should prove 
contentious after the Council. 
Chapter VI forms a bridge: The implications of Vatican II 1 s 
concept of ecclesiastical obedience for anthropology and the doctrine 
of God are drawn out. In Chapter VII we test hitherto unexamined pass-
ages from the documents against these implications. Generally, we find 
broad theoretical consistency throughout Vatican II 1.s presentation of the 
divine-human relationship in all its 'moments', of which obedient Church-
membership is one. The extent of this consistency, together with 
remaining tensions, are swnmarised in the Postscript. 
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PREFACE 
1 Aims of the Thesis 
This thesis takes the form of an analysis of a highly 
significant set of documents -those produced as a result of the 
deliberations of the Second Vatican Council ("Vatican II") (1962-1965). 
The Roman Catholic Church is the largest single section of Christendom 
and this, its most recent General Council, is commonly seen as a 
turning point in its modern history. It is the task of the present 
thesis to examine the Council's handling of the theme of obedience 
which, particularly since the time of the Enlightenment, has been the 
subject of controversy in the pattern of Western thought. We shall 
consider the question of obedience from two interlocking angles. 
Firstly, we shall consider the way in which the Council presented the 
ideal pattern of Christian obedience as it should be rendered in the 
Church; secondly we shall ex&nine the extent to which this view of 
ecclesiastical obedience was co-ordinated with Vatican II 1 s picture 
of the total relationship between man and God. The aim of the thesis, 
then, is to answer the question, 'was the theme of obedience treated 
coherently by the Second Vatican Council, and was it correlated 
consistently with co-ordinate doctrines?'. 
Documents such as those of Vatican II mqy be analysed in a 
variety of ways; the formal and classical way to assess them would 
be to analyse their official character according to their form of 
expression and the canonical status of the Council. Thus they could 
be related to other documents of the Roman Catholic Magisterium (1) 
with regard to their comparative weight and authority. This approach 
will not be taken here. As has been pointed out, the classical, 
official treatment does not provide an adequately scientific set of 
hermeneutical principles for the historical understanding of 
magisterial documents (2), and it is the entire Church which 
(1) I use the term 1Magisterium 1 , with an upper-case 'M', in the 
modern sense in this thesis: that is, to refer to the body of 
persons who, severally and corporately, hold teaching authority 
of various degrees in the Church. I use the same word with 
a lower-case 'm' to refer to the office which they hold (see 
Chapter II, PP• 85-90). 
(2) See Nicholas Lash, Change in Foc~s (London, 1973) pp. 3f. 
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suffers thereby. In the vacuum which is left it is easy for those 
interested in magisterial teachings to treat them in a way which is 
subjective, partial, or both. On the one hand, in the case of 
Vatican II, it is possible to understand i~ts documents purely in the 
light of later official commentary, or, on the other hand, to espouse 
a rather vague notion of the 'spirit of the Council' , which leads to an 
inaccurate and possibly biased reading of the texts. Neither of these 
approaches answers the requirements of scholarly analysis, for neither 
locates the documents carefully and rigorously in their historical 
context; these approaches thus fail to show up important aspects of 
the Council's significance. 
I believe that there are two major aspects to a critical, 
historical study of texts such as those of Vatican II; the complementary 
nature of these two aspects may be illustrated by taking the analogy 
of a tapestry. Firstly, the teachings of the Council may be considered 
in broad relief against the preceding historical background. In this 
way, the patterns of conciliar theology are thrown into view, like 
pictures woven into a contrasting plain background. Secondly, a close 
historical study may be made of the precise processes by which the 
patterns were brought into being; this more microscopic View focuses 
upon the threads of argument brought forward within the history of the 
Council, tracing their historical antecedents and tr.ying to locate, so 
far as possible, the intentions which motivated those who framed the 
documents. 
Whilst the second mode of approach focuses upon the 
intentions of the Council members, the first is to some extent more 
illuminating in relation to questions concerning how the teaching of the 
Council is likely to be received by the Church at large. Of course, the 
reception of the documents' meaning cannot be entirely divorced from 
the intentions by which they were inspired. Apart from official 
commentary provided by the Magisterium upon the teaching it gave at 
Vatican II, other commentaries and studies also elucidate the concerns 
and intentions of the Council's participants. Knowledge of these 
intentions, of course, enters into the process of reception. However, 
there is an area of intention and meaning which is perhaps never 
adequately illuminated even by detailed study of the course of events 
at Vatican II; this is the 'penumbra' of meanings attached to the 
schemata and final statements by those who voted upon them without 
actually maldng their intentions plain in so doing. Since many of the 
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texts incorporate compromises of one sort or another we know 
that this 'penumbra' is bound to have a wide scope; therefore, even 
detailed microscopic study of the Council's documents and history is 
not capable of supplying a clear-cut picture of the whole scope of 
Vatican II's theological significance. The broader form of study, 
whilst it cannot completely make good this lack in our knowledge of the 
documents' significance, can nevertheless serve as an indicator of the 
possible 'penumbra' of meanings attached to the documents' teaching by 
providing a useful perspective upon Vatican II's place in the broad 
development of Christian thought. It will be the task of the historian 
and the sociologist of a later age, as well as the theologian, to 
analyse the way in Which the Council's teaching has, in fact, been 
received and interpreted in the life of the Church. However, the 
theological relief-picture, which is attainable even now, is one factor 
which contributes to the possibility of understanding the history of 
Roman Catholicism after the Council, even as that history is being 
lived and created. 
It will be our concern in this thesis to concentrate mainly 
upon the broader type of analysis, in which the overall pattern of 
Vatican II's theological thought is thrown into relief against the 
background of magisterial teaching of the preceding hundred years. 
Necessarily, however, we shall also on occasion have an eye to internal 
processes o~ debate at the Council, in order to elucidate points and 
to keep the argument grounded upon known facts concerning the Council 
Fathers' intentions. In our study of theological patterns and themes 
we shall endeavour to avoid the pitfall of generalising about the 
1 spirit of Vatican II' by using a rigorous comparative methodology 
(see PP•ll-13) • 
The two ~~gles from which the theme of obedience Will be stud~ed 
have already been outlined (see p. 5, above). In the second part of 
the thesis, When the question of obedience is studied in relation to its 
co-ordination with wider doctrines of the relationship of man to God, 
we shall be using the theme of obedience as a tool to open up the 
issue of the prope~ systematic correlations which should subsist between 
ecclesiology, Christian anthropology and doctrines of God. This is not 
to say that the thesis aims to present a complete picture of Vatican II's 
theology in any one of these fields; our study of them should bear the 
marks all the time of our starting-point in the question of the 
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Christian's due obedience in the Church. However, from this 
starting-point, represented by the earlier part of the thesis, we 
shall approach areas of the relationship between man and his maker which 
do not seem to be immediately expressive of a theology of human 
obedience. However, these areas of anthropology and of the doctrine 
of God will be shown to have integral links with the way in which 
ecclesiastical obedience is conceived and commended. 
Why has the theme of obedience been chosen as a way of 
opening up questions of consistency and co-ordination within the 
theology of Vatican II? It has been chosen as a particularly 
significant ~hemep because it has been a matter of severe controversy 
over the last three centuries within the philosophy and social thought 
of the traditionally Christian countries of the West. Because of this 
controversy, the doctrine of ecclesiastical obedience is an area in 
which there are likely to be shifts of emphasis in theology, for 
theology is a discipline which is not only detenninative of behaviour 
and social patterns, but also susceptible to pressure from ideas and 
movements outside itself.(3) This is especially true in the area of 
ecclesiology which aims to be not simply theoretical, but also immediately 
and practically prescriptive for the life of people who exist not 
only as members of the Church, but also as participants in a wider 
culture and social life. In its prescriptions ecclesiology takes up 
elements derived from the sources of revelation, but also elements 
which are descriptive of the life of the Church as it concretely exists, 
or might exist, within the given social context. 
In oo far as an ec.clesiology is descriptive of the life of . 
the Church as it is actually lived, it gives theological ratification 
to that fonn of life. This weight of theological ratification may serve 
to maintain an atmosphere and form of life in the Church for some long 
time after significant changes have occurred in the social context in 
which the Church exists. In this way, for example, the atmosphere of the 
Ancien Regime, with its pomp, ceremony, and strict hierarchicalisation, 
(3) Robin Gill has put forward studies of theology which show its 
interrelationship with social factors in his books, The Social 
Context of Theology (London & Oxford, 1975) and The Social 
Structure of Theology (London & Oxford, 1977). 
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was frozen in the theory and practice of the Roman Catholic Church by 
theological justifications which outlasted the rise of democracy 
and egalitarianism in Western civil society by almost two centuries. 
There may come a time, however, when an atmosphere and form of 
ecclesiastical life promoted and reflected in theological formulations 
is no longer viable, because the pressure of social factors (which are 
often the vehicles of philosophical ideas) becomes too great. 
It is in view of this complex interaction and intermesh 
between theological and social factors, which in the case of ecclesiology 
is particularly tight, that the doctrine of ecclesiastical obedience 
may be seen as an area particularly susceptible to shifts of emphasis. 
Wider, more speculative o~ theoretical questions concerning the 
relationsh:l:p of man to God may, on the other hand, be less innnediately 
in the line of pres'sure from theology's social determinants. Therefore, 
one might envisage a shift coming about in the concept of ecclesiastical 
obedience at a council such as Vatican II which would not be 
systematically reflected in other areas of theology. In this way our 
major question, concerning the co-ordination and correlation of doctrines 
within the thought of the Council, arises. 
There are then, two major theological aims to this thesis; 
there is that of examining the co-ordination between doctrines, as 
outlined above, and there is also the aim of analysing the consisten,cy 
within the Council's presentation of what it means to be an obedient 
Catholic. In connection with this latter aim, we may also posit a third, 
minor concern of the thesis - a concern which is not strictly theological, 
but which comes naturally into view because of the close intermesh 
between theology and social reality which exists in ecclesiology. 
This third concern relates to the question, 1 is Vatican II 1 s picture of 
ecclesiastical obedience socially plausible?'. 
Even if significant theological shifts of emphasis have 
occurred within the Council's picture of the Christian's due obedience, 
and even if this is achieved without serious ruptures in theoretical 
co-ordination between doctrines, it is nevertheless possible to envisage 
ways in which such a teaching might fail to describe a plausible social 
reality. In such a case, the doctrine of obedience put forward might 
have concrete effects which were not intended or envisaged, as it comes 
into interaction with the Church's social contexts. 
The question of the plausibility of Vatican II's teaching on 
obedience cannot fully be answered in this thesis; it is a subject which 
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requires the resources not only of theology, but also of the 
sociology of ideas, for its complete study. However, in Chapters III-V, 
in which we shall examine the way in which the theme of obedience 
was treated in the Council's ecclesiology, we shall consider the 
question of plausibility briefly at various points and, in Chapter V 
in particular (on the Council's doctrine of assent to 'infallible' 
teaching) there will be a sketch drawn showing points of likely 
inconsistency and tension between Vatican II's theological position 
and viable concrete practice. 
To recapitulate: The first major aim of this thesis is that 
of analysing the Second Vatican Council's presentation of the ideal of 
Christian obedience within the Church, both in matters of faith and 
practice. Attached to this analysis, made on the theological plane, 
there will also be indications ~d sketches of the social plausibility 
of such a picture of obedience. The second major aim is to test the 
Council's treatment of the wider doctrines of God and man in their 
relationship against the picture of ecclesiastical obedience which has 
been uncovered, in order to discover whether the teaching of Vatican II 
is systematically consistent at this point, on the theological level. 
(In approaching this second major aim of the thesis, questions of social 
plausibility will be left behind, and the investigation will be made 
purely on the theoretical plane.) 
2 Structure of the Thesis 
Our study will take the form of an alternation between 
essays on the place and nature of the idea of obedience within a 
theological system, and analyses of the documents of Vatican II. 
The analyses will be carried out with the aid of criteria and typo-
logical motifs which have been presented in the theological essays. 
Thus, the first chapter will provide an introduction to the significance 
of the idea of obedience and its place in systematic theology; it will 
also provide a typological map showing the correlations between 
different possible treatments of obedience in ecclesiology and 
different ideas of God and man in their relationship. 
This will be followed by four chapters in which we analyse 
Vatican II 1 s teaching on the place and nature of obedience in the 
Church. In these four chapters the pattern of the teaching will be 
thrown into relief against the background of earlier magisterial 
pronouncements; in the first of the four, in particular (Chapter II), 
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we shall look back not only to documents of the immediately 
preceding hundred years, but also to the teaching of the Council of 
Trent, as we examine the theory of the nature of ecclesiastical 
authority. This study of authority will provide a necessary backcloth 
to the three chapters which follow, treating of Vatican II's 
presentation of obedience in the Church. 
Chapter III will be a study of the way in which the 
Council viewed the ideals and concrete structures of practical 
obedience in the life and mission of the Church. Chapter IV will treat 
the general question of the necessity and nature of obedient assent 
to the teaching of the Magisterium in matters of both faith and morals. 
Finally, our analysis of the ecclesiological idea of obedience will 
conclude with Chapter v, in which we shall consider the question of the 
special assent which Catholics should give to teachings which are 
deemed 'infallible' and 1irrefonnable 1 • It is in this chapter that we 
shall examine Vatican II's doctrine most fUlly from the perspective 
of social plausibility. 
In Chapter VI we shall return to theological reflection in 
essay form, as the implications of the four preceding chapters are 
drawn out and considered in the light of the typology of correlations 
which are presented in Chapter I. By means of this reflection the 
ground will be prepared for the final chapter of the thesis, in which 
the doctrine of God and man in their relationship, as the Council 
documents put these doctrines forward, will be examined for consistency 
with the conciliar concept of ecclesiastical obedience. Through this 
analysis we may discover the extent to which the teaching of Vatican II 
can provide a basis for a systematic exposition of Roman Catholic 
doctrine, in which ecclesiology is coherent with wider doctrines 
dealing with other aspects of the divine-human relationship. 
The thesis will conclude with a Postscript, in which the 
methods and achievements of our study will be briefly reviewed. 
3 An Explanation of the .Method of · .tm&ysis Employed in the Thesis 
I have already indicated that the basic method to be 
employed in analyses of the documents of Vatican II in this work is a 
comparative one. We shall compare the statements of this Council 
with statements contained in the official teaching of the Magisterium 
during the preceding century (that is, approximately since 1864, the 
12 
year of Pius IX 1 s encyclical Quanta Cura, with its attached 
Syllabus Errorum). In the first section of Chapter II, however, we 
shall also look back to the teaching of the Council of Trent as the 
locus classicus in which many points of Roman Catholic doctrine were 
defined, in forms which have been maintained over the centuries. 
It will not be the aim of this thesis in its use of 
historical material to gi. ve a complete or adequate picture of the 
development of Catholic teaching during even the last century; nor, 
on the other hand, woo.ld I wish to give the impression that the 
Magisterium remained static in its thinld.ng during that period. 
However, for our purposes, documents of the past will be used simply as 
a backcloth, against which the distinctive features of Vatican II's 
approach to obedience and other doctrines may be thrown into relief. 
In order that the patterns which are thrmvn into relief 
m~ be sufficiently detailed1 the analysis will proceed by picking 
out shifts of emphasis in particular points and ideas. We shall also 
note cases in which there has been not simply a shift of emphasis, but 
a complete change in teaching, or the clear addition or omission of 
important notions. 
The analysis of shifts of emphasis will depend upon judge-
ments which I shall make upon the content of Vatican II's teaching as 
compared to that of previous decades. Despite the fact that an analysis 
of this kind must, perforce, rest upon the basis of personal judgements, 
I contend that it is a very significant methodology to employ when 
studying Ro~ Catholic official teaching. This is because it is in 
the nature of the Magisterium to avoid contradicting itself where 
possible; rather, it prefers to develop its doctrine through nice 
linguistic and structural variations in the composition of documents. 
These variations, sometimes very subtle, ~ be taken as lines of 
evidence which together converge upon significant shifts of theological 
emphasis within a broad 'penumbra' of meaning. I hope that the 
judgements which I mak~-, and the conclusions which I reach, concerning 
these shifts of erJJ.phasis will justify themselves within the course of 
the argument. Occasionally we shall briefly review the process by which 
a shift of emphasis (or a clear change in teaching) has been 
developed by the Magister.ium over the years. In all these procedures 
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the aim will be to illuminate the picture of Vatican II's position. 
The question of shifts of emphasis brings into view the 
concept of a theological atmosphere • This is a te:r:m which I have 
already used in connection with the interaction between the theological 
enterprise and its social context (see above, pp.,!..Slf.). Shifts of 
emphasis in official documents may either reflect or create a certain 
atmosphere in the Church's life and thought. I have suggested that in 
the field of ecclesiology in particular, but also in other areas of 
theology, atmosphere does not dep.end solely upon the contribution of 
purely theological thinking, for the Church and its members are not 
immune from the influence of cultural and philosophical factors in their 
social context. Therefore, by examining shifts of emphasis in official 
Catholic pronouncements we may hope to signal both those influences by 
which it is conditioned, and also the ways in which it is creative of, 
or contributory to, a new atmosphere within the Church's life and 
thought. 
The comparative method by which shifts of emphasis are located 
will be most extensively used in Chapters II-V, where we analyse 
Vatican II's concept of ecclesiastical obedience against its historical 
backcloth. When we come to Chapter VII (the testing of the Council's 
picture of God and man in their wider relationship tor coherence with the idea 
of ecclesiastical obedience) the question of what emphases have shifted 
will be secondary to our quest for inter-doctrinal co-ordination. 
However, once again for the sake of illumination, the anthropology and 
doctrine of God put forward by Vatican II will occasionally be set 
against a backcloth of previous magisterial teaching, so that particular 
patterns of ideas may be highlighted. 
4 A Survey of some R'ecent \iilri tings, and of their Relevance to 
the· Subject of this Thesis 
It is obvious that the immediate correlate of obedience is 
authority. Now, authority in the Church has been of considerable 
interest to theological writers, and particularly in ecumenical debate, 
over the past few years. However, all too often studies of the 
question of authority are concerned not so much with its nature, but 
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simply with who exercises it. (4) Questions about the nature of 
authority are of great theological significance, because the answers 
given to them should indicate in what way persons are able to represent 
the authority of God to others, and also the character of this God 
whom they represent, and the significance fqr men of his authority, 
and its representations. 
By orientating this thesis not simply upon the question of 
authority, but rather upon that of obedience, I believe that we shall 
cover not only all the issues concerning authority's nature which were 
just mentioned, but also issues concerning the nature of man himself - his 
capacity to obey, and the forms his obedience can take. ~ studying 
the theme of obedience in the documents of Vatican II our analysis will 
therefore be both broader than one which is only cone erned with the 
theme of authority, and also less likely to over-emphasise the well-
worked question as to who exercises authority, while neglecting that of 
its inner nature and role. 
One of the most significant books from the point of view of · 
this thesis is, however, directly concerned only with authority as its 
central topic. It is the work of a French sociologist, Pierre He'gy, 
who presented it as a thesis at the University of Paris X in 1972, and 
subsequently published it under the title, L1Autorit6 dans le 
catholicisme contemporain: du Syllabus a Vatican II. (5) In this book 
Hegy takes as his starting point the work of Roland Barthes and Michel 
Foucault on the theory of signso ('semiology'). He argues that up to the 
time of Vatican II, Roman Catholicism worked with a classical theory 
of language, (6), in which fixed and immutable meanings of theological 
formulae were believed to be ··transparent to metaphysical t-ruth. In 
such a theory, the linguistic sign in its determinate context of 
relationship with other signs was seen as being an absolutely adequate 
"representation of the representation" of 1iruth. (7) That is to say, 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
This was a significant complaint brought against the Statement on 
Authority issued by the Anglican-Roman Catholic International 
Commission in 1977. (See Professor Geoffrey Lampe's speech of 
February 1977 to the General S~nod of the Church of England, reprinted 
in Theology, so, (1977) p.362.) 
Paris, 1975. 
A classical theory of language was current in secular philosophy 
from the beginning of the seventeenth century until the time of the 
French Revolution, according to Barthes. (See Hegy, PP• 18ff.) 
The phrase, "representation of the representation" is Foucault's. 
(See Hegy, PP• 18ff.) 
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man could apprehend the determinati.ons of :bruth correctly in 
abstractive notions, and his language could then be transparent to 
this notional apprehension. At the same time, the entire structure 
of ecclesiastical authority was seen as a 'representation' of the 
structure of the heavenly Jerusalem. (8) 
By contrast, modern theories of the sign highlight the 
extent to which language is fo:nned 1 from below' , bearing the marks 
of the history and culture to which it belongs. Therefore, knowledge, 
which is mediated through language, is conditioned by the transcendentals 
of language, work and history. The epistemological role of these 
transcendentals of understanding has been discovered as a fruit of 
Enlightenment thought. (9) 
H~gy argues that the Second Vatican Council "was not only a 
revolution which came a century-and-a-half late, but it was also an 
incomplete revolution ••• this Council touched every field of religion's 
life with the exception of the ecclesiastical power structure." (10) 
He claims that the modern theory of the sign was employed by Vatican II 
in every area of theology except that concerned with authority. For 
example, in the field of biblical study an historical-critical approach 
was admitted, supplanting earlier methods of imposing upon the biblical 
text a fixed and a-historical 'representation'; (11) the Council 
recognised a variety of human cultures, within which the Church exists 
as a fully historical sign; ( 12) finally, it also worl-::ed within the 
scope of a modern theory of the sign when it employed the concept of 
"signs of the times" as the framework for the theology of the Pastoral 
Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, (Gaudium e~ Spes). (13) 
However, despite all this, when talking about authority the Council 
continued to use a classical, a-historical theory of the sign as a 
representation of the immutable and transcendent ~ruth and ~uthority 
(8) Hegy, pp. 56ff. 
(9) ibid p. 27 
( 10) ibid P• 15 
( 11) ibid P• 47 
( 12) ;t.pid pp~ .161 f. 
( 13) ibid PP• 196f. 
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of God. The result, then, was inevitable, in Hegy 1s words: 
11
• • • Vatican II made a crisis in the Church 
unavoidable, because the Council Fathers had 
put forward a new definition of the sign 
without daring to touch the power structure 
inspired by the concepts of another age." (14) 
I have found Hegy 1 s work very illuminating, and my debt 
to him will be obvious, particularly in Chapters II, IV and V of this 
thesis. However, he tends to class theological statements rather too 
absolutely as either classical .2£ modern in their underlying 
conception of the sign. As a result, he passes over some real, though 
subtle, shifts of emphasis which have occurred in the teaching of 
Vatican II even in regard to questions of authority. It is my aim to 
highlight these shifts and nuances more delicately than H~gy's methods 
allowed. In addition, although my analysis indeed bears a debt to 
Hegy, the subject of this thesis is obedience, and not simply authority. 
The kind of obedience which is demanded of Christians depends not only 
upon the way in which God's authority is known and represented in the 
Church, but also upon the nature of God, the nature of man, and the 
nature of man's final end. 
This brings us to a consideration of another recent book; 
Philip Sherrard has argued in his work, Church, Papacy and Schism: a 
Theological ~nquiry (15), that differences in ecclesiology are rooted 
in different concepts of the very being of God and of man. The book 
is written from an Eastern Orthodox standpoint and locates the 
variations in the doctrines of God and man, which lie at the root of 
different Eastern and Western ecclesiologies, in the sphere of essences 
and ontology. Sherrard holds that the Roman Catholic theory of the 
Church, and of authority within it, expresses the idea of an 'ontological 
gap' between God an~ the created world - a gap which he believes is not 
to be found in patristic thought, which rather sees both Church and 
world as 'epiphanies' or 1theophanies 1 • (16) He goes on to argue that 
Western ecclesiology does not only posit a gap between the visible 
(14) ibid P• 238 
(15) London, 1978. 
(16) See Sherrard, PP• 41f. 
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aspect of the Church and the realm of the uncreated on the level 
of ontology, but also heightens this sense of separation through 
the influence of its doctrine of human fallenness. This separation of 
man from God is at the basis of the mediatorial authority structure of 
Roman Catholicism. (17) 
By contrast to that of the Roman Catholic Church, Sher.rard 
presents an ecclesiology in which the Church appears as a 11 theandric 
reality" ( 18), and which is related to an anthropology in which the 
basic unity between God and man is emphasised, despite the Fall. (19) 
This argument has a distinctly polemical flavour, but it is 
nevertheless a very instructive example of the way in which systematic 
theology should co-ordinate ecclesiology with wider doctrines of God 
and man. 
In the present thesis we shall not concentrate so much as 
Sherrard's book upon the formal structure of authority in the Church 
(for he is concerned to show that the doctrine of papal primacy is no 
merely 'accidental' feature of Catholic ecclesiology, upon which 
suitable compromise might be reached with .the Eastern Church) nor shall 
we be so concerned as he with the doctrine of the inner nature of the 
Godhead. Rather, we shall look more closely at issues concerning God 
and man in their relationship to each other; in the case of man, we 
will find that he is ontologically defined in the terms of this relation-
ship. In the case of God, however, our study will tend to focus more 
upon his outward 'moral' qualities than upon the inner-Trinitarian 
relations. (20) The moral qualities which characterise him in his 
(17) ibid. PP• 58-60 
(18) ibid. P• 78 
(19) ibid. PP• 80f. 
(20) Of course, ultimately our understanding of the mode of God's 
relationship to us must itself be co-ordinated with a doctrine of 
his essential inner nature. It is such a reassessment of the doctrine 
of God for which D.IYI. Mackinnon argued in an illuminating talk, 
which was published in 1969. He called for "a deep renewal of the 
Christological, indeed of essential Trinitarian understanding, 11 to be 
based on the revelation of the "mysteries of the self-revealing, the 
self-giving, the serving God" seen in the Incarnation. ("Authority 
and Freedom in the Church", in The Stripping of the Altars (London, 
1969) PP• 59 and 58. 
It is particularly interesting for us that in Mackinnon's article we 
are led to consider :fundamental doctrines of God by reflecting on 
questions of authority and obedience in the Church. However, in the 
present study we shall not be able to venture into the field of re-
assessing doctrines of God's very essence, because the material 
afforded by Vatican II in that area of theology is not sufficient. 
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approach to men will be summed up by the use of different 1pictures 1 
of God. 
A fairly recent article by J. Moingt, entitled, 11Le Dieu de 
la morale chretienne" (21), seeks to answer two questions: Firstly, 
around what picture of God did early Christian moral thinking 
constitute itself? And, secondly, what new picture of God could lend 
itself to co-ordination with contemporary moral thought? 
The question of the ideal of obedience which the Christian 
should render in the Church has, in large measure, a moral aspect; 
therefore the present study, being an attempt to correlate the picture 
of God presented by Vatican II with the standard of Christian obedience 
demanded b~r the same Council, can be said to follow the lines of 
Moingt 1s argument. 
He presented in his article an historical kaleidoscope of 
Christian pictures of God, each correlated with a different ethical 
model: Firstly, the picture of Jesus the new Jewish legislator, or 
the crowning point of the line of pagan sages; next, God as the being 
who is supremely rationally ethical, with Christ as the rational 
Logos. This led to the placing of a:nphasis upon God's role as creator 
and cosmic legislator, rather than as savioUD and legislator for his 
chosen people. From this point developed a legalism of natural law, 
while, "the severity of the judge came to veil the bounty of the 
creator, and the 'human' face of the Father of men was masked by the 
impo.ssi ble vi sage of the justiciary, 11 ( 22) • With the Constantinian era 
came a slide towards positive laws, correlated with the picture of 
God as monarch. The Middle Ages combined features of both positive 
and natural law in its Christian moral theory, but consistent~ spoke 
of God in immutable categories: 
"The custom in theological discourse of 
speaking of God from the point of view of 
his abstract nature and his essential 
properties, imposed retroactively upon 
ethical discourse the fixist model of an 
original and irreformable institution, 
posited by the authority of an unchange-
able past." (23) 
(21) In Recherches des Sciences Religieuses, 62 (1974) pp. 631-654. 
(22) ibid P• 640 
(23) ibid P• 643 
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Like Hegy, lVIoingt speaks of a modern revolt against 
a-historical, immutable categories in theology and ethics: 
"In our days the revolt of liberty 
against the oppression of power and 
society is overtaking both this [fixistJ 
ethical model and the picture of God of 
which it is the vehicle -a picture 
under which it has become d:i.fficult to 
recognise the God who is liberator of the 
oppressed, and r;iaviour of the people." (24) 
However, unlike Hegy, Moingt does not give an analysis of the 
function of language and institutions in representing God in a 
changing world. Instead, he looks at the picture of God of which language 
and institutions are the vehicles. He correlates the politicisation 
and de-privatisation of ethics with the 1signs 1 of the passion of 
Christ and of the liberating action of God in relation to his people. 
These are the new (or renewed) pictures through Which God is to be 
apprehended: he is either the liberator of his people, or the one who 
assumes the passion of history, or, of course, these two ideas may be 
fused. With the re-historicisation of ethics moral precepts are seen 
as posing tasks orientated towards the end of history (the eschato~) 
rather than as demands for conformity with an eternal unchanging order. 
In such a theological and ethical openness to the future, man's work 
may be associated with God 1s creative Word in an eschatologically 
conditioned activity. 
These are some of the key points of Moingt 1s analysis of a 
possible modern picture of God, correlated with new ethical 
orientations. His article is of importance for this thesis, both 
because it presents a strong argument for correlating different concepts 
of God with different presentations of ethical demand, and also because 
it gives a typology of such correlations. I, too, shall present a 
typology in my first chapter, and it will be in some respects similar 
to that of Moignt. However, it will not be built upon different 
ethical systems in general, but specifically upon various concepts of 
Christian obedience. In addition, it will extend to include a range 
of different doctrines of man, as well as pictures of God. 
The three works which have been surveyed in ~s section differ in 
their relationship to the present thesis. Hegy1s book, which is the only 
one of the three to deal specifically with the Second Vatican Council, 
(24) ibid P• 642 
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is the work to which I owe the greatest debt. It has provided me with 
the conceptual tool with which I Shall analyse the fUnction of 
ecclesiology in relation to the Christian's knowledge of the nature 
and content of God's authority. This same tool- the distinction 
between classical and modern epistemologies - also proves usefUl for 
analysing tensions within the document of Vatican II, and for 
assessing the social viability of their ideal of ecclesiastical 
obedience. 
The works of Sherrard and Moignt are move tangentially 
informative; they provide examples of the way in which the correlations 
between theological ideas may be systematically investigated; they 
confirm my premise that ecclesiology is to be correlated not only with 
theories about how we know God's authority, but also with doctrinal 
pictures of his characteristic stance towards us. The present thesis 
therefore has resemblances to aspects of their approach, as it first 
analyses the concept of Christian obedience put forward by Vatican II, 
and then goes on to test its systematic co-ordination with the same 
Council's doctrines of God and man in the wider scope of their mutual 
relationship. 
.· .. ~ 
.. , 
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CHAPTER I: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE IDEA 
OF OBEDIENCE Al'W TO ITS PLACE IN SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY 
This chapter will fall into two sections: firstly, we shall 
view some of the approaches which have been taken to the idea of 
obedience within the tradition of the Western world; particularly we 
shall focus upon the critique of obedience offered by thinkers of the 
Enlightenment period, and we shall examine some of the effects this 
critique mey have upon theology. Secondly, we shall consider the 
question of obedience in the Church, and a typology of correlations 
will be corstructed showing the systematic links between differing 
concepts of ecclesiastical obedience and various ways of conceiving 
the divine-human relationship and the parties to it. 
A) Obedience as a Problem for Modern Theology 
We may define obedience as the act or disposition by which 
a person allows an external criterion or authority to direct his will, 
action1 or thought. Obedience in thought and belief may be distinguished 
from obedience of action by being termed 'assent'. However, in certain 
cultural contexts assent and action are so closely related conceptually 
as to be well-nigh inseparable. It is from such contexts of 'concrete' 
thinking that there springs the close linguistic affinity between 
'to obey' and 'to hear' in many Semitic and European languages; the 
man "who bas ears to hear" manifests that fact by his action. His will 
and deed can scarcely help being under the compulsion of the word of 
authority which directs his thought, for, in such a context of concrete 
thinking, there is not the highly developed sense of separate faculties 
of the person, each with its relative autonomy. This idea of the 
separate fa.cul ties of personality, which supports the expression of 
conceptual distinctions between mental assent to propositions, obedience 
in action, and conformity of the will to the will of another, stems 
largely from Greek philosophy, and is foreign to the conGrete thought 
of most of the biblical writers. For them, knowledge of God is 
inseparable from action, or 'doing the truth' (see Hos. 4.1, Jn, 3.21, 
I Jn, 1.6) and willingness for, or profession, of obedience are of 
little interest apart from action (see Mt, 21.28-32, Mt, '7.21, Lk, 6,46). 
Within this context of concrete, unitive thinking, obedience and 
faith are closely related ideas when dealing with man's proper stance 
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before God: 11'1e do the Father's will in believing in him and in Jesus 
Christ whom he has sent (Jn. 6.28f.); this is the "obedience of 
faith" (Rom. 1.5 and 16.26) which, without works is dead (see James 
2.14-20). 
An integrated idea of obedience is, then, fi.rmly embedded 
in the biblical tradition. (1) It is co-ordinated with a variety of 
motifs by which Scripture interprets the overall structure of man1 s 
relationship to God: ~~the Old Testament obedience is presented as 
the proper response to God's self-revelation in the giving of the 
l~w; it is the appropriate human constituent of a covenant relationship. 
Disobedience, on the other hand, is consistently Shown as the cause 
of disruption in man's experience of the blessing of God, whether in 
the Garden of Eden, or in the history of the Israelite nation. God 
desires the sacrifice of obedience not only from the group, but also 
from the individual (see I Sam. 15.22). In the New Testament the idea 
of obedience appears in co-ordination with the motif of the ~ingdom, 
as its "subjective, or human aspect" (2) and it is also supremely 
exemplified in the obedience of Christ himself (see Jn. 4.34, Rom. 5.19, 
Phil. 2.8, Heb. 5.8). His obedience has a redemptive effect on man's 
behalf. Finally, we may instance the oonne.:otion between the idea 
of obedience and the teaching of Romans that all men know a law of 
God, which they should obey, written on their hearts (Rom. 2.15); it 
is because of this that the whole human race is accountable for its 
disobedience (see Rom. 11.32). 
It might be argued that in the New Testament - and 
particularly in the theology of Romans - the idea of obedience is 
presented in a very idiosyncratic way. The idea of God's fore-
ordination appears to rob man of the possibility of freedom in sub-
mitting his will - or not - which is a necessary presupposition of 
true obedience. 
( 1) 
(2) 
On the concept of Obedience in Scripture see further: 
Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible, 3 (New York, 1962) pp. 580f.; 
Theolo ical Dictionar of the New Testament, 1 , . edited by G. Kittel 
(Grand Rapids, Mioh.,l971 P• 223-25; K.Vl. Truhlar, 
L10beissance des lalcs11 , in La!cs et vie chretienne parfaite, 
edited by G. Thils and K.Vl. T~~lar (Rome, 1963) PP• 237-244. 
J.A.Heyns, "A Theology of Obedience", The Refonned Theological 
Review, 32 (1973) P• 41. 
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Without entering into all the complexities of the 
debate about predestination we may simply remark here that st. Paul, 
in Romans and elsewhere, treats disobedience as something for which 
man is truly £ewonsible,, for which he has "no excuse" (see Rom. 1. 20 
and 2.1). Such responsibility in disobedience implies a corresponding 
responsibility in obedience, albeit that the grace of God may be 
absolutely necessary to free the will and actions from those things 
which hold them back from obedience (see Rom. 7.14ff.). The dialectic 
of grace and freedom in relation to human responsibility in obedience 
is traditionally a central topic of theological controversy; we shall 
find that the issue arises again later in this thesis; at this point 
we have to take note of the linkage between the idea of obedience and 
the debate over grace and freedom, and also of the implications of 
personal responsibility which are attached to the concept of obedience. 
Even though obedience is firmly embedded as a fundamental 
idea in the matrix of Christian tradition it has nevertheless suffered 
criticism, and to some extent these criticisms have had effects on 
subsequent theology. The most forceful argument against the 
appropriateness of obedience as a human response and disposition 
arise from the philosophy of the Enlightenment. 
The Enlightenment critique of obedience has two major 
aspects: l!1j.~stly, it is an attack on the obedience of assent, as it 
is afforded to proposHions because of their extrinsic authori·hy. The 
second aspect of the critique is concerned with the moral status of 
obedience as a determinative uonn for human action. We shall examine 
each aspect separately. 
J._ Obedience and Epistemology 
The critique of assent to authoritative propositions is 
particularly associated with the empiricist tradition in philosophy; 
John Locke, especially, built up a synthesis which combined Descartes' 
method of 'systematic -doubt' with the idea that human certainty can 
only rest upon experience. Following on from this, Kant made of human 
understanding the agent which g1 ves structure to that experience, and thus 
foreclosed any possible knowledge of things as they exist in themselves. 
In this way, the authoritative teachings of the religions, concerning 
God and a transcendent realm, appeared to be making illegitimate claims 
upon human belief, which was closed into its own world of experience, 
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with the moral sense as its only indicator of anything 'beyond'. 
In order to find a way out of the Kantian impasse the 
Idealist movement sought for a divine reality which was in some way 
continuous with a structural feature of human experience - life, 
nature, mind in its constructive activity, the 'whence of things', etc.-
and human awareness was thus made part of a greater, enveloping whole 
which transcends the individual's experience. In this way, a form 
of transcendence was located whose authority intrinsically 
recommended itself to the human mind; it was the authority of a truth 
of which men might make themselves aware simply through rigorous 
analysis of the structure of their own knowledge and existence. 
Another way of dealing with the Katian foreclosure of 
transcendent knowledge was that put forward by Kierkegaard; he 
accepted the veto upon metaphysics posed by Kant, and stressed the 
reality of the absolute 'otherness' of God. This makes man's 
knowledge of him an 'absurd' fact, a paradox, a 'leap in the dark', 
possible only on the grounds of God's own radical action in bridging 
the gap between himself and man. This philosophical position entails 
a theology which is completely founded upon the authority of God's 
Word. However, the authority of this Word over man's intelligence is 
not bolstered by any extrinsic, formal features which should recommend 
it to our acceptance; this is why assent and belief have the aspect 
of 1 absurdi ty 1 • 
Finally we should take note of ways in which the impact of 
Kantian philosophy has indirect, as well as immediate, effects upon the 
pattern of theological thinking. Sociologists, and those treating 
questions in the philosophy of language, have developed the fundamental 
Kantian insight that the individual structures his own experience 
according to the 1transcendentals 1 of his understanding; but such 
thinkers have developed it at a level 1below1 that of concern with the 
universal transcendentals of space and time, showing how cultural 
factors of language and conceptuality condition human knowledge (see 
the Preface to the present thesis, pp.l4f. ). Thus, even if we can 
say with confidence that by some revelational breakthrough we have 
access to truth about the transcendent, we cannot be equally confident 
as to our ability to express it in universally perspicuous terms. This 
is the ground upon which are built the various theories of conceptual 
relativism. 
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Is it possible, then, to assent to Christian doctrinal 
propositions with an assurance that they convey clear and true 
knowledge ebout God? The effect of the Enlightenment critique is to 
raise severe challenges against the validity of such assent as a 
grounds of knowledge; the individual is called upon to validate his 
beliefs by his own experience, or at least to assess the statements of 
external authorities for their inherent probability and aptness of 
expression. There might, however, be one area of Christian doctrine 
which would seem to be innnune from some effects of the Enlightenment 
critique of assent; this is the area of doctrine which contains many 
avowedly negative, or paradoxical statements. These tell us some of 
the ways in which God escapes from the net of our thinking, and occupies 
a truly transcendent realm beyond our knowing. Are these doctrines 
proof against the critique which has been outlined? 
One must conclude that even such teachings of the via 
negativ~, or the Christological or Trinitarian paradoxes, do not 
escape the impact of the Enlightenment critique. These doctrines 
depend, for their const!'llction, upon the use of various terms with 
positive metaphysical referents, if only so that these can be denied 
or set in tension with each other. Thus, the language of the 
Quicunque Vult is framed in hie}:lly classical fonn, even though it 
presents in sum a series of intellectual paradoxes. The linguistic 
structure does not, therefore, remain immune from the relativistic 
critique, while the paradoxical substance of the teaching remains in 
controversy with empiricist epistemology. 
If Christian theology surrendered all claims that man can 
achieve or be granted any knowledge of God or the transcendent realm 
it would cease to have anything to say. If, on the other hand, it 
adopts an Idealist solution wholesale, and makes God totally continuous 
with an aspect of fundamental human experience, it loses the necessary 
sense of his transcendence as the truly 'other'. Such was the 
contention of Kierkegaard, and such, too, has been the conclusion of 
the Roman Catholic Magisterium over the past hundred years. (3) But, 
(3) Forms of Idealism leading to ]mmanentism were ruled out by the 
first chapter of Dei Filius (Cone. Vat. (1): Do~tic 
Constitution on Catholic Faith, 24 April 1860) :DZ 1782/DzS 3001) 
and both ]nnna.nentisll'tl and !idealism were marked out by Pius XII 
as false, in his encyclical Huma.ni Generis (12 August 1950) 
AAS 42 (1950) P• 563. (Dz 2306/DzS 3878) 
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yet again, the Kirkegaardian option is closed, to Roman Catholicism 
at least, because it was committed firmly by the First Vatican 
Council to the view that human reason is intrinsically capable of 
attaining knowledge of God by natural means. (4) The structure of 
Roman Catholic theological work has traditionally given a substantial 
place to philosophical apologetics and fundamental theology as 
prologomena to dogmatic and speculative theology. 
We see, then, the possibility of knowing about God, the 
idea of his real, transcendent 1otherness 1 ,and yet the assertion of 
the capacities of natural human reason in relation to this transcendent 
object, are principles which we cannot expect to see simply yielded 
up in Roman Catholic teaching. However, this does not exclude the 
possibility that such a body of teaching might yet be modified through 
a dialectical relationship to Enlightenment principles, without 
completely losing continuity with its own past. (This is all the more 
true when reference is made to the highly sophisticated epistemological 
and metaphysical positions of St. Thomas and other scholastic 
theologians.) 
Iu what ways might one detect the effects of the Enlightemnent 
and post-Enlightenment critiques in modifYing a body of theology? 
The relativists' contribution might lead to a less confident certainty 
among theologians as to whether religious propositions can be treated 
as more than partial, fragmented, and culturally relative expressions 
of man's apprehension of the truth about God -expressions which might 
even, though not necessarily, carry elements of real error and mis-
understanding along with the truth that has been grasped in human 
experienc·e of God's revealing activity. Such a diminution of confidence 
might be evinced in two, closely related, movement a: Firstly, that 
which places increasing weight upon the idea that faith is an attitude, 
and correspondingly removes emphasis from its epistemological function. 
Such a move both stresses the centrality of human experience ('faith 
is an attitude determined by the experience of encounter with the Lord') 
and also leaves room for the idea that the proposit:iiola81 content of faith 
may go through a process of clarification and development as the 
experience, which underlies it, itself develops or is more appropriately 
(4) Dei Filius, cap. 2. (Dz 1785/DzS 3004.) 
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articulated. Secondly, one might detect this diminution of 
confidence in the idea of assent to propositions, in the movement 
which produces a constant stream of reassessments and re-expressions 
of the corporately shared for-mulae of faith. This second move may be 
related to the first as its social dimension and consequence, or it 
may spring purely from changes in the theory of language. 
Now, of course, Christian faith has always included within 
itself aspects both of relationship to God, and of man's proper 
attitude before him. Indeed, we saw in the first part of this chapter 
that faith and the active attitude of obedience in relation to God were 
organically integrated in biblical thought. Nevertheless, the 
articulation of knowledge of the divine object of our attitude of faith 
has to be hammered out in some way. The questions at the crux of our 
problem are 1 can the for-mulae in which we express our faith in any 
sense be objectively reliable as descriptions of God and his stance 
towards us, or are they fuere:l;y human attempts to articulate the attitude 
we hold in face of an inexpressible mystery?' 1If they can be reliable 
objective descriptions in some way, what are the criteria by which we 
should recognise this reliability?' Finally, 1what is the nature of 
this reliability- is it the reliability of language which corresponds 
exactly with the nature of the (super-sensible) object? Or is it the 
reliability of language which stands in an analogical relationship 
to its object, and which might, therefore, be altered if old analogies 
become inappropriate because of changes in human culture and 
experience?' 
We see that there is a spectrum of degrees and types of 
objective reliability which might be attributed to propositions about 
God; the more the Enlightenment critique is accepted, the more such 
statements are reduced to being reflections of the human situation. 
Thus, where the veto on metaphysical or noumenal lmowledge is fully 
absorbed, religious language is completely converted into language 
about man in his attitudes. Where the critique is absorbed only in 
ter.ms of linguistic relativism, theology is set on a quest for proper 
canons of inter-cultural interpretation and understanding, and for 
proper criteria governing the development and re-expression of its 
own statements, for the truth about God is comprehensible only in terms 
dictated by different btUruan situations. Here we should note that 
Roman Catholic theology has al wa:ys formally aclmowledged the analogical 
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status of language about God, but at some points in history it has 
treated these analogies as universally valid, because a static view 
of a single true human Culture was co-ordinated with a theory of 
analogy based on the abstraction of the concept from the object, 
rather than upon the dynamic movement of the human mind in making the 
judgement involved in an analogical statement. Thus, even avowedly 
analogical language had a classical representational structure (see 
Preface, Pp.l4f. ).Modification of Roman Catholic epistemology by 
contact with the Enlightenment critique of assent to propositions 
may, therefore, be detected in either a shift towards a stress on the 
centrality of attitude and experience, or on a Shift in the theological 
concept of analogy, or, of course, in both together. 
2 The ~orality of 0 bedienc e 
I have mentioned that the second line of the Enlightenment 
critique of the idea of obedience was directed against the morality of 
acts carried out under heteronomous authority. Again, Kant figures 
prominently in the origin of this assault. He made man the centre 
of morality in two ways, thus abolishing any definition of moral action 
in terms of conformity of intention and action to ·the will of God. 
The first sense in which man was put in the centre of Kantian 
moral theory is that 'humanity as an end in itself' was made the 
object of the moral imperative: "Act so that you treat humanity, whether 
in your own person or in that of another always as an end and never 
as a means only." (5) The second way in which Kant made man the centre 
of morality was by making the human ethical consciousness, wherein we 
are aware of the categorical imperative of morality, the .!Qk source of 
truly moral injunctions. Conformity with any kind of duty or command 
which is not imposed by the individual's own ethical reason is treated 
as a heteronomy which robs an act of any moral value. Therefore, the 
law or will of God cannot be a moral principle for man; 'God' appeared 
in Kant's Critique of Practical Reason simply as a postulated 
guarantor of the universe's hospitality to morality (6), while Christ 
(5) 
(6) See Kant, The Criti ue of Practical Reason, edited and translated 
by L. W. Beck, with other writings by Kant on moral philosophy) 
(Chicago, 1949) PP• 235ff. 
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is alluded to in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone as an 
archetype of conformity to moral duty, but not as a concrete example to 
be heteronomously followed. (7) 
Kant's attack on the morality of obedience can be detected 
in two kinds of effect upon theology. In the first place, it has led 
to an exaltation of conscience over against 'objective', exterior 
religious norms. In its more moderate forms, this injection of concern 
for the primacy of conscience does not differ significantly from a 
traditional, scholastic idea of the rational creature's participation 
in the eternal law through a natural law inscribed upon the heart. 
However, in its more radical forms a theological coming-to-terms with 
the Kantian critique excludes all possible correction or guidance of 
the individual's decision by reference to any objective law whatsoever, 
as being an assault on free human responsibility. Thus, for example, 
one modern Protestant theologian holds that Jesus should be seen as 
having proclaimed "liberated spontaneity", rather obedience to an 
already-formulated will of God (8) and another traces the human moral 
and spiritual pilgrimage to its goal in "the courage to be". (9) 
This ethic of human self-determination is closely related 
to the Enlightenment's fruits in epistemology and ontology, as we may 
see by examining further statements from the Protestant theologians 
just quoted. Dorothee S~lle specifically says that modern criticism of 
the entire concept of obedience should be radical, "simply because ~ 
do not know .exactly who God is, and what he, at any given moment, wills. 
It is no longer possible to describe our relationship to God with a 
fonnal concept that is limited to the mere performance of duties." (10) 
In other words, this ethic of liberated spontaneity, in whiCh obedience 
to exter.i.or law is abolished, is fundamentally linked to an increased 
agnosticism about God and the transcendent realm, which are removed 
from the realm of our apprehension and understanding. 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
See Kant, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, translated 
by T.M. Green and H.H. Hudson (New York, 1960) PP• 54-60. 
See, Dorothea S811e, Bexond Mere Obedience (Minneapolis, 1970) title 
to Ch. 5. 
See, Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be (New Haven, 1952). 
(10) S811e, op. cit., P• 20 (emphasis mine). 
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Paul Tillich, on the other hand, treats God more after the 
pattern of the Idealists. The divine is proximate to us, as the 
'ground' or 'power' of Being. In positing this ontological bond 
between God ("the God beyond God11 ) and man, Tillich lays the basis 
for his Christian ethic which is founded on the idea of theono%y 
rather than pure heteronomy or autonomy. Once again, however, the 
concept of obedience to an objective, exterior law becomes otiose. (11) 
I have suggested that the official teaching of the Roman 
Catholic Church is committed to positions which makes it impossible for 
it to admit either the idea that God is unlmowable, or that he is to 
be found purely by means of analysing what is immanently part of human 
self-a~xeness. Therefore, this body of theology is not likely to 
absorb the concept of e!lfuics which is correlated with these ideas to 
the extent which Protestant thinkers such as sH11e and Tillich have 
done. However, it may respond to the Enlightenment critique of 
heteronomously based ethics by placing increased stress on the 
importance of conscience, and by emphasising more the ways in Which 
moral action is a self-realisation of the person rather than a sheer 
conformity to external authority. 
In addition, a theological ethic which is responsive to 
the philosophy of the Enlightenment and modern eras will tend to identify 
the will of God with that which is self-evidently good for persons - for 
'humanity-as-an-end-in-itself'. The demand of the Enlightenment and of 
subsequent humanisms is that our concept of the divin@ will should be 
derived from what we apprehend as being good for men, rather than 
vice versa. Thus, the enhancement of those human values whiclnm~ 
commonly be agreed between believers and non-believers takes the centre 
of the stage as the determining principle of a modified Christian ethical 
theory, rather than the a priori concept of an objective law of God, 
whether positive or natural. According to the canons of commonly 
acceptable human values, ascetical, 'negative' and self-restrictive 
actions, taken sheerly out of obedience to what is conceived to be God's 
command, will not be seen as morally valuable, but rather as irrelevant 
or inimical to true morality. On the other hand, actions taken with a 
view to changi.ng the human order for the better in the future will 
tend to be highly esteemed. 
(11) Systematic Theology (London, 1953) PP• 163-170. 
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Vf.hen humanistically-based views of morality are absorbed 
within Christian theology this has significant implications for the 
doctrine of God's relationship to man. B,r identifying the good-for~an 
with what is absolutely good, in an unqualified way, such a theological 
position logically implies that the will of a supremely good God 
must similarly be fully orientated on 1humani ty-as-an-end-in-i tself 1 • 
This bears with it the implicit suggestion that God cannot will the 
eternal less or frustration of the qualities of humanity in any 
person, Therefore, one might detect the influence of the humanistic 
Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment ethical theories in a theology 
which gave increased emphasis to the love of God for man, and to the 
universality of salvation. 
Conclusion 
In this section we have begun to see the central position which 
ideas of obedience occupy in systematic theoJ.ogy, and the reason why 
the subject has become a problem for modern thought. I have indicated 
some of the modifications which the impact of the Enlightenment critique 
of obedience mey have, not only upon Christian ethics, but also upon 
epistemology and the doctrines of God's ver,y being or nature. At 
the same time, I have suggested that a body of authoritative theology, 
such as the teaching of the Roman Catholic M:agisterium, bears certain 
criteriological constraints within it, which make it impossible for the 
principles of Enlightenment thought to be absorbed wholesale. There 
may, however, be shifts of emphasis brought about by the dialectic of 
Enlightenment thought with traditional theology. 
It is the first major aim of this thesis to analyse the effects 
of an epochal change in Western thought, ultimately attributable to the 
Enlightenment, within the theological shifts of emphasis which appeared 
at Vatican II concerning the controversial question of obedience in the 
Church. The second major aim is that of examining whether the 
influence of Enlightenment philosophy was displayed to an equal and 
correlative extent by shifts in the Council's basic doctrines of God and 
man in their relationship. In the section which follows I shall set 
up a typology relating different ways of conceiving obedience in the 
Church with different ideas of the divine-human relationship. This will 
serve as a 'map' for our further analysis of the teaching of Vatican II. 
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B) TyPology of the Relationship of Ideas of Obedience to other 
Doctrines 
Cne way of asserting the significance of the idea of 
obedience in the structure of systematic theology is to point out 
that it is a standard by which man 1 s relationship to God mey be 
characterised and measured. As a concept attached to this notion of 
relationship, obedience bears with it the idea that man and God are 
beings who are distinct from each other in thought and will, whose 
concrete encounter or relationship is amenable to descl~ption in moral 
ter.ms. Therefore, in a study of the theme of obedience, the ideas of 
distinctness in being, and relationship through morally qualified 
encounter, are premises for all that is subsequently said about man and 
God. 
The central area of theology dealing with the conditions of 
the divine-human encounter is ecclesiology. This is not to say that 
the doctrine of the shape of the Church is the only theological 
discipline which treats of a possible, conscious relationship of man 
to God, for one may envisage fo:nns of encounter Vlhich take place outside 
the Church. However, the Church is the place in which people become 
consciously related to God in a distinctively Christian way, because of 
the Church's role as bearer of special revelation to the world. (We 
may also say that any Christian consideration of ways of being related 
to God outside the Church must be explicitly co-ordinated with a 
pattern of ecclesiology.) 
Bscause of the nature of the Gospel-message as special 
revelation, requiring communication through the teaching and preaching 
of an historical body of men, we may say that the Church is, in some 
for.m, the necessary mediator of revelation. But more than this may 
aJ.so be said about the role of the Church: In most systems of theology 
the Church is considered necessary as the community within which the 
new disciple of Christ, assenting to the message of the Gospel, lives 
out his faith. There may be two aspects to this necessity by which the 
Church lives as the communit,l of discipleship: Jnrstly, the Church may 
be viewed simply as the social context in which ·the life of faith must 
be lived, existing in this capacity purely because of God 1 s ordinance 
that there should be a people assembled in his name. Secondly, the 
Church may be seen as a necessary instrument or .E.!! whereby individuals 
are enabled to live the life of faith in grace. These different concepts 
of the Church's role in man's saving relationship to God involve 
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different emphases and ideas in the presentation of the proper 
pattern of ecclesiastical obedience. 
In this section I shall set up a typology of correlations 
between presentations of ecclesiastical obedience, concepts of the 
role of the Church with respect to the individual's relationship to 
God, and themes in Christian anthropology and the doctrine of God. 
This typology will then be available to us as a 'map 1 , on which to 
chart the direction, extent and inner coherence of the doctrinal 
shifts of Vatican II. 
It must be emphasised at the outset that the purpose of 
this tyoplogy is purely schematic and functional. It is not intended 
to be descriptive of concrete theological systems as they exist in 
their richness and complexity. We may cite Richard Niebuhr's 
explanation of the purpose of a typology in order to illustrate the 
point: 
"A type is always something of a construct • • • 
When one returns from the hypothetical scheme 
to the rich complexity of individual events, 
it is evident at once that no person or group 
ever confonns completely to a type. Each 
historical figure will show characteristics 
that are more reminiscent of some other family 
than the one whose name he has been called, 
or traits will appear that seem wholly unique 
and individual. The method of typology, however, 
though historically inadequate, has the advantage 
of calling to attention the continuity and 
significance of the great motifs that appear 
and reappear in the long wrestli~ of Christians 
with their enduring problem." ( 12) 
Because the typology which follows in this section does 
not aim to delineate complete patterns of ecclesiology, but only 
aspects of the doctrine of the Church whiCh are related to the idea 
of obedience and the question of the individual's relationship to 
God, it differs from the fuller ecclesiological typology set out 
by Aver.y Dulles in his book, Models of the Church.(13) 
We shall begin this typology by considering the role of 
the Church in mediating revelation, salvation, and above all, the 
(12) Christ and Culture (London, 1952) PP• 56f. 
(13) Dublin, 1976. 
'., ':~~ 
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authority of God, to the individual. Secondly, we shall consider the 
correlation between the content and extent of obedience which the 
Church requires of her members, and the different pictures of God which 
these requirements convey. Finally, we shall examine the doctrine 
of man which should be co-ordinated with different concepts of the 
Church's role in mediating God's authority, and different presentations 
of the content and extent of proper obedience in the Church. 
1 First Part of the Typology: the Church's Mediatorial. Role 
The Church mediates the conditions necessary for man to 
have an explicit and conscious relationship with God because it 
exists, in some sense, as a~ of divine authority and truth. In 
this sub-section I shall put forward three motifs by which the 
Church's role as a sign may be variously characterised. The three 
motifs are not rigorously exclusive of one another; they can appear 
within actual, historical ecclesiologies in different combinations. 
However, each motif entails a different justification for the obedience 
of one member of the Church to another; therefore, we may say that the 
idea of obedience which is linked with a concrete ecclesiology derives 
from the relative dominance of one motif over the others, or from the 
particular way in which they are combined. 
Because these motifs of mediation are not exclusive, emphasis 
can be shifted from one to another without the complete loss of any 
of them within a theoretical presentation of the Church's nature. It 
is such shifts of emphasis, of course, which are the subject of the 
analysis of the documents of Vatican II which will form the bulk of 
this thesis; therefore, the first part of our typological 1map 1 
consists of setting out these motifs in artificial isolation. They 
are the motifs of Witness, Embodiment and Representation. 
a) The Church's role as a witness to God 
In this context, the word 1witness1 is being used in a way 
primarily shaped by its association with the law-courts. X take it 
to mean a person who recounts events or words of which he has 
knowledge, in order to convey a share in that knowledge to someone 
else. Essentially, the activity of such a witness is not 
self-referent - he speaks of something which happened, or happens, 
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'outside himself'. In a secondary usage, the word 'Witness' may 
be used of a person whose action or demeanour witnesses to something 
beyond himself in some way; similarly, even an inanima·te object may 
bear witness. 
In the specifically religious context, a witness does not 
merely invite others to assess the factual probability that 
such-and-such took place, but also invites them to enter~nto a 
particular interpretation of events and their significance. This 
interpretation has an existentially engaging dimension. A Christian 
witness, then, not only conveys knowledge of revelation, but also 
asks those whom he (or it) addresses to take up a stance of 
commitment based upon faith in the God of this revelatory activity. 
In this invitation, the Christian witness points beyond himself (or 
itself). It is the divine truth to which the witness points more or 
less adequately, which has authority over the minds and hearts of the 
hearers, and not the witness himself or itself. The hearer must 
assess the message which the witness bears, and only if this message 
commends itself as the expression of truth and existential authority 
should the hearer assent to it. His assent and conuni.tment are not 
elicited by a quality of authority formally inhering in the witness, 
although they may be partially el:tci ted by evidence of the witness 1 s 
claims to reliability in conveying the message. 
If we consider the Church under the aspect of a witness:, 
to the truth of God's revelation in Christ, and to the presence and 
authority of God in the world, we conceive it as having only subjective 
or invi tatory authority over the hearts and minds of men - an 
invitatory authority cO<!-.extensi:ve with-its power to commend its message 
as the expression of divine truth. The Church's role as a witness is 
enhanced by its ability to claim special commissioning by Christ for 
its preaching mission; However, if one were to conceive the Church 
solely as a witness, this commissioning would merely appear to be an 
added motive for accepting ecclesiastical preaching as persu~Give; 
it would not give the Church, or its officers, any formal authority 
over those whom it addresses. 
In a secular and pluralistic world the Church appears in 
relation to the rest of humanity under the aspect, and with the 
authority, of a simple witness. However, there are relationships 
within the Church which may be amenable to description through use of 
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the witness motif, but which mey also be described and justified 
in other ways. In particular, we are concerned with the exercise 
of authority within the Church. 
If the exercise of authority in the Church is largely or 
solely justified by the concept that some Christians are specially 
qualified to bear witness of God's truth and authority to others, 
the form of Christian obedience which will prevail as an ideal will 
be that of considered responsiveness to authority, rather than that 
of acquiescence and formal assent. Such a pattern of authority and 
obedience will be tolerant of a wide variety of responses and actions 
flowing from the responsible decisions of those to whom the 
invitation of the special witnesses is addressed. Nevertheless, because 
of the natural exigencies of community life, there will need to be 
certain minimal norms of belief and behaviour to which obedience is 
due, but the way in which these norms are enforced will clearly be 
functional and orientated by the good of the Church as a social group. 
The administration and enforcement of these functional norms and 
requirements of Church life would, most naturally, be delegated to 
those in the connnuni ty who have particular claim to be reliable 
witnesses to the truth about God. However, because in this sphere of 
enforceability their authority is functional, their demands for 
obedience would not inherently form part of the conditions for the 
indiVidual's salvation; the requirement of outward obedience to the 
authorities of the Christian connnunity would appear as strictly 
subordinate to the inner response of the heart which the individual 
must render directly to God, the source of the truth and grace which 
lead man to salvation. It is in this interior relationship, to which 
men are pointed by the witness of the Church, that the power of the 
Christian life resides, and not intrinsically in the externals of 
ecclesiastical relations. 
Because a witness invites a considered response to his 
message, the Church's proclamation, seen as a piece of witnessing, 
may gain from the individual only partial assent, or an assent which 
is qualified by an act of reinterpretation or modification. Therefore, 
if the Church is regarded solely as a witnessing body, it may evoke a 
wide variety of forms of Christian profession, and also a variety of 
interpretations of the moral consequences and applications of the 
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Gospel. Yet, even wi thi:n a witnessing body, variety can only be 
tolerated up to a level which the members consider compatible with 
a convincing witness to the outside world. This, then, in the 
spheres of belief and theory, is how the issue of minimal nor.ms arises 
for the Church. However, different Christians might pitch the level 
of required unanimity at different points, and this can be a cause 
of disagreement. Hence, there is a potential root of instability lodged 
within the witness motif when it is the ·dominant aspect under which 
the Church is considered in its mediatorial role. Inasmuch as a 
Christian community and its theologians seek a way out of this potentially 
unstable situation by stressing the need for certain norms to be 
enforced, and certain key holders of the witnessing office to have powers 
of enforcement, they Will tend to make another idea than that of sheer 
witness the dominant motif in their ecclesiology; the role of the 
Church and its office-holders will begin to be characterised by other 
ideas, Which will justify a stronger exercise of authority. 
b) The Church's role in embodying the divine presence and authority 
In using the term 'embodiment', I mean to express the idea 
that God uses a created reality to manifest himself directly within 
the categories of space and time. We may break down the idea of 
embodiment into two further concepts: Firstly, the most direct and 
immediate manifestation of the divine presence may be termed an 
1 epiphany'. In this sense, a 1high1 doctrine of the Eucharist 'ICJJ3.Y be 
said to teach that the consecrated species is an epiphany of Christ's 
presence. Secondly, one may use the simple tenn 'embodiment' in rather 
a weaker sense, to suggest that persons participate substantially in 
the presence and power of God's Spirit in such a way that they inherently 
share something of his authority. Therefore, although such persons do 
not embody God's presence in a completely unqualified way, they do, 
nevertheless locate his authority and action 1!:, themselves to some 
extent. In this sense, embodiment can be the subject of various degTees 
of guarantee and authority. 
Eastern Orthodox theology tends to describe the entire 
Church as an epiphany- an immediate manifestation of Christ's presence 
in the world -because it is the "body of Christ", the "temple of the 
Holy Spiri t 11 , and the community of which God himself is the immanent 
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principle, assimilating human acti·ons to his own. This concept 
of the Church posits the social body as au hom9genous extension 
of the eucharistic epiphan;y around which it is assembled. Such a 
description runs into the problem of explaining the evident imperfections 
of the Church's concrete life, for these must be harmonised with the 
claim that the community is a divine-human reality operating 
according to a single divine-human mode of activity of which God is 
the subject. A solution m~ be sought in the idea that the Church has 
not attained full 'self-realisation'; on examination, this does not 
really solve the problem at all, but simply gives it another form of 
expression. 
If the Church is seen as an embodiment of God's presence, in 
the 'weaker' sense, this idea m~ be related to that of the eucharistic 
epiphany through the doctrine that Christians embody God's presence 
because of their participation in the power of the sacramental epiphany, 
which is the 'focus' of creation's capacity to be a vehicle of the 
divine presence. However, the idea that the Church corporately, and 
its members individually, embody the presence of God IIJ.ey also be 
related to another way of conceiving the focus of the divine presence 
in the world: In its own way, Scripture, as it is read and preached 
in the Church, may be seen as an epiphany of God's Word and action. 
Finally, the doctrine of the Church 1 s corporate embodiment of God's 
presence may be associated with no central focus at all, but simply 
flow from the doctrine of the indwelling presence of the Holy Spirit 
in the hearts of believers - a presence and participation that depends 
on no focused epiphany to be the instrument of its mediation. 
Indeed, whether or not an ecclesiology co-ordinates a 
doctrine of embodiment with the idea of an epiphany, it will always 
express the idea that men can embody God 1 s presence and action, b;yj,. 
using ' some theology of the Holy Spirit. He it is who conveys to each 
Christian a share in the illumination and authority which is associated 
with God's presence to the world; through him, each Christian embodies, 
albeit imperfectly, the principle of truth and holiness. 
From the doctrine of the general indwelling of the Holy 
Spirit, no immediate determination of the way in which authority should 
be exercised within the community can necessarily be drawn. Since all 
share in the divine power and presence by virtue of membership of the 
Church, the authority of one Christian over another is not directly 
indicated. Where, then, is supreme authority in matters of faith 
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and conduct to be located for pra0tical purposes? 
Upon the theological basis of the idea of embodiment 
there may be erected a doctrine of the ~upreme authority of the 
consensus of the entire community; this doctrine sometimes takes the 
form of attributing to this ~onsensus the quality of inerrancy 
(although this is not its necessary consequence). However, whatever 
form it takes, the doctrine of the supreme authority of the consensus 
of the entire Christian community has an inner contradiction, arising 
from the fact that authority becomes actual not on the theoretical 
level, but in its practical enforcement, and particularly in its 
enforcement against potential dissidents. How is the dissident to 
be defined over against the authoritative whole? He belongs integrally 
to it until some means is found of counting him out of it. Therefore, 
when we find a theological account of Church history which appeals to 
the idea of the authority of a consensus when explaining the expulsion 
of heretics from the Church, we must say ei"ther that the concept of a 
consensus has been retrospectively impos~d upon the account, or that 
the concept of a whole and entire consensus is not strictly interpreted, 
but that the notion is a cipher for the effective rule of the view of 
the majority, or, finally, that the authority of the entire Church has 
been delegated to particular representative organs, which have then 
proceeded to work quasi-independently in their enforcement of authority, 
while yet drawing their validity and justification from the fact that 
the Church universally participates in the Holy Spirit's presence and 
power. 
Wnen the authority of the entire Christian community is 
delegated to certain of its members, it is very often, and logically, 
delegated to.those who are associated with any central focus or 
epiphany of God's presence which is recognised in that Church. That 
is to say, it is given to those who administer the sacraments or 
expound the divine Word. The powers allowed to these persons in an 
ecclesiology dominated by the motif of embodiment may be greater or 
less, but they will always be to some extent in tension with the idea 
that each individual Christian also embodies the principle of divine 
authority immediately within himself. This situation of tension 
between the p.epresentati ves of community norms and the reality of 
individual participation in the Holy Spirit, will probably tend to 
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result in an exercise of authority which is largely negative; that 
is to say, those who define the Church's beliefs and enforce its 
discipline will tend to do so by setting up broad boundaries of 
permissibility rather than by putting forward positive and specific 
statements of what is ·to be believed and done. Only on occasions of 
genuine, near-universal consensus in the Church, might one expect 
office-holders, to whom authority is essentially delegated, to express 
positive and determinate statements of the Gospel's meaning and 
application. However, as we shall see, such occasions are to be 
considered a rarity and perhaps, in modern times, an impossibility 
(see Chapter V, pp.263-68). 
Obe:dience in matters of faith within an ecclesiology 
dominated by the concept of embodiment appears, then, as something which 
allows scope for personal interpretation within a broad but defined 
boundary of what is corporately acceptable. In this way, it resembles 
the ld.nd of obedience in matters of faith which would appear in an 
ecclesiology dominated by the motif of witness. (In fact, concretely 
ecclesiologies of witness do not exist in isolation; the,power to 
witness to the Gospel is nearly always linked theologically with the 
idea that the person who is a witness is indwel t and inspired by the 
Holy Spirit, but that this indwelling does not formally guarantee the 
content of the witness's proclamation in every part.) 
In matters of administrati'Vl.e. authority within an 
ecclesiology in which the motif of embodiment is dominant, the concept 
of obedience will be co-ordinated with concern for maintaining and 
protecting the conditions under which embodiment and epiphany can be 
realised. Thus, for example, canon law may have as its main concern 
the enforcement of reverence for the Eucharist and the definition of 
the conditions under which it may be validly celebrated; or it may be 
concerned with controlling the liturgical exposition of Scripture, or 
the expression of supernatural charisma. 
When authority is delegated by the community to certain 
persons - even to those who are particularly responsible for the 
administratj_on of the sacraments or the preaching of the Word - there 
is a clear sense in which such authority exists within the Church and 
derives ~it. However, the more closely such authoritative 
persons are bound to a focus of God's presence through their special 
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sacramental or kerygmatic role, the more likely it is that they will 
come to be seen as representative not of the community, in their 
exercise of authority, but rather of God himself. This brings us to 
our consideration of the third motif whereby authority structures in , 
the Church may be justified, that of representation. 
c) Representation of God in the Church 
The idea that authority in the Church is 'representational' 
of the authority of God is, like some theories of the embodiment of the 
divine presence in the Church, closely associated with the concept of 
an epiphany or focused embodiment of God's power and presence at the 
heart of the co:mmunity' s life. However, when the motif of representation 
dominates, the emphasis is not placed so much upon the immediate 
participation which all Christians have in the power of the epiphany, 
but rather, upon the qualifications and authority enjoyed by those 
persons who represent Christ in bestowing on the community the focus 
of the divine presence. In particular, the representational motif is 
linked with the doctrine that Christ's ~eal Presence in the Eucharist 
is dependent upon a capacity which priests have for actualising it. 
This capacity is not rooted in the personal holiness, competence or 
charismatic authority of the priestly class, but rather in the fact 
that they occupy a place in an institutionalised hierarchy which has 
immediate divine foundation and commissioning for these sacramental acts. 
The sacramental hierarchy does not derive from the community, but 
rather, gives the community its constitutional shape. 
We see, then, that an ecclesiology of representation takes the 
idea of a diVine epiphany, and looks at it from the opposite angle 
from that taken by an ecclesiology of embodiment. Instead of concentrating 
upon the powers which flow outward into the community from participation 
in God's focused presence, it concentrates upon the question, 'how 
can the epiphany of God be guaranteed to the community, and what power 
is associated with being the agent of its actualisation?' The answer 
it gives is expressed in quasi-legal terms of divine institution and 
empowerment for the sacramental function. This function in turn 
translates concretely into power ~ the community, because those 
who are sacramentally ordained control the access which others enjoy 
to the divine epiphany. 
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Alongside the sacramental or sacerdotal hierarchy, and 
interpenetrating it, an ecclesiology of representation m~ also 
posit another aspect of institutionalised power -namely, a 
hierarchy of authority in matters of teaching and government. This, too, 
m~ be seen as the object of Christ's quasi-legal foundation, and 
the holders of such authority may appear formally as his 'vicars', or 
legal representatives. 
The two aspects of institution - the priestly aspect, and 
the governmental and doctrinal aspect - are theoretically separable, 
but in practice they belong together as the form and substance of 
practical authority in the Church. All Christians who do not belong 
to the hierarchical structure, participate in God's presence to the 
Church only through being under the authority of those who are 
instituted as his representatives at the altar and in the cathedra 
of authority. (14) 
The structure of the representational hierarchy draws its 
existence from Christ's two-fold institution, and it extends the 
authority of the incarnate Lord in histor,r. Obedience to members of 
the hierarchial structure is obedience to Christ's commissioned 
representatives, and can formally be identified with obedience to the 
Lord himself. However, we must draw the distinction between persons 
who represent God because of their institutional status, and actions 
which represent the acts of God himself. The latter are associated 
with the sacramental function into which priests are instituted, but 
the capacity to represent God's actions in a guaranteed w~ does not 
extend beyond this into the sphere of government. There m~, then, be 
cases in which those holding representational status in the Church can 
be questioned or challenged as to whether what they do or say adequately 
mirrors the divine will. However, for the most part, the acts of the 
representational authority are to be treated as though they were the ,.,. 
acts of the one it represents. Thus, it has binding, fonnal authority 
(14) We shall find, in Chapter II, that the theoretical distinction 
between sacramental representation and the representation of 
God in government and teaching, does,lead to some practical dis-
tinctions within Roman Catholic ecclesiology. However, the 
point holds good that the two forms of representation are 
organically related as the form and substance of effective 
authority in this kind of picture of the Church. 
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over the hearts and actions of those who wish to obey God. (For 
further consideration o:f the limits to representational autho:r;-i ty in 
Roman Catholic ecclesiology see Chapter II, ~p.Sl-85 and Chapter I1]:D, 
pp.ol74-79.) 
In Roman Catholic theology the idea of the representation of 
God by men enters so :far into the theory o:f teaching authority that 
some statements o:f the hierarchy are themselves given the status of 
representational acts. That is to say, although they are not to be 
identified with the Word or speech o:f God, they are nevertheless 
guaranteed distillations of knowledge about divine matters, representing 
the truth with accuracy through the means o:f appropriate analogical 
language. Such teaching is inerrant or 'infallible' in its 
representation o:f the truth, and it therefore cannot be reformed, 
although the knowledge it conveys might be developed or added to. 
Whilst we have seen above that a teacr.dng authority which 
sums up the beliefs o:f the community which embodies God's presence, or 
which lays down the minimal norms :for a community o:f witness, is likely 
to put forward mainly negative, limiting forms o:f doctrine, expressing 
the boundaries of what is acceptable to the whole Church, a teaching 
authority which, on the other hand, claims to be immediately represen-
tational of the authority of God has more scope :for proposing determinate, 
positive doctrines :for the assent o:f Christians. The balance o:f the 
activity of the Holy Spirit is differently conceived, for 
more weight is given to his guarantee of the inerrancy of official 
teaching than to his direct enlightenment o:f the minds o:f ordinary 
believers as they meditate on the meaning and consequences o:f the Gospel. 
Knowledge of divine truth, then, is :founded upon assent - assent to the 
representational teaching of representational persons, Christ's 
authoritative vicars in the Church. 
Summary to first part of the typology 
We have seen three basic ecclesiological motifs which 
each justify and locate the exercise o:f authority in the Church in 
a di:f:ferent way, and indicate a di:f:ferent scope and significance for 
the practice o:f obedience. In an ecclesiology totally dominated by 
the first motif, that o:f witness, the significance o:f obedience to the 
officers o:f the voluntar,y assembly of the Church would be so 
subordinated to the importance o:f the individual's judgement o:f what 
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obedience to God involves, as to lose any inherent value for the 
apprehension of truth and salvation. Therefore, if the Church and its 
authority were conceived solely after such a witness model, any 
requirements for obedience which might be attached to Church member-
ship would be of greater sociological interest than theological 
concern, for it would express simply something of the exigencies of 
group activity. However, if either of the other motifs has a. pre-
dominant part in an ecclesiology -that is, if God's presence and 
authority is in some way located .!!!. the Church - the nature and scope 
of required obedience within that community should tell us something 
about the structure and quality of God's own a.uthori ta.ti ve relationship 
to man. 
We now turn to consider the nature and content of the 
Church's demands for obedience from her members, examining the different 
pictures of God which may be correlated with these requirements in 
ecclesiologies of embodiment and representation. 
2 Second Part of the Typology: Pictures of God 
In this sub-section we shall correlate the content of 
obedience in the Church with different pictures of God, am then go 
on to examine how these pictures of God should also be co-ordinated 
with ideas of the Church's role in regard to revelation and salvation. 
By the tem 'content' of obedience I mean the character of those actions, 
beliefs;or attitudes which holders of authority in the Church require 
or request from their subordinates. 
a) Pictures of God 
The content of ecclesiastical obedience may be defined in 
relation to two sets of polarities; in the first place, it may be 
characterised according to the degree in which obedience involves 
adopting beliefs or actions which are either disjunctive with norms 
of secular belief and action, or else in harmony with such norms. 
Secondly, the content of obedient action may be described either as 
being the achievement of conformity with a. stable moral order, or as 
ta.ldng the form of constructive a.ctivi ty with a future goal which 
determines its nature. I shall suggest in; this sub-section that the 
different C·)mbinations of ways in which obedience may be characterised 
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afford the basis for four different pictures of God as their 
theological correlates. 
Like the motifs by which the Church's mediatorial role may 
be characterised, the four different pictures of God whiCh I shall 
propose here are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, Christian theology 
usually operates with a great variety of complementary pictures which 
enrich our concept of God in his relations to us by the ver,r fact of their 
variety. Such pictures of God are not individual attempts 
systematically to define the essence of divinity, but are rather 
metaphors or types, conveying something of the way in waich God is 
experienced. 
i) The God who is eternal king and judge 
Under this heading we may place the picture of God which is 
related to a set of demands in the Church which are both disjunctive 
with secUlar norms, and also require conformity from the Christian, 
according to a stable pattern. For example, the kind of obedience 
which might be required could include conformity to rituals and worship 
patterns, and submission to precepts which could not have been 
inductively guessed at, but have been made known purely as the subject 
of special revelation. An ecclesiological model which corresponded 
to this picture of God would show the Church as a body which makes known 
the revelation of God 1 s will and expounds it as something immutable 
and applicable to all sorts and condi tiona of men. The .·~\aw of God is 
thus published abroad through the Church, and is binding upon all who 
wish to please the deity and to escape the charge of rebellion against 
the eternal king and judge. 
ii) The God who is creator and legislator of the universal natural order 
We may use this description to suggest a picture of God which 
derives fron the experience of finding in the Church a moral teaching 
which demands stable confonni ty, and which also purports to be the 
law of man's own nature, something which might therefore be inductively 
arrived at even without the aid of the concept of God and his status as 
nature's creator. 
Concretely, such a moral law will probably be in harmony a 
good deal with the ideas of various non-Christian ethical systems, 
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although the correspondence may not be complete. The Church will 
propose its version of the natural law by the use of rational 
argumentation, as well as by appeals to the authorit.y of the creator. 
It will suggest that man should obey this law partly because it is 
the norm of his own self-realisation. The universality and 
immutability of the first principles of the law of nature will be 
stressed, and they will be said to be the principles by which men are 
guided through the changing conditions of the world to the attainment 
of an eternally valid pattern of human perfection. 
iii) The God who is a liberator and covenant lord 
With this picture of God we leave the realms of religious 
demands for conformity to a stable order, and we consider a picture of 
God correlated with a content of obedience orientated towards the 
achievement of a future goal. In this particular case, the obedience 
required could not be deduced from natural moral experience, but is 
the subject of God's revealed will. However, man does not obey this 
will sheerly from the motive of pleasing God and escaping the stigma of 
rebelliousness, but in order to achieve a new future in the way that 
God has prescribed specifically. Man obeys because God has promised him 
liberation from sin and despair by certain means, and also the 
attainment of a blessed end in company with others. 
One of the reasons why the demands associated with this 
picture of God may be disjunctive with a secular consideration of 
what woUld be the right course of action, is because the future towards 
which man is orientated by his obedience is a future totally 
unimaginable in the terms of this world's wisdom. Obedience is rooted 
in faith, therefore, and faith is rooted in God's promise. This, in 
turn, may also be grounded in the fact that God himself has already 
acted on man 1 s behalf, in such a way as to make the obedience which is 
subsequently required of Christians effectual for their redemption. 
The Church, then, appears in correlation to this picture of God as a 
body which makes his will known, and is also the pledge and sign of 
the salvific import of this will. It may.- exist as the community in 
which a foretaste of God's future is already available. 
i v) The God who shares his creative activity with man 
This picture of God is associated, once again, with 
demands for obedience which are orientated upon the achievement of 
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new conditions in the future. The Church invites men to collaborate 
with God through their actions. However, this picture of God is to 
be distinguished from that in which he appears as liberator and coven-
ant lord by the fact that the action to which the Church invites end 
urges its members is in harmony with the actions to which they might 
be prompted by the considerations of a dynamic secular ethic. 
Similarly, the goals towards which the obedient Christian works may 
also be easily recognisable as natural human goods, towards which men 
of many faiths strive - brotherhood, justice, peace, etc. 
The picture of the Church which corresponds to this concept 
of Christian ethics, and to this picture of God, shows it to be an 
assembly of those called together as the vanguard and co-creators of 
the new order for which all men long. Within the Church community, 
the obedience of one member to another will be dictated by the exigencies 
imposed by these communal goals. 
b) Pictures of God and the Church's role with regard to revelation 
The reader m~ have noticed that in the preceding pages 
the four pictures of God which I proposed as types were derived largely 
from a consideration of the content of obedient Christian action. 
However, if we are to consider the whole topic of obedience in the 
Church, we must also consider the relationship between pictures of God 
and the content of obedient assent. In the pages which follow we shall 
therefore examine the co-ordination of the four pictures of God, which 
have already been set forward, with different concepts of the ldnd of 
assent which is due in the Church. 
Firstly, pictures of God which posit him as the author of an 
immutable law (whether this is a revealed, positive law, which could 
not have been deduced from any purely philosophical starting point, or 
whether it is the eternal law of man's own nature) imply that there 
must be one place at least in which the divine law is absolutely 
clearly available to man. Only so could human guilt in disobedience 
be both subjectively and objectively real. Thus, for example, even when 
the immutable law of God is conceived to be the law of human nature, 
and thus accessible to purely philosophical reflection, the Church 
nevertheless has the role of unveiling and clarifying man's view of it, 
so that there can be no mistake. And when the law of God is 
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conceived to be purely the subject of special revelation, it is 
the Church which is the locus of this revelation. 
Because an immutable law must be clearly available to men, 
the pictures of God as eternal king and judge, and as the creator 
and legislator of a universal order, are most easily co-ordinated 
with ecclesiologies in which the law of God is either the substance 
of an epiphany around which the community is formed (as the Jewish 
worshipping community is formed around the Torah) or else is expressed 
accurately and representationally in the Church's formal teaching. 
On the other hand, those pictures of God which stress the 
future goals to which he leads men through his connnands are more 
easily correlated with ecclesiologies in which authority is attributed 
to people having a prophetic role. The essential function of the 
prophet is to make ever new applications of the general principles of 
the divine will, by reading the 1 signs of the times' so as to indicate 
the concrete means necessary for attaining God's future from the 
Church's historically-conditioned starting-point. The prophet may, 
or may not, hold an institutionalised office, and the role may even 
be carried out corporately, perhaps by the community as a whole. 
The statements of a prophetic fig~re or group may be 
attributed differing degrees of authority; if a prophetic figure holds 
institutional office in a representationally conceived Church structure, 
he will require the respect and obedience for his person which belongs 
to his status. This personal respect will have its consequences for 
the way in which his prophetic teaching is viewed and treated. There 
may even be a degree of authority attached to prophetic teaching which 
leads men to treat it, itself, as smething which is representationally 
guaranteed by God, and therefore deserving of absolute obedience and 
assent. 
On the other hand, prophetic teaching may appear as something 
which has no formal authority, but which must recommend itself simply 
by its appeal to the hearts and minds of its hearers as they seek to 
find God's way forward. 
Whether or not prophetic teaching has the formal authority 
Which belongs to representational status, it differs from the stable 
representation or epiphany of a fixed divine law because the prophet 
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is the herald of constant growth and change. This has consequences 
for the way in which men respond to it: Even if it is acknowledged 
that prophetic teaching substantially represents the present diVine 
will (or the most appropriate wey of understanding diVine truth for 
present circumstances) there will always be an element of uncertainty 
and debate attached to the question of how long a particular message 
or injunction is concretely valid. Therefore, men's assent to teaching 
of a prophetic, future-orientated type, will always be to some extent 
qualified by the need to be open and responsive to new 1 signs of the 
times'. 
I have tried to draw the distinction between stable and 
prophetic forms of revelation as sharply as possible, for the sake of 
clarity. In fact, concretely, the contrast cannot be quite so stark. 
For example, in the moral sphere, those pictures of God and his will 
which correlate with the idea of obedience as goal-seeking must 
nevertheless include within themselves the idea that there is some-
thing unchanging ,about God; his will, although expressed differently 
in different concrete circumstances, must always have an immutable 
orientation towards the goals which he wants for men and the world. On 
the other hand, those pictures of God which associate him with an ethic 
of conformity to a stable order must nevertheless allow a degree of 
variation in the ways in which God's law is concretely applied in 
different historical and human situations. In this way, the tro pairs 
of pictures of God, and the two kinds of ethical pattern with vihich 
they are associated, come to meet each other. 
However, the contrast I have drawn is not completely 
dissolved by these qualifications, for although in both cases there 
is a co-ordination of unchanging principles with varying applications, 
in each case the immutable principles have rather a differe~t nature. 
In those pictures of God, for example, in which his will and command 
are seen as being orientated upon the achievement of future goals, 
the unchanging principles of this will have the form of generalised 
definitions of its characteristic orientation. In the pictures of 
God which are associated with an established set of stable moral 
absolutes, the unchanging principles of divine law have much greater 
practical scope in themselves, and the secondar,y applications which 
mey be built up upon the general laws will tend to assume relatively 
fixed form in a science of casuistry. 
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To sum up, we may say that pictures of God which present 
him as the author of a stable law, whether natural or wholly revealed, 
tend to be correlated With ecclesiologies in which the Church is 
given the role of revealing that law in absolute form to the world 
through dogma and representational teaching, or through the mani-
festation of that law in liturgical reading of the Scriptures. If 
this is true of the way in which an ecclesiology presents moral teaching, 
it is also likely to be true about the role it gives to the Church in 
revealing other aspects of divine truth. Therefore, we may say that 
the pictures of God as eternal king and judge, or as creator and 
legislator of a stable and universal order, tend to be correlated with 
doctrines of the Church which attribute to it a clear dogmatic role, or 
else describe it as the assembly which is gathered round an epiphany 
of the Word. On the other hand, those pictures of God which present him 
as one who commands men to seek future goals will tend to be co-ordinated 
with ecclesiologies in which the Church does not have the role of 
revealing tne divine will with such absolute and uncJ;:J.angeable certainty. 
Similarly, when other matters of revelation are considered, such 
ecclesiologies will probably not treat Church teaching as a matter of 
fixed and universally perspicuous certainty, but as a more historically-
conditioned form of representation or witness. Therefore, in these 
doctrines of the Church, communal certainty will not be guaranteed by 
universal e.:nd unquestioning assent to the propositi onal form of 
authoritative teaching. 
c) Pictures of God and the Church's role with regard to salvation 
As we consider the Church's role with regard to salvation 
in the next few pages we shall be looking at this role specifically 
from the angle dictated by our concern with the question of obedience. 
Therefore, we shall not be examining the Church 1 s function as a 
provider of the resources of grace necessary for the life which is 
directed towards salvation, but rather the part played by the Church's 
demands for obedience in marking out the path of redemption. 
Once again, this part of the typology of correlations is to 
be constructed by the drawing out of a contrast. Here, the contrast is 
that between a cone ept of final salvation which sees it as a reward, 
given because of the obedience which man has rendered (or, which has been 
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rendered on his behalf) and a concept in which final salvation 
appears as the fruition of man's earthly relationShip to God in grace, 
and of the activities and attitudes characteristic of that 
rela ti onshi p. 
Where the experience of final salvation is conceived to be 
a fruition of that which went before, emphasis is laid upon the 
continuity between human awareness of things divine in this world, and 
the awareness which men will have of them in the next. Now, those 
pictures of God which posit him as one who invites and commands men to 
construct a new future thr~gh their obedience - that is, the pictures 
of God as liberator and covenant lord, and as one who shares his 
creative activity with man- necessarily locate ·the beginning of God's 
future on the earthly plane, for that is within the scope of man's 
constructive activity and achievement. Therefore, such pictures are 
usually to be related to the notion that the final experience of 
salvation will be a fruition of the situation that man can bring about 
through his present obedience. However, in each case the pattern of 
fruition will be different; where God is conceived as one who shares 
his creative activity with men through injunctions which are congruous 
with dynamic secular morality, the pattern of fruition will be 
straightforward - ultimate salvation will mean the enhancement of all 
the human values for which men naturally strive, and which the Church 
fosters. On the other hand, where God is conceived as a liberator 
and covenant lord, leading men to a new future through underivable, 
positive commands, human obedience will indeed bring about new situa-
tions redolent of the kingdom even in the earthly sphere, and these 
new situations Will be perfected and consummated when the kingdom 
finally breaks in, in its fullness. However, the foretastes of the 
kingdom which are attainable even now are already grounded not only 
in human obedience, but also in the transforming, redemptive action and 
promise of God. Therefore, final salvation will be experienced not 
straightforwardly as the fruit and enhancement of mere human strivings, 
but rather ~s the consummation of a radical act of redemption with 
which men have been proleptically associated during their earthly lives. 
If we turn to the pictures of God, and the ethical demands, 
which are associated with ideas of a stable and fixed order in the 
divine will, we find that the two pictures of God concerned each have a 
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different bearing upon the way in which salvation is to be conceived. 
Firstly, if we examine the picture of God as creator and legislator of 
a universal natural order, we find that the idea of natural law w.hich 
is associated with this picture is the idea of the norm of man's own 
growth in perfection. Therefore, the na·tural law mey direct men to 
growth which is partially attainable even in this life, and the concept 
of final salvation may be presented in terms of a frui"tion and completion 
of this progress to perfection. Secondly, however, the picture of 
God as eternal king and judge presents the divine demands for obedience 
in such a way as to suggest that their fulfillment may' bear only an 
arbitrary relationship to the experience of final salvation. The man 
who glorifies and pleases the eternal king through the sheer fact of his 
obedience may, indeed, be rewarded, but it is not at all clear that 
the substance of this reward must be the fruition of what he achieved 
by his obedience. 
We see, then, that three out of four pictures of God bear 
with them the suggestion that man's obedience and its content is of 
substantial, and not merely of formal, interest to the wey in which he 
is to experience final salvation. But what exactly is the role of the 
Church in man 1 s pilgrimage of obedience towards this goal? Is she 
merely the body which enunciates the nature of God's will, or does 
membership of the Church enter into the substance of the obedience which 
is to bear fruit or be rewarded at the end? 
There is, I contend, a clear correlation between concepts 
of salvation as a fruition, and beliefs that the Church and its life 
will continue into the divine ,kingdom. If we examine those pictures 
of God, ana their co-ordinate ethical systems, which suggest that 
Christian obedience should be orientated towards the achievement of 
future goals, we find that these goals are almost bound to include the 
dimension of human community - it is hard to conceive of a:ny idea of 
constructing a new future, whether by natural or supernatural means, 
which would not posit this future in terms of human interrelationship. 
Therefore, those pictures of God and of the ethical endeavour which 
are most closely related to the concept of salvation as a fruition of 
the achievements of obedience, are consequently likely to be related 
to concepts of salvation in which the experience of community 
('communion') is integrated and perfected. Man obeys God's precepts 
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in order to build up a communion of love, brotherhood and justice, 
both in the Church and beyond it; upon this ende~vour, eschatological 
salvation supervenes to confirm and complete the communion for which 
men strove. That which man experiences now as the oommunity of 
the Church is a foretaste of heaven's social realit.y. 
If we turn to the picture of God which is co-ordinated with 
the concept of universal natural law, we find that the corporate 
dimension of salvation may, or may not, be associated with it. The 
law of human nature, which leads to the individual 1 s perfection, can 
be conceived in more or less social terms, depending upon whether 
human nature is viewed as being intrinsically, or only 'accidentally', 
wedded to social relationships. If human perfection (which is the 
end sought through conformity to the dictates of natural law) is 
conceived as being a perfection of the faculties and capacities of 
the individual, achieved only with the instrumental help of the social 
relationships in which he has been sustained, it is possible to 
conceive of a final consummation of the individual's life before God 
in vhich community will no longer have any part to play. On the other 
hand, the experience of participation in community may be conceived 
to be an essential part of what human perfection means, and in this 
case the life of heaven would logically include enhanced communal 
relationships. 
It is the picture of God as eternal king and judge which is 
most unequivocally related to a concept of salvation which is purely 
individualist. The Church's role on this earth is to preach God's 
positive, revealed law, and to provide occasions for its practice. In 
this way, the, ind!.tvidual can glorify God through his obedience, and 
merit the reward of salvation. Once he attains that reward, the need 
for the Church passes away. Avery Dulles caricatured the idea of the 
Church's role in mediating salvation, which can appear when this nexus 
of theological ideas predominates, thus: 
••• "Because man's social life, in this model, 
is fully institutionalised, the disappearance of . 
the institution at the end of man's earthly 
pilgrimage involves the termination of social 
life. Each individual, equipped with his own 
pair of opera glasses (lumen gloriae) gazes 
on the divine essence without being conscious 
of who is in the next box." (15) 
(15) Op. cit. PP• 103f, 
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To sum up, the life of the Church is seen as giving a 
foretaste of a conununal experience of salvation in ·those patterns 
of thought in which salvation appears as a fruition of the 
obedient actions of men. This idea of fruition is, in turn, 
associated with pictures of God which posit him as commanding and 
inviting men to obey him in the construction of a new future. It 
may also be associated with the picture of God which presents him as 
the founder of a stable, natural order in which human perfection is to 
be found in personal relationships which grow to conformity with 
the natural and stable norm. On the other hand, the life of the Church 
appears to be merely instrumental in the achievement of individual 
salvation when that salvation is conceived to be the reward which God 
gives for acts of obedience whose value lies purely in their formal 
nature as acts of submission to the divine, royal will. Therefore, 
concepts of ecclesiastical obedience which concentrate upon the value 
of its formal nature are likely to be correlated with a picture of God 
as eternal king and judge (or else as the author of a natural order in 
which human perfection is conceived purely in individualistic ter.ms). 
Summary to second part of the typology 
We have examined the correlation of various ideas of the 
proper content of Christian obedience with four different pictures of 
God. We have then considered the co-ordination of these pictures with 
different ideas of how God and his truth are known in the Church, and 
of the Church's role in conveying salvation t~ men. Out of these 
considerations, certain circles of correlative doctrines have emerged; 
these circles of related ideas can be entered conveniently by means of 
answering our primary question, 'what content of ecclesiastical 
obedience is set up as an ideal in any given ecclesiology?'. 
The reader may have noticed that, while setting up these 
circles of correlation, we have effectively ignored the doctrine of 
sin. It is, of course, the fact of sin which explains why natural law 
should have to be the subject of ecclesiastical teaching at all; it is 
also the fact of sin which explains why the Church's role in mediating 
salvation to man must go beyond the mere conveying of revelation and 
the provision of a communal life, and must include the mediation of 
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grace so that man may achieve obedience. In the sub-section which 
follows, we shall pay more attention to the doctrine of sin and 
human fallenness, as we come to focus on the co-ordination of 
different doctrines of man with various ways of presenting the purpose 
and nature of ecclesiastical obedience. Here, however, we must 
remind ourselves that the aim of the typology- of correlations which we 
are constructing is limited to that of providing a schematic 1map 1 • 
Within the perspective of this aim, the isolation of the patterns 
which we have observed above from the problem of sin can be justified, 
because such isolation provides a useful schematic basis for locating 
certain interrelated ideas when they appear in more complex theological 
wholes. 
3 Third Part of the Typology-: Obedience in the Church and the 
Doctrine of Man in his Relationship to God 
Having examined how different ideals of obedience in the 
Church entail different pictures of God within the context of coherent 
theological systems, we must now consider the relationship between 
ideals of obedience and different types of Christian anthropology-. 
Man's relationship to God develops through a series of 
'moments' - that of the original relationship of creator and creature, 
that which subsists with human fallenness, that Which is brought about 
through grace, even in this life, and that relationship for Which man 
is eschatologically destined. We shall begin our study of the 
structure of man's relationship to God from the starting point provided 
by the issue of obedience in the Church. We can proceed from an 
ecclesiological starting point in this way because the doctrine of the 
Church stands at the turning point of man's relationship to God; the 
life of the Church is located between the 1 moments' of creation and 
fallenness, on the one hand, and that of man's eschatological destiny, 
on the other. It is in the Church that man's relationShip to his 
maker is reconstituted in the structure of grace. The way in which 
this relationship of grace is described should both indicate the 
human condition upon which it supervened, and also the structure of 
relationship for which man is being prepared. 
We Shall begin our examination of the correlation of 
ecclesiastical obedience with doctrines of man's relationShip to God 
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by recapitulating on the different roles which m~ be attributed 
to the Church in mediating God's authority (see above, sub-section 
(1)). I Shall then suggest how these different roles (of witness, 
embodiment and representation) should each correspond to a different 
exposition of the changing pattern of divine-human relationships. 
However, the expositions whiCh I shall construct on this basis will be 
seen to lack specificity on certain points. This lack will lead us 
to approach the question of man's relationship to God from another 
ecclesiological angle - this time, that of the content of due 
ecclesiastical obedience. It is at this point that we shall particu-
larly illuminate the part played in Christian anthropologies by 
different approaches to the fact of sin. 
a) Recapitulation of the Church's role in mediating salvation and 
revelation to man 
B.y the very fact of saying that the Church is the locus in 
which man comes to a conscious and explicit relationship to God we 
imply that, on the conscious level at least, man is generally separated 
from awareness of his creator. This separation is radical, because 
the Church 1 s function in conveying knowledge of God and his will has to 
extend beyond that of mere Socratic midwifery to that of mediating 
distinctly 1new1 , revelatory information. 
Man's separation from God extends beyond the sphere of 
knowledge and consciousness, of course; it is for this reason that 
the Church has a role beyond that of revelation alone in providing 
the necessary conditions for man's salvation, as we have already 
remarked (see p. 54 ) • However, at this point in the thesis we are 
limiting our consideration of the Church's mediatorial task to issues 
directly related to the overcoming of man's epistemological separation 
from God. It is largely because this epistemological separation is 
conceived in various ways that there arise different ways of 
characterising the Church 1 s mediatorial role - namely, through the 
motifs of witness, embodiment and representation. 
i) Man's relationship to God and the Church's role as a witness 
\7a have seen in sub-section ( 1) that, inasmuch as the 
Church is viewed as a witness to God, to what he has done, and to what 
he continues to do, it is seen as a body.which points to something 
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which is beyond itself. Therefore, an ecclesiology dominated by 
this motif would stress man's separateness from God. Of course, the 
founding events of the Church, to which her preaching witnesses, 
comprise the dramatic overpassing of ·that separation by God himself, in 
the act of incarnation; but, in so far as the Church is a simple 
witness to this event, she stresses its uniqueness and its paradoxi-
cally divine quality. If there existed a concrete ecclesiology \'ohich 
was purely of this type, then, it would not claim for the Church and 
its members any effective immediate participation in the power and 
presence of God. However, as we have seen (see p.38 ) , ecclesiologies 
purely based on the idea of witness alone do not exist, because of the 
theological ubiquity of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. The nearest 
approximation to an ecclesiology of the pure witness type is to be 
found when the idea of the Spirit's indwelling is not expounded as 
entailing any guarantee that the Church or the Christian 1 s intellectual 
knowledge about God is 'right' , although it may well be the dynamic 
of the Spirit which impels the Church and its members to g:i. ve the best 
witness that they can to the reality in which they mysteriously 
participate, and to the historical events of the ~ncarnation. 
ii) Man's relationship to God and the Church's role of embodiment 
When the Church is viewed more immediately under its aspect 
as an embodiment of God's presence, or when it is seen specifically as 
a community gathered around a focused epiphany, the separation between 
man and God does not appear to be so radical. Some part of the human 
realm is shown to have the continuous capacity to be a point of divine 
embodiment or manifestation; the incarnation may, in a sense, be 
'extended' in the eucharistic elements, the Word of Scripture read 
among the faithful, or the composite life of the entire Church. Emmanuel 
has not departed. The members of t~e Church each share in the power 
of the divine presence through substantial participation in it, whether 
through the Sacrament, or simply through the real presence of the 
Holy Spirit in their hearts. At ·the very least, therefore, we may se:y 
that the structure of human nature is such as to admit of God's 
indwelling; at the most, some part of man's world (bread, language or 
human interrelationships) can become so translucent to the divine as to 
constitute an epiphany in a continuous form. 
58 
iii) Man's relationship to God and the Church's role of representation 
Whilst the functions of witness and epiphany are on the 
opposite ends of a scale of man's intrinsic openness to God (with the 
idea of a rather diffuse and mysterious embodiment of the Holy Spirit 
inbetween) the ecclesiological function of representing the power and 
presence of God is conditioned not simply by an idea of man's intrinsic 
openness to the divine, but also by the concept of extrinsic and formal 
conditions by Which human openness to God may be qualified in such a 
way as to guarantee its fUlfillment of a representational role. We 
have seen that the notion of representational authority in the Church 
is linked to a concept of sacramental epiphany which, of itself, gives 
rise to the idea that the Holy Spirit's presence and power is diffusely 
embodied in all those who partake in the sacraments. However, in the 
Western tradition of ecclesiology the concept of extrinsically con-
ditioned representation has tended to detract from certain aspects of 
effectual belief in the whole Church's diffuse participation in the 
power and knowledge of God. The openness of the ordinary Christian to 
God has been overshadowed by a stress on the special guarantees attached 
to representational office, and the special endowments of grace given 
to those who hold such office. (16) 
In this brief recapitulation we have seen that the different 
motifs by w.aich we characterised the role of the Church, or of certain 
persons in the Church, in mediating salvation and re:velation, are linked 
to different concepts of the way and extent in which man is open to the 
(16) The special guarantees attached to representational office 
have, themselves, a formal and negative quality; they are, 
for example, the guarante~s of indefectibility (see Chapter II, 
pp.76 and 82-84) which are' attached to the 
actions and government of representational figures, and of 
'infallibility' or inerrancy, attached to certain exercised of 
teaching authority. Only in the sphere of the sacraments are 
guarantees of intrinsic and positive power attached to the idea 
of representation, and this positive power belongs more 
immediately to the promised epiphany than to God's representational 
agents who actualise it. 
Special endowments of personal grace tend to be a matter of 
pious belief and hope, although they are not matters of 
guarantee. 
59 
experience, knowledge and power of God, through a very complex 
web of ideas. Since none of the motifs completely describes a 
single, concrete ecclesiology, the relationship of these ideas in 
actuality is likely to be even more complicated. However, within 
this web, we mey pick out the threads which indicate whether human 
openness to God is an intrinsic factor in man's life, or whether 
it is, on the other hand, dependent on or qualified by, extrinsic 
and formal conditions. These threads of correlation will be useful 
to us in our analysis of shifts of emphasis in the ecclesiology of 
Vatican II. 
b) Patterns of ecclesiology and the history of man's relationship to 
God 
Having considered the implications which different 
ecclesiological motifs bear regarding the present structure of human 
relationship to God, we must now examine the factors in man's history 
which must condition these structures of relationship. Why is man 
intrinsically open, or closed, to God? What relationship does the 
extent of mm' s present openness have to his original, created nature? 
And, what will be the str-ucture,:of the divine-human relationship in 
the eschaton, according to these different forms of ecclesiological 
thought? These are some of the questions Which we must now broach, 
examining once again each ecclesiological motif in turn. 
i) The Church's role as a witness, and the history of the divine-
human relationship 
In an ecclesiology of witness, stressing the ways in which 
man is separated from God, even within the context of the Church, 
human persons are sharply distinguished from the one whose heralds 
they are, and their message is distinguished from his immediate self-
revelation.· Even when this theology is combined with a doctrine of the 
Holy Spirit's presence to believers, this presence does not so bridge 
the gap between the human condition and the life of God as to make 
men's words and deeds identifiable with the words and deeds of God 
himself. Perfection of human knowledge of God, and completeness of 
comnru.nion with him, remain eschatological goals. In the Church, the 
grace of Christ enables man to "see through a glass darkly" - this is 
the fUll measure of the possible effectiveness of salvation within 
the confines of space and time. 
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How can such a radical separation from God be accO&nted 
for? :HJ.rstly, it may be laid at the door of man 1 s created nature; 
the status of a creature may be conceived as being so ontologically 
distinct from that enjoyed by the creator that no inherent affinity 
between them is to be expected. It is quite possible to conceive of 
God as creating a perfect, but self-enclosed nature, operating and 
developing according to divinely-given laws, but which has no immediate 
access to the transcendent realm. Such a nature could find its 
completeness in a created perfection which had no reference to divine 
life, and the extent of its knowledge and expression would be strictly 
limited to its experience within the space-time continuum. 
(2his picture of the inherent limitations of human nature 
and knowledge, cut off from the transcendent by its very created status, 
is, of course, coherent with Kant's enclosure of the scope of pure 
human reasoning within the boundaries of space and time. Therefore, we 
may expect certain lines of post-Enlightenment thought to reinforce 
the idea that the Church may be a human body which witnesses in only a 
fragmentary way to a God who is radically beyond us, and yet who has 
broken in uniquely and paradoxically upon the h~Unan realm by his act of 
in~arnation.) 
Man's separation from God may be conceived as being not only 
attributable to his created status and condition, but also as being 
reinforced by the fact of sin. This can be seen as supervening upon the 
ontological separation of man from God, having the further effect of 
mald..ng mankind untrue even to itself. The way in Vlhich the effect of 
sin has been assessed in different theologies has varied; most radically, 
it has been seen as the total corruption even of man's natural goodness. 
This view suggests that mankind is not only cut off from the divine realm, 
but also actively turned against it; it is both true that man cannot 
attain to God by natural reasoning or natural virtue - and it is 
even true that what we count as reasoning and virtue, within the 
concrete conditions of our fallenness, actually prove obstacles to, and 
rejection of, the ingress of God's grace. 
The less radical view of the effect of sin sees it as a 
wound or weakness in man 1 s natural goodness. The individual does not 
lose it completely, but he is divided against himself in the practice 
of it; his various faculties are disordered, and none of them can 
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fully achieve its end, nor can they work in harmony. However, in 
strictly limited ways, real goodness can be attained, and human 
reasoning can be of positive value, even though it is partially 
obscured. The divine goodness, in the revelation of God, does not, 
therefore, negate human expert ence, reasoning and morality; rather, 
nature can be in·tegr~ted in the obedient life of gr:-ace which is 
both man's response to the witness of God, and also GOd's gift. 
We have looked at two contrasting views of the effects of 
sin, and we have seen that it is the concept of total corruption of 
human nature which most fully reinforces the ontological gap between 
man and God. The second concept leaves man with a more favourable 
basis for receiving the witness of the Church and affirming it in faith. 
The concept of total corruption must be linked with a theory of a 
completely transforming action Which the Holy Spirit must preveniently 
carry out in man in order to make him receptive to the Gospel; the 
second also requires a doctrine of the Holy Spirit 1 s e.ction, but in 
this case it will be characterised in terms of healing and elevation of 
human nature, because the Church's message is not totally disjunctive 
with the evidence of this nature, but rather presents to man a higher 
and more integrated goodness and truth than that which he might 
attain for himself. 
Finally, if we consider the relationship of an ecclesiology 
dominated by the witness motif to the idea of man's final salvation, we 
find. that the gap between man and God) written into the very essence 
of the Church according to this view, suggests that the eschatological 
fulfillment or reward which results from a life lived in grace is also 
likely to preserve within itself a clear distinction between man and 
God. Created human nature would not seem to have the structural 
capacity for a substantial union of life and knowledge with the divine 
(unless the radical newness of that which is to come takes the form of 
a complete re-creation and restructuration of man's existence according 
to a different ontological and epistemological pattern). 
ii) The Church's role of embodiment and the history of the divine-
human relationship 
If we take an ecclesiology based on the idea of epiphany, or 
some degree of embodiment of the divine presence in the Church, it 
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suggests that human nature ltas a basic structure of openness to the 
presence of God. This may be accounted for in two ways' Firstly, it 
may be attributed to the nature of man's creation - he was made in 
the image of God , capable both of attaining to perfect knowledge of 
the divine (even to a share in God's own self-knowledge) and of 
living a life of communion which both mirrors, and participates in, 
the life of the Trinity. Human beings were made to be 1Go.d-bearers 1 
to one another. Being thus created, man 1 s nature persists in this 
structure of openness. His language, and the work of his hands can, 
perhaps, be the adequate vehicles of God's epiphany. Likewise, the 
human spirit can apprehend the things of God with immediacy, through 
the intuitive knowledge given by the Holy Spirit. 
How is sin to be integrated into this first pattern of 
doctrine? It may be held responsible for the fact that mankind does 
not, concretely, live in constant affinity to God. This affinity was 
lost through the l:!1all, and the divine life for which man· was made was 
withdrawn (although the structure of openness to divine life remained, 
but as an empty shell) until grace returned as Christ's gift. 
This first pattern of doctrine, which stresses man's essential 
goodness and openness to God, has been presented by means of a highly 
schematic type. In fact, man's capacity to embody the divine presence 
in the Church is not usually set forward so starkly as a mere 
restoration of the situation which prevailed in the moment of creation. 
A second faotor is normally emphasised as a further way of accounting 
for human openness to God. This second factor is that of redemption: 
By Christ's incarnation human nature (as a universal reality) has 
been assimilated to the life of God so that, concretely, each 
individual is potentially open to the divine because of the Word's 
redemption of humanity as a whole. 
The idea of the redemption of univ~sal human nature through 
its 'inclusion' in the being of the Godhead by Christ's inosrnation 
supervenes upon the doctrine of man's created openness to God in two 
ways. Firstly, the idea of redemption m~ be co-ordinated with a 
doctrine of sin and the Fall which attributes to them a greater effect 
than that of having caused simply a~ of divine life. If the 
Christian in the Church finds himself open to God's presence, this 
may be because a real wound or distortion in his nature, which sin had 
brought about, has been healed and set right by the redempti~e 
effects of Christ 1 s i.ncarnation (and particularly by the passion of the 
63 
:;,ncarnate Lord). The idea of a redeemed openness to God, therefore, 
can cope with a graver view of sin than can the idea of a human 
openness which is rooted solely in man's created nature. 
Secondly, the idea of the redemption of human na·ture 
through Christ's incarnation and passion is often taken to include 
the notion that man's redeemed relationship to God is more thru1 a 
restoration, and is actually a better and a closer relationship than 
that in which man was created. The state of grace is more blessed 
than the state of original justice. 
We see, then, that the motif which characterises the life 
of the Church as a life which embodies the presence and activity of 
God, may be co-ordinated with a view of human nature vmich focuses 
either upon the fact that God created us to be open to him, or else, 
upon the fact that human nature has been redeemed and refashioned 
after the p3.ttern of openness through its adoption by the Son of God. 
The two ideas may also be closely linked, as,;dhe:v>ar.e, for example, 
when the bond is stressed between man, who is made after the image of 
God, and the eternal Word, who 1[ the Image of the Father. 
Although an ecclesiology in which the motif of embodiment 
or epiphany predominates does not have altogether clear implications 
concerning the created structure of man's first relationShip to God, 
nor conoerning the extent and nature of what would have been sin's 
unredeemed effects, it does, however, have clearer implications 
regarding the way in which man will be related to God in the eschaton. 
Because of the claim that created things have a capacity to be vehicles 
for the divine (and this is particularly true in the case of 
ecclesiologies based around a e~charistic epiphany) it may be deduced 
that man, the creature, may also have the ca}nci ty to be· transfigured 
by a full participation in the divine life. It is no accident that 
Eastern Orthodox theology, which most strongly emphasises the way in 
which the Church embodies the divine presence and manifests it to the 
world, is also the scheme of thought which stresses the concept of man's 
final · divinisation • This divinisation begins in the diffuse 
participation in God's presence which individual men can know through 
present membership of the Church and their share in the power of the 
eucharistic epiphany; it will reach its full realisation at the last 
etay, the final epiphany or unveiling of God 1 s presence in the midst 
of .his people. 
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iii) The Church's role of representation and the history of the 
divine-human relationship 
Finally, we reach the question of ecclesiologies dominated 
by the motif of representation. The reader will remember that the 
idea of representation attaches itself to the doctrine of embodiment, 
but qualifies it by introducing extrinsic conditions for the Church's 
embodiment of God's presence, and for the individual's participation in 
the power of a central, sacramental epiphany. 
J~ ecclesiology which was strongly formed by the idea of 
representation might suggest an underlying ambivalence about the capacity 
of human nature to be open to God. Is it that knowledge and 
experience of God are available to man within the institutional struc-
ture of the Church because only there does the Holy Spirit create the 
necessary new conditions within human nature? Or is it rather the 
case that all human nature, within and without the Church, is potentially 
open to knowledge of God and to a share in his life, but it is only 
within the Church that this possibility is activated within a proper 
structure of relationships and revealed truths? If the first were 
true, we might conclude that human nature as it exists outside the Church 
is deeply corrupted by sin, and that this creates an opposition to God 
which only the powers of ecclesiastical grace can overcome. If the 
second were the case, however, human nature as it exists outside the 
Church would appear to be less radically distorted by sin, and to 
bear more clearly the marks of having originally been created after 
God's image. 
We find, therefore, that an ecclesiology dominated by the 
motif of representation does not, in that single aspect, make clear 
the role of sin and the role of man's original, created nature in 
determining his present capacity for relationship to God in the Church. 
If we consider the nature of that relationship to God 
which is ac11ieved in the Church, we find that in the representational 
scheme of thought, it is a matter of some complexity, involving both 
intrinsic and extrinsic factors (see P. 58-: ) • · However, the fact 
that man can intrinsically be open to God only to the degree of a 
rather diffuse participation in the Holy Spirit's presence, and that 
extrinsic, formal conditions must be fulfilled for the guarantee and 
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confirmation of the faith and authority which flow from this 
diffuse participation, suggest that there is a real gap between 
man and God of which membership of the Church and the presence 
of the Holy Spirit do not fully overcome. Whilst the pattern of 
relationships within the institution of the Church m~ mirror the 
pattern of heavenly relationships, and while human words may 
represent divine truth through appropriate analogies, even so, 
ecclesiastical authority and ecclesiastical teaching are not identical 
with the mystery of divine truth and authority, of mich they are the 
mere analogies, representations and reflections. Only in the 
eucharistic focus of the Church's life (where we leave the realm of 
representation for that of epiphany) does the crea·ted realm become 
substantially transformed and divinised. 
There is, then, a two-fold structure of human relationship 
to God implied in a representational ecclesiology; on the epistemological 
level, there is a definite gap, which persists, between man and God; 
on the 'spiritual' level, however, touched by the eucharistic epiphany 
on a plane other than that of intellectual knowledge, man and 
creation may be seen as having a real capacity or openness for the 
divine realm. 
How, then, are we to envisage the doctrine of man's final 
destiny which should properly be co-ordinated with a representational 
ecclesiology? Perhaps this, too m~ be conceived as a two-fold 
structure: On the intellectual level, we might expect man to remain 
excluded from God's own knowledge of himself, because humanity lacks 
the capaci~r for a share in this; but on the spiritual level of 
sanctification, a real identification or divinisation m~ be envisaged. 
However, as in the case of the other ecclesiological motifs, we must be 
very tentative in drawing conclusions concerning man's eschatological 
destiny, because the radical newness of the kingdom might cancel all 
expectations. 
Having looked at the interrelationship between the ways in 
which the Church is said to mediate God's presence, power and truth 
to men, and the structure of human nature vis-1-vis its creator, we 
have found that the bare patterns of ecclesiology do not completely 
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define and delimit which doctrines of God and man should correspond 
to them. Rather, each ecclesiological motif can be co-ordinated with 
different concepts of the structure of the divine-human relationship. 
The main factor distinguishing these differing concepts is the 
issue of sin and its effects on man's openness to God. 
In order to discover a determinate concept of man's 
relationship to God - that is, a concept which includes a specific 
notion of the weight and effect of sin - we must view an ecclesiology 
not only from the angle of the way in which it shows God's action, 
authority and truth to be mediated, but also from the point of view 
afforded by knowledge of the content of ecclesiastical obedience which 
is associated with it. We turn once more, therefore, to the issue 
of the content of due obedience in the Church. 
c) The content of due Christian obedience in correlation with the 
concept of sin and its effects 
In those patterns of ecclesiology in which the Church is 
attributed a witnessing or representational role in relation to the 
action, power and presence of God, we saw that it is possible to 
conceive of sin as either having wounded and weakened the htunan 
capacity for goodness, .s:, as having corrupted it. In'•tm latter case, 
that which man considers good is not merely disordered on the natural 
plane, but also constitutes a real obstacle to obedience to God's 
will. Without a total conversion of thought and action, effected by 
the prevenient grace of the Holy Spirit, human nature will reject any 
revelation of God and his law which might lead it to its transcendent 
destiny. 
A picture of the formal content of the Church's require-
ments for obedience helps us to locate which of the above concepts of 
sin is operative in an ecclesiology which is of the representational 
or witness type. (It cannot, however, help us immediately with the 
question posed by an ecclesiology based purely on ideas of epiphany 
or embodiment because, whatever the nature of sin's effect on 
universal human nature, the effects of its redemptive healing are 
equally universal, through the assumption by Christ of human 
m:ture. Therefore, the distinction between man's openness in the 
Church, and his openness to God outside the Church, can, at its 
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sharpest, only be a distinction between potential and actuality; 
the fundamental structuration of man's redeemed nature towards divine 
life is the same, whether or not the individual has concretely 
received that life.) 
We have, of course, already examined the issue of the 
formal content of ecclesiastical obedience, when we derived four 
different pictures of God from the various possible ways of conceiving 
this obedience. The reader will remember the distinction which was 
drawn between Christian obedience which is disjunctive with secular 
moral norms, and Christian obedience which may be harmonised with 
such norms (see P• 44 ) • The disjunction of divinely revealed law 
with man 1 s 1 natural' way of conceiving what is right may be of two 
kinds: Firstly, it may be a disjunction of mere difference. For 
example, secular morality does not suggest that we should rest one 
day in sevenr , nor that we should turn to prayer in our concern to 
construct new human conditions. However, secular concepts of duty 
do not actively oppose themselves (generally) to such actions. 
Therefore, both secular and religious precepts may be compounded 
together in one coherent system of morality, without violence to 
either element. However, there may be a disjunction which is of 
another kind, namely, a disjunctiOn of opposition between secular and 
divinely revealed injunctions. For example, purely human concepts 
of justice may indicate that injury should be met with proportionate 
retribution; the command of Christ, on the other hand, is to "turn 
the other cheek". 
The existence of the less ra~ical kind of disjunction, 
that of mere difference, indicates that the created order has its own 
laws of government which are distinct from divinely revealed laws 
because they deal with a different plane of life. Human sin may well 
have disturbed man's apprehension of the laws of the created order, 
but it has not entered as a radical corruption into the very fabric 
of his concept of the good. Divinely revealed laws, which direct man 
to a supernatural destiny, can be added to natural morality and be 
co-ordinated with it, although this divine revelation may have to 
clarify matters of natural morality which wounded human nature grasps 
only obscurely and inaccurately. 
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The existence of the more radical kind of disjunction, 
that of opposition, may indicate that natural moral concepts as we 
concretely know them are opposed to the carrmandments of God which 
direct man to a supernatural end. That is to say, human nature is 
corrupt and goes contrary to the will of its creator (for it is 
inconceivable that God's will for human action should be radically 
self-contradictory between the natural and supernatural orders). 
However, it is necessary to be cautious in reaching such a conclusion 
from the evidence of one or two 'clashes' between human and divine 
precepts; these may be explicable in terms other than that of the total 
corruption of human nature. They may, for example, be the results of a 
wounded nature, and even come about because man grasps a real good, but 
grasps it in a distorted way. Thus, if we take the example given of 
retributive justice, it may be viewed as a distortion of the idea of 
God-willed justice which is a moral reality in both the natural and the 
supernatural spheres. 
There is, then, a continuum of degrees of distortion which 
may be attributed to human nature in its apprehension of the good. 
At one pole there stands total corruption, whereby man is both 
radically disordered in his natural ideas of what is right, and also 
actively set against the reception of divine revelation. At the other 
pole of the continuum stands the idea that human nature is merely 
weakened in its grasp of the natural good, and that it is neutral, or 
even passively open, to the revelation of God and his will. This 
continuum is to be correlated with a spectrum of different ideas of 
the obedience which is due in the Church; at one pole stands the 
concept of the Church that sees it as the vehicle of a divine law 
which stands in total judgement over all natural human ethical insights. 
At the other pole stands the idea of the Church in which its 
demands are almost completely justifiable in humanly comprehensible 
terms. 
J~l this is very reminiscent of the distinctions we made 
when putting forward the bases upon which different pictures of 
God might be constructed; however, our concern is not immediately 
with the doctrine of God, but with the question of sin in human 
nature. However, it will be clear that the pictures under which God 
is conceived in different theologies can be correlated, in their turn, 
with the ways in which these theologies see the role of human 
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sinfulness. Thus, for example, the picture of God as creator and 
legislator of a stable natural order is associated with the Church's 
teaching of natural law, and this, in turn, is correlated with a view 
of man in which he appears as one Who is wounded by sin, but not 
totally corrupted. On the other hand, the picture of God as eternal 
king and judge belongs together with a concept of Christian ethics 
which is completely disjunctive with 1 natural! human morality; this, 
in turn, is correlated with the idea of man's total corruption by sin. 
From this, it should become clear that the 'pictures' of God 
which were described earlier are not, indeed, systematic doc·trinal 
accounts of his nature. If God appears, for example, as a king who 
demands actions which are disjunctive with normal, secular morality, 
this is not necessarily because he is in fact asking for obedience 
which is disjunctive with the nature of the world he has created; it 
may rather be because man's view of the world and' of ·the nature of the 
moral order is totally corrupted and distorted through sin. Therefore, 
we may conclude that pictures of God in his relationship to us do not 
tell the whole divine story. Later in this thesis, when we come to 
treat the doctrine of God more systematically, we shall have to draw 
not only upon the pictures of God which we have constructed, but also 
upon the doctrine of man, in order to reach a more determinate concept 
of the divine nature. 
Surmnary of the third part of the typology 
In this part of the typology we have examined the structure 
of man's relationship to God as it is entailed in ecclesiology, and 
particularly in the idea of due Christian obedience in the Church. By 
taking a standpoint in ecclesiology we have been able to look backwards 
over the history of the divine-human relationship in the 1moments 1of 
creation and fallenness, and we have also been able to look forward to 
the structure of man's redeemed relationship to God. We have taken 
this overview by means of drawing together elements of ecclesiology 
which we had already examined in earlier parts of the typology, and by 
examining the ways. in which they correlate with different expositions 
of the changing character of the divine-human relationship in its 
wider scope. Through the use of this method, several distinct circles 
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of correlative ideas have emerged, in which concepts of obedience, 
pictures of God, doctrines of man, and ideas of the nature and 
significance of sin, are seen to be integrally linked together. It 
is against the background of these links, vvhich have been schematicall;)r 
mapped-out here, that we shall chart shifts of emphasis in Vatican II's 
ideal of ecclesiastical obedience, and suggest their significance. 
Conclusion 
The title at the head of this chapter is, ".An Introduction to 
the significance of the Idea of Obedience and to its Place in 
Systematic Theology". How far has the treatment of obedience which has 
been given here provided an outline of its significance and place in 
systematic theology? 
I have structured the typology which occupies the second 
section of this chapter upon the basic supposition that obedience is 
a theme with an integral place both in ecclesiology and also in wider 
doctrines concerning the nature of God and man in their relationship. 
I have suggested that obedience has this necessary organic place in too 
various fields of systematic theology because mainstream, orthodox 
Christian thinking treats man and God as distinct beings who can be 
related through mutual knowledge and through activity directed towards 
each other. Obedience has its place particularly in the doctrine of 
the Church, because it is in the Church that man enters into this 
relationship with God consciously; the character of the obedience which 
is said to be due in the Church, or which should at least be inspired 
by its preaching, is a measure of a theological system's concept of the 
way in which man should rightly encounter God. The character of such 
a right encounter itself depends on the nature of the God and creature 
who are set face to face in it. 
Ideas of due Christian obedience may change, but the 
centrali~y of the theme is not lost. Shifts in the idea of such 
obedience should indicate similar shifts in all co-ordinate areas of 
doctrine. I believe that the typology constructed in the second section 
of this chapter amply illustrates this contention, as well as setting out 
a schematic 1map 1 , to guide us through an analysis of the teaching of 
Vatican II. 
CHAPTER II: 
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THE DEFINITION AND JUSTIFICATION OF THE INSTITUTION 
AND USE OF AUTHORITY IN THE CHURCH IN THE DOCUMENTS 
OF VATICAN II 
In this chapter, and the three which follow it, we shall be 
analysing the documents of the Second Vatican Council according to the 
method outlined in the Preface to the thesis (see PP•ll-13);that is 
to say, we shall be looking for shifts of emphasis in the Council's 
treatment of the idea of obedience, by comparing its teaching with 
that of magisterial documents of earlier times. During the course of 
this analysis we shall pay attention to the theologi..cal atmosphere which 
Vatican II's treatment of obedience betokens, and in this way we shall 
be able to remark not only upon the inner consistency of the Council's 
teaching on obedience, but also, to some extent, upon its social 
plausibility. 
In the present chapter we are to examine the justifications 
which Vatican II gave for the institutional exercise of authority in 
Christ's body, the Church; this study will begin to illuminate the way 
in which the Council distributed emphasis among the different motifs 
describing the role and significance of the Church and its authorities 
in mediating salvation and revelation to men. The theme of the Church's 
role will also be followed up in the subsequent chapters, but they will 
treat the matter more concretely, and also show what the conten~ of ideal 
Christian obedience was, according to the thinking of the Council. 
Now we must turn to the questions which will concern us in 
the present chapter: 1Do the men who hold institutional authority in the 
Church do so primarily as God's witnesses, his representatives, or as 
those whose authority is grounded in their special association with an 
epiphany at the heart of the Church's life?' ·tv./hat is the relationship 
between their special, authoritative role, and that which belongs to 
the Church a.s a whole?' 
In order to have a clear view of the background against which 
we should see the answers given by Vatican II to these questions, we ·, 
shall devote the first section of this chapter to a sketch of the ways 
in which institutional authority in the Church was defined and justified 
in the period from the Council of Trent to this century. After this will 
follow two sections which are devoted more particularly to Vatican II's 
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own teaching: Firstly, to the Council's general definition and justi-
fication of the existence of institutionalised authority in the Roman 
Catholic Church, and secondly to its delineation of the specific degrees 
of hierarchical authority which exist, and of their relationship to 
the life and function of lay Christians. In connection with our concern 
with the status of lay Christians, we shall also view Vatican II 1s con-
cept of the role of the entire Church in mediating God's authority and 
presence to the 'secular' world. 
A) The Definition and Justification of Institutional Authority in 
the Church, from the Council of Trent to the Twentieth Century 
During the post-Tridentine era there have been two distinct 
ways of describing and justifying the possession and exercise of power 
in the Church. (1) The first has been the use of the idea of canonical 
(jurisdictional) authority; the second has been the idea of sacramental 
power. Each concept of power or authority underlies the structure of 
a hierarchy of office holders in the Church - a hierarchy which exists 
by the institution of the ~ncarnate Christ - and these two hierarchies 
overlap with one another, although the degrees of the possession of 
sacramental power have not been seen as exactly equivalent to the 
degrees in which canonical authority is held. 
Although two distinct types of power are invested in Roman 
Catholic clergy, theirs is not a twofold, but a threefold task. They 
have the functions of sanctifying, ruling and teaching in the Church 
of God, (2) The function of sanctifying the Church is attached to the 
possession of sacramental power, and that of ruling it to the 
( 1) 
(2) 
For general articles on "Power'·', see: s.I. Berm's article in 
Encyclopaedia of Philosop4y, 6 {New York and London)1967) 
pp. 424-26; article by K. Hemmerle, in Sacramentum Mundi, 5 
(London, 1970) PP• 70-72. 
For articles specifically on ecclesiastical power, see: 
G. H. Joyce, "The Power of the Keys", in Encyclopaedia of 
Religion and Ethics, 10 (Edinburgh, 1918); J. Dahyot-Dolivet, 
"Potestas", in Dictionarium Morale et Canonicum, 3 (Rome, 1966) 
pp. 720ff; F. Lakner, "Potestas", in LTK, a, cols. 647f. 
We shall see later (p.85 ) that the formulation of a trichotomy 
of functions was a late addition to Roman Catholic theology. 
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possession of canonical power. The task of teaching with authority, 
(magisterium) has, since the nineteenth century, customarily been 
assigned to the function of jurisdiction held by those with higher 
degrees of canonical power. The reasoning behind this identification 
of teaching authority and canonical power is this: The most authorita•"' 
tive form.of teaching in the Church is a definition • This is a formal 
judgement on an issue in faith or morals, and it discriminates between 
what is acceptable and what is unacceptable for members of the 
Church to believe and do. A definition commonly has a negative form, 
and describes which views are anathematised; such acts of anathema-
tisation, by which the limits to Church membership are fixed through 
the medium of doctrine and morals, are clearly acts of jurisdiction. 
This, then, is the most authoritative way of teaching in the Church, 
and it belongs to those with canonical, or jurisdictional, authority 
of the highest degree. Moreover, if an act of authoritative teaching 
is considered in its positive aspect, as an act which enunciates what 
should be believed or held in the Church, it requires formal obedience 
or assent. Therefore, it appears closely related by nature to acts 
of government, which also require obedience. (We shall return to these 
issues in greater detail in the pages which follow, and also in 
Chapter IV~} 
There are, then, in post-Tridentine ecclesiology (particularly 
as it has been received since the beginning of the nineteenth century) 
two types of power which may be attributed to office-holders in the 
Church and three functions in which these powers are exercised. In 
the sub-sections which follow, we shall examine the relationship 
between these powers and these functions more closely, and ask the 
question, 'what kind of role in mediating God's authority does post-
Tridentine ecclesiology attribute to those who hold office in the 
Church?'. 
1 The Canonical Office and the Power of Jurisdiction 
Jurisdictional, or canonical, power has legislative, 
juridical and administrative elements. One who holds such power in 
its fullness has the faculty of commanding that certain laws and 
specific injunctions should be kept, and he is institutionally 
qualified to enact and enforce these laws and injunctions. On the 
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negative side, the holder of the highest degree of canonical power 
can also enforce prohibitions. 
So far, canonical power in the Church appears to be very 
similar to civil authority; however, ecclesiastical power has a 
distinctive dimension: Whereas civil law and jurisdiction can only 
apply to men's external, social actions, the jurisdictional power 
of the Church is exercised in reference to the law of God, as well 
as to humanly made laws. The law of God extends over both man 1 s 
external action and his internal thought and intention; it extends 
both over actions Which have social effects and over those whose 
effects appear to be purely private. Thus, there is an aspect of the 
jurisdictional power of the Church, exercised through the confessional, 
which gives its holders authority to pronounce on matters of the 
'internal forum', and to pronounce verdicts and penalties which are 
effective not only in the socially observable sphere, but also have 
effective validity before the divine tribumal. (3) Equally, even when 
the specific case is not brought to the judgement of the confessional, 
certain transgressions of divine law are attached to automatic 
ecclesiastical penalties, according to principles enunciated by the 
Church. (4) However, we should note here that the Church's power of 
pronouncing upon a person's state before God, by reference to divine 
law, does not extend so far as the capacity to say that even an 
excommunicate of the most seri'ou.s degree( 'to be avoided 1 ) is finally 
damned, because of the possibility of arcane 'perfect contrition', 
accompanied by a desire for the sacrament of penance, which remains 
open to him to the end of his life. (5) The Church's power in regard 
to the law of God, therefore, consists of the faculty enjoyed by 
properly empowered ministers to say that someone needs to repent, or, 
upon evidence of repentance in confession, that his sins are remitted; (6) 
whereupon the minister may enjoin appropriate penances by which the 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
See Cone. Trid., Sess. XIV~ Doctrine on Penance (de Paenitentia), 
canon. 3. (Dz 913/DzS 1703); also, ibid,, can. 15. {Dz 925/ 
DzS 1715). 
For example, desecration of the Sacrament, or involvement in an 
abortion, entail an internal excommunication, effecto secutu, even 
if the circumstance is only known to the transgressor himself. 
See de Paenitentia, cap. 4. (Dz 898/DzS 1677). 
See note (3) above. 
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temporal satisfaction still due to the consequence of sin may be 
rendered. 
With regard to humanly made, ecclesiastical laws, the 
extent of the Church's authority in the'internal forwn'of conscience 
is a matter of debate. According to one view, ecclesiastical law 
can be raised to the status of having binding force in the sight of 
God, by virtue of the authority which Christ give to Peter and the 
Apostles, when it is enacted by the highest jurisdictional authority 
in the Church - that is, by the Pope or a General Council. (7) 
According to another view, however, such humanly made law only has the 
status of Et very strong guideline regarding the exigencies of salvation, 
and it belongs to the individual's conscience to interpret and apply 
such laws as those which require yearly confession and communion, for 
example. (8) Indeed, it is possible theoretically to envisage a case 
in which the Pope or a Council might command something which the 
individual Catholic found to be directly contrary to the indications 
afforded by his conscience. Such a command might even be attached to 
threatened excommunication for those who failed to keep it. In this 
case, there is a strong stream of tradition which indicates that the 
individual should obey conscience rather than the authority of the 
Church, and11htunbly bear the excommunication". (9) 
What role, then, do holders of jurisdictional authority 
play in regard to the mediation of God's own authority? Clearly, when 
they act and speak in the sphere of divine law, they act and speak as 
those who can give representational teaching (see PP• 48f.; ) • In the 
light of this teaching, their acts of judgement make them agents, or 
representatives, of God himself in applying divine law to specific cases. 
However, when they act or speak in the sphere of purely ecclesias-
tical law, it is not clear whether their very~ can be representational 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
See J. Salaverri, Sacrae Theologiae Summa, 1 (4th edition, 
Madrid, 1958) sections 703 and 708. 
Cone. Lat. IV, cap. 21 (Dz 437(I)/DzS 812). 
Innocent III, cited from A. Friedberg, Corpus Iuris Canonici, 
(Leipzig, 1881) by Hans Kling, in Infallible? (London, 1971) 
P• 39. See also the traditional sources.quoted by J.H. Newman 
in his Letter Addre~3sed to His Grace the Duke of Norfolk 
(London, 1875) PP• 52f., 64. 
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of the will of God himself, or whether their authority is limited 
to that of being representational persons, even when this authority 
is exercised in its highest degree. 
It is clear that some acts of jurisdictional authority lay 
no claim to being representational of the acts of God; it is only at 
the highest level, when ecclesiastical law is made with the utmost 
solemnity, that some commentators deem it to be invested with full, 
inerrant, binding authority. In other cases, the exercise of canonical 
authority may be said to enjoy the assistance of God, in a 'relative', 
1 prudential' manner. ( 1 0) Decisions of this kind command moral assent, 
which is rendered on the basis that rnembers of the hierarchy hold and 
exercise their authority legitimately. Anyone who withheld the proper 
moral assent and obedience, for insufficient reasons, would be 
committing sin, because he would be withholding the obedience which 
is due in justice to his superiors because of their status as 
representatives of God. 
We may raise two questions about the traditional concept 
of canonical power and its scope. (a) In what ways was the possession 
of this power by a distinct group of persons in the Church theologically 
grounded and justified? And (b) what might constitute sufficient reason 
for withholding the obedience demanded by someone in a position of 
canonical authority? 
a) The justification for institutions and persons holding authority 
The Council of Trent cited St. Paul's words to the elders 
of Ephesus, that they were "set by the Holy Spirit to rule the Church 
of God,"· (see Acts 20.28) as the basis for the canonical power of 
bishops, relying also on the idea that they are successors to the 
Apostles ( "9..ui in Apostolorum locum successerunt") in their task. ( 11) 
(10) See Charles Journet, L'Dglise du Verbe incarne, 1 (Paris, 1955) 
pp. 426-31. We Shall discuss the questions arising from a 
concept of 'prudential' assistance in division (b) of this 
sub-section,~ pp.Bl-85. 
(11) Cone. Trid. Seas. XXIII, Decree on the Sacrament of Order 
4de sacram. Ordinis), cap. 4. (Dz 960/DzS 1768). 
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Meanwhile, the 
the Apostles. 
Pope is seen as the successor to Peter, chief of 
These ideas of gradation in canonical office were 
quasi-legal notion of being an inheritor ( 1haeres 1 ) based on tln 
of power and status; this, in turn, was integrally linJced with a 
concept of the Church as a 'perfect society', conforming to the same 
lcind of social relationships as those to be found in civil society, 
and 11 as visible and palpable as the community of the Roman people, 
the kingdom of France or the~ republic of Venice". (12) The holding 
of canonical power could be justified by immediate reference to its 
institution by Christ, then, and also by the necessity incumbent on 
the Church of having an orderly social constitution. Only in this 
did the Church essentially differ from other societies in the 
character of its constitution- the Church's hierarchy could be claimed 
to reflect the hierarchy of heaven! (13) 
The grade of the priesthood below the bishops did not 
possess powers which were proper to it in the canonical sphere; 
presbyteral priests exercised authority in the Church only by virtue 
of 'canonical mission' given by their superiors. This was because 
they did not fill the jurisdictional category of being inheriting 
successors to the Apostles in canonical power. However, there was one 
exception to this: It is in the jurisdictional sphere of action that 
persons are referred to as "vicars of Christ" (a title most often 
associated with the Pope himself) but it was also applied by the Council 
of Trent to all priests in their exercise of the "power of the keys", 
when they preside over the faithful in the sacrament of penance, (14) 
We see, therefore, that in the sacrament of penance the canonical and 
sacrrunental hierarchies of power intersect, so that presbyters, who 
are distinguished chiefly by their participation in the sacramental 
power structure, are, at this point, attributed a title and role which 
(12) Robert Bellarmine, De Controversiis Christianae Fidei, 2, 
Prima Controv. Generalis, Bk. III, cap. 2 (Ingolstaldt, 1601) 
cols. 137f. 
(13) See Pius XII, encycl. Mediator Dei (20 Nov. 1947) AAS 39 
(1947) P• 538. 
( 14) de Paeni tentia, cap. 5: 11 Iesus Christus • • • sacerdotes sui 
ipsius vicarios reliqui t • • • tamquam praesides et iudices. '"1 
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belongs to the sphere of jurisdiction. Because they succeed the 
Apostles in the priesthood (15) even presbyters potentially inherit 
a limited share in juridical power through their penitential function. 
However, under normal circumstances, this juridical potential needs to 
be activated by the bestowal of proper canonical authorisation from 
above if it is to be exercised at all validly (and not just if it is to 
be exercised leg;timately). (16) There was, therefore, at this point 
a certain ambiguity about the exact way in which presbyters participated 
in the jurisdictional function instituted by Christ. (we shall explore 
further ambiguities concerning the relationship between the 
sacramental and canonical hierarchies vvi thin the next few paragraphs.) 
By the nineteenth century, the theory of the structure of 
the canonical hierarchy was highly developed. At the head of this hier-
archy stands the Supreme Pontiff, who, according to the teaching of the 
First Vatican Council, occupies a see which holds the primacy of ordinary 
power o~er all the churches; the Pope's primacy of jurisdiction is 
"t~.,tly episcopal" ("vere episcopalis11 ) (17) and can be immediately 
(15) de sacram. Ordinis, cap. 1. (Dz 956/DzS 1764). 
(16) Except where someone is in danger of death (ere can. 882) proper 
juris6ictional power must have been delegated to a presbyter if 
he is to administer the sacrament of penance validly (ere can. 872). 
(17) Cone. Vat. (I), Do tic Constitution on the Church of Christ 
(Pastor Aeternus 18 July 1870 cap. 3. Dz 1827/DzS 3060 • 
The phrase, "truly episcopal", can be taken to mean that the Pope 
has a power of oversight, in a general sense. Indeed, a document 
issued by the German bishops in 1875 (as a vindication of the 
Vatican Council in the face of Bismark's Kulturkampf) stressed that 
the Pope is "bishop of Rome, not bishop of any other city or 
diocese, 11 but that as pastor and head of the whole Church "the 
Pope must take care that each bishop fUlfills completely the 
obligations of his office; and where the bishop is impeded, or 
some other necessity demands it, the Supreme Pontiff has the right 
and duty - not as bishop of the diocese concerned, but as Pope -
of ordering everything concerning its administration." (DzS 3113) 
This corporate declaration was confirmed by Pius IX. (DzS 3117) 
We may say, therefore, that although the Pope has oversight over 
all the churches, he is not their bishop. However, there is an 
area of uncertainty here, expressed, for example, in the signature 
which Pope Paul appended to each of the documents of Vatican II: 
"Ego PAULUS Catholicae Ecclesiae Episcopus." 
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exercised in the whole Church. It follows, therefore, that 
"pastors and faithful of all rites, whether singly or together, are 
bound by tha duty of hierarchical obedience not only in matters of 
faith and morals, but also in matters concerning the discipline and 
government of the Church throughout the world". (18) Although the 
bishops possess a power which is "proper to them, and are called 
with absolute truth the governing ordinaries ("antistites ordinarii") 
of the people they rule, " which means that they are not to be 
considered as "vicars of the Roman Pontiff" (19) yet, both Leo XIII 
and Pius XII taught that their jurisdictional power is not fully 
"sui. iuris 11 ; (20) Pius XII spelt out what this meant in the following 
way - the ordinary power of jurisdiction which bishops enjoy is 
"in:nnediately con:nnunicated" to them "by the Supreme Pontiff". (21) 
The Pope then, stands at the head of the jurisdictional 
hier~rchy; in the period succeeding Vatican I he was attributed a 
role which almost made him the sole fount of jurisdictional power. 
Below him were the bishops, successors of the Apostles in their office, 
and they, in turn, presided over presbyteral priests, to whom canonical 
authority was quite clearly ceded only through the device of 'canonical / 
mission', or delegation from above (except for the ambiguous area of 
jurisdiction concerned with the sacrament of penance). 
We must now consider a question which the Council of Trent 
left open: Is the distinction between bishops and presbyters a 
distinction to be attribu-ted purely to the canonical or jurisdictional 
hierarchy, or is it rooted also in different gradations in the 
possession of sacramental power? 
The Council of Trent treated the generic notion of priesthood 
( 1 sacerdotium') as its focus of interest in the treatment of Sacred 
Order. In relation to this it said: 
(18) Pastor Aeternus, loc. cit. 
(19) Leo XIIIt encycl. Satis Co;a.?tum (29 June 1896) ASS 28 
(1895-96) PP• 731f. (Dz 1958 DzS 3307) 
(20) Leo XIII, ibid., 737; Pius XII, encycl. Mystici Corporis 
(29 June 1943) AAS 35 (1943) P• 211. 
(21) loc. cit. 
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"In addition to the other ecclesiastical 
degrees ( 11gradus11 ) bishops, who succeeded in 
the office of the Apostles, belong in an 
eminent way ( "praecipue ,pertinere") to this 
hierarchical order • • • and are superior to 
presbyters, and can confer the sacramen-t of 
c onfi nnati on, ordain ministers of the Church, 
and accomplish many other things. Others, 
of the lower order, do not possess the power 
for these functions." (22) 
It is not clear here whether. "ecclesiastical degrees", and 
"hierarchical order" refer to sacramental or to purely jurisdictional 
distinctions. Previously, in the same decree, where the grades of 
a sevenfold ministry relffted to sacerdotal functions are listed, the 
episcopate is not mentioned; (23) however, the fact that biShops are 
partly distinguished by their powers to confirm and ordain suggest a 
sacramental definition for their eminence in the hierarchy. (24) It 
is in this way that the matter was left ambiguous. One thing, however, 
is clear: Never in the post-Tridentine era has the papacy been 
considered a higher degree of sacramental order than the episcopate, 
despite its jurisdictional superiority. (25) Therefore, at one point 
at least, the sacramental and canonical hierarchies are visiblY non-
equivalent in their gradations; the ambiguity lies in the answer given 
by Trent to the question whether this non-equivalence was manifest 
also in the distinction to be made between priests of the presbyteral 
and episcopal orders. 
We find, then, that the twofold justification for the 
possession of power in the Church led, concretely, to a concept of 
(22) de sacram. Ordinis, cap. 4. (Dz 960/DzS 1768) 
(23) ibid. cap. 2 (Dz 958/DzS 1765) 
(24) The practice of the Eastern Church does not suggest that the bishops 
alone have the power to administer confirmation, and in extra-
ordinary circumstances, even the Latin rite Catholic Church has 
allowed a "simple priest" to administer the sacrament with chrism 
blessed by a bishop. (See Clement XIV, Instructio. (DzS 2588)). 
(25) Cornelius Ernst argues that the Anniversary Sermons of Leo the 
Great (440-461) show a view of the Petrina primacy as a 'sacrament': 
"The decay of this sacramental consciousness led to a juris-
dictional or 'political' theology of the primacy which was to find 
its most balanced expression in Vatican I." ("The Primacy of 
Peter: Theology and Ideology", in New Blackfriars,50 (1968-69) 
p. 354.) 
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two hierarchies which intersected at certain points. The points 
of intersection were not clearly defined, but for the practical purposes 
of government of the Church it was the jurisdictional or canonical 
way of conceiving the power structure which was determinative. 
b) What might constitute sufficient reason for withholding the 
obedience demanded by someone in a position of canonical authority? 
Within the philosophy and theology of St. Thomas, obedience 
is due to legitimate authority when it does not demand something 
which is outside its proper area of concern, and when it does not 
require something which is objectively immoral. (26) However, this 
statement should be qualified by reference to the autl1ority which 
Thomas attributed to the human act of conscience (the act of judgement 
which translates for the individual what is demanded by the moral law 
written on his heart into concrete terms). Because conscience appears 
to be the most immediate vehicle of God's objective law, the individual 
sins in disobeying it; he sins in disobeying it even if his conscience 
is objectively wrong, but he also sins in obeying it in these 
circumstances (though less gravely) because he has a responsibility to 
make sure that his conscience is objectively in conformity with divine 
law. (27) If the matter in question is a command issued by a superior 
cone erning something \'ihich is, in fact, of indifference with regard to 
divine law, the man who feels that he should obey his conscience in 
disregard of his superior's command firstly, is mistaken as to the 
moral nature of the matter in question, and secondly, sins in justice 
against his superior. "However, he sins~ if he does not do what 
his conscience dictates, as long as that conscience remains, since it 
binds more than the precepts of a superior. 11 (28) 
The original Thomist basis for post-Tridentine moral 
theology, therefore, gave a significant place to conscience, but 
always measured conscience itself for its adequacy against the standard 
(26) Aquinas, ST 2a 2ae, q.104, a.1 and a.5. 
(2~) Aquinas, ST la 2ae, q.19, a.5 and a.6 
Q~ q. 17, a.3, and a.4. 
(28) Aquinas, QD q. 17, a.5 (vol. 2, P• 336). 
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of an objective, divine law, which the individual was responsible 
for knowing. 
Overlying the Thoroist analysis of the duty of obedience, 
and its relationship to conscience, there came to be a stratum of 
thought, partly attributable to St. Ignatius Loyola and the Jesuits' 
"Fourth Vow", by which obedience in the Church was more and more 
assimilated to an ascetical practice for the member of a religious 
order. This kind of obedience became, in subsequent literature, ·t;he 
model for all Christians. (29~) Therefore, some of the careful balance 
worked out in the moral system of St. Thomas was lost, and the 
strong presumption in favour of obeying the hierarchy's commands in 
all cases, except any which involved blatantly obvious immoral action, 
became a norm of action. 
In addition to the spirituality of obedience, an expanded 
concept of indefectibility sometimes bolstered the idea of the 
safety which lies in submitting to the requirements of superior 
authorities. We have seen that a 1 relative 1 or 1 prudential' assistance 
of the Holy Spirit came to be attributed by some theologians to the 
non- 1infallible 1 exercise of authority by the hierarchy (see p.7P ). 
Journet, for example, saw this 'prudential' assistance as having ·the 
effect that the particular leg~slation of the Church constituted 
adequate action for the circumstances. (30) He did, however, also 
admit that the fallibility with which authority might be exercised in 
individual commands could create tensions for the Christian which 
were "terribly painful and fraught with anquish". (31) However, 
within the sphere of commands constraining the individual alone, a 
Catholic is never required to obey if obedience is objectively immoral.(32) 
That is the limiting point of obedience. The safeguard of the 
individual's conscience, where there are particular precepts addressed 
to him, protects the Church's hierarchy from ever being totally 
responsible for immoral actions which Catholics might perform under 
(29) See A. ~ller, Obedience in the Church (London, 1966) P• 45. 
(30) See note (10) above. 
(31) 
L1Eglise de Vatican 
p. 309. 
(32) ibid. P• 310o 
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its fallible command. We return, therefore, to the Thomist 
principles governing ·the limits of obedience. 
The problem which arises in respect of Thomist principles 
governing individual action is this: The categories of an objective 
moral law do not seem to be big enough to cope with the objections 
which an individua~ may responsibly raise against a course of action 
which seems 1 less than the best 1 , or even positively harmful for 
some section of the life of the Church. The idea of the Church's 
indefectibility, on the other hand, is too large, for one may not 
actually have to envisage that a certain course of action woiJ,ld 
destroy the Church before one might wish to object to it as inappropriate. 
Whilst Catholic moral theology often allowed that the individual indeed 
bad the right of making 'representations' to his superior if he 
thought a command a bad one, there was, nevertheless (particularly 
from the time of the late nineteenth century onwards) an ever-
increasing presumption in favour of the rightness of those in authority 
in the Church. Certainly (after any appropriate 'representation' 
might have been made) there was no room for any kind of 'conscientious 
objection' in,the Church, except for that Which was wedded to the 
strict canons of recognised objective, divine law. (33) 
(33) The issue of obedience in the Church became the subject of heated 
controversy during the 1950s. The view that had become standard 
was expressed, for example, by M. Labourdette in his commentary 
on Thomas's concept of obedience: "As far as practical judgement 
is con~erned • • • the subordinate must obey the order of a 
legitimate authority if it does not overstep its limits, even 
if he continues to think that the goal in view could have been 
much better attained in another way." (Quoted by K.n. Truhlar 
in "L'Obeissance des la1cs 11 in Laics et vie chretienne parfaite, 
edited by G. Thils and K.Vl. Truhlar (Rome, 1963) P• 248.) 
Similarly, G. Philips wrote that "conscientious objection to a 
fonnal decision of authority is unthinkable for a Catholic. 11 
(The Role of the Laity in the Church) (Cork, 1955) P• 34. 
The issue of the difficulty of locating a border-line between 
'immoral' and undesirable commands was hi@llighted by a play, 
Sur la terre comme au aiel, by HochwMlder, Which occasioned 
a sharp theological debate in France in 1953-54. The question 
is raised by the play in the context of the Jesuits' 
administration of Paraguay in the sixteenth century. They were 
commanded by their superior in Rome (for political reasons) to 
abandon the work, leaving large numbers of Indians to the mercies 
of a notorious Spanish administration. Should the Jesuits of 
Cont. p. 84 
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Finally, before concluding this sub-section, we should 
briefly examine the concept of indefectibility more closely. Whilst 
theologians such as Journet expanded the notion of indefectibility 
to cover the idea that the Holy Spirit gives 'prudential' assistance 
to the legislation of the hierarchy, so that is adequate for the 
life of the Church, in fact the idea of indefectibility only denotes 
Christ's promise that the Church should endure as the institution of 
salvation, and that it will not be destroyed so far as its essential 
constitution goes. Some theologians would hold that the only thing 
that could destroy the Church would be a grave deficiency in a matter 
touching doctrine. Thus, the guarantee of indefectibility may cover 
the hierarchy's action to the extent that a papal decree could not, 
for example, command the recitation of an heretical creed, but in 
areas concerning matters other than doctrine, the hierarchy might, 
in fact, command things which could be highly questionable, both 
morally and practically. 
If indefectibility is copsidered in this narrower scope, the 
legislation and commands of the chief authorities of the Church lie 
much more open to question, objection, and perhaps disobedience. 
However, tlt3 problem with this limitation of the concept of indefect-
ibility lies in the fact that it is attached to rather a narrow 
concept of waat constitutes destruction of the Church's life. It is 
because of a desire to claim for the commands and laws of ecclesiastical 
authority a rather more expansive scope of protection that theories 
such as that of the Spirit's 1prudentia1 1 assistance of the hierarchy 
have been used as interpretations of the concept of indefectibility. 
(33) cont. from page 83 
Paraguay have obeyed the command? This is the central issue of 
the play. 
A similar border-line problem, in a more modern context, was 
sketched by Karl Rahner in an article published in 1960; his 
example is this: What should a headmaster do if commanded by a 
legitimate superior to make his pupils go to confession once a 
week? ("Reflections on obedience: A basic Ignatian Concept", in 
Crosscurrents (1960) pp. 364-74.) Rahner was one of those who 
argued that one should not simply obey without assessing the 
probable results of one's action; these should be included in 
one's view of the morality of a command. 
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(We shall see in Chapter IV that similar concepts have appeared 
in theological commentary on the extent of obedience due to the 
Magisterium when it does not speakainfallibly~) 
2 Teaching Authority in the Church (the Magisterium) 
It was the nineteenth-century canonists and theologians 
who attributed to the hierarchy a threefold function in the Church; 
this was associated first of all with an ecclesiology which saw the 
Church as a continuation of the l;ncarnation, and consequently 
attributed to its officers shares in all the offices of Christ -
prophet, priest and king. (34) The function of teaching with 
authority was firmly assigned to the Pope and bishops, and this pro-
vided the basis for the modern use of the term 1Magisterium 1 as a way 
of describing these persons in the exercise of that function, (35) In 
this sub-section we shall largely be examining the concept of the 
Magisterium and its authority as it has been described since the 
nineteenth century. We shall also consider specifically the role of 
the Magisterium in preaching the Gospel to the world. 
a) The nature of magisterial authority 
One significant aspect of the shift in the use of the 
term 1Magisterium1 is the fact that it;signified the complete 
ascendancy of the hierarchy in the teaching sphere; no longer, as in 
the Middle Ages, would Catholic condemnations of heresy be issued 
by the universities, It had become the task of the hierarchy, and 
par ticularly of the Pope, to be both judge and organ of truth, As 
the organ of truth, the supreme, extraordinary magisterium of the 
Pope was declared infallible at the First Vatican Council (36) whilst 
(34) Congar first notes the use of the threefold division of powers 
in the second edition of F. Walter's Lehrbuch des Kirchenrechts 
(Bonn, 1823.) (See Y .M. -J. Congar, "Pour une histoire semantique 
du terme 1 Magisterium 111 , in Revue des Sciences Philoso hi ues et 
Theologiques, 60 (1976) P• 95. Michael Place remarks on the 
fact that the threefold division of officers entered Roman Catholic 
theology from Protestantism. (See "From Solicitude to Magisterium" 
in Chicago Studies,17 (1978) PP• 232f.) 
(35) See Preface, note (1). 
Congar holds that the first popes to use 'Magisterium1 in the 
modern sense were Gregory XVI and Pius IX. The usage became 
connnon under Pius XII and Paul VI. (See Congar art. cit. p. 97~) 
(36) Pastor Aeternus, cap. 4. (Dz 1839/DzS 3074). 
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the same Council also confirmed the teaching of Pius IX that the 
universal ordinary @agisterium of the bishops might propose 
doctrines to be the object of divine faith, (37) The Magisterium, 
then, was the body through vvhom God's truth was representationally taught 
to the Church and the world, with a divine guarantee of accuracy. 
\Vhat was the relationship of theologians to the representa-
tional teaching of the Magisterium? In the years following the First 
Vatican Council the role of the theologians was firmly delineated in 
direct relation to magisterial definitions. Theological and 
exegetical study could serve the function of preparing the way for 
ecclesiastical definitions (38), but it could also be employed in order 
to vindicate official teaching to the world, and to explain and 
comment upon it: "Now, it is ••• always right for theologians to 
return to the sources of divine revelation; they have the task of 
showing in what way the teachings of the living Magisterium are to be 
found in Holy Scripture and divine 'tradition', wbether explicitly or 
implicitly." (39) Indeed, it could be said that it was the teaching 
of the living Magisterium which was the 'proximate·' norm of faith for 
all Catholics, whether theologians or simple faithful. As we shall see 
in Chapter IV, this view, at its most extreme, could even seek to make 
the teaching of the ordinary magisterium of the Pope (which had no 
strong claim to infallibility) a final norm for theological study. 
This was a result of the thorough juridicalisation of the teaching 
function which we have already noted (see p. 85:,); even when the 
~~gisterium could not claim to be teaching representationally (i.e. 
'infallibly;) it claimed the respectful obedience to its teachings 
Which should characterise the proper attitude before any enunciation 
given by persons who, of themselves, represent Christ in governing 
authority. 
What were the theological ideas underlying the assignation 
of magisterial functions solely to those with canonical authority? 
We have already remarked that doctrinal and moral teaching lends 
(37) Dei Filius, cap. 3. (Dz 1794/DzS 3011) 
Pius IX bad first advanced this idea in a letter of 1864 
(Ep. "Tuas Libenter". (Dz 1683/DzS 2879)) 
(38) See Leo XIII, encycl._ Providentissimus DeUsT·:(18 l'Toy;o,:18.\~5)');, 
ASS 26 (1893-94) P• 280 • (Dz 1944/DzS 3282). 
(39) Pius XII, encycl. Humani Generis, p. 568. (Dz 2314/DzS 3886). 
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itself to being placed in a juridical category because of the 
importance of beliefs and moral behaviour in delineating the 
boundaries of the Church (see pp.72f,.). In the nineteenth century 
the function of the teaching authority was heightened, and the Popes 
saw their task not merely in terms of marking out fairly wide limits 
of acceptability, but rather in terms of achieving virtual unanirni ty 
in the Church. Thus we find Leo XIII speaking of the Magisterium's 
role in his encyclical on the unity of the Church in these terms: 
nTo unite spirits, to create and conserve agree-
ment of sentiments, it was necessary, despite the 
existence of divine Scriptures, to have another 
:Rrinciple • • • 
:'DJlor this reason] Jesus Christ instituted in the 
Church a living, authentic and perpetual Magisterium, 
which he has invested with his own power, taught by 
the Spirit of truth, confirmed with miracles, and 
whose precepts of doctrine he has willed and solemnly 
commanded to be accepted as his own. n (40) 
It is clear from Leo's treatment of the subject that the 
exercise of the office of magisterium was an exercise of government 
aimed at maintaining tight social unity, for, "the necessary 
foundation of such great and absolute harmony among men is the 
agreement and conjunction of minds". (41) It is tempting to posit 
a link between the nineteenth century's complete juridicalisation 
of the teaching office and the Church's history in that period, as it 
closed ranks against an increasingly hostile post-revolutionary world. 
However, an earlier change also lay behind the development: This was 
the fact that the content of the creeds had already come to be seen 
in juridical categories as a content put forward by the hierarchical 
authority of the Church, and therefore requiring assent on those 
extrinsic grounds. In earlier times, the creeds had been seen as 
the expression of the universal Church's Tradition, and the hierarchy 
had simply had the function of confronting the interpretations of 
faith put forward by the theologians with these Symbols of the Tradi-
tion, which essentially belonged to the context of worship. (42) It 
(40) Satis Cogn&tum, PP•716 & 721Jsee DZ 1957/DzS 3305) 
(41) ibid. P• 715• (Dz 1956/DzS 3305). 
(42) Y.M.-J. Congar, 11Bref historique des formes du 'Magistere' et 
de ses relations avec les docteurs" in Rifvue des Sciences 
P@iloBophiques et Theologiques, 60 (1976) PP• 101f. and 105. 
See also Avery Dulles, "The Magisterium in Histo:cy: A 
Theological Reflection", in Chicago Studies, 17 (1978) p. 278. 
88: 
was the juridioalisation of th.e concept of the creeds which made 
of the hierarchical Magisterium a body which could propose deter-
minate, theological t~aching for the Church's assent, on the grounds 
that Christ had given authority to the hierarchy to make i·~ an 
organ of truth. 
b)The Magisterium and preaching 
Because the idea of the Magisterium which was dominant 
in the nineteenth century, and the first half of the twentieth century, 
qutie firmly located the enunciation bf truth in a juridical context, 
it did not only subject the aspect of the creede associated 1.vi th 
worship to the juridical framework, but subjected the function of 
.E!'eachi.~ to) this framework as well. The £2_d,ex, .I..'l!.l:.E Canonic~ of 1917 
treats of preaching as a section of its Part IV, which is generally 
headed, "~e Magist_~-~io Ecolesia.stico". 1rhe first canon of the section 
on the preaching of the Gospel defines the activity in the following 
terms: 
1) "Christ the Lord. entrusted the deposit of faith 
to the Church so that it might religiously guard 
revealed doctrine, and faithfully expound it, 
und.er the continual help of the Holy Spirit. 
2) Iv is the right and duty of the Church to teach 
the doctrine of the Gospel ( 11 evangelicam 
doctrinamn) to all nations, indepe:U"de";'iiy of 
;;;y. civil. power wha·~soever: Everyone is bound by 
divine law to learn it rightly, and to embrace 
the true Church of God." (43) 
Now, of course, this stEtement !!.e.cess.~ri!z has legal 
dimensions, because of its origin in a code of canon law; what we 
should particularly notice here is not the way the Church asserts 
her rights to evangelise against interference by civil au·thori ties, 
but the fact tha.t the Gospel is treated as a body of doctrine 'con-
tained' in the Church, which functions as a preservative insti·~ution. 
The act of spreading the Gospel is identified with the extension of 
the jurisdictional boundaries of the Church.(44) The world appears in 
--·---·~-----
(43) CIC can.1322~ 
(44) The correlation between the salvation of souls and the ex-
tension of the Church's bom1daries was a common theme: For 
example,n(on account of the salva·~ion of soulsJit is the nature 
tr the Ohurc~ that she should extend herself to embrace the 
entire human race". (Leo XIII, enoyol. Immortale Dei (1 Nov. 1$85)) 
ASS, 18 (1885-86) p.l64. (DzS 3166)).· ----
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the guise of a classroom of pupils, who are duty-bound to learn 
the doctrine of their ecclesiastical teacher, lest otherwise they 
incur the wrath of God. Such a concept of the Gospel treats faith 
as though it terminates in the words of the hierarchical teachers, 
rather than in a divine mystery lying beyond the full representational 
grStfflJ of those words. 
Because all magisterial activity is assimilated to the 
exercise of canonical and jurisdictional authority in this conceptu-
ality, we find that the place of the Pope at the head of the 
canonical hierarchy is duplicated by his position as the Church's 
supreme teacher. Indeed, some of the early advocates of the theory 
of the'infallibilitylof the papal magisterium equated this character-
istic with the Pope's supremacy in the temporal order (45) and when 
Vatican I came to define• infallibility' it was in a context which linked 
the pastoral and the doctoral roles together. (46) 
Just as the Pope appears as the chief doctor of Christians, 
he also appears as the one who is chiefly responsible for the 
preaching activity of the Church: "The universal care of missions 
among non-Catholics is reserved to the Apostolic See alone." (4 7) 
However, this legal demarcation of sole responsibility was tempered 
by appeals from the Popes to other bishops for aid in the task. 
Pius XI, in 1926, specifically made mention of the fact that Christ's 
missionary mandate was not given to Peter alone, and he appealed to 
the ChrisU 3.n sense of charity which should particularly inspire the 
bishops, "conspicuous by the plenitude of priesthood", so that they 
might be moved to share in the Pope's labours for the propagation of 
the faith. (48) This line of thought was further developed by Pius XII, 
and his biShops were not so much appealed to, as told that they were 
answerable for the mission of the Church, being successors to the 
(45) This was the view of Joseph de Maistre, for example. (See Place, 
art. cit. p. 235.) 
(46) When Christ prayed that all should be one, he "desired that there 
should be pastors and doctors in his Church to the end of the 
age." (Pastor Aeternus, prolog. (Dz 1821/DzS 3050)) Similarly, 
Peter's successor is both 11 father and doctor" of all Christians." 
(ibid. cap. 3. (Dz 1826/DzS 3059) 
(47) ere canon 1350.2. 
(48) encyclo Rerum Ecclesiae (28 Feb. 1926) AAS 18 (1926) p. 69. 
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Apostles. (49) Nevertheless, _it remained the case that preaching to 
the whole world remained primarily the Pope's res·ponsibility, and 
this is to be related to his position at the head of the juris-
dictional hierarchy. 
3 Sacraments and the h]cercise of Authority in the Church 
We remarked in Chapter I that, in an ecclesiology dominated 
by the motif of representation the sacramental function and the 
power of government belong together as for.m and substance of practical 
authority in the Church (see P .. ,; 42). . . This is because sacramental 
power -although of itself it is not the power to command anything-
gives those who possess it the capacity to accomplish sacred actions on 
behalf of others. Those who can accomplish these actions are thereby 
also empowered to deny their benefits to those who cannot, and to use 
this possibility as a means of disciplinary sanction. In this sub-section 
we shall first examine the relationship between sacramental power and 
the exercise of discipline in the post-Tridentine era. Secondly, 
we shall look more closely at the way in which the sacramental hierarchy 
is theologically defined in the doctrine of 'character'. 
a) The sacraments and discipline 
Sacraments are the means by which the saving benefits of 
membership of the Church are bestowed on men. According to the theology 
of Trent, entry to the Church with the remission of the guilt of both 
original and actual sin is given in Baptism; (50) full communion in 
the grace of Christ present in the Church is enjoyed through a share 
in the Eucharist, and the offering of the Mass has the nature of a 
sacrifice which satisfies God, and serves for the bes·towal of grace and 
penitence and the remission of sins. (51) Reconciliation with God after 
mortal sin is effected by the sacrament of Penance (52) whilst tha·t of 
(49) encycl. Fidei Donum (21 April 1957) AAS 49 (1957) P• 236. 
(50) de Paenitentia, cap. 2. (Dz 895/DzS 1671-72) 
(51) Cone. Trid. Sess. XXII, Doctrine on the Most Holy S~crifice ~~ 
the Mass (de Missa) cap. 2. (Dz 940/DzS 1743) 
(52) de Paenitentia cap. 2. (Dz 895/DzS 1671-72) 
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Unction gives the remission of sins, helps and strengthens the soul 
to bear sickness and the temptations of the devil, and sometimes 
also brings healing of the body. (53) In addition, there are three 
further sacraments - of Confinnation, Holy Order, and Marriage. 
However, it is the four whose functions have just been outlined which 
are of particular interest to us here. 
It is the sacraments of Baptism, the Mass, Penance and 
Unction which have, in Tridentine th.eology, a direct relationship to 
someone 1s forgiveness, and hence to his salvation. Because of this, 
they intrinsically confer potential disciplinary authority on those 
who control them. Although, strictly speaking, only Baptism 
( 1in voto', at least,) is the sole absolutely necessary sacrament 
for salvation, and its administration is not totally reserved to the 
hierarchy and clergy (54) the fact that those in Holy Orders do have 
complete control over the Eucharist and Absolution gives them 
effective power over the degree to which other Christians can partici-
pate in the means of grace.which are available only in the Church, 
because the grace of Baptism must be supplemented by the effects of 
these other sacraments in the case of anyone who has committed mortal 
sin after his entry into the Church. It is the general assumption, 
underlying the Church's discipline of annual confession and communion,(55) 
that most adults need to receive Absolution at least once yearly, and 
to make their c01nrnunion as often. Thus it is that the possession of 
sacramental power by the clergy, and the control of its exercise by 
the bishops, gives to them the capacity to include or exclude people 
from the ecclesiastical life of grace which leads to salvation. 
In addition, I think that we may note a factor in the 
theology of the post-Tridentine era which enhanced the authority of 
those holding sacramental powers by relating these powers more fir.mly 
to a jurisdictional framework. The idea of dealing with sin so 
dominated Catholic thinking during this period as to overshadow other 
benefits of the sacraments. Penance held the centre of the stage in ihe 
experience of many Catholics, alongside communion at the Mass. Both 
(53) Cone. Trid. Sess. XIV, Doctrine on Extreme Unction (de Unctione 
extrema) cap. 2. (Dz 909/DzS 1696) 
(54) See Cone. Trid. Sess. VII, Decree on the sacraments, Canons on 
the sacrament of Baptism, cap. 4. (Dz 860/DzS 1617) 
(55) See note (8) above, p.75. 
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were enjoined as yearly duties, and, despite the reforms of Trent, 
more frequent communion did not become common until the time of 
Pius X. Thus, those in sacramental order were commonly encoUntered as 
frequently in their juridical role in the confessional as at the 
al ta.r rail :ln communion. Moreover, the very Tridentine doctrine of 
the Mass tended to stress the doing away of sin at least as much as 
the invitation to live a life nourished by grace. The priest, 
therefore, by virtue of his sacramental role, stood before his people 
as a representative of divine justice and its requirements for 
satisfaction. This, we may conclude, built up an atmosphere in which 
an essentially juridical concept of authority in the Church was very 
much at home. 
Because the sacrament of Penance is also an act of jurisdiction, 
and because it was central to Catholic experience during much of this 
period, this could only enhance the authority of those who were able 
to reserve to themselves the power of Absolution in the cases of gravest 
sin. (56) The highest judge of all, of course, was the Roman Pontiff, 
"supreme judge of the fai thfu1 11 , to whom appeal might be made in all 
ecclesiastical cases, but against whose judgement there was no appeal. (57) 
Because of this, the one who possessed a purely canonical degree of 
supremacy thereby had the power to use sacramental discipline in a way 
impossible for anyone else. 
b) Sacramental 'character' and status in the Church 
The sacraments of Baptism, Confirmation and Order are those 
which bestow different kinds of sacramental status. All three are 
unrepeatable. Catholic scholastic doctrine, as expressed at the 
Council of Trent, expounds the change of status brought about by these 
sacraments in ter.ms of a permanent metaphysical change within the 
recipient - namely, the imprinting of a 'character' or "a certain 
spiritual and indelible sign upon the soul". (58) The idea that a 
(56) de Paenitentia, cap. 7. (Dz 903/DzS 1659) 
(57) Pastor Aeternus, cap. 3. (Dz 1830/DzS 3063) 
(58) Decree on the sacraments~ canons on the sacraments in general 
can. 9. (Dz 85i/DzS 1609 
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'character' is indelible Shows that it is not simply to be 
equated with an infusion of grace; nor did many theologians accept 
the idea ~hat reception of a new 'character' merely meant that someone 
was permanently marked off from others by his function. (59) 
The idea of 'character' was in theological circulation well 
before the Council of Trent. St. Bonaventure saw its imprinting as 
the imprinting of a disposition in relation to faith: The 'character' 
received in Baptism belongs to those who are the faithfUl; the 
'character' of confirmed Christians belongs to those who are 
strengthened in the faith; that of Order is imprin·bed on those who not 
only have to live by faith, but also to impart it, as well as carrying 
on the "ministry of the Temple11 • (60) This view of 'character' is 
grounded in faith as a unifying concept - a single reality, of which 
both ordained and lay Christians are actively possessed in common, 
although their relationship to it differs. However, the theology of 
Trent and subsequent centuries relied more upon a Thomist concept of 
1charact.er 1 • St. Thomas saw it as a participation in the sacerdotal 
power of Christ; those who are endowed with a 'character' can be either 
ministers or objects of the action of sacramental power, in the manner 
appropriate to the kind of 'character' they have received. This makes 
the functional distinction between those with a lay' character', and 
those with the 'character' of Order, a contra-distinction between 
those exercising, and those being the objects of, sacramental power. 
The 'character' of the baptised 1~ marks him out ontologically as 
a recipient. Of course, the priest, too, always retains within his soul 
the receptive 'character' of a baptised Christian (so that he, too, 
can be one upon whom sacramental action takes effect) but in his 
peculiarly priestly 'character' he is the 'Alter Christus', the inan who 
administers the power of the sacraments so that others may receive, 
or be acted upon. 
(59) 
(60) 
The influential Roman theologian of the nineteenth century, 
J.B. Franzelin, was one of those who believed that a purely 
functional view of 'character' was worthy of censure. (See his 
work De Sacramentis in Genere (3rd. edition, Rome, 1878) 
thesis XIII.1, PP• 163-169) 
Sent. lib. IV, d.6.p.I., art. unicus, q.4. (Cited by Y.M.-J. 
Congar in Jalons pour une theologie de Laicat (Paris, 1953) 
p. 35.) 
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The 'character' of Order is; then, the grounds for the 
exercise of sacerdotal power, with all the possibilities of 
exercising discipline which are inherent in it. The Church is a 
society of those who are ontologically unequal. However, as we 
saw in sub-section (1), although sacramental ststus is the basis for 
jurisdictional inequality, sacramental degrees are not to be 
identified straightforwardly with different grad.es of the canonical 
hierarchy, and it was superiority in the canonical power structure 
which mainly determined control in the Church during ·t;he post-
Tridentine period. 
Conclusion 
We see, then, in the ecclesiology of the post-Tridentine 
period an almost complete domination of the concept of authority by 
the representational motif. The idea of representing God vicariously 
in the exercise of government, because of the institution by Christ 
of an apostolic hierarchy on a quasi-legal model, was the prevailing 
notion. It came to colour even the way in which the kerygmatic and 
teaching functions were perceived,· so that doctrines which had no .claim1 
to 'infallibility' could nevertheless require acceptance by an ac·t; of 
obedience. (we shall develop this theme in Chapter IV.) It also 
dominated over the theory of :sacramental 1 character' as a basis for 
the respect and obedience owed to persons. In addition to the idea 
that persons could represent God in their jurisdiction over the 
Church, there also developed increasingly strongly the idea that 
Church teaching, itself, could represent the truth about God with 
accuracy and perspicuity. This concept reached its highest form of 
precision and development in the declaration of the 1infallibility1 of 
the papal magisterium, in 1870. 
In relation to this dominance of the represen-tational 
motif, the idea of the Church and her officers as having a witnessing 
role scarcely appeared in theology or official teaching. The idea 
that the generality of the Church might embody something of God 1 s 
authority in themselves was subordinated to the place given to Pope and 
bishops as those through whom the Tradition of the Church was set forth, 
under the guarantee of the Holy Spirit's assistance. Thus it was that 
the clear distinction - typical of the nineteenth century - could be ~ 
made between the two parts of the Church, active and passive, "the 
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teaching Church and the learning Church, pastor and flock; and 
among the pastors, one who is head of all and supreme pastor". (61) 
B) Vatican II's Definition and Justification of Institutional 
Authority in the Church 
How did the Second Vatican Council change the way in 
which structures of authority were conceived and justified in 
ecclesiology? This is the question which we shall be seeking tn 
answer in the present section of the chapter. We saw in the Preface 
that Pierre Hegy has argued that the Council Fathers failed to 
modify the ~'Jower structure of the Church; (62) similarly, Christian 
Duquoc has recently wri ttem that Vatican II did not adequately 
integrate its theory of hierarchical authority with its picture of 
the Church as a community: 11 [The authors of Lumen Gerrtiurn] affirmed 
the primacy in ecclesiology of the Christ-ecclesial community 
relationship, but they did not sufficiently integrate into this part of 
their argument the account of the hierarchical structure of the 
Church, which;i judged to be secondary, is still treated as though it 
were quasi-autonomous." (63) 
I shall argue in this section that, although the represen-
tational motif was by no means abolished as a justification for the 
exercise of authority in the Church, there were, none the less, 
significant shifts towards greater prominence for the motifs of 
witness and embodiment. Although these shifts were individually small, 
and can perhaps each be balanced-off against a restatement of the 
earlier position (64) cum~atively they present a cluster of ideas 
which link up with indications that another idea as well as that of 
(61) See Leo XIII, Letter to Cardinal Guibert (17 June 1885) ASS 18 
(1885-86) PP• 3ff. 
(62) See Preface, P• 15. 
(63) "Concepts of IV.Iinistry", in The Tablet, 24 March 1979, p. 310. 
(Orig:inal French' version in Etudes, January 1979~) 
(64) Duquoc gives several examples of the way in which new ideas 
were not articulated with older concepts. (loc. cit.) 
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institutional representation, was at work in the way in which 
authority was conceived and justified by the Fathers of Vatican II. 
At the end of this section I shall suggest a way in which this 
new idea might be appropriately characterised. 
Like the preceding section, this one will be divided 
into three major sub-sections, dealing respectively with canonical, 
magisterial and sacramental power. 
1 The canonical office and the power of jurisdiction 
In this sub-section we must examine first, how the Council 
described the origin:,!b.nd":gustification of the apostolic hierarchy in 
the Church, and the character under which they conceived it; secondly, 
we shall consider the way in which they urged that canonical authority 
should be exercised. 
a) The concept of the apostolic hierarchy 
Vl3.tican II did not abandon the idea that a structure of 
authority was instituted by Christ and built upon the foundation of 
the Apostles. This fact becomes abundantly obvious if one exmaines 
Chapter 3 of the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, (Lumen Gentium). 
The doctrine appears, for example in LG 18.1, 19, 22.1, 24.1, 27.1, and 
28.1., as well as many other passages. We are told that Christ 
"instituted various ministries in his Church in order that they might 
pastor and increase the people of God" (LG 18.1), and that it was the 
Apostles whom he originru.ly sent for this task (see LG 19); just as 
the Apostles, with Saint Peter, formed a stable college, so too do the~r 
successors, the bishops and Pope (see LG. 22.1); the biShops are 
"vicars and legates of Christ", and "rule the particular churches 
entrusted to them," (LG 27.1), and the whole structure of 
ecclesiastical ministry, in its threefold form of bishops, priests 
and deacons, was established by God (see LG 28.1). We see, then, a 
repetition of the concepts of apostolicity, succession, vicarious 
government of the Church, and institution by Christ. There are, how-
ever, factors, even within these passages, which combine to present 
the picture of Christ's institution of the apostolic hierarchy in 
rather a :new light. The major point which I wish to highlight is 
the way in which the Council related Christ's institution of this 
hierarchy of canonical authority to a concept of mission. 
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In LG 28.1 we are told that Christ made the successors 
to the Apostles, namely, the bishops, "sharers in his consecration 
and mission". This phrase is used in the paragraph before one 
which refers to the divine 'institution' of the Church's ministry; 
the idea of "consecration and mission" appears to be the controlling 
notion by vVhich the institution of the apostolic succession is 
characterised. '.J:Ihis point appears yet more clearly if we examine 
other passages. 
The missionary mandate of Christ is quoted or referred to 
twelve times in each of its Marean (65) and 1~tthaean (66) forms 
either in whole or in part, over the documents of Vatican II taken as 
a body, while John 20.21 (67) appears seven times. The idea that the 
Apostles were 1sent 1 by Christ was not solely related by the Council 
to their task as preachers of the Gospel, but was also seen as a 
'sending' for all the functions of the ministry (see LG 19, SC 6.1, 
CD 1, and 2.2, AG 5.1). It is the Gospel, however, which should be 
"at all times for the Church the principle of her whole life" 
(LG 20.1), and this is why 11that divine mission entrusted to the 
Apostles by Christ is destined to last to the end of time. 11 (loc. cit.) 
We see here that the hierarchically ordered society which the Apostles 
took care to institute for the sake of continuity (loc. cit.) exists 
in order to serve the Gospel. The dynamic of the threefold mission 
of governing, teaching and sanctifying, and the institutional fonns 
to which it has given birth, spring from the fact that Christ sent 
men out with a message. Therefore, although the institutional 
element in the Church is not done away, nor even seriously minimised, 
it is set in a significantly fresh context, by its association with 
the idea of mission. 
In order to throw this shift of emphasis into relief we may 
compare a section of LG 19 with a passage from Leo XIII's encyclical 
(65) Mk. 16.15: 11Go into all the world, and preach the Gospel to the 
whole creation. 11 
(66) Mt. 28.19-20a: 11Go ••• and make disciples of all nations, 
baptising them • • • (and] teaching them to observe all that I 
have commanded you. 11 
(67) "As the Father sent me, even so I send you. 11 
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Satis Cogni tum. Both the encyclical and the Councj_l 1 s text speak of 
the sending out of the Apostles by Christ, and describes them as 
"sharers in his power". In Sa·tis Cogni tum this phrase· is followed by 
.a colon, and appears to be a jurisdictional qualification Which the 
incarnate Lord bestowed on them. (68) Only after the colon, and 
reference to the gift of the Spirit, did Leo XIII go on to speak of the 
preaching mission. In LG 19, on the other hand, the phrase, "sharers 
in his power," occurs directly within the context of Christ's sending 
of the Apostles: "He sent them ••• so that, being sharel;'s in his 
power, they might make all people his disciples, and sa~tify and govern 
them, thus propagating the Church." Here, "power" appears not so much 
as a purely jurisdictional qualification, but more as a dynamic capacity 
by Which the Apostles were enabled to propagate the Church through 
their mission. 
The apostolic mission, which underlies::;the fact of an 
apostolic ministry, is located by the theology of Vatican II within a 
wider context - the mission of the whole Church. The first article 
of Lumen Gentium begins by saying that the Council desired to illuminate 
all men with Christ's light by proclaiming the Gospel to every creature. 
It then went on to say that in the constitution which followed the 
Church would be described in terms of her nature and mission. (LG 1 .1) 
The Church is described as being "missionary by her very nature" during 
her earthly pilgrimage (AG 2.1, see also AG 35.1) having been sent to 
all nations by the command of her found~r (AG 1.1). She is caught up 
in the action of God, the mission of the Son and the Spirit (loc. cit.), 
and we may contrast this picture with that of a society of divinely 
instituted order upon which the Holy Spirit "began to come" at 
Pentecost, as though to animate structures already established without 
him. (69) 
One may, however, detect an inner tension in the sections 
of the documents explicitly dealing with mission, between a theological 
affirmation that the whole Church is responsible for spreading the 
Gospel, and one which presents the task as being the inherited duty of 
(68) Satis Cognitum, p. 717: "Since this divine task was to last con-
tinually for ever, he attached to himself those who studied his 
teaching, and made them sharers in his power: and when he had 
called down the Spirit of Truth from heaven upon them, he commanded 
them to traverse the world, and to preach faithfully to all 
nations what he had taught and commanded them." 
(69) See, for example, Leo XIII, encycl. Divinum Illud (9 May 1897) 
ASS 29 (1896-97) p.649 • (DzS 3328) 
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bishops, in Which the rest of the Church "co-operates". (see AG 6.1) 
This is a tension which arises from the juxtaposition of the idea 
that bishops are successors of the Apostles (70) with the idea that the 
Apostles were the founders or "seeds" of the whole "New Israel", as 
well as of the sacred hierarchy. (AG 5.1) If the Apostles were seeds 
of the entire Church, how, then, is it that the entire Church does 
not inherit Christ's co~nand to preach the Gospel, and the authority 
of mission which accompanied this command? (71) How, and why, is 
authoritative apostolic preaching to be demarcated from the respons-
ibility which all members of the Church have for "announcing saving 
truth"? (see LG 17.1) 
AG 5.1 attempts to accommodate the tension between different 
ideas of a share in the evangelistic mission by suggesting that the 
Church as a whole, and the episcopate as a distinct body, are related 
to Christ~in different ways. The entire Church has a duty of 
propagating the faith because it is the b_ody of Christ, which is 
filled with his life, (and we are led to understand that it is because 
it is Christ's body that it is structured by the existence of various 
ministries - which would suggest an intrinsic reason Why certain 
members of the Church have a particular ~ole in preaching and mission). 
The bishops, assisted by presbyters, and in union with the Pope, have 
(70) The succession of bishops to the Apostles is expressly affirmed 
in LG 18.2, 20, 22.2, 23.2, 24.1, DV 7.2, CD 2.2, 4.1, 6.1, 8.1, 
35.1, AG 38.1, UR 2.4. 
(71) It is interesting to note that recent New· Testament study suggests 
that the concept of the "Twelve Apostles'' is a composite idea, 
combining the idea of "the Twelve", which originated within Christ's 
ministry, and which represents his foundation of the eschato-
logice.l community, with the idea of an "Apostle", a charismatic 
preacher of the early Church whose office (like that of St. Paul) 
owed more to individual experience of God 1 s call than to any quali-
fication for government bestowed b~ the community. (See G. Klein, 
Die ZwBlf Apostel (GB.ttingen, 1961) and R. S@hnaokenburg, 
"Apostolicity: the Present Position of Studies", in One in Christ, 
6, (1970) PP• 243-73.) 
The significance of this is that it suggests that, already, in the 
era of the New Testament's writing, there were moves to qualify 
charismatic preaching in the Church by attaching it to the function 
of government in the community - a situation which is echoed in 
modern Roman Catholic history by the fact that preaching was banned 
to the laity at the Council of Trent, and, except under special 
circumstances, remains so banned. (See CIC cans. 1337ff.) 
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inherited an express missionary mandate from Christ through the 
Apostles (and this suggests a reason extrinsic to the Church community 
as to why certain of its members have a particular authority in 
mission). We find, therefore, that the documents of Vatican II retain 
the traditional idea of an apostolic ministry which has its origins 
in an impulse extrinsic to the communitarian life of the Church, but 
supplements this by opening up wider perspecU ves on the active 
share in the missionary dynamic which belongs to the entire body of 
the Church. One might summarise this by seying that the power and 
mandate which characterise the hierarchy's mission constitute a focused 
and guaranteed image of an empowering and a task which belong to all. 
In other words, the representional motif, concerning the office of 
bishops and clergy, is here supplemented and modified by an increase 
in emphasis given to the concept of the Spirit's active embodiment in 
the whole Church. 
If we turn to examine more specifically the characterisation 
of the apostolic hierarchy by Christ's missionary mandate, we find 
that Vatican II clearly brings to the fore the idea that the bishops' 
11 eminent task" is the preaching of the Gospel (LG 25.1). (72) We have 
seen in Section A that by the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
the universal care of missions had been reserved to the Apostolic See 
along (see p.a§ ) • We have also seen that Pius XII began to reinstate 
a theory of joint apostolic responsibility for world mission devolving 
upon the whole boqy of bishops. Vatican II made this idea yet more 
explicit through its theology of the episcopal college, (with which 
we shall deal more fully in Section c, pp.12&..:.31); "All bishops, 
as members of the episcopal body which succeeds the college of 
Apostles, are consecrated not only for their own dioceses, but for the 
salvation of the entire world. Christ's command to preach the 
Gospel to every creature ••• touches them primarily and immediately, 
along with Peter, and under Peter." (AG 38.1) (73). Thus, the identity 
(72) The idea that the bishops had the 11 eminent task" of preaching was 
expressed at the Council of Trent (see Cone. Trid. Sess. v, de ref. 
can. 2; Sess. XXIII, de ref. can. 1, Sess XXIV, de ref. can. 4) 
but was later rather submerged under the emphasis on papal 
resp onsi bili ty. 
(73) See also LG 23.3, CD 3.1, AG 29.1. 
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of those participating in the apostolic succession is essentially 
the identity of those who herald the Gospel to the world. Bishops' 
canonical authority is organically linked with their inherited 
mission, which is a mission of service to the Gospel. We shall 
examine the significance of this shift of emphasis more fully in the 
conclusion to this section. But now we must consider the way in which 
Vatican II envisaged canonical authority as being exercised. 
b) The exercise of canonical authority 
It is often noted that LG 18.1 and 24.1 present the exercise 
of canonicr.l authority under the description of "ministry", "service" 
and 11 diakonia11 • These terms do not only suggest the way in which 
canonical authority should be exercised in relation to the community (74) 
but, more importantly, indicate the fact that all the functions belon@ng 
to members of the hierarchy - gover.nment, teaching,and sanctification -
should be seen together as an integrated task directed to the salvation 
of men. LG 24.1 clearly shows that this integrated ministry is to be 
identified with the mission which the successors to the Apostles receive. 
We therefore find that we can begin to build up a definite cluster of 
correlated ideas: A share in the apostolic mission is a shsxe in a 
ministry, in which the threefold office is integrated under the sign of 
the Gospel for the salvation of men. This mission and ministry has the 
characteristic nature of serving a community. 
Because Vatican II's increased use of the term "ministry" 
has often been noted, and the ecclesiology of service has been both 
developed and criticised elsewhere (75) I shall, in the pages which 
follow, concentra·t;e rather upon another, less noted concept in which 
there was a significant shift of emphasis at the Council. This is the 
(74) 
(75) 
One of Christian Duquoc 1s specific complaints against~ is that 
it lacked articulation between the image of ministry as service, 
as expressed in LG 18'- and its concept of priesthood as "~Sacred 
power" (LG 10, 18). (Duquoc loc. cit.) 
See, f..:)r example, Chapters 1-3 of J .L. McKenzie 1 s Authority in 
the Church (London, 1966). 
See also Nicholas Lash's critique of the confusions that may 
arise from laying too much stress on a concept of authority as 
service, in Voices of Authorit~ (London, 1977) P• 15. 
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concept of pastoral authority in the Church. I believe that the 
way in which the idea of pastoring was used at Vatican II shows the 
same characteristics as its concept of ministry; that is, the idea 
of pastoral authority was primarily attached to descriptions of the 
canonical function, and yet its use indicated clearly that it is 
impossible fully to separate jurisdiction from the tasks of teaching 
and sanctifying without artificiality. It also indicated that 
canonical authority in the Church should be exercised characteristically 
as service rather than dominion. 
'Pastor' is a traditional term used in reference to someone 
holding authority in the People of God. In its original meaning of 
'shepherd' it has good biblical precedent. (76) Catholic theology has 
identified pastoral with canonical power, but, at the Council of Trent 
the imagery of shepherding was used as an argument for temperance in 
the use of this power: 
"The Holy Council of Trent ••• intending to decree 
certain things concerning the jurisdiction of biShops 
••• first considers it fitting to admonish them to 
remember that they are shepherds(!,'pastores 11 ) and not 
those who make their influence felt by violent means 
("percussores"); therefore, they should so preside 
over their subjects that they do not domineer over 
them, but rather love them as sons and brothers, and 
labour for them. Thus, by advice and warning they 
should prevent them from doing wrong, and so be spared 
the necessity of punishing transgressors with due 
penalties. Yet, should it befall some of their sub-
jects that tbrough hi.Un.an weakness they sin, the 
Apostle's command is to be kept (by the bishops): They 
should convince, entreat, and reprove in all goodness 
and patience, since it is often the case that benevo-
lence achieves more in the way of correction than 
severity, exhortation more than threats, charity more 
than power." (77) 
(76) In the Old Testament 'shepherd' was often used to describe both 
religious and civil leaders of Israel: See Num. 27.17, I Kings 
22.17, Is. 56.11, 63.11, Jer. 23.1ff., 25.34ff., 49.19, 50.6, 
Ex. 34 passim., 37.2, Mic. 5.5, Nah. 10.2f., Zech. 10.2f., 
11 passim, 13.7. In Is. 44.28 the term is applied to Cyrus. 
It was also used to describe God in his relationship to his 
people: eg. Ps. 23.1, 80.1, Is. 40.1_1, Zech. 11.7ff. 
In the New Testament the term 'shepherd' was applied to Jesus 
himself: Mt. 9.36, 26.31, Mk. 14.27, Jn. 10.2 and 11ff. It 
seems to have constituted part of a Messianic claim. R. Tarbet 
notes that Jesus transformed the connotations of the image by 
associating it with his death for the ' sheep 1 ; 11 so, too, in John, 
cont. on page 103 
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Leo XIII described pastoral duties in this way: "To provide 
leadership for the flock, and to nourish it with healthy food, by 
warding off dangers, warning against snares, protecting from force; in 
short, ruling by directing the flock, ( "regend~bernando"). (78) We 
see, therefore, that the idea of pastoral government was firmly 
lodged in Catholic tradition. 
Vatican II, however, particularly sought to be a Council 
with a pastoral approach, in conscious rejection of one that was 
juridical or clerical. (79) This pastoral. approach was to be one which 
did not make definitions, nor issue edicts simply for the sake of the 
smooth running of the Church's machinery or for the enhancement of 
jurisdictional power. Rather, the pastoral idea was connected with 
an aim of making the riches of Christian doctrine more easily available 
both to members of the Church, and to the world. Thus, pastoral reform 
of the Liturgy aimed to make it more of a pedagogical experience (see 
SO 33-36) and the ~ti tui!.i.<?n on the Church in the :t1odern World 
(Gaudium et Spes) is a "Pastoral Constitution", because "it seeks to 
express the relation of the Church to the world and to the men of 
today". (80) In this document, the Church is shown as being in dialogue 
with the world; this is her pastoral attitude to a sphere over which 
she has no jurisdiction. Her only authority in the face of secular 
society is that of one who announces the true answers to men's questions, 
(see GS 4.1). 
(76) cont from page 102: 
when Jesus talks of Peter as shepherd, he immediately goes on to 
talk of Peter's death." ("Authority and Obedience in the Church 
Today", in New Blackfriars, 50 ( 1968-69) p. 584.) See also the 
use of the term in Heb. 13.20, in reference to Jesus and in Acts 
20.28f. and I Pet. 5.2ff., in reference to Church leaders. 
(77) Cone. Trid. Sess. XIII, de ref. 
(78) Satis Coggitum, P• 728 
(79) See John XXIII 1 s opening speech to the Council: "We must find ways 
of expounding things which correspond better with a raagisterium 
whose nature is, above all, pastoral." (11 Oct. 1962) AAS 54 
( 1962) p. 792. 
(80) Official note on the title "Pastoral Constitution on the Church 
in the Modern World". 
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We find, then, that for Vatican II the words associated 
vti·th the concept, 1pastor1 , are very far from being equivalent to 
words associated with the concept, 'ruler'. The Council would have 
been disinclined to follow Leo XIII's example, and sum up the 
pastoral task under the rubric of "ruling by directing", because for 
them it included a humble approach to men over whom ecclesiastical 
pastors have no rule. Whilst Leo XIII (and Trent before him) 
considered the pastoral function primarily as that of canonical control 
(within the sphere of which teaching and sanctifying might safely 
go on) the Fathers of the Second Vatican Council saw the pastoral 
function more generally as an integrated ministry of making the 
Church's riches available. They were less concerned than their pre-
decessors to specify how and why pastors should react in condemnation 
of dangerous tendencies in the flock; they were more concerned with 
leadership, where previous writers had been more concerned with 
direction. 
This is not to say that the verb "pascere" and the word 
"pastor" were not sometimes used by Vatican II solely in reference to 
the canonical part of the hierarchical office; indeed, they seem to 
have been used interchangeably with "regere", 11 gubernare 11 and their 
derivations quite often, in referring to the canonical fUnction. 
"Pascere" is used in CD 2.2 and PO 7.1, whilst "regere" is used in 
LG 21.2, 27.1, PO 15.2, AA 2.2 and UR 2.3. However, in some of these 
latter passages there is also reference to the pastoral motif; for 
example, in LG 21.2 the bishop is described as acting in the role of 
Christ the pastor, and in UR 2.3 there is mention of the 'shepherding' 
role of Peter, while, in this same passage, the role of Christ as 
pastor of souls appears in very close proximity to an account of the 
threefold office of the Twelve. Article 16 of the Decree on the 
Pastoral Office of Bishops in the Church (Christus Dominus) which 
begins a more detailed study of the episcopal office of government, 
calls this duty that of a "father" and "pastor". We may also note 
that the t£;rm "government" is qualified by the adjective "pastoral" 
in LG 23.2 ("regimen pastorale"). It seems, therefore, that 
Vatican II tended to use the pastoral motif to modify and qualify what 
it understood by the idea of government. It is my contention that, 
because the idea of pastoring can be used inclusively, integrating the 
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concepts of teaching and sanctifying with that of governing in a 
single notion, and because the Council could also speak of a pastoral 
approach to those over whom the hierarchy has .!!2. jurisdiction, the 
prevalence of the word 1pastor1 and its derivatives in the documents 
of Vatican II indicates a displacement of the jurisdictional motif 
from its practical position of dominance in the concept of authority. 
Striking uses of the concept of pastoring in en inclusive 
way are to be found in LG 19, 20.3, and 32.4. We should also mention 
the parallelisms of scriptural texts, found in LG 8.2: Peter was 
commanded to "shepherd" ( 11pascere 11 ) the Church, the Apostles were given 
the task of spreading and ruling it, and the successors of Peter and 
all the Apostles together have the function of ruling it. The apparent 
distinctions in the sentence must be held to derive more from the 
biblical sources used than from real theological distinctions; therefore, 
Peter's task of shepherding or pastoring includes all the functions of 
spreading the Church, ruling itjand feeding it with sound doctrine. 
Finally, we should note that Vatican II set before clergy 
the model of Christ, the Good Shepherd, who lays down his life for the 
sheep (LG 27.4, PO 13.4, 14.2, see also LG 41.2). Here we see the 
Messianic idea as Jesus transformed it; (81) unlike the Old Testament 
"shepherds of Israel" (see Ez. 34.2) he came "not to be served, but to 
serve, and to give his life as a ransom for many11 (rvlk. 10.45). At 
this point, the theme of pastoring most explicitly joins the motif of 
ministry in describing the ideal nature of authority in the Church. (82) 
2 Teaching Authority in the Church (the Magisterium) 
\7a shall be examining Vatican II 1 s presentation of the exact 
authority of magisterial teaching in Chapter IV and Chapter V. At 
this point, therefore, we may concentrate upon the way in which the 
Council justified the existence of authorised teachers in the Church, 
and described the nature of their function. This will entail con-
sidering the use made by the Council of the ideas of teaching and 
preaching. 
(81) See note (76) above. 
(82) Mk. 10.45, itself, is used in connection with ecclesiastical 
ministry in LG 27.4 and OT 4.1. See also the use of Lk. 22.26f. 
in LG 27.1 and CD 16.1. 
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The theme of preaching and teaching has alreaQy been 
broached in sub-section ( 1), pp. 98-101, above, when we considered 
the way in which Vatican II grounded the apostolic ministry in a mission 
of which the Gospel is both the dynamic and the principle. 
We saw that preaching appears once more as the "eminent task" of bishops, 
and that this worked out practically into a theory of their corporate 
responsibilit,y for the evangelisation of the world. I shall now 
argue that, underlying this practical expression of a concern for 
preaching in foreign missions, there was a theological shift of emphasis -
incomplete, but nevertheless significant - towards a characterisation 
of the magisterial role by the motif of witness. This shift modifies 
that understanding of the authority of the hierarchy's ordinary 
teaching which is based upon recognition of the bishops' authority as 
representatives of Christ. 
In the passage in which Lumen Gentium explicitly refers to 
the teaching of Vatican I concerning the succession of the apostolic 
ministry it omits mention of the teaching function. \Vhere Pastor Aeternus 
says that Christ wished there to be "pastors and doctors" in his 
Church (83) LG 18.2 says, "he wished their successors, that is, the 
bishops, to be pastors in his Church". Does this mean that Vatican II 
played-down an emphasis on the ministry of the Word which is to be 
found in the documents of Vatican I? By no means. The First Vatican 
Council speaks of Christ 1 s intention for the Church in a context in 
which it is considering the foundations of unity in the Christian 
community; a succession of pastors and doctors was needed to ensure this, 
because of the significance attributed to doctrine in mail'~taining 
Church unity (seep. 87 ). The Vatican II text, on the other hand, 
begins by considering the variety of ministries which provide for the 
good of the body (LG 18.1) and locates unity as only one among many 
benefits promoted by the hierarchical structure of the Church. Perhaps 
it is because of a relatively diminished concern with unity as the 
chief end of ministry and government that the doctoral function of the 
episcopate is not mentioned here; unity conceived as the chief end 
of government tended to mean uniformity; unity as one benefit among 
others may be a different thing - a unity in diversity and richness of 
(83) Prolog. (Dz 1821/DzS 3050) 
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expression. Diversity and richness are not promoted primarily by 
magisterial authority from above. 
When Lumen Gentium did come to devote an article to the 
teaching office of bishops, it first of all presented the activity of 
preaching as that which has primacy: "For bishops are heralds of the 
faith who lead new disciples to Christ, and they are authentic doctors 
that is to say, endued with Christ's authority- who preach to those 
entrusted to them both the faith they should believe, and its 
application to moral matters." (LG 25.1) It is quite noticeable that 
it is the emphasis on preaching which sets the tone for what is said 
about teaching. Likewise, although the same paragraph later speaks of 
the "religious obedience of spirit" which is due to episcopal teaching, 
this comes after the introduction of the idea that the biShops aim to 
make "disciples" for Christ. The very word 1 disciple 1 , as used in this 
context, may be compared with the phrase which Leo XIII employed to 
describe the relationship of the Apostles to Christ: Vfuilst the word 
in LG 25.1 i.s 11discipulos'', Leo XIII uses the phrase "alumnos 
disciplinae suae". Although this, too, could be translated by 
1 disciples 1 , I have translated it more closely as "those who studied his 
teaching" •. (84) One might also translate it by 'those who studied his 
way of life 1 • In either case, it bears with it the conno·tation of 
'pupils'. The term used by Lumen Gentium moves away from the imagery 
of the classroom to that of active followers of Christ. Finally, in 
this connection, we should note that whereas Leo XIII saw the Apostles 
and their successors as preaching "doctrine" and "laws" (85) LG25.1 
suggests that the bishops preach the "Gospel" or "the fai th11 (or, 
simply, "faith"). 
We may say, then, that the idea of preaching is distinctly 
brought to the fore by Vatican II when its formulations are compared 
with those of the previous century. The activity of representational 
teaching of divine truth appears to be a development and special 
qualification of preaching, which is the more basic activity; (we 
(84) See note (68), above, p.98. 
( 85) Sat is Cogni tum continues: "by this design the human race might 
acquire holiness on earth and eternal bliss in heaven, through 
profession of his doctrine and obedience to his laws." (p. 709). 
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should, however, note here that CD 12.1 described the entire task 
under the term "teaching11 , but expounded this activity as being first 
of all that of announcing "Christ 1 s Gospel to men ••• calling them 
to faith"). It is not that Vatican II denied the possibility of 
expounding divine truths accurately; rather, it continued actively to 
affirm it. However, such accurate teaching is clearly subordinated to 
the purpose of pointing men to a single truth and mystery beyond itself; 
faith terminates in Christ, rather than in the teaching of the hierarchy. 
The Magisterium "serves" the Word of God (DV 10.2) and listens to it 
religiously (see DV 1.1); in its representational teaching, it returns 
to the status of being i.h"llth 1 s guardian and kerygmatic vehicle, rather 
than its formal organ. 
We shall see in Chapter V how this shift in the concept of the 
magisterial activity affected the epistemology connected with the 
theory of 'infallibility; here, however, we must note that, in regard to 
teaching which does not claim to be 1 infallible~ a shift of emphasis 
towards the motif of wi tne.ss, such as that which is conveyed by the 
renewed stress on the function of preaching,is likely severely to modifY 
the way in which fallible statements of the ordinary magisterium are 
viewed. Preaching, or witness, which points beyond itself, and beyond 
those who give it, to a Gospel, and to Christ, gains its inherent 
authority from the power with which it co~nends itself to men's hearts 
(see Chapter I, pp. 35f.). _ Such a form of invitatory authority is 
only With difficulty, and with some degree of artificiality, 
compounded with a requirement for "religious obedience of the mind and 
will", to be rendered on the grounds of the witness's formal authority 
as a representative of Christ in the function of government. We 
shall explore this theme further in Chapter IV when we come to analyse 
in more detail the nature of the authority which Vatican II claimed 
for the non-infallible teaching of the Magisterium. However, the 
tensions which we shall examine there are all fundamentally allied 
to the fact that the Council located the original justification for the 
function of a formal teaching authority in the necessity for the Gospel 
to be preached, and for there to be "witnesses of divine and Catholic 
truth" (sec LG 25.1). 
3 Sacraments and the Exercise of Authority in the Church 
We saw in Section A that post-Tridentine theology tended to 
make of the sacraments instruments which could easily be used for 
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discipline in the hands of an institutional hierarchy. It also 
defined sacramental status in such a way as to emphasise the powers 
and activity of one group in the Church, over against the receptive 
and passive stance of the rest. In the pages Which follow, we shall 
examine Vatican II' s treatmen·t of the nature of the sacraments and 
the stance in which their ministers appear, and then, the question 
of sacramental 'character' and status in the Church. 
a) The nature of the sacraments and the stance of sacramental 
ministers 
The documents of Vatican II stress the centrality of the 
l!.ucharist: 
·· · · "The other sacraments and all ecclesiastical 
ministries and works of the apostolate are 
bound to the Eucharist and ordered towards it. 
For it is in the most holy Eucharist that the 
whole spiritual good of the Church is con-
tained, Christ himself, our Passover, our 
living bread, who offers life to men through 
his flesh, raised to life and giving life 
through the Holy Spirit. So he invites and 
leads men to offer themselves, their work, and 
all created things in union with him. There-
fore, the Eucharist is the source and summit of 
all evangelisation." (PO 5.2) 
No statement of the centrality of the Eucharist to the 
Christian life could be more emphatic than this. Similar emphatic 
assertions are to be found in sa 10.1, LG 11.1, CD 30.6, PO 6.5, and 
AG 9.2. Baptism finds its complete meaning in ordaining someone 
to full eucharistic communion (see UR 22.2); the Eucharist is the 
central Christian experience, a "mystery!' (sa 48, LG 26.1, PC 6. 2) 
in which the paschal mystery of Christ's death and resurrection is 
proclaimed (LG 28.1), celebrated (PO 13.3), and relived by the 
faithful (CD 15.2). 
Frequent communion at the :Mass is "strongly reconunended" 
(sa 55.1), and particv~ar mention of the possibility of even daily 
communion is made in the Decree on Oriental Catholic Churches 
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(Orientalium Ecclesiarum) (OE 15) (86) 0 
As the locus of "the whole spiritual good of the Church11 , 
the Eucharist has a wealth o~ meaning. In it, the unity of the 
Church is both brought about and manifested (LG 26.1), "for sharing 
in the body of Christ has no other effect than to transform us into 
that which we consume. 11 (loc. cit.) As those in communion with 
Christ, and incorporated into him (LG 7.2, AG 36.1, 39.1, see also 
UR 15.1), Christians can offer themselves in the Eucharist, along with 
their livec, labours, and praise, in union with the divine victim 
(sc 12, 48, LG 11.1, 34.2, PO 5.3). Of course, the Eucharist is 
traditionally regarded as the re-presentation of the redeeming sacrifice 
of Christ, and the Council of Trent devoted an entire decree to this 
aspect of it. (87) This aspect is not neglected in the eucharistic 
theology of Vatican II, but only once, and in an oblique way (CD 15.1), 
is there immediate reference to the doing away of sin, or to 
propitiation: GS 38.1 speaks of Christ as 11undergoing death for us 
all who are sinners, 11 and the next paragraph goes on to refer to the 
Eucharist as a pledge of hope; but the hope that we are forgiven is not 
explicitly mentioned here. SC 10.2 and PO 4.2 make reference to the 
covenantal aspect of the sacrifice of the Mass, and SC 10.2, along with 
PO 13.3, speaks of the sanctification effected by the Eucharist. 
SO 2, 6, LG 3 and OT 2 mention in general terms the fact that the 
eucharistic sacrifice actualises the work of salvation, but they do 
not spell out the relationShip of this effectual sacrifice to man's 
sinful state. Most notably of all, LG 28.1 says of priests that they 
"re-present and apply the unique sacrifice of the New Testament, that 
is, Christ offering himself once and for all to the Father as a spot-
less victim, in the sacrifice of the Mass 11 • This is an explicit 
citation from the Council of Trent, but there is a significant 
difference: Trent spelt out what the 'application' of Christ's sacri-
fice means: "He left a sacrifice in which that which he wrought once 
(86) For reasons peculiar to the form of their Liturgy, not even 
weekly attendance at the Eucharist is required in all the 
oriental rite churches. For Catholics of the Latin rite, weekly 
Mass attendance is an obligation, and, since the pontificate of 
Pius x, frequent communion has been consistently urged upon them. 
This was made more feasible by Pius XII's relaxation of the laws 
of fasting in 1953 and 1957. (AAS 45 (1953) pp. 15ff. and AAS 49 
(1957) PP• 177f.) 
(87) Cone. Trid. Sess. XXIII, Doctrine on the most Holy Sacrifice of the 
~' (de Missa) (Dz 937ff./DzS 1738ff.) 0 
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for all on the cross might be re-presented ••• and its saving 
virtue might be applied in the remission of those sins which we dailY, 
connnit. 11 (88) 
I am by no means suggesting that the doctrine of the 
propitiatory value of the Mass was expunged at Vatican II. The 
Council did not set out to alter Catholic doctrine, but to transmit i·t 
in ways appropriate to the modern age. (89) However, by virtue of the 
fact that the Eucharist's connection with the remission of sin was not 
stressed by the Council we may say that it was submerged under other 
ideas, which took its former place of primary importance. We have 
looked a~~ these ideas above, except for one: This is the idea that the 
Eucharist should be viewed as nourishment, and the communication of grace, 
for the Chris·tian life. There is a long list of passages wbich bring 
this concept to the fore (sc 10, 48.1, LG 33.2, 42.1, 48.2, DV 21.1, 26, 
PO 18.1, PC 6.2, 15.1, AA 3.1, AG 6.3, GS 38.2). The significamt fact 
is that such a conception of the central Christian sacrament stresses 
both its invi tatory nature, and the character of active dicipleship 
of those who receive it. ( 90) "The sacraments, and especially the most 
holy Eucharist, communicate and nourish that charity which is the soul 
of the whole apostola·te. 11 (AA 3.1) "The Lord left to his own a pledge 
of hope and food for the.; journey in the sacrament of faith ••• This 
is the meal of brotherly communion, an anticipation of the heavenly 
banquet.u· (GS 38.2) "He offers life to men through his flesh ••• so 
he invites Jlld leads men to offer themselves." (PO 5.2) - Such are 
some of the passages in which the imagery of eucharistic nourishment 
appears. Communion sustains the spiritual life of the individual, 
and builds up the communal reality of the Church; it imparts grace for 
(88) deMissa, cap. 1. (Dz 938/DzS 1740) (emphasis mine.) 
(89) See John XXIII 1s opening speech, PP• 791f. 
(90) Pius x, too, stressed the fact that communion could be a help in 
the Christian life; but, if we examine a decree of the Sacred 
Congregation of the Council, issued in his pontificate, we find 
that the help envisaged was largely conceived as aid in an 
individual's battle against sin, rather than as aid in the active 
apostolate and the building up of community: "The desire of 
Jesus Christ and of the Church that all the faithful should daily 
approach the sacred banquet is chiefly directed to this end: That 
the faithful may be. united to God by means of this sacrament, and 
thence derive strength to resist their sensual passions, to cleanse 
themselves from the stain of daily faults, and to avoid those graver 
sins to which human weakness is prone. Its primary purpose, then 
is not that the honour and reverence due to our Lord should be safe-
guarded, nor that it should serve as a reward or recompense for the 
virtue of those who receive it." (Deer., Sacra ~ridentina Synodus 
(20 Dec. 1905) ASS 38, P• 401.) 
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the active apostolate, and, above all, it invites members of the 
pilgrim Church to press on to the fUll, eschatological feast, with 
whose joyous praise it is already united (see LG 50.4). 
This dominant emphasis on the nourishing aspect of the 
Eucharist, and its invitator,y dDnension, is likely to form a 
spirituali~y which is centred more around the notion of responding 
I 
to grace received, than around heroic self-preparation for infrequent 
communions. Vatican II's theology of the Eucharist creates an 
atmosphere in which the significance of the sacrament lies in pointing 
forwards to new possibilities, rather than in affecting God's verdict 
on the past. 
Turning to Vatican II's treatment of the sacrament of 
Penance we find that SC 72 reads: "The rites and formulae of Penance 
should be so revised as to express more clearly the nature and 
effect of the sacrament." What are its nature and effect? .Again, 
we may not suggest that the doctrine of Trent disappears completely, 
but rather that new emphases come to light at Vatican II, and that 
a new atmosphere is breathed. One of the ideas which comes to the 
fore at the Council is that of reconciliation with the Church; this 
ancient notion ha~ largely disappeared in mediaeval theology, 
following the development of individual confession,. Therefore, at 
Trent, all the weight was placed upon the benefit of Penance which 
is comprised in pardon from God. The concept of reconciliation with 
the Church appears in LG 11.2, alongside mention of God 1 s pardon, 
while LG 28.1 and PO 5.1 refer to the sacrament in general terms as one 
of 'reconciliation.' P05.3 says that priests will teach their 
people "to submit their sins to the Church with a contrite heart in the 
sacrament of Penance so that they may daily be converted more and 
more to the Lord." All these passages speak of the idea of pardon 
in terms that are more personal than juridical, and indicate that the 
sacrament is something which points beyond itself to the future, to 
a life lived in reconciliation with God and his Church. Therefore, 
we may say that even this sacrament, dealing as it does with the sins 
of the past, has a dimension of invitation. (91) 
(91) The Council of Trent spoke of the sacrament of Penance as one of 
reconciliation, but saw the fruit of reconciliation purely in 
terms of a conscience set at ease, and a determination not to sin 
again. de Pae~tentia, caps. 3 and 4. (Dz 896/DzS 1674 and 
Dz 897/DzS 1676 ) The Vatican II concept of reconciliation, with 
its inclusion of the idea of reconciliation with the Church and 
constant conversion to God, gives a more positive concrete content 
and context to the new life that is to ensue. 
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Tne sacraments appear in the theology of Vatican II, then, as 
being less orientated around the pure idea of remission of sins, and 
more directed towards the life which the Christian is to live in the 
future. The experience of life in Christ is conceived in fully 
social terms, and in personal categories. This theory of the sacra-
ments is necessarily reflected in the image of the sacramental 
minister and his role. 
The minister who presides at the Eucharist "in the person 
of Christ," (sc 33.2, LG 10.2, 28.1, see also LG 21.1) presides at 
what is essentially a public and communal offering and experience, 
(see SC 26.1). The Constitution of the Sacred Liturgy (Sacrosanctum 
Concilium), like Pius XII's encyclical Mediator Dei (92) takes up the 
theme of the active participation of all the faithful in the Eucharist. 
Christus Dominus and the Decree on the Ministry and Life of Priests 
(Presbyterorum Ordinis) :Lssue exhortations to clergy to encourage such 
general participation. The Mass is the offering of the entire "royal 
priest hood 11 ( sc 14. 1 , LG 10. 1 , PO 2.1 ) and in making this oblation the 
sacramental minister acts in the name of the people (LG 10.2, see also 
PO 5. 3). However, his sacramental priesthood is "different in essence 
and not only in degree 11 from that which is shared in common by all 
the baptised (LG 10.2), and this is because, in the Eucharist, there 
is a two-wa;y pattern of representation. The sacramental minister 
represents both the people before God, and also acts as "a minister of 
him vmo continually exercises his priestly office for us through the 
(92) Although Pius XII was concerned to prombte active participation 
by ·the laity, who, "according to their condition ••• share in 
the priesthood of Christ himself11 (p. 554), he was first anxious 
to make it clear that, "before acting in God's sight on behalf of 
the people, the priest is the ambassador of the divine redeemer, 
and because Jesus Christ is the head of that body of which 
Christians are members, the priest is God's representative for the 
people entrusted to his care. 11 (p. 538) He later went on to speak 
of the sense in which the priest was the people's representative, 
seying, "the priest acts in the name of the people precisely because 
he represents the person of our Lord Jesus Christ ••• the priest 
therefore approaches the altar as Christ's minister,,lower than 
Christ, but higher than the people.n (p. 553, emphasis mine.) 
Pius XII's emphasis on headship and superiority was much reduced 
in the teaching of Vatican II. 
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Spirit in the Liturgy" (PO 5.1). Christ is, in a sense, present in 
the person of the priest (sc 7.1 , see also LG 21 .1, 28.1). In 
particular, the sacramental minister represents Christ before the 
people, for he is a steward of the mysteries of God (CD 15.1, see 
also LG 21.1, 26.1). (93) 
As a representative of Christ before the people, the priest 
partakes by association in the characteristics of the Lord in whose 
name he acts. In view of the revision in the way in which the theology 
of the sacraments is put forward, we may say that ·the authority of 
the sacramental minister is likely to appear less in a juridical and 
jurisdictional light, and more in the terms of a power of invitation 
to new life. 
b) Sacramental 'character' and status in the Church 
The ter.m 'character' reappears in the documents of Vatican II 
in relation to the sacerdotal function of people of different 
ecclesiastical status. There is also a reaffirmation of the existence 
of "sacred power11 inhering in the ministerial priesthood (LG 10.2, 18.1, 
PO 6.1), and of the difference in "essence" which distinguishes those 
in sacred Order from other baptised Christians. However, although the 
Council used the ter.m 1 character', it considered it not so much in its 
ontological connotations as in relation to what people do. All 
'character' is seen as a qualification for an activity in the worship 
(93) To illustrate the balance of elements held by Vatican II 1 s teaching 
we may cite part of an article by o. Semmelroth, in which he 
comments on LG' s presentation of the Church as an "organically 
structured" worshipping community; "Its organic structure is, in 
fact, the distinction between the common and the ministerial 
priesthood; and in the sacramenta it shows up in the polarity 
between minister and recipient • • • both minister and recipient 
are active subjects in a common activity, even though the minister 
represents the real priest, Jesus Christ, while the recipient 
allows himself to be drawn into the ritual action in so far as it 
is an action of Christ. The sacramental action is a priestly 
activity directed to God thro~~h mutual encounter ••• In (the 
people's] presence (the pries~ is not only a guiding pastor and 
a prophet of God's ~Vord; he is also the sacramental representative 
of the sacrificing Christ." ("The Priestly People of God and 
its Official Ministers", Concilium, 1, :tlo. 4 (1968) pp. 47-51.) 
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of the Church, including the 'character' bestowed in Baptism. 
Vatican II accepted without question the idea that there is a 
permanent differentiation between persons in the Church, and this 
it expressed through employing the term 1 character 1 , or the notion 
of 'configuration to Christ'; it did so, however, in order to 
direct the reader 1 s attention immediately on to the function of 
different 'characters', and not in order to impose a particular 
scholastic metaphysical idea of a 1 sign on the soul 1 • 
For example, PO 2.3 speaks of presbyters as being marked 
by the Holy Spirit's anointing "with a special 1character111 , which 
11 configures them to Christ the priest, so that they are able to act 
in the person of Christ the head" (emphasis mine). The idea of 
1 configuration to Christ 1 reappears in PO 12.1 : 11 Since each priest, 
according to his degree, assumes the person of Christ himself, he is 
endowed with a special grace. 11 This sentence, however, is immediately 
preceded by one which sets the assumption of Christ's person within 
the context of saving activity: "Being consecrated to God in a new 
way by receiving ordination, they become living instruments of Christ 
the eternal priest, so that they can accomplish through all time his 
marvellous work11 (emphasis mine). 
Similarly, bishops are said in LG 21.2 to have a "sacred 
1 character' imprinted upon them so that • • • (they] may assume the 
role of Christ himself ••• and act in his person. 11 As for the 
1character'of Baptism, common to all the faithful, it is viewed not 
as an object of interest in itself, but as an appointment to 
Christian worship (LG 11.1). 
Trent's decree on Sacred Order had used the idea of 
1 character' for a particular polemical purpose - to argue that the 
priesthood is permanent even when its holders do not carry out an 
active ministry of the Nord. (94) This is partly why it had focused 
upon the notion of a 1 sign on the soul 1 • While Vatican II did not 
deny this ontological basis for the permanence of different 
sacramental qualifications, it was more concerned to bring to attention 
the question of what activities and ministries should normally be 
attached to the possession of sacramental 'character'. This accounts 
for the Council's shift of emphasis in its use of the doctrine. 
(94) de sacram. Ordinis, cap. 4. (Dz 960/DzS 1767) 
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I have already remarked that 'character' , seen as being 
essentially related to action, attributes to all baptised Christians 
an activity proper to them in the sacramental sphere. The very 
statement that the ministerial and common shares in Christ's priest-
hood differ in essence, occurs in a context which stresses that the 
two forms of priesthood are ordered in mutual relation to each 
other (LG 10.2). Such an affirmation of mutual relationship might 
be no more than a restatement of the fundamental distinction 
between active and passive, the giver and the recipient were it not 
that LG 32.2 and 3 (whilst firmly denying any. "inequality" in the 
Church) asserts that the basic equality of all Christians refers both 
to their (passive) relation to rebirth and grace, and also to the call 
which they have received (actively) to pursue perfection. (95). The 
passage makes the activity involved in pursuing perfection quite 
explicit: "There flourishes among them all a real equality as regards 
their dignity and the activity which belongs to the faithful for the 
building up of the body of Christ." (LG 32.3) (However, the sentence 
which follows seems to mute this, by saying that the laity provide 
merely "collaborative aid", ("sociam operam"), to their pastors and 
teachers, as though it were to these, in the first place, that activity 
properly belonged. Nevertheless, this has to be set against a general 
tendency amply to affirm the proper activity of the laity, an activity 
which extends to their own share in the priesthood of Christ (LG 34.2, 
AA 3. 1 ) • We shall examine the theology of lay action more fully in 
Section 0 of this chapter.) 
We may say that lay 'character' is not simply determined 
over against that of the clergy by mere passivity; rather, it is 
defined in terms of "exchange"; (96) nor does the difference in essence 
(95) In his encyclical Ubi Arcana (23 Dec. 1922) Pius XI had spoken of 
a "certain equality of rights which grows and flourishes in the 
Kingdom of Christ, as all possess the same dignity, and all are 
marked with the precious blood of Christ." (AAS 14 (1922) p. 695.) 
LG 32 partly echoes this encyclical, but emphasises not only a 
passive equality, in respect of salvation through Christ's blood, 
but also an equality of call and actiVity. 
(96) See o. Semmelroth, art. cit., P• 47. Also, H. Heimerl, "The 
Laity in the Constitution on the Church", in Concilium, 3-e no. 2 
( 1966) p. 69. Heimerl writes: 11This concept (of exchangeJ 
deserves to be called 'essential' because it approaches most 
closely the theological essence of the layman. 11 
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which marks off the priesthood common to all Christians from that 
peculiar to those in Sacred Order, undercut the fundamental equality 
which all enjoy by virtue of their baptismal 'character'. It was 
this equality which Vatican II chose to stress, in contrast to the 
emphasis on inequality evident in earlier documents. (97) 
Conclusion 
I promised, in the introduction to this section of the 
chapter, to suggest a way in which the idea which underlay shifts 
of emphasis in Vatican II' s definition and justification of authority 
might be characterised. The time has now come to fulfill that prrnnise. 
Whereas the ecclesiology of the post-Tridentine era came 
to divide the hierarchical function into three parts, end effectively 
to give eminence for purposes of authority to the canonical office, at 
Vatican II we see a shift towards a reintegration of the different 
functions - a Shift which was significant, if not complete. This 
reintegration moves towards a picture of authority's origin and purpose 
in the Church which we may characterise by employing the notion of an 
'invi tatory sign 1 • Within ·iihis concept, two principle ideas balance 
one another: These are the idea of mission, and the idea of sacramental 
consecration for action in this mission. The notion which integrates 
the two may be described as that of an 1invitatory sign' both on 
grounds of what mission and sacramental status inherently involve, and 
also on the basis of the moral character of the God who is represented 
by the authorities of the Church in these functions. 
(97) We hav'9 seen the wey in which Leo XIII emphasised inequalities 
in the Church in his Letter to Cardinal Guibert (see pp. 94f.); 
the idea of inequality was explicitly expressed in the schema 
for the Constitution on the Church of Vatican I. Although this 
schema was not fully debated (because of historical contin-
gencies) it expressed succinctly a point of view which was 
constant in the latter part of the nineteenth century: "Now, the 
Church is not a society of equals, as if all the fai thfu.l in it 
had the same rights, but it is an unequal society, and this is 
true not only because some of the faithful are clergy and others 
are laity, but especially because there is in the Church the 
institution of divine power, with which some are invested for the 
purpose of sanctifying, teaching and ruling, while others do not 
possess it." (Mansi 51, col. 543, or Omnium Concilii Vaticani ••• 
Documentorum Collectio, edited b~ Martin (Paderbor.n, 1873): Schema 
Canst. Do~. de Ecclesia, cap. X). 
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To elaborate: We have seen that the idea of mission 
grounds the existence of canonical authority in a lCLnd of representa-
tion of Christ which is not purely that of a quasi-legal 
institution. Although it remains true that the hierarchy (or 
ministry) continues to have representational stat us, so that it can 
require obedience, the idea that this status is rooted in the 
apostolic mission indicates 
the service of the Gospel. 
evangelistic heralds to the 
that authoritative representation is at 
The Church, and its leaders, appear as 
world, rather than as those who continually 
seek the expansion of institutional jurisdiction. This, it must be 
admitted, is a shift in emphasis which affects the atmosphere of 
ecclesiology rather than any specific delineation of the extent or 
nature of the authority which Church officers have to require 
obedience; nevertheless, such a change of atmosphere ca~ be practically 
significant ~Vhen it is one of a variety of factors in vvhich there have 
been shifts. 
Secondly, we have seen that there was a shift in the way 
in which the exercise of canonical authority was propounded; this 
shift was expressed through the ministerial and pastoral themes. 
Once again, this is a shift of atmosphere, and depends for its practical 
effects upon the good will of those who hold office in the Church. 
None the less, the idea of pastoral ministry is coherent with~ Shift 
towards an invitetory, rather than a dominative, concept of authority. 
Therefore, in sum, Vatican II's presentation of the nature, justifi-
cation and exercise of canonical authority in the Church suggests that 
the idea of jurisdiction and ~are shifted to the circumference of 
theological thinking; canonical authority does not exist on its own 
account, but as an 'accidental' necessity in the service of the Church's 
invitatory mission. Because it exists ih the Church as a derivative 
of the Church's inntatory role, canonical authority itself should 
mainly be exercised in an invi tatory, pastoral or ministerial manner. 
This pastoral stance of invitation will also cohere with the character 
of the Lord of the Church's mission, who came not to judge the world, 
but to invite it to salvation. 
The theme of mission is continued in Vatica~ II 1s 
presentation of the magisterial office; we have seen that, although the 
Council did not abolish demands for formal assent, it grounded the 
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authority of those who make these demands primarily in the preaching, 
witnessing mission of the Apostles. Once again, the formal require-
ments for obedience move to the circumference of theological concern, 
as 1accidentals 1 , while the central picture is occupied by the idea 
of invitation to the world to participate in a truth and relationship 
which lies beyond any mere propositions. Members of the Magisterium 
are not schoolmasters imparting doctrine, but heralds of discipleship. 
Their message appeals to the inner man, and only secondarily to 
externalised assent. 
We find the theme of invitation taken up again in the way in 
which Vatican II described the kind of authority which inheres in the 
sacramental ministry. The sacraments point man to the future, and do 
not simply focus all his attention upon the fact that God is a judge· 
and redeemer of the sins of the past. Therefore, those who administer 
these sacraments appear as invitatory signs in themselves, pointing men 
to new life. When we move on, to consider the basis of sacramental 
status, we found that the notion of 'character' was eployed in such a 
way as to indicate that sacramental ministry is a concept,;:Correlative 
with the idea of apostolic mission; that is to s~ 'character' is 
conceived as a basis for activity, rather than as a static quality 
which is of interest in itself. We shall particularly examine the extent 
to which the concept of sacramental 'character' integrates with that 
of apostolic mission, when we come to study Vatican II's teaching on the 
office of the bishop in the following section. However, here we must 
note that the shift towards the idea of Church authority as an 
1invitatory sign', in which the characteristics deriving from the 
nature of mission and sacramental reality are more important than 
characteristics of a purely jurisdictional type, makes that authority 
more clearly a nucleus of leadership for the entire Church (for all 
Christians are caught up in the divine mission, and all are marked 
by the sacraments for worship and action). 
It would be foolish to try to claim too much for this Shift 
of emphasis. Vatican II did not espouse a model of the Church which 
was purely dominated by the motif of witnessing, nor of embodiment. 
The status of Church authorities as representatives of Christ remained. 
However, it was set in a complex and integrated relationship with 
newly re-emphasised elements of the witness and embodliaent motifs. 
This new context for the idea of representational authority 
qualifies its nature, making it conform more nearly to the concept 
of an 1invitatory sign', as outlined above; it also, potentially 
qualifies the scope of authority, as the tension between different 
ecclesiological motifs is worked out in practice. In Chapters III-V 
we shall trace Vatican II's practical delineation of the concrete 
scope of representational authority, in its context of integration 
with the other motifs, and we shall also make brief excursions into 
the question of the social plausibili·ty of the description of authority 
which is gi. ven. However, before we do that, we must turn in the 
final section of the present chapter to the way in vvhich the Council 
described and justified the specific different ranks in the Church. 
c) Vatican II 1 s Definition and Justification of Specific Hierarchical 
Ranks in the Church, including the Status of the Laity 
This section of the chapter will have four sub-sections, 
dealing with the rank of bishop, that of presbyter, the deacon's role, 
and the status of the laity. There will be no separate sub-section 
treating of the papacy; this will be dealt w.i th in connection with the 
episcopate. Our studies of the different ranks in the Church will lay 
the essential. basis for the chapters which follow, in vvhich we shall 
examine the relationships which the Council thought should subsist 
be tween different persons in the Church. 
1 Bishops 
We shall examine first Vatican II 1 s picture of the episcopal 
office in itself; then we shall turn to a consideration of the 
relationship of the episcopate and the papacy. 
a) The definition and justification of the episcopal office in 
itself 
We have seen the fundamental importance .attached in Roman 
Catholic ecclesiology to the office of the bishops, the 1 successors 
of the Apostles". We must now notice an important point which arises 
in LG 28.1; the passage reads: "The bishops ••• legitimately handed 
on the office of their ministry in various degrees to various members 
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of the Church. In this way, ecclesiastical ministry, Which is 
divinely established, is exercised in diverse orders by ~1ose who 
have been called 'bishops', 'presbyters' and 'deacons' since 
antiquity i tself. 11 Hans Kting notes three points about this passage: 
~he first is the use of the word 'ministry', rather than the 
"unbiblical word 'hierarchy' 11 ; this we have already commented upon 
in the previous section of the chapter. However, KUng's other 
points are these: 
"While Trent uses the phrase 1 divine ordinance 1 
• • • obviously to refer to the distinctions in 
office between bishops, presbyters and deacons, 
Vatican II unambiguously applies the words 
'divinely established' ••• solely to the 
ecclesiastical ministry as such. 
11 While for Trent there is a 1 hierarchy established 
by divine ordinance, consisting of ••• bishops, 
presbyters and deacons,' Vatican II says that the 
ecclesiastical ministr,y is exercised • • • on 
different levels by those who from antiJuity ••• 
(not, that is, from the very beginning have 
been called bishops, priests (presbyters) and 
deacons." (98) 
Kting calls these changes "a result of recent exegetical 
and historical resear.ch, an explicit correction of a canon of the 
Council of Trent" (99), and draws attention to Vatican II's 
reference to the research of P. Beno1t on the origins of the 
ministry. 
What is the significance of all this? In the light of the 
passage in question we may say that the ministry of M.shops, as 
particular successors to the Apostles, appears to be the origi.naJ. and 
essential form of ministry in the Church. The presbyterate and 
diaconate are therefore seen not as necessary to the Church's 
structure, .'lhich Christ instituted, but as legitimate developments 
within the human ordering of the community. Divine insti tu ti on 
belongs only to 11ministry 11 itself, undifferentiated, but historically 
(98) The Church, (London, 1971) P• 418 
(99) loc. cit. The passage from Trent to which reference is made 
by Vatican II, and which KUng quotes, is de sacram. Ordinis, 
can. 6. (Dz 966/DzS 1776) 
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passed dowm from the Apostles through the episcopal line. (100) This 
is important, bec~se we have seen that the bishops' apostolic 
ministry is the correlate of an apostolic mission, in mich the 
functions of preaching, teaching, governing pastorally, •'and sancti-
fying, are all integrated inseparably. Therefore, if a single, 
undifferentiated commission from Christ is the originating source 
of all grades of ministry in the Church, we may expect to find a 
similar set of integrated functions exercised at every level of 
ministry. The idea of a separate line of succession from the Apostles 
in the sacramental priesthood of the Mass becomes untenable. (101) 
The idea of a single, originating source of ministry in 
Christ's commission to the Apostles, and in its inheritance by the 
episcopate, is matched by Vatican II 1s teaching concerning the sacra-
mental status of bishops. LG 21.2 says that "the fullness of the 
sacrament of order is conferred by episcopal consecration". The Council 
presented this as a "teaching" rather than a solemn definition on a 
previously unresolved question, but it was to base all its subsequent 
treatment of the episcopal office on the basis of this teaching. (102) 
(100)We Should note that the Council of Trent did not claim that it was 
the earthly Christ who instituted the threefold (or seven or 
eightfold) hierarchicalisation of the Church. It only attributes 
the institution of a :new 'priesthood' to the Lord's incarnate 
lifetime, (see de sacram. Ordinis, cap. 1. (Dz 957/DzS 1764)); 
elsewhere, the Decree on the sacrament of Holy Order speaks of 
bishops as succeeding the Apostles, without saying that their pre-
eminence was instituted by the incarnate Christ (see cap. 4. 
(Dz 960/DzS 1768)) Divine ordinance, therefore, as the basis for 
a threefold hierarchy, must have been attributed to the direction 
of the Holy Spirit in the early Church. If we contrast Vatican II 1s 
:i.d.ea that the development of the threefold m.i.nistry was 
slmply legitimate, God's providence appears to be permissive rather 
than directive at this point. We may also note that, if any 
form of ministry appears to be Trent 1 s basic datum, from which all 
others are derived, it would be the ministry of sacramental priest-
hood, founded by Christ during his lifetime, rather than the 
episcopate. 
(101)LG 20.2 is not so explicit as LG 28.1 over the originating primacy 
of the episcopal office. However, in its assertion that the 
bishops hold first place in the ministry handed on by the Apostles, 
and that it is they who are the vehicles of the apostolic seed, 
LG 20.2 does not contradict the teaching of the later passage, but 
rather prepares the ground for it. 
(102)The statement was the consequence of a vote of October 30 1963, in 
which the ~oting figures showed an overWhelming majority in favour 
of this teaching. 
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It is to be noted that the Council's expression avoids the language 
of 1rank1 and 'highest degree', because of their juridical overt:ones, 
considered inappropriate in an affirmation in the field of sacramental 
theology. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the teaching concerns 
the bishops' sacramental status first of all, it also brings about a 
greater degree of correspondence between the sacramental and the 
canonical orders. Indeed, the idea of fUllness of Sacramental Order 
is used in LG 21.2 as a basis for arguing that a bishop represents 
Christ not only in his sacerdotal activity, but also by 'playing his 
part' as teacher and pastor as well. That is to say, all three 
functions of ministry are related by Vatican II to the bishop 1 s 
sacramental qualification. Since the preceding article grounded the 
threefold office in the concept of an apostolic mission, it is cleex 
that the ideas of a mission (of which the Gospel is the principle) 
and of the sacramental actualisation of Christ's presence and work 
are treated by the Council as correlated notions. 
I have suggested that the ideas of mission and sacrament 
can be integrated through viewing them in a perspective in which they 
appear under the heading of 'invitatory signs'. However, there is a 
tension here all the same. The sacramental sphere of action is one 
in which the minister's actions remain identified with those of 
Christ; the spheres of preaching, teaching, and pastoral government 
and leadership, are fields in vvhich the minister's actions are at the 
most representational of Christ's activity and will, and may be only 
witnesses to them. Therefore, despite the invitatory perspective in 
which sacramental status may be seen as the proper correlate of a 
general apostolic mission, there is a danger that a theory of ministry 
which emphasises the sacramental basis of office too much will tend 
to transfer the irmnunity which sacramental action enjoys from the 
effects of human limitations and frailty, to the other functions as 
well, so that the whole action of the hierarchy becomes identified 
with the action of God himself. 
The documents of Vatican II do not altogether avoid this 
danger. Indeed, at first sigpt, one might take the mole of'_JJG;21~1 
as teaching that there is identity of action between Christ and the 
bishops in all three parts of ·their integrated ministry. Likewise, 
LG 20.3 makes a reference to the letters of St. Ignatius of Antioch, 
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saying that "the bifhops have undertaken the ministry of the 
community • • • presiding in the place of God over the flock" 
(emphasis mine); however, in other contexts where the non-sacramental 
offices of the episcopate are mentioned, Vatican II was careful to 
use terms i nplying that ecclesiastical ministers are not to be 
identified with their Lord: They 'play his part', as actors would 
(see LG 21.1..); they are "vicars and legates" (LG 27.1); they are 
his "representatives" (LG 37 .3); and - if we now look back more 
closely to LG 21.1 -we find that it is through their service and 
witness that Christ preaches the Gospel, for they are "ministers" and 
"stewards" of the mysteries of God. 
There can be, then, a certain unsatisfactoriness about 
Vatican. II 1 s immediate correla·tion of sacramental status with all the 
functions of the threefold ministry, although it goes a long way to 
rescue the Council's concept of ministry from domination by juridical 
categories and canonical restrictions. 
We can notice the way in which the sac ramen tal theme took 
over from some of the more extreme juridicalising types of ecclesiology 
by remarking that LG 21.1 attributes all three episcopal functions to 
the effects of consecration. iVhere Pius XII had treated the power of 
jurisdiction as not inhering immediately in the biShop's status, but as 
being "immediately imparted by the Supreme Pontiff" (see p. '79), 
Vatican II saw this power of government as bei:ng grounded in his 
sacramental status and apostolic mission, "Hierarchical communion" 
with the Roman Pontiff is still required if the fu.ncti ons of the 
bishop are to be exercised (or to be exercised in a church which is 
recognisably the "Catholic Church", at least) (LG 21. 2, 24. 2), but the 
power of jurisdiction is not ontologically derived from the Pope's 
canonical authority. Lumen Gentium, then, ratified the opinion which 
is "well founded in Tradition" ••• "that episcopal consecration confers 
of itself an ontological participation in the sacred functions of the 
pastoral mission of the Apostles, conceived as an. organic whole", (103) 
The effect of this theory of the episcopate is to 1~ new 
weight upon the idea of the 'local church' of which the biShop is the 
(103)G. Dejaifve, 11La Magna Charta de Vatican II", in Nouvelle 
Revue Theologique, 87. (1965) p. 12. (emphasis nine). 
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centre (CD 11.1). (104) The jurisdiction of the bishop is not 
derived from the Pope, but is grounded in his almost mystical 
relationship to a portion of ·t;he greater Christian community. In 
this - portion though it be in quantati ve terms - the Catholic Church 
is "truly present and operative" (loc. cit.) in the fullness of life 
and function. (105) 
It has been argued that the idea of the local church is a 
more original and significant contribution to the thought of Western 
Christeno.om than Vatican II 1 s affirmation of 1 collegiali ty 1 , 
(see PPo 126-31 ) • Emmanuel Lanne has suggested that the idea of the 
local church, gathered in eucharistic celebration around its bishop, 
(as presented in SC 41) can be seen as the natural ground for the 
bishop's power of magisterium. Not only is the J.d turgy ·t;he prime locus 
of Christian teaching (that is to say, doctrinal teaching of the 
faithful) but also the theology of the local church allows the bishop 
to be viewed in essential connection with the community which surrounds 
him. He is located !at rather than above, the People of God, and 
therefore he can be an authentic interpreter of the w:i.tness which his 
church bears to Christ. He is not only the minister of Christ and his 
t<Prd, as a messenger sent to the community, but he is also his church's 
servant. ( 1 06) In other words, the theme of the local church situates 
the authority of the episcopate firmly in a setting of the general 
embodiment of God's activity and presence by the community. 
The theology of the local church is of oriental inspiration, 
and it is sketched in terms redolent of Platonist thought. The local 
churches appear as the instantiations of a universal 1for.m 1 of the 
Church: They are "formed in the image of the universal Church; in them 
and from them the one and unique Catholic Church has 'its existence" 
(LG 23.1 , see also 26.1 ) • The most outstanding "manifestation of the 
( 104) I say "new weight"; strictly speaking, this should be qualified by 
recognition of the constancy of this theme in the Eastern churches, 
including those in communion with Rome. 
(105)We should note that our object of interest here is the diocesan 
bishop, and not the curial, coadjutant,or auxiliary bishop. The 
existence of bishops in these other roles, exercising power which 
is truly delegated and not ontologically proper to them, constitutes 
a continued effectiveness of a canonical hierarchy separable from 
the sacramental one. 
(106)See Lanne, "Evolution of the Magisterium in the Roman Catholic 
Church", in One in Christ, 1976, PP• 253f. 
126 
Church" is in the episcopal 11i turgy of the diocese (so 41. 2). The 
reader will notice here language which suggests that the local church 
at worship is, itself, an epiphany of God 1 s presence. Such a 
concept is in tension with the idea that the Church is a continuing 
mission, a 'movement 1 , because of its static overtones. We find 
again, therefore, an uneasiness in Vatican II's use of both mission 
and sacrament as integrating concepts for the unification of its 
idea of authority. However, behind this uneasy coalescence there is 
nevertheless a clear determination to move away from a jurisdictional 
ideology of authority, towards one which stresses more the invitatory 
function of the Church and its officers. 
b) The episcopate and the papacy 
Just as the pic·liure of the bishops as the centres of 
their local churches depends upon a somewhat uneasy combination of the 
ideas of mission and of sacramental epiphany, so too the concept of 
a 1 college 1 of bishops contains the same sort of tension. It combines 
the idea that the unity of the Catholic Church is fundamentally 
found at the sacramental level, in the communion of the local churches 
and their bishops, ~uth the notion that the bishops are successors of 
the Apostles, and inherit not only their mission, but also the formal 
structure of their interrelationship. This interrelationship is 
expressed in a college, of which the Pope is the head because he has 
inherited a particular chaxge over the universal Church directly from 
Peter. 
We shall examine the notion of the episcopal college 
firstly in its 'communion 1 , or sacramental, aspect; then we shall 
consider it under its aspect as an inherited structure in the pastoral 
government of ·t;he Church. 
i) The idea of an episcopal college may be so conceived as to allow, 
in itself, for a certain primacy to be attributed to the Pope, because 
of his centrality in the communion of the churches. This centrality 
may even be expressed as 'headship' of the hierarchy. Thus, one of the 
strongest proponents of the theology of the college at Vatican II, 
the Melkite Patriarch, Maximos IV, argued that one of the principles 
which should be made clear at the Council was that the Pontiff's power 
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is gi. ven him "essentially in that he is head of the whole hierarchy, 
and precisely with a view to fulfilling the primatial diakonia." (107) 
The Patriarch hoped that the expression of this principle would 
override the idea that the Pope solely rules the Church by a special 
and peculiar jurisdiction and power: 
11If the hierarchy in the Church is conceived 
only in the sense of power, instead of being 
thought of and expressed in the sense of a 
service, episcopal collegiality becomes 
impossible, because, in the face of a univ~sal 
and direct power - if the Roman primacy is so 
c)nceived - all other power can be only delegated 
and particular ••• The human notion of juris-
diction, applied without adpatation to the 
hierarchy of the ChUQ~ch, has falsified the nature 
of apostolic ministry." (108) 
We see here an organic linkage of the notion of primacy in 
a college based on conununion of the churches, with the delineation 
of the exercise of this primacy in terms of service. This is not 
simply an accidental link, because the redefinition of the papal 
primacy totally in relation to his headship of the hierarchy, and 
not at all in relation to a peculiar jurisdiction inherited from 
Peter 1by a different channel', would locate that primacy completely 
among the bishops instead of~ them. (109) 
Karl Rahner, writing before Vatican II, suggested that the 
papal primacy should be viewed in this way. He said that this would 
not mean that the Pope would have to have a 'canonical mission' 
from the rest of the college, nor would it mean that he would be 
unable to act alone. He would, however, act on behalf of the college, 
(without thereby being concretely answerable to it,) and therefore 
(107)Intervention of Maximos IV, on 7 October 1963. (See Documentation 
Catholique, 1964, col. 1460.) 
(108)Article by Maximos IV, entitled "La collegialite episcopale 11 , in 
Irenikon, 36 (1963) P• 322. 
( 1 09 )Maximos IV was not arguing that papal primacy should totally be 
defined in these terms, without ~reference to special 
Petrine jurlsdiction. However, he did hold that Petrine juris-
diction does not precede collegial power either conceptually 
or chronologically, and that the two forms of power should be 
made to appear as complementary and mutually indispensable. 
(See art. cit., p. 323.) 
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all his actions would be seen as service of the communion of 
Churches which the college represents. (110) Concretely, 
Maximos IV considered that a recas·t; concept of the papal primacy 
would remove the justification for the existence of a papal 'civil-
service', t·te CUria, by which Peter's successor can administer the 
affairs of the universal Church as though he were its monarch. (111) 
How far did Vatican II's concept of the college of 
bishops express the purely sacramental concept of the Church's unity 
in the communion of churches? It expressed this concept, first of 
all, through its teaching that membership of the college is the 
automatic consequence of sacramental consecration: "It belongs "to 
the bishops to introduce into the episcopal body through the sacrament 
of 8rder thos~ who have newly been cliosen" (LG 21. 2); "bishops, by 
virtue of their sacramental consecration and hierarchical communion 
with the head and members of the college are constituted members of 
the episcopal body ••• all bishops who are members of the episcopal 
college have the right to be present at an Ecumenical Council" (CD 4.1). 
Therefore, consecration, and continuance in cormnunion with the head 
and members of the college, insert a bishop into that corporate office 
of supreme authority in the Church, which is "exercised in its solemn 
mode in an Ecumenical Council" (LG 22.1 ). Indeed, as Rahner pointed 
out, the doctrine concerning Councils and their authority had always, 
if only implicitly, contained the con trine of the college of bishops 
as "a unified subject of rights and duties". (112) Vatican II merely 
drew out the consequences of this concept, and showed more clearly 
how it had significance outside the sphere of solemn Councils. It did 
this by te8ching that, in unanimous communion, and under the instigation 
or recognition of the Pope, the college of bishops does form a subject 
of supreme governmental power, even When dispersed throughout the 
world (see LG 22.2). 
(110)See "On the Theology of the Council", in Theological Investi;-
gations, 5 (London, 1966) P• 249. 
( 111 )See Maximos IV, Intervention loc. cit.: 111l'his power is by 
nature personal and cannot - if it is to remain so - be 
delegated in any way." 
(112)Rahner, loc. cit. 
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Membership of the episcopal college also has more 
indefinable effects; we have already seen that it involves a biShop 
in concern for all the churches, which issues in his partic.1pation 
in the Church's universal mission. (Bee LG 23.3, CD 6.1, UR 3.5, 
AG 38.1.) 
It is in this sphere of universal concern that the nature 
of the episcopal college as 11 a true and obligatory community 
fashioned entirely from the Church 1 s sacramental reali ty11 ( 113) 
becomes plain. This is because mutual concern and aid in the Church's 
mission is a form of activity which expresses the essence of the 
Church, and the first impulse which lies behind the existence of 
ecclesiastical ministry. It does not depend upon jurisdictional 
commissioning and empowerment. Indeed, LG 23.2 makes it clear that a 
share in the concern for the universal Church's well-being does not 
confer on the individual biShop any jurisdictional power over a church 
which is not his ovm. It is, rather, a form of vocation to service. 
Once the doctrine of the existence of the episcopal 
college is translated into canonical fonns (as it is when the supreme 
authority in the Church is defined, as above) we at once find 
reference to the position of the Pope which suggests that his primacy 
is something other than that which derives purely from headShip or 
centrality in the communion between the churches. We turn now, there-
fore, to consider the episcopal college under its aspect as an 
inherited structure of defined interrelationship in the government 
of the Church. 
ii) Even if the reader should have no knowledge of current Roman 
Catholic ecclesiology, it would be evident to him, from the fact of 
the continued existence and universal legislation of the papal Curia, 
that the Roman primacy has not been totally redefined in relation to a 
sacramentally-defined college. Rather, Vatican II continued to 
present the Pope as holding universal power of government by virtue of 
a separate channel of authority, flowing directly to him from Peter. 
The Roman Pontiff is "Vicar of Christ" and "Pastor of the whole Church". 
( 113)J. Ratzinger, "The Pastoral Implications of Episcopal 
Collegiality", in Concilium, 1, no. 1 (1965) p. 29. 
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The Council alludes specifically to those promises and tasks which 
were given to Peter alone, (LG- 8.2, 22.2) .. (114) It is in this light 
that he has his own proper mission, to procure "the common good of 
the universal Church, and the good of the individual charches11 • (CD 2.1 ) 
Hence, 11he holds the primacy of ordinary power over all the churches 11 • 
(loc. cit.) (115) 
The very term 11 college11 belongs to the jurisdictional sphere, 
and so, although it is used in order to express the social reality 
constituted by the communion between bishops, it was a~so amenable 
to definition in such a way as to indicate the canonical structure of 
bishops' relationships; in the usage of the Council it is to be 
understood as meaning 11 a stable body, whose structure 81ld authority 
is to be deduced from revelation". (116) Just as the term 11college 11 , 
therefore, qualifies the notion of sheer communion, so too does the 
use of the adjective 11hierarchical11 ; the reader will remember that 
membership of the college depends upon both consecration and continu-
ance in 11hierarchical communion with the head and members of the 
college". (JD 4.1) 
We find, then, that the concept of the college does not 
expunge the independent primacy of the Pope, but incorporates the 
Pope's headship within itself, making it part of the college's 
structure, and the necessary condition of its operation. The papacy, 
itself, appears as being endowed with supreme authority on two 
(114)Dejaifve notes how high is the number of references to Peter's 
successor in Lumen Gentium: There are 40 such references in 
passages on the episcopate, and 14 of them are in the articles 
on collegiality alone. This, along with the official~ 
Explicativa, constitutes an effort to reassure the minority 
that Vatican I's doctrine of the primacl was not being 
jettisoned. (Dejaifve, art. cit. P• 12.) · 
(115)For other passages on the papal primacy, see: LG 18.2, 19, 23.1, 
CD 2.1, 5, AA 5.1, UR 2.3 and 4. 
(116)Nota Explicativa 1: The~ is, at this point, explaining that 
the term "college" is not to be understood in its normal 
juridical connotation in this context (ie. it does not mean a 
"body of equals who delegate their authority to a president") 
but that it is nevertheless amenable to comprehension and 
definition in such a way as to have a canonical structure which 
can either be operative or non-operative. 
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counts - both because of its inherent power, derived immediately 
from Peter, through succession in his pastoral mission, and also 
because of its relationShip to the college of bishops as a centre and 
controlling point of communion. In this latter capacity, the 
Pontiff's power is translated into a ministry of service or a 
presidency over the "universal community of charity" (LG 13. 3, see 
also AG 22.2) which is made up of the communion of the different 
local churches. 
If the idea of the college were to become the doctrinal norm 
in the future, under which the Pope's primacy were generally under-
stood and exercised, joint action by the bishops and Pope, accompanied 
by continual processes of consultation, would become the norm of 
practice. ~his would conform the exercise of papal power more closely 
to the model of invitatory witness. However, this potential 
situation, fostered by Vatican II 1 s enunciation of the idea of 
collegiality, has to be balanced against the continuing ·theme of 
representational jurisdictional power, which is entailed by the alter-
native concept of primacy. 
2 Presbyters 
Like the preceding sub-section, this will be divided into 
two. 
a) The definition and justification of the presbyteral office in 
itself 
By teaching that the bishops possess the fullness of the 
sacrament of Order, Vatican II created a problem in defining the 
presbyteral order's status. On the one hand, the Council Fathers 
did not want to deny that presbyters fully represent Christ in their 
local congregations; on the other hand, the apostolic ~tssion in the 
local (diocesan) church had been concentrated theologically upon the 
person of the bishop. Therefore, while presbyters are "brothers" to 
the bishops (PO 7.1), and ''co-operators" in their mission (LG 28.2, 
CD 28.1, 30.1, see also PO 12.1), they are also their "sons" (LG 28. 2, 
CD 16.3), and their "instruments", (LG 28.2). Indeed, the contrast 
between these sets of terms does not seem to have struck the Council 
as stark, since it could describe presbyters as "co-operators" ~nd 
"instruments" in a single phrase, and when the bishops are asked to 
-' 
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treat them .?..S "sons", they are also enjoined to consider them as 
"friends"- a term more indicative of equality than sonship. 
However, although it mey not be immediately obvious, there. is a real 
paradox lying behind Vatican II 1 s use of these terms. 
The assertion of the bishops' unique possession of the 
fullness of the sacrament of Order implies that presbyters depend 
upon them not only canonically, but also sacramentally. The very 
priesthood they enjoy is derivative; in some sense, a presbyter 
does not walk away from his ordination with a degree of Order as full 
and independent as that of the man who ordained him, requiring 
merely a 'canonical nussion' in order to exercise it. Rather, in the 
very act of celebrating the Eucharist, the presbyter will represent 
the bishop, the central sacramental ndnister of the diocese (PO 5.1); 
at the same time, of course, he will also be representative of 
Christ (loc. cit.). 
It seems, therefore, that Vatican II dindnished the sta·tus 
of the presbyterate in the sacramental sphere. However, from another 
angle, the Council mey be said to have attributed more to the nature 
of the second degree of priesthood: The derivative order of presbyters 
orientates them essentially not only towards sacramental functions, 
but towards an integrated threefold office. Their first duty is that 
of evangelising all men (PO 4.1); their second (chronologically and 
logically, but not in worth) is the sacramental office in the Liturgy 
(PO 5); their third function is ·that of representing Christ the head 
in their cornnunities (PO 6.1). 
The paradox of the presby·teral state appears rather sharply 
in the way in which PO 6 expresses the function of headship. Presbyters 
exercise this office "according to the authority which is theirs" 
("pro sua parte auctoritatis"). At the same time, they do not exercise 
this authority which is proper to them in a sphere of jurisdiction which 
is their own; they "collect together the family of God • • • in the 
name of the bishop." (PO 6.1 , see also LG 28.1). 
Vfuerein, then, does the authority proper to a presbyter lie? 
First of all, it may be seen as sacramentally based, in the sense that 
this authority is orientated upon the Eucharist. This is not quite 
the same thing as saying that the presbyter's very role in the 
Eucharist gives him such authority (which seems to have been Pius XII's 
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view, see note (92), p.l13) but it is rather a claim that the 
sacrament 1 s nature as a communal celebration requires of' its celebrants 
an inherent 11 spiritual power, given for the building up of the 
Church". It is, then, an authority which is at the service of their 
invitatory mission and ministry. Secondly, it is an authority which, 
like the entire presbyteral priesthood, is derivative; it does not 
therefore have the full scope which belongs to the power inhering in 
the bishops' share in the apostolic mission. 
Concretely, the authority of' headship which belongs to 
presbyters is described not in terms of commanding, but rather in terms 
of educating their flocks in the faith (PO 6.2), ~d 0f leading them 
to unity in love (PO 9.3). The presbyters are "defenders of the 
common good, for which they care in the bishop's name". (loc. cit.) 
Naturally, the defence of the common good in a parish or other 
Christian group, and the very celebration of the sacraments, make it 
necessary for presbyters to have powers of taking final responsibility, 
and of maldng administrative arrangements. All this is assumed in the 
Council's description of the way in which they should conduct them-
selves as "fathers", but also as "brothers" of the laity (PO 9.1). 
However, outside the special sphere of the confessional, the pastoral 
activity of the presbyter does not appear as giving commands or 
making prescriptions which are binding on others on his own behalf. 
We must, I propose, separate the proper 11 spiri tual power" 
of presbyters from the fact of any actual authority which an individual 
priest may be given so as to make binding demands on others. The 
power which is inherent in presbyteral order is a pastoral power, 
having purely invi tatory authority. As ministers of the sacraments 
and WGrli of God, priests of the second order are responsible for 
uniting people around the altar and pulpit. It is the authority of 
invitation invested in them which sends them out to "those who have 
fallen away from the practice of the sacraments, or even from the 
faith itself" (PO 9.3, see also LG 28.4); it is this which makes them 
specially concerned for the poor and unfortunate, for sinners and 
children (see PO 6.3 and OT 8.1). Their inherent authority is that of 
servants of the great king, sent out to the highways and b~vays to 
compel people to come in (see Lk. 14.23). Theirs is the authority 
attached to the invitation to the wedding feast, and consequently, to 
the invitation to a life of holiness in the co~nunity of God (see PO 4.1). 
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It is not, in itself, the power to command certain actions. This 
latter, administrative authority, depends more upon 'canonical 
mission' than upon sacramental status; presbyters malce demands on 
people, and binding decisions for their parishes, in virtue of their 
representation of the bishop. This is clear, because the bishop 
remains as a court of appeal and a final arbiter, being the locus of 
truly jurisdictional authority. 
Of course, the invitatory authority of the presbyter can 
only be effectively exercised in the concrete circumstance of his 
relationship with a specific group of Catholics, to whom he is 
delegated by the bishop; but the fact remains that, conceptually, 
his administrative authority as bishop's representative, and his 
pastoral, invitatory authority, are separable. The practical fusion 
of the two kinds of authority makes it difficult to distinguish them, 
and this is reinforced by the fact that, on the sacramental level, 
and on the level of a share in the preaching mission, the presbyter's 
powers are also derived from the bishop (but directly, through 
ordina·tion). Therefore, even the sacramentally-based pastoral authority 
of invitation, which is 1 proper 1 to presbyters, is only possessed as 
something derived at an ontologically 'lower' level from the pastoral 
authority of bishops. 
What, then, may we deduce concerning the nature of presbyteral 
authority seen as a Whole? Is the lack of an inherent, sacramentally-
rooted power to command among the factors which explain why presbyters 
do not enjoy the fullness of Order? This seems to be the conclusion 
towards which the documents point. Fullness of pastoral authority, as 
possessed by the bishops, must include the power to command, in the end. 
If pastoral authority is a reflection of Christ 1 s authority (through the 
fact of an integrated apostolic mission) we must say that his power as 
Lord and king should be represented in the Church; such a role cannot 
be expunged. nevertheless, Christ chooses to make himself knovm more 
generally in invitation and appeal to the heart of man. Therefore, the 
more general and basic element of pastoral authority is the authority of 
invitation- and this basic power is conferred on presbyters as properly 
theirs through ordination. (117) The powers of government, of command 
( 117) IVI. Schmaus speaks of 11 a certain basic element of pastoral authority" 
donferred in the power of orders, and says that, for a presbyter, 
the "fullness of pastoral authority" is given in 1 canonical 
mission'. ( 11Hirtengewalt", LKT, 5, col. 387)• 
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and administrative decision, are secondary, though necessary elements 
in the Council's concept of authority which is representative of 
Christ; (part of the necessity for this secondary element is not purely 
theological, but owes its force to the exigencies of life in human 
conununi ty) • Although such authority must always exist in the Church, 
it is presented as theologically rather marginal in the definition of 
an integrated threefold ministry. The primary authoritative task of 
both bishops and presbyters is to 11 invi te all men insistently to 
conversion and holiness 11 (PO 4.1). 
b) The presbyterium 
In LG 28.2 Vatican II introduces the notion of a diocesan 
1presbyterium 1 , constituted of presbyters and their bishop. It is 
an idea derived from St. Ignatius of Antioch, suggesting 11a strong and 
intimate body with mystical overtones11 subsisting among the diocesan 
clergy. (118) It is evidently not a juridical concept, since LG 28.2 
leaves its function obscure. It does not imply a body of equals, since 
presbyters are both sacramentally and canonically dependent on their 
bishops, who are 11fathers 11 to their presbyteria (CD 28.1). In fact, one 
function of the idea is to make it clear that 'religious' who are 
engaged in pastoral work are truly under the authority of their diocesan 
ordinary, since, in a certain sense, they too belong to the clergy of 
the diocese, the presbyterium (see CD 34.1). 
However, the thinking which is expressed in the idea of the 
presbyterium is not primarily concerned with the structures for the 
exercise of diocesan authority. Rather, the concept is proposed as a 
model of the way in which presbyters, although dependent on the 
episcopate, do really share in the dignity of priesthood in a corporate 
and organic mission and ministry (see LG 28.2). Although PO 8.1 speaks 
of the unity of the presbyterium as deriving from the fact that 
presbyters are given over to the service of the diocese under their 
bishop, LG 28.2 uses the word 1with 1 , and presents the dependence of 
presbyters on their bishop in visual terms as a unity around a central 
figure, rather than a hierarchical pyramid. That which presbyters 
(118)See F. Haarsma, 11The Presbyterium: Theory and Programme for 
Action11 , in Concilium, 3, no. 5 (1969) pp. 32ff. 
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share with their bishop is so significant that they can, indeed, be 
his "brothers11 (PO 7.1), and his "indispensable counsellors 11 (lac. 
cit.). The unity of the presbyterium is best expressed in 
liturgical concelebration, in which the ministry which all share in 
the sacramental sphere is manifested (lac. cit. and SO 41). In 
short, the concept of the presbyterium belongs to the sacramental 
definition of priesthood. 
Because of its sacramental form, the idea of the presby-
terium tempers an over-hierarchical view of the Church by Showing that 
the ontological dependence of presbyters upon bishops is not too 
immediately to be translated into a structure of 'higher' and 'lower'; 
the sacramental sphere has its o•v.n rationale, which is not adequately 
conveyed by ideas of persons being set 'over' o·t;hers. It is a 
rationale of communion. 
Yet, on the practical level, authority has to be exercised 
and delegated. As we have seen, distinctions of power to command are, 
concretely, rooted to a large extent in sacramental status. A 
theological concept of the presbyterium 1 s communion in the ministry 
with its bishop cannot win for it anything more than an advisory role 
(as we shall see in the next chapter). But what it m~ achieve, if taken 
to heart, is an atmosphere in which consultation, and~'advice become a 
norm in dioJesan government. Therefore, although a presbyterium is 
not equivalent to a scaled-down college of diocesan scope, because its 
members remain of different sacramental status to their head, the idea 
of the presbyterium is potentially as significant in its sphere as the 
doctrine of the episcopal college (within whose processes, after all, 
the Pope always has a power of veto). 
3 Deacons 
Little needs to be said on this subject for our present 
purposes, since deacons are in no way holders of authority in the 
Church. However, we may note that LG 29 confirms the general tendency 
of Vatican II to make degrees of ministry equivalent to degrees of 
sacramental status (thus showing the Council's integrated notion of 
ministerial mission and sacramental reality). This confirmation appears 
in the phrase 11 strengthened vv.i. th sacramental grace 11 ; it is a slightly 
runbiguous expression, but it seems to signify the recognition of the 
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diaconate as a real sacramental status, while at the same time, 
not casting a slur on the thought of the few theologians mo have 
doubted this. (119) 
4 The Laity 
We now turn to the subject of the status of the laity in 
the Church. Lay folk are not inherently involved in the hierarchy 
of authority, and yet they enjoy their own sacramental status and 
dignity. The mode of their obedience is dependent both upon this 
status, and also upon the way in which authority of those who are set 
over them is conceived. Let us briefly refresh OUJ1 memory of 
Vatican II 1 s picture of the nature of hierarchical authority, before 
we move on to situate the layman's status and activity in relation to 
it. 
I have argued that authority in the Church is attributed 
a role which is representative of Christ, but representative in a 
modified WHJ• Mollifications arise both because of the inherent 
nature of authoritative representation, which is seen as justified by 
the apostolic mission and by sacramental reality, rather than by sheer 
mandated jurisdiction, and also because of the moral and pastoral 
qualifications put upon its exercise. Finally, modifications also 
arise from the complex relationship between ideas of representation, 
anbodiment and witness. In sum, the picture of authority in the 
Church which appears is that of an· 1invitatory sign', in which ideas of 
jurisdiction and rule are shifted to the circumference of attention 
and importance (see PP•ll.?-20)• 
However, even within this modified concept of representation, 
in which there is a tendency to integrate all three functions of 
ministry in an invitatory perspective, there exists a tension between 
the notion of sacramental representation, and the representation of 
Christ which flows from a share in the dynamic mission of the Gospel. 
The representation of Christ in sacramental action is conditioned by 
its association with the eucharistic epiphany, so that it is to be 
seen as identity of action; representation in the apostolic mission 
approaches more closely to the idea of witness, for it does not claim 
( 119)See H. Vorgrimler, in Vorgrimler, 1, p. 229. 
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to catch God's action w:i.thin its own, but points beyond itself to 
God (see PP• 123f.). 
The relationship of those who hold ecclesiastical authority 
to lay members of the Church is conditioned not only by pure 
theological theory, but also by the reality of the Church's position 
in the world. We may say, therefore, that the picture of hierarchical 
authority as largely invitatory reflects the fact that the Church has 
no jurisdiction in the secular sphere, so that her pastoral approach 
to the world must be that of invitation. The laity exist at the 
interface of invitation, because they both live as part of the secular 
order, and yet also as part of the Church. They are, ·then, both 
subject to the (mainly) invitatory authority of their pastors, and also 
under the requirement to issue the Church's invitation themselves, for 
they are caught up in the mission of God to the world through their 
'character' as baptised Christians (see p.l16 ). 
Vatican II's recognition of the independence of the secular 
sphere is not presented as the fruit of a regrettable reality, but as 
a matter of basic theological principle. Whereas Leo XIII had tried to 
work out a theory of the Church's indirect power in secular matters, 
as part of his response to the collapse of Catholic royalism in 
nineteenth-century Europe (120), the Second Vatican Council established 
that this was a sphere which was the concern of the Christian 
conscience, without being the concern of the Church as such (see LG 36.4). 
Christians have a "just liberty" in the affairs of "the terrestrial 
city", and this the Church's pastors should respect (see LG 37.3). 
This is not to say that the terrestrial city is beyond the sphere of 
God 1 s control, but rather that it is the area of what Yves Congar 
called 11legi timate laicity." ( 121) 
In the secular world, the terrestrial city, God's 
authority will not be known through the Constantinian expansion of the 
iristi tutional Church in all fields of culture an.d influence, but 
through the omnipresence of his witnesses, the members of the 
(120)See, for example, Leo XIII's encyclical, (largely directed to 
French political problems) Sapientiae Christianae, (10 Jan. 1890) 
ASS 22 (1889-90) PP• 396f. 
(121)Jalons, p. 43. 
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~ngdom, (see LG 13.2, 33.2) who are instruments of the Church's 
mission because they issue the Lord's authoritative invitation in 
the midst of man11 s secular activities and concerns. 
Only at one level is this invitation (although it is parG of 
the Church 1 s mission) an invitation to men that they should join the 
Church itself. Although the Christian community, the People of God, 
is destined to include within itself all mankind (see LG 17, AG 9.2) 
not all human activity is destined to come under ecclesiastical 
control; the area of legitimate laicity is to remain, and the impact 
of God's invitation upon this area is meant to be that of a 
vocation to full humanity, after the pattern of God's design (see 
GS 4.1, 11.1, et passim.). The boundary of the Church runs through tbe 
human heart; the Church has a duty to stimulate that which can never 
be ecclesiastical in man's life to become, nevertheless, divinely-
ordered. In this way, she carries the invitation of Christ to that 
part of man's life which lies • rightly and essentially- outside 
her borders. 
We find, then, that the invitation of the Church to the 
world is double-faceted, being both an invitation to faith and 
membership of the People of God, and also an invitation to men that 
they should carry out God's purposes. The laity, as members of the 
Church in its interface with the secular world, are involved with 
both aspects of this invitatory mission. That is to say, they have 
both a secular and a 'spiritual' apostolate. 
One might suppose that only the secular apostolate belonged 
properly to the laity; since it is their involvement with the secular 
sphere which forms the existential content of their distinctiveness. ( 122) 
However, the 1 spiritual 1 apostolate of issuing the invitation to 
faith is also theirs, because they are fully members of the household 
of faith, and through Baptism share in all three offices of the 
(122)H. Heimerl suggests that there are various ways of defining the 
nature of the lay state; whilst an abstract definition is given 
in terms of the layrnan's relationship of sacramental exchange 
with the clergy (see note (96, above) the documents of Vatican II 
also use a "positive existential" concept of the lay status, 
defined in terms of its properly secular activity. 
(See Heimerl, art. cit. p. 69J 
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Church's mission. We have already seen how their 'character' involves 
them in the priestly worship of the Church (see p. 113) ; now we 
are to examine more fully the Council's treatment of other features 
of lay status as well. We shall conduct the analysis which is to 
follow under three headings: (a) Baptism and the threefold office; 
(b) The ecclesial activity of the laity; (c) The secular activity of 
the laity. 
a) Baptism and the threefold office 
We have seen that Baptism deputes a Christian to worship, 
(LG 11 • 1) ; it also binds him ·t;o the profession of his faith before 
men, (loc. cit.). Therefore, the layman participates essentially in 
the priestlJ and prophetic functions of the Church, and by his cont±nual 
union wi·t;h Christ, he is bound up in its mission (AA 3.1, see also AG 5.1). 
This is expressed by the Council in its teaching that Baptism and the 
other sacrrunents depute the laity to an apostolate (LG 33.2, AA 3.1). 
The very "Christian vocation is a vocation to the apostolate 11 
(AA 2.1), then. 
However, we have said that the apostolate of the laity 
operates in the purely secular sphere, as well as in the spheres of 
explicit worship and profession of the faith. How does the threefold 
office, stemming from the Church's mission, qualify the layman for 
this worldly area of his task? 
It is the 'royal' office which the laity exercise when they 
pursue their secular apostolate; this is made clear by LG 36, which 
speaks of the royal freedom of Christ's disciples not only in reference 
to their liberation from the dominion of sin, but also in reference 
to their freedom to serve others. LG 36.1 goes on to speak of the 
laity's part in spreading Christ's kingdom of truth, life, holiness, 
grace, justice, love and peace; "in this ki.ngdom the creation itself 
will be freed from the slavery of corruption, into the glorious liberty 
of the children of God ••• For it is a great promise, and a great 
command given to the disciples: 1 All things are yours, you are Christ 1 s, 
and Christ is God 1 s. 111 The rest of the arUcle builds on this 
theological foundation, to describe the task of the laity in the 
secular sphere as that of imbuing the world with Christ's spirit, "so 
that it may attain its end more easily in justice, love and peace" 
(LG 36.2). 
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We see, then, that the threefold share in Christ's 
office and mission belongs to the laity in such a way that their 
participation in his royal office does not give them a share in the 
Church's own internal structures of authority, but rather directs 
them outwards to secular servia e of the world. 
In looking at the Council's treatment of the threefold 
form of the laity's mission, I have treated it rather schematically; 
in fact, it is clear from the documents that the Fathersof Vatican II 
conceived of it in an integrated way, so that the secular apostolate 
was not seen as really separable from the apostolate of evangelisation 
or from worship. For example, co-operation with others in the 
conduct of the world's affairs may prove a preparation for the Gospel 
(AA 13.2, see also LG 36.1); it m~, in fact, lead to the open 
announcement of God 1 s will, as Catholics explain the values by which 
they are motivated (see AA 16.5); it will lead the believer to give glory 
to God (loc. cit.), and in the Mass he will offer himself, his 
concerns and e_.ctivi ties, as "spiritual offerings, acceptable to God 
through Jesus Christ", along with the divine victim (LG 34. 2). The 
threefold mission of the laity is, therefore, concretely an organic 
whole, for, 
"there is in the Church a diversity of 
ministries, but a single mission • • • the 
laity are made sharers in the priestly, 
prophetic and royal office of Christ, and 
pl~ their part in the mission of the 
whole People of God in the Church and in the 
world. They carry out an apostolate 
concretely in their efforts for the evangel-
isation and sanctification of men, for the 
penetration of the temporal order with the 
spirit of the Gospel, and for its per-
fection. Therefore, their efforts in that 
order clearly give witness to Christ, and 
Hid in the salvation of men." (AA 2.2) 
The reader will bear in mind the integral unity of the 
different functions of the lay apostolate, as we go on to consider 
each of those functions in somewhat artificial isolation in the 
following pages. 
b) The ecclesial activity of the laity 
We shall consider the ecclesial activity of the laity under 
the separate heads of their prophetic and their priestly functions. 
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i) The prophetic function is, as we have seen, grounded in the 
fundamental Christian duty of professing the faith (LG ·11 .1); this, 
itself, is rooted in the experience of sonship of God, known 
tb.rough baptismal regeneration. It is the motive fore e of the 
Christian's witness; it should inspire him to announce Christ by 
word, "both to non-believers, so that they may be led to faith, and 
to believers, in order to instruct them and stimulate them to a 
more fervent life" (AA 6.3). This activity is inspired by the love of 
Christ (lac. cit., see also AA 3.1, LG 33.2) and shows that the laity 
are involved in issuing his invitation to the world. 
However, the prophetic function goes beyond that of sheer 
invitatory witness. The laity actively embody the presence of the 
Holy Spirit, and this can give rise to supernatural charisms, which 
are to be exercised in the building up of the conununity (LG 7 .3, 12.2, 
30.1, AA 3.4, PO 9.2). Priests are to judge of the authenticity of 
these, but they are also to welcome and develop them (PO 9. 2). The 
attitude of the clergy to these gifts is presented in a very positive 
light by the citation of I Thess. 5.12 and 19ff.: They are not to 
"quench" the Spirit, but to "test all things, and hold fast to that which 
is good" (LG 12.2, AA 3.4). AA 3.4, in particular, emphasises the 
freedom in which gifts of the Spirit are to be exercised. This is a 
very striking emphasis in the teaching of the Council, and was, to 
the very end of discussion, a matter of controversy. 
~1 ''le enbodiment of the Holy Spirit's active presence in 
the faith and profession of the laity is also emphasised by the teaching 
of LG 12.1, concerning the existence of a "sense of faith", which 
can give rise to an authoritative "consensus of the faithful": 
11 All the faithful together, who have the 
anointing of the Holy Spirit ••• cannot be 
deceived in their belief; they show this 
peculiar property by means of a supernatural 
sense of faith of the entire people when, 
'from the biShops to the last of the lay 
faithful,' they exhibit a universal consensus on 
matters of faith and morals. Through this sense 
of faith, roused and sustained by the 
Spirit of truth, the People of God, under the 
guidance of the sacred Magisterium, and in 
faithful obedience to it, receives not the word 
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of men, but, in truth, the Word of God ••• 
it adheres indefectibly to the faith one e and 
for all delivered to the saints • • • and 
with right judgement it penetrates it more 
deeply and applies it more fully in its life." 
Because, then, of the activity and sustaining power of the 
Holy Spirit, which underlies the very act of believing, the 
unanimous consensus of the faithful can be a source for knowledge 
of the truth of the Gospel. Vie shall be exploring the significance 
of this affirmation further, in Chapters IV and v. However, here 
we must note that i·~ is one of the clearest points at which Vatican II 
gave new emphasis to the motif of the Spirit 1 s embodiment in the 
whole Church, and thereby modified the concept of representational 
authority. 
ii) The priestly function of the laity is referred to several times 
in the documents of Vatican II. The phrase, "royal priesthood", 
derived from I Peter 2.9, is cited in SC 14.1, LG 9.1, 10.1, AA 3.1, 
18.1, PO 2.1, AG 15.1. There are two, closely related, consequences 
of this priesthood for the lay Catholic. The first we have already 
seen in our study of Vatican II' s treatment of the idea of 
'character' (seep,. 116 ); it is the fact of the layman's right and 
duty to full participation in the liturgy, as one who offers the 
sacrifice of the Mass along with the priest (LG 11.1, PO 5.3), or, 
(to bring out the other aspect of the same corporate but structured 
action) as one in whose name the priest makes this oblation (LG 10. 2). 
We have noted the way in which the Council shifts the emphasis away 
from Pius XII 1 s stress on the fact that, although "the faithful take 
part in the eucharistic sacrifice 6his] does not mean that they also 
possess the power of priesthood" (123) and the new weight given to 
the idea of a common, baptismal share in Christ's sacerdotal office. 
Therefore, this first aspect of the laity's priestly fUnction is 
alre~dy manifest. 
The second aspect of the lay priestly function has likewise 
already been alluded to, when we examined the integration of the 
( 1 23) Mediator Dei, pjj +: 55 2f. See also note ( 9 2) , above. 
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secular apostolate with the laity's spiritual apostolate and their 
worship (see p. 14l)o Apart from the divine victim, those who worship 
at the Mass also have their own offerings to make, including the 
offering of all their secular endeavour. This constitutes a conse-
cration of the world by the laity (see LG 34.2). :l!"'inally, we must 
mention the laity's offering of praise in worship, and thankfulness 
in prayer; this, too, is part of their exercise of a priestly role 
(see LG 10.2 and 12.1). 
c) The secular activity of the laity 
I have argued that one may characterise the secular task 
of lay Catholics almost entirely under the heading of their royal 
function, following the theology of LG 36; however, I have also 
pointed out the way in which this secular activity is integrated with 
worship (because in the ll'Iass the laity can consecrate the world by 
offering it to God) and with the prophetic task (from which, in practical 
tenus, it is virtually inseparable). 
When viewed in isolation, the secular task of the laity 
appears as something which has a distinct end·- the summing up of 
all things in Christ, who is the cosmic Word (see AA 7 .2). 'rhe 
activity directed to this end may be described as a penetration 
(AA 2.2, 5.2), a perfecting (AA 2.2, 5.2), an ordering (AA 2.1, 7.4), 
a renewing (AA 7 .4, 31.4), an es·tablishing (AA 7 .4), a sa11ctification 
and animation (AA 16.3), and a building up of the t6nporal order, 
and of the conduct of its affairs, in the light of the higher motives 
inspired by faith (see AA 16.1). All these terms denote what I have 
described as the lay function of issuing God's invitation in the 
secular sphere - an invitation to humanity and creation to discover 
and fulfill their true ends. 
Because this task of the laity is carried out fully in the 
temporal order, it escapes from being under the control or authority 
of the Church's hierarchy. It is the work of Christians, rather than 
the work of the Church, and it is related to the hierarchy only 
through the fact that a Christian conscience should be properly formed, 
by attention to the Magisterium1 s teaching; pastors, however, are 
not to be called upon to give concrete solutions to problems (see GS 43.2). 
(We shall consider further, in Chapter IV, the ldnd of significance which 
the hierarchy's teaching may have, as it enunciates the evangelical 
principles Nhich Catholics are to apply in the secular order.) 
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Conclusion 
To sum up, we m8lf say that in all three aspects of the 
lmty's share in the Church's mission, Vatican II emphasised the 
idea that they embody the presence and activity of the Holy Spirit, 
and that they have a sacrruaental status which is correlated with 
this activity and dignity. The Council quite clearly maintained, 
however, the distinction between the royal office of a lcyman, and 
the pastoral and governing functions of the clergy within the Church. 
Nevertheless, there-emphasised reality of the laity's status and 
mission stands in such a relation to the Council's teaching on 
representational authority as to modify it significantly, by com-
parison with the teaching of earlier decades and centuries. 
This modification of the theory of representational authority 
stands alongside the other modifications which we have studied, and 
particularly the Council's tendency to root hierarchical authority 
firmly in both sacramental reality and ·.also in the ac"tivi ty of 
mission. Although jurisdictional authority in the Church was not 
completely redefined in these terms (particularly in the case of papal 
jurisdiction) the shift of emphasis towards a model of authority as an 
~nvitatory sign1 was distinct enough to be noticeable in the description 
of each hierarchical rank. We may say, therefore, that despite inner 
tensions, the theory of Vatican II concerning the nature and 
justification of the exercise of authority in the Church contains 
within it a significant shift of emphasis. It will be our task in the 
following cnapters to examine whether the Council 1 s new stress on the 
motifs of embodiment and witness, and its modification of the concept 
of representation, were consistently reflected in its treatment of ·lihe 
ideal of Christian obedience. 
CHAPTEH. III: 
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VATICAN II 1 S TREATMENT OF OBEDIENCE TO CANONICAL 
AUTHORITY 
In this chapter we are to examine Vatican II 1s picture 
of the ecclesiastical structures and institutions in which Christian 
obedience should concretely be practised, and also its concept of the 
nature and value of such obedience. The chapter will, therefore, fall 
into two sections, in each of which we shall be asking ourselves 
whether the Council's modification of the concept of authority, described 
in the preceding chapter, finds a corresponding echo in its presentation 
of obedience. In particular, we Shall analyse the documents with a 
view to discovering whether the shift towards a picture of authority 
as the .authority of invitation is correlated with an increasing stress 
on the interior responsibility and responsiveness of those called 
upon to obey. We shall also bear in mind the new emphasis given by 
Vatican II to the fact that all Christians embody the active presence 
of the Holy Spirit; if this concept is reflected in the Council's idea 
of obedience it will, once again, be made manifest by an increasing 
stress on the interior responsibility of Christians, for it is in 
the response of the inner man that the action of the Holy Spirit should 
be evident, in the service of God, the Church and the world. 
A) Concrete Structures and Institutions in which Obedience to 
Canonical Authority is to be Practised 
The reader will remember that the concept of canonical 
authority was represented by Vatican II in such a way that its holders 
continue to be seen as representatives of Christ, although the nature 
of that representational status is mod.i.fied, Modifications come 
about firstly, through the way in which rep:r.'esentational authority 
is placed in close relationship to the Church which, as a whole, 
embodies God's presence, secondly, through a new stress on the witnessing 
function of the Church, and finally, through the rooting of represen-
tational authority in the ideas of apostolic mission and sacramental 
status, rather than in a quasi-legal institution by Christ. I have 
argued that we should see these modifying factors as significant, 
although each one, individually, only amounts to a change in the 
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theological atmosphere surrounding the concept of canonical 
authority. 
If I am right in claiming that this change in atmosphere 
is significant, my claim should be borne out by the concrete picture 
which Vatican II gave of the norms and structures goverrung the 
exercise of canonical author:i. ty - norms and structures which also 
condition the Catholic's response of obedience. They, in them-
selves, may conform to the atmosphere in which canonical authority 
appears primarily under the guise of pastoral invitation, or else 
they may militate against the creation of such an atmosphere in the 
practical life of the Church; as Charles Davis wrote in 1966, "the 
relation between bishop and priest and between priest and l~n, the 
pattern of decision~aking, the distribution of responsibility, and 
so on, can be very different sociologically without any difference 
in doctrinal principles being involved." ( 1) Do the sociological 
structures of relationship proposed by Vatican II, therefore, convey 
and conform to an atmosphere in which pastoral invitation 
prevails as the primary notion of author.i ty? Or do they continue to 
stress the idea of representation which is attached to a picture of 
authority as a quasi-legal institution, operating dominatively? 
In order to answer these questions, we shall examine 
Vatican II's morphology of ecclesiastical relationships in three sub-
sections, dealing, respectively, with the ways in which authority may 
be delegated in the Church, ways in which collaboration may be 
fostered and structured in the carrying out of the Church's mission 
and ministry, and ways in which the freedom of different persons 
and groups in the Church ma;y be protected. 
1 The Delegation of Authority in the Church 
Although the Second Vatican Council moved towards a position 
in which the possession of canonical authority was seen more closely 
in relationship to specific degrees of sacramental status, it did not 
thereby abolish the semi-independence of the canonical hierarchy 
of powers. A legal structure continued to exist, thro~gh which 
authority might be delegated, although the concept of such authority 
(1) "The Theology of the Lay State" in Concilium, 3, no. 2 (1966) p. 76. 
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was partially modified by the Council's tendency to see it in an 
integrated way, in the perspective provided by the idea of a single 
apostolic missionary impulse. 
We have already come across the idea of 'canonical mission'. 
This is the term used to denote the delegation of canonical authority 
to an individual. In the pages which follow we shall examine the 
Council's view of this device in more detail; then, we shall turn to 
consider the delegation of authority or responsibility to groups, 
particularly analysing VaUcan II 1 s treatment of the idea of a 
'mandate'. 
a) 'cano:n:i.IJal mission' 
'Canonical mission' is the term used to describe the 
delegation of a sphere of authority, together with certain specific 
responsibilities in that sphere, to someone whose sacrrunental status 
does not immediately entail such a concrete position and responsibility. 
So far, we have seen the term applied in the case of presbyters, who 
take responsibility for particular parishes or areas of diocesan life 
under the authority of the bishop; we have also seen that Vatican II 
made it clear that diocesan bishops do not exercise jurisdiction over 
their sees by virtue of such a 'mission', but rather by virtue of their 
consecration and continuing communion in the Catholic Church (see pp .• 124f'. ) • 
'Canonical mission', therefore, is a device which qualifies the 
exercise of authority and responsibility largely among those of 'lower' 
sacramental status than the bishops. (2) 
The significance of this lies in the fact that the bishops, 
as those who succeed the Apostles, are the people who are answerable 
to God for the apostolic mission; their delegation of a concrete 
share in this mission to others does not prescind from their answer-
ability. Because of this, the bishops do not formally delegate to 
others the powers of final judgement which are theirs, and which 
(2) However, as we have seen in Chapter II, note (105),1).125, there 
are bishops whose authority is delegated to them, because 
they gre not diocesan ordinaries. In view of Vatican II 1 s 
concept of the bishop's inherent sacramental link with the 
local church, the existence of these bishops (and of retired 
bishops) creates a certain theological anomaly. 
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constitute the fullness of canonical authority. The episcopate 
with the Pope, remains responsible for all the final decisions 
which delineate the boundaries of the Church; therefore, ultimately 
the power to command (which is the obverse side of the power to judge 
and exclude) can properly only rest with bishops, although it may be 
exercised on their behalf, and under their control, by those to whom 
it is delegated. 
I have argued that the form of authority which is proper 
to presbyters, by virtue of their sacramental 'character', is 
essentially the power of invitation, except in the sacrament of 
Penance, when they exercise the power of the keys by v:i.rtue both of 
their sacramental status, and also of their canonical mission (see 
Chapter II, note (16), p.78). However, even the sacramtmt of Penance 
appears in the teaching of Vatican II in a more invitatory than 
juridical light. The authority bestowed in 1canonical mission' is 
superadded to the pastoral authority of invitation so that presbyters 
mey make decisions within a certain area, and have effective adminis-
trative faculties. However, nonnally even the exercise of administra-
tion is to be carried out in an invitatory and educative mode, as PO 6's 
picture of headship makes clear; only rarely might one expect a 
presbyter to fall back on the ''legal representational authority which is 
delegated to him from the bishop, so as to make binding requirements 
on others. Therefore, we may say that there is a close intermesh 
between the 11 sacred power11 inherent in the sacrament of &rder, and the 
delegated authority which a presbyter exercises in his administration 
on behalf of a bishop. 
1 Canonical mission 1 can also be bestowed on lay persons, 
such as catechists (see AG 17) and others who share in the teaching 
of Christian doctrine, or who partake in certain 1i turgical actions, 
or have the care of souls (see AA 1.2 and 24.6). Does such 
delegation of responsibility intermesh with factors inherent to the 
lay 'character'? And, can it be said to endow lay persons with 
authority? 
In 1963 J.J. Reed suggested a threefold division of the 
lay apostolate into (i) the action of the laity in matters properly 
clerical, (ii) the action of the laity in matters properly laical, but 
with a mandate and under the direction of the hierarchy, and (iii) the 
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action of -the laity in matters properly laical without such 
direct intervention. (3) 'Canonical mission' is largely concerned 
with Reed's first category, which he suggested should cover activity 
involved in the administration of the sacraments and the care of 
souls, such as the work of catechists, and those Who convey the 
sacraments. (4) LG 35.4 seems to share Reed's concept of such tasks 
as being 11 properly clerical", for it says that some laity 11 supply a 
supplementary ministry for certain sacred functions (".9.,uaedam officia 
sacra pro facultate ,s_upplent11 ) when there is a lack of sacred ministers, 
or when such ministers are impeded by organised persecution." (See 
also AA 1.~) AA 24.6 refers to the mission of the laity in such 
spheres as being 11more closely joined to the pastors' functions", 
and elaborates on what is involved - the teaching of Christian 
doctrine, certain liturgical ac·ts and the care of souls. We see, then, 
that Vatican II considered that such actions are not really 'normal' for 
the laity. 
However, the Council resisted the idea of actually 
clericalising those who carry out such functions by conferring 'minor 
orders' upon them, nor did it follow through a radical suggestion made 
by Karl Rahner in 1954, to the effect that "anyone who is, in any 
way, rightfully in habitual possession of any part of liturgical or 
legal power (over and above the basic rights of every baptised member 
of the Church) is no longer a layman in the proper sense, i.e. no 
longer belongs to the simple people of God." (5) The most it did 
towards giving laity, who are involved in the tasks normally attached 
to the pastors' functions, a greater basis of authority, was to 
recommend that catechists should have their 'mission' conferred upon 
them publicly and liturgically, "so that they may serve the faith 
with greater authority among the people" (AG 17.5). 
The position expressed by Vatican II on the point of the 
'canonical mission' bestowed upon laity seems to contain some ambiguity. 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
"The Laity in Church Law", in Theological Studies, 24 (1963) p. 616. 
ibid. PP• 616f. 
English translation of article, "The Lay Apostolate", in 
T}:leological Investiga·tions, 2 (London, 1963) P• 320 
151 
On the one hand, the Council re13isted clericalising such lay people, 
but on the other it clearly treated them as those who participated 
in functions which are not strictly natural to their 'character' and 
status. The issue is, however, elucidated if we turh to consider the 
authority of such lay rainisters. 
We have seen that AG 17.5 spealcs of the enhancement of 
the authority of catechists by the public conferral of 'mission' upon 
them. What is the essential nature of this authority? Basically, it 
must be understood as the authority of preachers - the power of 
invitation which calls a camnunity to assemble, to believe and to obey 
the Lord. At root, then, it is grounded in the invitatory authority 
Which every baptised Christian enjoys as he professes the faith by 
virtue of his regeneration and sonship. However, in the case of those 
under 'canonical mission', this authority is enhanced because it is 
authorised; that is to say, the hierarchy which succeeds in the 
Apostles' particular responsibility, makes itself answerable for the 
preaching and teaching given by those upon vvhom a 'mission 1 is 
conferred. The public endowment of this 'mission' and authorisation 
makes a catechist's preaching more psychologically authoritative, by 
making visible the answerability which the hierarchy will adopt for what 
he says. In addition, a liturgical act makes clearer the association 
of a catechist's preaching with the sacrrunental nature of the Church. 
However, it does not make him strictly a representational and 
authoritative figure who can require obedience; he remains essentially 
a witness , an inviter. There fore, he is carrying out an activity 
appropriate to his status, but in a sphere and under an authorisation 
and conditions which more usually characterise the functions of 
clergy. 
Gn the other hand, there are those whose supplementary aid 
to the clergy includes delegated powers of administrative authority -
a share in the government of the Church. It is from this group of 
people that AG 16.6 suggested that mature, married men might be chosen 
to be ordained to a permanent diac onate. Clearly, the Council felt 
that government of Christian communi ties "in the name of the parish 
priest and bishops" was most appropriately carried out by those whose 
sacramental 'character' was not simply that of laymen. These, as well 
as some of those involved simply in preaching or charitable work, 
should be "strengthened by the laying-on of hands which has come down 
from the Apostles, and joined more closely to the altar, so that their 
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ministry may be carried out more fruitfully, through the sacramental 
grace of the diaconate. 11 
We find then that despite some 1 rough edges 1 , Vatic an II was 
moulding a doctrine of the ministry of commissioned lay individuals 
which eludes categorisation in terms of 'power', but is rather to be 
described in terms of 'spheres of authorisation'. The Council seems 
to have envisaged a real intermesh between activity which properly 
belongs to the laity (ie. witness) and the specialised, delegated 
ministry of those under 'canonical mission'; the point of distinction 
is constituted not by additional 1power 1 , but by an unusual 'sphere of 
authorisation'. This seems to be the thinking behind the rejection 
of any clericalisation of ley ministry, and behind the staunch renewal 
of the refusal to adopt Rahner's contention that such people are not 
really 1lay1 anyway (6). Rahner 1s argument, it vull be remembered, 
depends upon the idea that ley ministers and catechists exercise 
liturgical Jr legal 1power 1 , over and above that belonging to every 
baptised Christian •. 
On the other hand, when the Council came to consider those 
who really do exercise administrative authority, so that they can make 
binding decisions in the name of the parish priest and bishop, it 
tended towards the idea that such authority is best bestowed upon 
deacons. Therefore, the conciliar tendency to ground pastoral 
authority in the Church in the possession of sacramental status, was 
reflected (though not rigorously) at this point as well. This may 
appear to be a step in the direction of old-fashioned clericalism; 
however, in another perspective, it may equally be argued that the 
association of administrative authority with the deacon's role lays 
stress upon the fact that administration and decision-making are 
services to the community, and Should typically be carried out in a 
diaconal, ministerial manner (see LG 29.1, also 24.1). 
The most significant feature of a 'canonical mission' is not 
that it confers some kind of dominative authority, but rather that 
it places the one who receives it under the authority of the bishops 
in a special way, so that they can take responsibilit,y before God and 
(6) Pius XII had already rejected the point of view put forward in 
Hahner's article, in 1957. (See, alloc. Six ans sont ecoules 
(5 Oct. 1957) AAS 49 (1957) P• 925) 
153 
man for what is done in their name. Because of the nature of the 
bishops' own mandate from Christ, the 'canonical mission' they confer 
should be viewed as the delegation of tasks within the general move-
ment of apostolic mission, and, as such, it should share the apostolic 
characteristic that any authority which may be attached to it is 
primarily the authority of an invitatory sign. 
b) The delegation of authority or responsibility to lay groups, 
and Vatic an II 1 s treatment of the idea of a 1 mandate' 
Vatican II's resistance to the clericalisation of lay 
ministers is based upon a respect for what lay Christians can do by 
virtue of their own sacramental 'character', conferred in Baptism. The 
power to evangelise is the layman's by right; he does not need 
authorisation to act as a member of the Church in this way, but only 
if he is to do it explicitly in the name of the apostolic hierarchy, and 
under their responsibility. 
The situation is similar in regard to the group apostolate 
of lay people; there is much that they can do entirely on their own 
initiative and in their own name. However, there are some groups, often 
arising tlu.':ugh lay initiative, (see AA 20d) and carrying out functions 
within a truly lay capacity, which the hierarchy wishes to "choose and 
promote in a particular way, assuming special responsibility for them. 11 
(AA 24. 5) The text goes on to say that, in this way the hierarchy 
11uni tes such a form of the apostolate more closely to its own apostolic 
task, preserving, meanwhile the proper nature and distinction of each 
task, and not removing from lay people the necessary faculty of acting 
on their own initiative. This act of the hierarchy is called a 'mandate' 
in various ecclesiastical documents." (See also AA 20d) 
Vatican II 1 s treatment of 'mandated 1 groups of the Catholic 
Action type seeks to keep two facts in balance: Firstly, the lay 
status itself is a basis for apostolic action, with or without explicit 
authorisation from above. The apostolic action of the laity 
naturally extends into the spheres of evengelisation and sanctification. 
Secondly, however, this activity which essentially belongs to lay 
Christians because of their Baptism, can operate under the immediate 
responsibility of the hierarchy, so that the bishops are answerable for 
it. Such responsibility does not remove the essentially lay character 
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or sphere of group work (and in this, the'mandating'of groups differs 
from the 'canonical mission' given to individuals to exercise functions 
in spheres normally reserved to the clergy), but it is one way in 
which lay groups may qualify to include the description 'Catholic 1 in 
their name (see AA 24.3). 
However, we must note that the Council used the concept of 
a 'mandate' reticently, saying that the hierarchy "may" authenticate 
Catholic group work with a 'mandate' (see AA20d) and that the term 
has been used in documents of the past (AA 24.5). It was not suggested 
that the authorised character of the corporate co-operation of laymen 
with the ministerial hierarchy should universally be expressed through 
a 'mandate', nor that such work should universally be termed 'Catholic 
Action'. There were both practical reasons, associated with the 
Church's relationship with the government of certain states, and also 
theological reasons, underlying this reticence. 
The concept of a 'mandate' had previously been a source of 
theological confusion and controversy, largely because it had been seen 
as a category through which additional powers might be given to the 
laity. There was, up to the early 1960s, a debate as to whether lay 
members of 1mandated 1 Catholic Action groups participate in the 
hierarchical apostolate (ie. in an apostolate which is not essentially 
theirs) or whether they collaborate with it, by themselves acting in a 
thoroughly lay manner. This debate rested upon an artificial reifica-
tion of the concept of authorisation (7) and some participators in it 
unfortunately tended, through their exegesis of ideas such as that of 
the 'mandate' and 'participation', to suggest that Catholic Action was 
the longa manus of the hierarchy, or a way of making a particular 'order' 
out of certain laymen. The effect was implicitly to deny that other 
members of the laity had a proper apostolate at all. (8) 
(7) Heimerl describes the fundamental roots of the debate thus: 
"Some corrnnentators tried to bring the practical and pastoral 
instructions of Pius XI, limi.ted as they were by the situation 
in which they arose, into scholastic categories, thereby 
arriving at a valueless exegesis of the expressions 'mandate', 
'participation in the hierarchical apostolate', etc." (art. cit. 
P• 72) 
(8) See Congar, Jalons, p. 508 and PP• 519f. 
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Although AA 20.1 uses the phrase 11 a co-operation of the 
laity in the hierarchical apostolate11 (emphasis nrl.ne) - an expression 
suggesting that Catholic Action groups in fact work beyond the properly 
~ay sphere - the phrase is explicitly put forward as one which has 
been used in the past. It is not proposed as the ideal description 
for this kind of group; rather, AA 20b speaks of laity "co-operating 
in their own way with the hierarchy" (emphasis mine; see also AA 20d). 
This terminology expresses better Vatican II's stress on the truly lay 
character of the Catholic Action apostolate. At the same time, the 
Council die. not repeat Pius XII 1 s description of these groups as an 
"instrument" in the hands of the hierarchy (9), but instead said that 
the organisations "act under the higher direction of the hierarchy " 
(AA 20d). 
Although the issue of terminology, and whether an explicit 
1 mandate 1 is given or not, is ..!!Q.i one which practically affects the 
working of a Catholic Action type of organisation (that is, a group 
for which the hierarchy takes special responsibility, in such a wise 
that it is under the hierarchy's "higher direction") and although the 
question of whether 1~ people co-operate or participate ~ the 
hierarchy's o;vn apostolate, or rather co-operate or collaborate with it, 
seems to be a matter of rather abstract interest, (10) it is neverthe-
less true that nuances of language communicate the atmosphere in which 
relationships are concretely worked out between hierarchy and laity. 
Vatican II 1 s approach to the question of 'mandate 1 and authorised lay 
groups has been criticised as embracing the status quo, "which had 
been dictated not by the 'People of God' as the main image, but by 
the hierarchical image of the Church which had developed in the nine-
teenth century". ( 11) Nevertheless, the Council 1 s language shows a 
(9) alloc. De quelle consolation (14 Oct. 1951) AAS 43 (1951) P• 789 
(10) Pius XII did not consider this a matter of merely abstract interest, 
but was very careful to 'correct' the terminology of his prede-
cessor from that of 'participation' to that of 'collaboration'. 
The historical development of the theology of the lay apostolate is 
excellently discussed by J.-G. Dubuc, in Les Relations entre 
hierarchie et lalcat dans l'a ostolat chez Pius XI et Pius XII 
Rome,1967, and by Robert E. Donovan in 1The Modern Theology of 
the Layman' (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Fordham University, New 
York, 1974) PP• 89-117. 
(11) Donovan, op. cit., p. 261. 
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shift towards an emphasis on the proper freedom of the laity, even in 
Catholic Action, for "the laity, co-operating in their own way with 
the hierarchy, contribute their experience and asswne their responsi-
bilities in the government of these organisations, in research into the 
conditions in which the Church's pastoral activity must be carried 
out, and in the elaboration and execution of programmes of action " 
(AA 20b). The "higher direction" of the groups by the hierarchy is 
proportionate to the responsibility taken for them; that is to say, 
it should extend only to the delimitation and authorisation of fields 
of activity through the approval of statutes and of organs of 
leadership; it may also include the approval of the most important 
decisions which are made. 
Vatican II's stress on the properly lay nature of groups of 
this kind indicates that in no way do they have canonical authority 
granted to them, although they have canonical responsibilities. What 
these groups do acquire is the hierarchy's backing for their exercise 
of Christian kerygmatic, or invitatory, authority (although, of course, 
the leaders of the groups possess the administrative powers which are 
necessary for the other functions to be executed smoothly). Rather than 
being given jurisdiction~ other members of the Church, members 
of Catholic Action are placed more squarely under the authority of the 
bishops, as is the case of individuals with 'canonical mission'; 
however, unlike those individuals, members of the lay group apostolate 
work in spheres which are essentially fields of lay work. 
2 Collaboration in the Church 1 s :Mission and Ministry 
Robert E. Donovan, in criticising Vatican II 1s treatment 
of the idea of a 'mandate', said that "what was and is needed are 
practical suggestions that will take seriously the hierarchical 
principle bv.t stress the corporate nature of the Church." ( 12) In 
the terms of the present thesis, we may express this by saying that 
the Council needed to find a practical correlate for its renewed stress 
on the laity's embodiment of the Holy Spirit's active presence, a corre-
late which would integrate this reality with Vatican II's continuing 
support of the idea of representational authority (albeit of a modified 
form). 
(12) loc. cit. 
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I have already suggested that Donovan's critique of the 
concept of the 'mandate 1 passes over a real though subtle shift of 
emphasis which did occur; I must now turn to examine whether there 
were other ways in which the Council effectively shifted emphases and 
changed practices in favour of the corporate collaboration implicated 
in its underlying ecclesiology. 
A structure of corporate collaboration would be one which 
fostered the situation in which those with representational authority 
fulfilled their tasks with referenc~ to, and in reliance upon, the 
active help and advice of persons and bodies of different sacramental 
status. Such a structure would not echo the pattern of episcopal 
collegiality, because the college of bishops possesses authority 
sui iuris, whereas these collaborative structures would possess author-
ity only in virtue of delegation from above. 
A significant feature of a structure of collaboration m~ 
consist in the fact that it is not necessarily a homogenous body, 
under the higher authority, but m~ be a body in which the constituent 
members are of differing sacramental status from each other, and yet 
are brought to co-operate in ways vvhich do not reflect the hierarchical 
divisions between them. 
T'1e first structure of collaboration which we may consider 
is that of the Synod of Bishops, which Paul VI established during the 
course of the Council in 1965, (13) and which was subsequently 
mentioned in CD 5. This institution functions as a structure fostering 
collaboration between bishops and the Pope, without fUlly actualising 
the sui iuris powers of the college. It does not actualise the powers 
of the college, because, by definition, these cannot be delegated to a 
limited number of bishops; nevertheless, the Synod s~bolises the 
reality of collegial communion, because its manbers are representatives 
of the whole group. This symbolic factor gives the Synod a measure 
of moral authority which may be set in the balance agai.nst the 
monarchical potential of papalism. 
In my description of what would be involved in a structure 
of corporate collaboration, the reader may have been rernnded of the 
idea of the presbyterium (see pp. J.35:f. ) • I described the presbyterium 
(13) See Paul VI's motu proprio Apostolica Sollicitudo (15 Sept 1965) 
AAS 57 (1965)PP· 775-80. 
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as a sacramental concept related to the reality of mutual communion, 
more than as an administrative structure in itself. However, the 
sacramental reality signified in the presbyterium does have a signifi-
cant effect in the concrete and canonical sphere: Vatican II did not 
merely recommend, but actually prescribed, the establishment or 
reform in each diocese of a Senate of Priests. Its job is to "give 
effective assistance to the bishop in his government of the diocese, 
through its advice." (PO 7.1, see also CD 27 .2.) This Senate should 
be structured in such a way as to be representative of the presbyterium, 
but has merely a consultative voice. (14) Despite this, however, it 
goes some distance towards "filling a gap at diocesan level" which was 
left by the fact that each diocesan bishop was given greater indepen-
dence with regard to the general laws of the Church, and thus 
effectively given grea·lier control over the lot of his priests. (15) 
Because the Senate of Priests has its ontological justifi-
cation in the theology of the presbyterium, the provisions of 
Vatican II gave it priority over another structure, the diocesan 
Pastoral Council. This was recommended in CD 27.5, and should consist 
of specially chosen clergy, religiou~1 and laity, under the presidency 
of the bishop. The task of such a council is to investigate matters 
of pastoral concern, and to give considered recommendations on the 
subject. 
Perhaps the major significance of such councils lies in the 
fact that lay members are placed on an equal footing with clergy and 
religious, as they collaborate under the bishop. Structures of this 
kind favour an atmosphere of de-hierarchicalisation in the relationships 
of a lower level in the Church, even though they do not necessarily 
qualify tho bishop's authority in decision, legislation and jurisdiction 
over his diocese. 
A further provision of Vatican II which heightens the tendency 
to de-hierarchicalisation in the relations between clergy and laity is 
( 14) Paul VI 1 s motu proprio Ecclesiae Sanctae 
norms for the operation of this Senate. 
(1966) Pp. 766£.). 
of 6 Aug. 1966 set out 
See article 15, (AAS 58 
(15) See T.G. Barberena, "Collegiality at Diocesan Level" in 
Concilium, 8 no. 1 (1965) p. 16. 
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to be found in the cou.ncils which co-ordinate the lay apostolate at 
every level of the Church's life (parochial, interparochial, diocesan, 
interdiocesan, national and international). Again, these were only 
the subject of a recomrnendation (AA 26) but on all these councils it 
was suggested tb.at clergy and religious should "co-operate with the 
laity" - a 3triking turn of phrase, indeed! These councils differ 
from the Priests' Senates and the Pastoral Councils because they are 
directed more specifically to the mutual collaboration of independent 
bodies than to giving aid to bishops in the exercise of their authority 
and pastoral responsibility. Therefore, although the Councils for the 
Lay Apostolate are significant in exhibiting a potential breruc-down of 
hierarchicalised relationships at the lower levels, this is because they 
enshrine the principle of ~bs!_~..:!!z rather than because they ensh.·Hne 
that of a corporate collaboration given from 1below1 to those in 
positions of representational authority. 
Before we turn to consider the Council's presentation of 
the idea of subsidiarity, we must sum up what we have discovered about 
its ideas of corporate collaboration. 
We have found that structures favouring collaboration were 
se·t up or recommended by the Council at a variety of levels. However, 
only the Senates of Priests were made compulsory, being rooted in 
sacramental status, and even they do not prescind from the final 
authority which bishops possess to make decisions for the government of 
their dioceses. Therefore, if a bishop is not disposed to utilise or 
take account of the collaborative aid and advice of clergy or laity, 
there is nothing in Vatican II's description of structures of collabor-
ation which might guarantee their effectiveness in expressing the Holy 
Spirit's embodiment and authority voiced through the generality of 
Christians. (16) 
We may suggest, however, that the very fact that the Council 
set up and suggested insti·tutions favouring consultation and collabor-
ation contributed to an atmosphere in wluch such collaboration is more 
(16) Christian Duquoc complains that "no social adjustment is suggested 
[by Lumen Gentium) which would ensure that the ministry, which is 
defined as service, might effectively become such. Only the 
evangelical or moral virtue of this social body conduces it to 
place its 'power' at the service of the community." (loc. cit.) 
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likely to be accepted as the norm. It may also be argued that, so 
long as the theory of representational authority was maintained in 
ecclesiology in any shape or form, final decisions in government and 
leadership ~ to remain vested in the Pope and bishops, who hold this 
authority through their share in the apostolic mission. Therefore, the 
structures of collaboration which Vatican II set forward, when seen in 
combination with its stress on the pastoral and invitatory character 
which should mark the exercise of authority, correspond fairly 
accurately to the Council's theoretical delineation of the way in which 
God's authority is mediated in the Church. However, the. :further question 
still remains as to whether structures of collaboration of 
the limited type proposed can be socially plausible. That is a question 
to which we shall address ourselves at a later stage. 
3 The Freedom of Different Groups and Persons in the Church 
Since the time of Pius XI the expression 'the principle of 
subsidiarity' has been used in Roman Catholic writing; H was first 
employed in reference to secular affairs, to designate the principle 
that individuals and groups should have legitimate freedom to carry 
out activities in the educational and economic fields, without inter-
:fe:cence from the higher authorities in the state. ( 17) The term was 
used in this way at Vatican II several times (see GS 86.5, GE 3.2, 6.2). 
However, it may also be applied to relationships in the Church, (18) and 
we shall UE:.e it here to denote "the constant effort of the Council to 
do justice to personal and partial responsibilities in the Church. 11 ( 19) 
The term is particularly useful to describe the way in which the 
Council sought to leave room to the individual to act on his own 
responsibility and initiative in many matters; where groups are con-
cerned, the phrase ma.y also be applicable, but, as Vli.ll become clear in 
what follows, it is not always easy to make a sharp distinction between 
structures which express the subsidiarity of groups, and structures which 
involve them in immediate collaboration with the hierarchy. 
( 17) See Pius XI, encycl. Quadragesimo Anno (15 May 1931) AAS 23 (1931) 
p. 203. (Dz 2266/DzS 3738); also John XXIII, encycl. Mater et 
Magistra (15 May 1961) AAS 53 (1961) P• 414. (DzS 3943) 
(18) Pius XII used it in this application in Six ens sont ecoules, p. 927. 
( 19) A. Grillmeier, in Vorgrimler 1, note on p. 144. 
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I have suggested that Councils for the Lay Apostolate exist 
primarily because of the principle of subsidiarity. H is not the 
councils themselves which are the object of the principle, but the many 
different kinds of lay organisation which make them up. The indepen-
dence of these organisations, which is protected by the principle, 
might tend to fragment the Church's apostolic efforts if no structure 
of collaboration among the groups existed. Therefore, because of 
their subsidiary freedom, the o~ganisations should work together. How-
ever the councils through which Vatican II suggested they should co-
operate are also ultimately expressive of collaboration given 1from 
below' to the hierarchy, for it was recommended that the lay apostolate 
should be co-ordinated at the highest level by a Vatican secretariat, 
which would place the organisations in a special relationship to the 
Pope. In addition, the fact that many of the organisations which were 
to collaborate on the local level are of the Catholic Action type 
involves the interest of the hierarchy immediately in the running of 
the Councils for the Lay Apostolate. Therefore, we may say that these 
councils are an example of the fusion of the principles of subsidiar~ty 
and corporate collaboration. 
What other concrete examples did Vatican II provide of the 
commendation and enhancement of the idea of subsidiarity in the Church? 
We may note, first of all, that the Council's theology of the local 
church was translated concretely into the allotting of a greater scope 
of subsidiary powers to the diocesan bishops. Various refonns were 
enacted or prepared at Vatican II which were intended to give them 
greater independence in their jurisdiction. The Pope no longer delegates 
certain let iL rights to them as a matter of concession, for ·the 
previously existing situation is turned on its head, and the 1 ordinary, 
proper and immediate power' of the bishops in their own dioceses 
becomes the legislative norm both for the enforcement of the general 
law of the Church, and for dispensations from it (CD 8b) (20). Another 
important emphasis of the Council is contained in articles 33-35 of 
(20) Compare this with CIC can. 81. 
After Vatican II there exists a catalogue of those cases which 
are to be matters of papal reservati. on. 
This was juridicially enacted in Paul VI's motu proprio De 
Episc_oporum Muneribus (15 June 1966) AAS 58 (1966) pp. 467-472. 
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Chr:i.stus Dominu§_, whereby religious institutes are brought much more 
firmly within the diocesan structures for co-operation in the 
apostolate, and it is made clear that 1 papal exemption 1 of certain 
institutes relates primarily to their internal organisation, and to tbe 
disposition of religious personnel for the good of the whole Church: 
"Exemption does not prevent religious from being subject to the 
jurisdiction of the bishops of the individual dioceses, according to the 
norm of law, as far as the fulfHlment of the pastoral task, and the 
right ordering of the care of souls, makes this necessary.'' (CD 35.3) 
These measures, along with CD 9 and 10 (the Council's request for a 
reform of the Roman Curia), CD 40.2 (the reconunendation that dioceses 
formerly iinked only with Rome should be incorporated into provinces) 
and CD 28.1, which deals with the suppression of rights and privileges 
which hinder the bishops in freely appointing priests to benefices, and 
therefore touches on certain rights and privileges of the Pope, effecti-
vely show that the universal, immediate power of the Roman See was 
viewed by Vatican II as something which should be accommodated, quite 
strictly, to the jurisdictional rights of bishops within their own 
dioceses. 
This increased respect for the subsidiary powers of bishops 
is the concrete expression of Vatican II's attempt to redress the 
balance betr.reen the central government of the Church Universal, and the 
sacrrunental reality of the local church, whose bishop is endowed with 
the fullness of Order. 
A further structure enhancing subsidiarity goes beyond the 
theological foundation-idea that each diocese is a full expression of 
the Church. This is the structure of Episcopal Conferences, either 
national or regional, prescribed by CD 37; at the same time. as pre-
scribing these, the Council renewed the more ancient institution of 
solemn provincial Synods of Bishops. (CD 36) (These meet more rarely 
than Episcopal Conferences, have a wider membership, and can enforce 
binding decisions on the episcopate of a p~nce.) 
The institution of the Episcopal Conference is a 
particularly interesting example of the way in which Vatican II 
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extended the application of the principle of subsidiarity. (21) 
A national Episcopal Conference does not strictly and legally have 
its roots in the sacramentally based collegial nature of the total 
episcopate (although, on the affective level, it provides an occasion 
for the expression of the affectus collegialis - see AG 6.6). Rather, 
it is an administrative and legal device, designed to enhance the 
proper personal authority of the diocesan bishops, by bringing them 
into collaboration with one another for practical purposes (see, for 
example, the recommendation of CD 18.2 concerning the pastoral care 
of particular categories of the faith~ll, such as emigrants, refugees, 
seamen, etc.). In order that this collaboration may be effectual in 
achieving its practical ends, Episcopal Conferences are granted certain 
legislative and executive powers which exceed the sum of the powers 
of their members. These delegated powers touch upon such matters as 
the liturgy and the training of clergy (see SC 22.2, CT1, 22, AG 20.5)-
matters which had largely been the direct concern of Rome in the 
past. Therefore, as well as being called for by the necessities 
imposed by the proper subsidiarity of each bishop individually, these 
conferences in themselves are treated as bodies which come under the 
principle of subsidiarity. 
Conclusion 
Of the different structures set up, recomnrended or extended 
by the Second Vatican Council, those Wo.ich express the principle of 
subsidiarity are probably the most effective forms of concrete balance 
to different ldnds of centralism. The idea of subsidiarity is 
theologically rooted in the fact that certain persons have functions 
which are truly proper to them, and belong to their sacramental 
definition. Therefore, institutions which seek to translate this 
sacrarrental fact into concrete practice have a firm theoretical basis. 
The actual institutions and structures concerned (Councils for the 
(21) Vatican II did not invent Episcopal Conferences, which had 
been in existence since the nineteenth century in some areas, 
and had been given limited practical funct~ons in the Codex 
(see CIC can. 292). Pius XII had fostered and commended 
them (see alloc. of 2 Nov. 1954, AAS 46 (1954) P• 675). 
Va-tican II, however, prescribed that they should exist 
universally. 
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Lay Apostolate, Episcopal Conferences and Provincial Synods, the 
codes governing the juridical powers of the diocesan bishops) them-
selves have a certain contingency. The rules which govern them can be 
changed, and have been changed in the past. This might mean that 
structures of subsidiary power seem vulnerable to the encroachments of 
centralism (as indeed was the case from the end of the nineteenth 
century to the beginning of this one). However, such encroachments 
have to be through the medium of general laws, or through the per-
mission of the subsidiary bodies themselves, and thus have a public 
aspecto Any rough-dealing on the part of central authority would now 
be likely to incur a loss oi' interior loyalty among many Catholics. 
We may say, then, that such encroachments would lack social plausi-
bility, because Vatican II so firmly institutionalised end ratified 
subsidiary freedoms and the atmosphere which protects them. 
The other structures and institutions which the Council 
commended to enhance relationships in the Church are less well 
entrenched in law. Some of the structures of collaboration remain 
optional, and all of them depend for their effectiveness on the good 
will of members of the hierarchy. Nevertheless, as I have already 
suggested (see p. 160) the Council was at least theologically con-
sistent in the way it drew up its picture of collaboration between 
those ¥dth representational authority, and those Who embody the Spirit's 
presence and power in a more diffuee way. In addition, Vatican II used 
the pastoral and ministerial themes as ways of showing what authority 
should be like in practice, namely invitatory and non-juridical. Its 
ideal picture of the relations between the hierarchy and the rest of 
the Church is logically coherent in outline, even if details might have 
been different (for example, diocesan Pastoral Councils might have been 
prescribed rather than merely recommended). 
We see, then, that if the Council's provisions for the 
structures of relationship in the Church remain open to criticism, it 
is not first of all on the grounds of internal incoherence, but rather 
because of social implausibility. The renewed stress on the fact that 
the entire Church embodies the presence of the Spirit, and the 
Council's moves towards greater consultation- which were likely to 
create an atmosphere of expectancy in this respect - contributed to 
a tide of ideas which was bound to run up against the fixed point 
of the ultimate representational authority of the hierarchyo 
165 
Secondly, we may remark that on the strictly theological 
level, it is possible that Vatican II's concept of ideal ecclesiastical 
obedience, and the relationship of this concept to a certain 
theological model of the Church's role, may turn out to be inconsistent 
with its treatment of vdder areas of doctrine. This will provide 
the substance of our investigation in Chapters VI and VII of the 
thesis. Immediately, however, it is our task to examine further the 
way in which the Second Vatican Council painted its picture of ideal 
Christian obedience. 
B) The Nature and Value of Obedience in the Church 
So far, we have examined the structures of the Church in 
which obedience is to be exercised. In Chapter II we looked at the 
theological basis for those structures; in the first section of the 
present chapter we considered the concrete provisions and recommendations 
which the Council made. It is now appropriate to ask, 'what does 
obedience itself involve, so far as the Church's practical life is 
concerned?' In order to answer this question, we shall exandne first 
the extent of obedience which different ecclesiastical persons can 
require; secondly we shall consider the characteristics of the 
obedience which Va·tican II recommended; finally, we shall assess the 
significance of Christ's own obedience as a model for the obedience 
of Catholics. 
1 The Extent of the Obedience which Different Persons m~ Require 
Necessarily in this sub-section it will be impossible to 
do more than merely indicate rather briefly the fields of activity which 
the requirement of canonical obedience may cover in respect of 
different persons. We shall begin with the Pope's powers to require 
such obedience. 
a) The obedience due to the Pope 
We saw in Chapter II that the Second Vatican Council main-
tained the doctrine that there is an independent Petrine juriisd;i.~tional 
primacy,, i11heri.te·d by the Pope. This autonomous primacy was, however, 
juxtaposed with an idea of the papal headship which grounded it in the 
idea that Peter's successor is the centre of communion in an authorita-
tive college of bishops (see pp.l29-31 ). The two ideas sit rather 
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uneasily together, but attempts were made to harmonise them on 
the practical level by the Council, in that it indicated that the 
primacy should encroach less than prev:Lously upon the diocesan juris-
diction of the bishops. However, CD 2.1 also gives a forceful and 
lapidary formulation of the fuJ.lness of scope of papal oversight: 
'~In this Church of Christ, the Roman Pontiff, 
as the successor to Peter, to whom Christ entrusted 
the task of pastoring his sheep and lambs, enjoys 
supreme, full, immediate and universal power for 
the care of souls. Likewise, as he is pastor of 
all the faithful, with a mission for the good of the 
universal Church and the good of all the individual 
churches, he holds primacy of ordinary power over 
all the churches." 
This formula is reminiscent of the teaching of Vatican I, 
even though it no longer employs the controversial adjective 
11 epi§_copalis'1 to describe the Pope's power in respect to all the 
different dioceses (see Chapter II, note (17), p. 78 ) •. 
What effect does the difficult balancing-act of Vatican II 
have upon the type and scope of the obedience which the Pope can 
require? We may note that CD 2 certainly breathes a different atmosphere 
from the equivalent passage in I>astor Aeternus ( 22) , for, whilst the 
latter follows up its statement on the primacy with the cone lusion 
that all Catholics are thereby bound to the duty of hierarchical 
subordination and obedience to the Pope, the former moves straight 
from the primacy to a description of the proper status of biShops. 
(Similarly, in LG 22 the doctrine of the college succeeds immediately 
to the doctrine of Pettine primacyo) 
It must be concluded nevertheless, that, apart from the 
juridical changes and adjustments made by Vatican II concerning ·iihe 
delineated powers of the bishops, the effect of the Council 1 s teaching 
upon the exercise of the primacy was entirely in terms of atmosphere. 
Papal oversight can still involve the Roman Curia in a variety of dj_rect 
disciplinary interventions when they are considered necessary, (23) and 
(22) cap. 3. (Dz 827/DzS 3060). 
(23) It is for H.ome to decide when these interventions may be necessary, 
and there have been some notable cases since the Council in 
which it would seem that the local hierarchies did not share the 
Roman view of this necessityl 
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the Roman &ee continues to be able to produce general legislation 
for the Church (al·though, as we have seen, powers of enforcement and 
dispensation are more fully in the biShops' hands). The Pope's 
authority can touch anything with pastoral import - and the Council 
did not limit the subjects which may be deemed to belong to this 
categoryl Therefore, Vatican II did not significantly reduce the powers 
of the Pope and the Curia, except in the fields explicitly no·ted on 
PP • 16lf. of this chapter. However, it did create the fully theological 
basis for a new atmosphere, in Which the primacy might be exercised 
pastorally and with more regard to collegial constraints and courtesies. 
b) The obedience due to bishops 
Because the primary model for the bishop is summed up in 
the idea of an invi tatory sign, we find that his major influence is 
portrayed as being through 11 counsels, persuasion and example" 
(LG 27.1); all these are addressed to men's hearts, and therefore share 
the characteristics of invitation. Only secondarily does the same 
text speak of a bishop 1 s 11 authori ty and sacred power11 , by which he can 
require and enforce obedience. 
Bearing in mind these indications of atmosphere, we may go 
on to ask what areas are covered by the "authority and sacred power" of 
the biEhops. We have already seen that vis a vis Rome, the juris-
dictional £;tatus of diocesan ordinaries was enhanced; we have e~so seen 
their relationship of 11higher direction" in relation to certain 
organisations of the lay apostolate. In addition to these powers, 
bishops exercise administrative authority in matters concerning finance, 
personnel, buildings, education, the liturgy, etc. in their dioceses. 
Their administrative aut,hori ty is backed by their juridic a~ and 
legislative powers, through which they can pass from invitation to 
command, requirement, and judgement. Vatican II' s tendency was not to 
reduce the power of corrunand which underlie.s a bishop 1 s authority, 
but to push it further away from the centre of theological attention, 
and indicate that it should be subordinated to a pastoral ministry 
of invi taU on. 
We are given pictures of the episcopal invi tatory authori"hy 
in LG 23.2 (bishops should stir up people to serve in the missions), 
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LG 26.3 (they should exhort people to talce a full part in the 
liturgy), LG 27.4 (they should arouse zealous collaboration in 
pastoral work) and in o~r 2. 2 (they should promote vocations). All 
these activities have the characteristic of being acts of leadersh:i.p; 
they inhere closely with the preaching ministry, and are not, in 
themselves, acts of government or decision-making. They are the 
primary, governing images of the bishop 1 s relationship to his people • 
.As in the case of papal authority, the translation of these 
images into concrete priorities, depends upon the willingness of 
people to follow the atmosphere of pastoral invitation indicated both 
by Vatican II's doctrinal picture of the nature of the Church and its 
ministry, and also by its exhortations that bishops should talce a 
ministerial attitude. 
c) The obedience due to priests 
We have seen that the 11 spiri tual power" of presbyters (PO 6.1) 
is largely a compound of administrative and kerygmatic (invitatory) 
authority, except in so far as the sacrament of Penance gives them a 
juridical role in respect of the 'internal forum'. PO 6.1, 2, 4 and 5 
captures the sense in ~Vhich the presbyter's administrative authority 
is ordered to the invitatory functions of sacrruaent and preaching, in 
its image of the priest as 11 educator" (see pp.l32-34). 
We have also seen that the documents of Vatican II clarified 
the nature of the lay apostolate by marking out the freedom of the 
laity in the secular sphere, on the one hand, and legitim:i.zing their 
active role in the religious raission of the Church, on the other, 
(see pp.l39-44). 
The relationship of individual clergy to Catholic lay 
associations, whether of 'the Catholj_c Action type, or of a freer, more 
self-organised kind, has never properly been one of command or control, 
because such associations are immediately responsible to the bishops, , 
who are the holders of full pastoral authority in the mission of the 
Church. However, the episcopal hierarchy frequently appoints chaplains 
to these organisations,· and we m~ compare what AA 25.2 says about the 
role of a chaplain with earlier statements on the subject: AA 25.2 
treats the role of chaplains as being that of "fostering" and 11nourishing11 
the spiritual life, the apostolic sense, and the unity of the 
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associations to which they are accredited. They represent the 
hierarchy in its "pastoral" activity, and are to nurture good relations 
between hierarchy and laity, and to have a position Which involves 
them in dialogue with members of the associations (see also OT 20). 
We may contrast with this the picture held by Pius XI of Catholic 
Action's chaplains: 
"·l'hey should direct the laity so that 
their activity may not stray from the 
right path which it ought to follow, 
and so that it always follows the 
norms of the hierarchy with the neces-
sary faithfulness. Moreover, it 
belongs to priests to conform members 
of Catholic Action, especially those 
Who are to take up the task of directing 
the associations, to Christian moral 
ideas. 11 (24) 
Whilst it must be admitted that the above passage was 
written at a time of particular political tension, in vmich the nature 
of Catholic Action's social role was precarious, and whilst we must 
note that Pius XI allowed for the direction of the associations by 
lay people, it must nevertheless be granted that the Pope's tone 
indicated a didactic and rather authoritarian stance on the part of 
priests in relation to the lay apostolate; such a stance is :far from 
the atmosphere of AA 25.2. In general, the obedience which is due to 
priests is described by Vatican II in such a way as to indicate the 
possibilities of free initiative which properly lie with the laity, 
and the invitatory nature of priestly authority: Presbyters are 
"confidently to entrust to the laity tasks in the service of the 
Church, allowing them liberty and room for action; or better, ir1viting 
them to take up works spontaneously when the opportunity presents 
itself11 (PC 9.2). 
2 The Characteristics of Christian Obedience According to 
Vatican II 
In this sub-section we shall examine particularly the 
'spiritual' aspect and nature of Christian obedience as Vatican II 
envisaged it, relating the ascetical value attributed to the obedient 
(24) Letter to the bishops of Argentina (4 Dec. 1930) AAS 34 (1942) 
p;.. 244. 
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attitude, to the Council 1 s picture of its practical character. 
We shall deal particularly with the obedience of presbyters and laity, 
for little was satd by the Council about the proper attitude of 
bishops towards the Pope -presumably a mental cast of loyalty and 
Willing collaboration is to be assumed within the colleg;ial bond of 
"peace, love and unity" (LG 23.1). 
a) The obedience of presbyters 
In 1906, at the height of the Modernist crisis, Pius X vr.cote 
an encyclical concerning the clergy of Italy. In this encyclical, 
Pieno L1Animo, the Pope deplored a spirit of "insubordination" and 
11 independence11 among the clergy, rem.tnding them that they were especially 
bound by the general Catholic obligation of obedience, because they have 
an outstanding part in the bishops' work. (25) Pius X's anxiety about 
priestly obedience was, if anything, heightened by the recognition that 
presbyters are no mere executors of the episcopate, but, because of 
their share in sacerdotal dignity, they should be seen as "most 
provident co-operators" of the episcopal order. (26) 
Within the more positive, less crisis-ridden atmosphere of 
Vatican II, it was possible to develop the concept of presbyteral 
co-operati~e obedience (27) and to overcome the tendency of earlier days 
of describing the obedience of secular priests in terms more appropriate 
to the obedience of religious to their superiors. (28) 
(25) 28 July 1906, ASS 39 (1906-07) PP• 321f. 
(26) A phrase from the Roman pon-tifical's rite of ordination. 
(27) The phrase from the Roman pontifical is used or referred to in 
LG 28.2, PO 2.2, see also OT 9.1; the way Vatican II used it makes 
clear that presbyters are co-operators not only with the individual 
bishops who ordained them, but with the entire episcopal order. 
(28) The first draft of the decree on priests, produced on 22 Aprll 1963, 
and at that time called De Clericis, was written before the decision 
on the fact that fullness of sacramental Order belongs to the 
bishops. Until that decision had been taken, commission had been 
able to describe the difference between bishops and other clerics 
only in terms of their juridical differentiation. Hence, the first 
draft described their concrete relationship almost entirely in terms 
of the obedience which the latter owe to the former, and this 
appeared to be much after the pattern of the obedience which a 
religious owes to his superior. Ironically, perhaps, it was the very 
enhancement of the recognised status of bishops 'I'A.1ich cleared the 
way for abandoning a description of the relationship in these terms. 
cont. p. 171 
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In their obedience, presbyters should recognise and respect 
their bishop as a father (LG 28.2, see also 41.3); this respectful 
attitude is expressed in "faithful union and generous co-operation" 
(LG 41.3), and an 11 adherence characterised in the first place by love11 
(PO 7. 2). It leads to an obedience which is both 11responsible and 
voluntary" (PO 15.3). How, then, should the presbyter act? He should 
interpret his a.i.m of obeying God j_n terms of accepting and following 
the commands and counsels of the Pope, bishops,and other superiors, 
in a spirit of faith (see PO 15.2). But he should also seek out and 
propose new ways to serve the Church's good, and should insist upon 
the needs of his flock before his bishop (see loc. cit.). Both 
obedieltt~ submission, on the one hand, and initiative and dialogue 
with superiors, on the other, are inspired by "pastoral charity" - a 
concern for the good of the Church and her members which makes the 
maintenance of hierarchical communion through obedience and loyalty 
an indispel13able condition of ministry (see PO 15.2 and LG 28.2). 
The obedience of presbyters, then, incorporates within 
itself the grounds upon which personal initiatives are formed; initia-
tive has always been accepted as a value in the life of the Church, 
but usually worth has been ascribed to the movements of initiative 
after the event. At Vatican II, however, initiative was positively 
sponsored, and was even. encouraged within the education of se~i.narists 
(against some opposition (29) see OT 11.2). 
Note (28) cont from p. 170 
A draft of 22 April 1964 said in its article 2 that "this obedi-
ence of priests by its own nature differs from that which, ••• 
belongs to religious." A new concept of obedience appeared, set 
in a pastoral and co-operative context, and based on a firm doc-
trine of the gradations of priesthood which are not merely 
juridical, but rather sacramental, and therefore rise to a rela-
tionship which should be described not in juridical terms, but 
in the terms of a shared communion and mission. (See P.-J. Cordes's 
commentary, in Vorgrimler, 4 p. 244.) . 
· (29) The second text of the Decree on the Training of Priests had 
specifically ruled out any possibility of seminarists' taking part 
in the administration of their colleges. That prohibition did not 
reappear in the final text, and instead OT 11.2 rather indicates 
a gradual growth in such participation. (See the commentary of 
A. Laplante on this article, in La Formation des pr~tres: G6nese 
et commentaire du decret conciliaire Optatam Totius (Paris, 1970). 
Also P. Dezza, "Obedience and the Spirit of Initiative 11 in 
Obedience and the Church, by Karl Hahner and others, (London, 
1 968) pp. 201 f.) 
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ln so far as a personal ascesis is expressed through 
priestly obedience it is an ascesis of charity: The holiness of 
priests is firmly attached to their pastoral action (see LG 41.3), 
and therefore that freedom of God's children wbich is acquired 
through obedience grows because obedience is the necessary condition 
of a ministry in the Church (See PO 15.2). In their responsible 
and voluntary obedience presbyters are conformed to Christ, for they 
share the mind of Jesus whose obedience unto death redeemed man 
(PO 15.3).. (30) 
b) The obedience of the laity 
We have seen how the theology of Vatican II attributes to 
the layman a proper share in both the social and the religious 
apostolates, and the dignity which he possesses by virtue of his 
Baptism. We have remarked, too, on the Council's recognition of the 
laity's civil liberty (LG 36.4, 37.3, PO 9.2). We must now mention 
that the Council several times spoke of the secular competences of 
the laity - areas of competence which glve them substantial grounds 
not only for liberty in their secular decisions (see AA 4.9, GS 43.2) 
but also give grounds for their active involvement and advice in the 
running of Church affairs (LG 37.1 and 4, see also PO 9.2). 
The emphasis on the laity's active and responsible role 
contrasts fharply with the picture of passive obedience which was 
conjured up by Pius X in 1906 (the time not only of the Modernist 
crisis, but also of a crisis of Church-state relations in France): 
"The Church is the mystical body of 
Christ, administered by the authority 
of pastors and doctors; that is to say, 
it is a society of men in which some 
preside over others with full and 
(30) In 1908 Pius X wrote to Catholic clergy everywhere, and 
obedience was among the very first subjects of his exhortation. 
He cited Leo XIII to the effect that humility of spirit, 
obedience, abstinence, and self-abnegation are principles of 
spiritual strength, virtue and fruitfulness. However, he did 
also warn priests not to seek personal perfection before the 
fulfillment of tasks for others. (Exhortation, I-Iaerent Animo, 
(4 Aug. 1908) ASS 41 (1908) p. 562.) Vatican II's teaching 
goes a step further, in indicating that personal perfection is 
.insel?.arable from pastoral ministry. 
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perfect power of ruling, teaching and 
judging • • • These orders are disting-
uished from one another, so that in the 
hierarchy alone resides the right and 
authority to move and direct their fellows 
to the end laid down for the society; it 
is the duty of the multitude, moreover, 
to le·t themselves be governed, and 
obediently to follow the leading of their 
rulers. 11 (31) 
We must now look at the attitude in which Vatican II held 
that lay obedience should be rendered, and the spiritual basis. for 
the laity's active collaboration with the clergy. 
The confidence with which presbyters were exhorted to 
entrust tasks and leave freedom to the laity was matched by a call 
for corresponding confidence and openness on the part of lay folk. 
This confidence should be linked to courage, which enables them to 
express both their needs and their opinions sincerely to their pastors 
(see LG 37.1); it should also, however, give rise to an obedience 
which promptly embraces the decisions of the pastors once they have 
been fixed (LG 37 .2). The context of the obedience which the laity 
render is to be a 11 familiar dialogue 11 with clergy (LG 37.4); this 
dialogue is sustained, from the lay side, by love, prayers, aid1 ~nd 
action to assist those set over them (LG 37. 2, PO 9. 6). 
We find, once more, that the attitude of obedience promoted 
by the documents of Vatican II includes the willingness to take 
inititatives which contribute to the good of the Church's life and 
mission, and that the building up of communion and dialogue between 
the different orders is treated as an essential feature of ecclesi-
astical existence. However, as in the case of presbyters, the freedom 
of the laity to express their views and to contribute actively 
(whether or not they belong to associations for the ap?stolate) does 
not remove their ultimate duty of adhering to decisions which are 
made 1 from above 1 • 
The motive for the laity's obedience has a double aspect: 
Firstly, it is due because of the position which pastors hold as 
Christ's representatives in sacred office (see LG 37.1 and 2); they 
will have to give account for the souls of men before God (LG 37.2). 
(31) Ep. Vehementer Nos (11 Feb. 1906) ASS 39 (1906-07) pp. Sf. 
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Secondly, obedience is to be rendered because the offices which 
these persons fill are for the common good; for exarnple, the presbyter 
in the parish uses his authority to bring harmony between persons of 
different mentality, 11 so that no one should feel himself a stranger 
in the community of the faithful" (PO 9.3). 
As in the case of priests, an ascetic of obedience for the 
laity is based upon the idea of imitating Christ, whose obedience 
was redemptive for others (LG 37.2). The idea of this spiritual 
discipline is not, however, greatly developed by the Council; notice-
ably, in ar-ticle 4 of the Decree on the Apostolate of the La:i. ty 
(Aposto).ica.m Ac"buosi tatem) which deals with the spirituality of lay 
people, there is no mention of obedience as part of that spiritual 
discipline. The lacl{ of stress given ·t;o the subject suggests that the 
Council Fathers were in agreement with a statement of Alois MUller: 
"It does not ••• correspond to the 
reality of the Church to exaggerate the 
phenomenon of obedience in general, and 
to create the impression that the highest 
and only Christian task of the member 
without official function is merely to 
obey the hierarchy. This obedience bas its 
place, but this place is nei ·t;her the only 
one nor the principal feature in the 
Church's life." (32) 
3 The Obedience of Christ as a Model for the Obedience of 
Catholics 
In the case both of clergy and laity there is a double 
motive for obedience, constituted by the representational role of 
their superiors and by the exigencies of the common life and mission 
of the Church. The second motive is brought more firmly into the 
Catholic line of vision by Vatican II, and provides the grounds for 
describing obedience as incluoing active collaboration, the ·t;aJdng 
of initiatives, etco It is presented, we may say, as the normal 
motive for obedience, and is associated with the idea that those who 
obey shoul'~ do so from inner conviction as to the effectiveness of 
their course of action in promoting the Church's good. Therefore, 
(32) "Authority and Obedience in the Church" in Concilium, 5 noG 2. 
( 19 66) p. 4 7. 
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the increased stress on this form of obedience corresponds to the 
increased stress gl. ven to the possibility that authority may 
present itself under the character of invitation, appealing to the 
responsive decision of the inner man .. 
However, lying behind this there remains the idea of 
representational authority, and its inherent formal claim to 
obedience even though it does not pretend to command in guaranteed 
uni t.v with the mind of Christ. (See pp. 81~·85 ) • Does this not come 
into conflict with the idea of serving the life of the Church as 
best as one can, if it should happen that the representational 
authority gave commands which seemed 'less than the best', or even 
positively deleterious? We have already raised this question 
(lac. cit.); it is now time to examine Vatican II's answer. 
We shall elucidate this answer by analysing the Council's 
use of the motif of Christ's obedience, which was proposed as an 
example and inspiration to both clergy and laity; it combines within 
itself the ideas of being under (painful) constraint, and of acting 
for the benefit of others. (33) We shall seek to find out whether 
either of the ideas predominated in the Council's handling of the motif, 
for this would indicate the balance of significance which Vatican II 
gave to the two motives for obedience. 
The docUill.ents focus sharply upon the concrete life of the 
man, Jesus; they locate Christ's obedience there, within the span of 
his earthly existence, and in what he underwent in the flesh. Vattcan II 
does not refer the obedience of the Son to his action in submitting 
to become incarnate. In its use of the Christological hymn of 
Philippians 2.7-11 the Council implicitly supports that line of 
exegesis which sees the whole passage as relating to the this-worldly 
action of Jesus. The passage is quoted or referred to frequently in 
the documents (see LG 8.3, 36.1, 37.2, 42.4, UR 4.6, PC 1.3, 5.3, 14.1, 
AG 24.1 and PO 15.3) along with other New Testament references to 
(33) Christ's obedience is particularly significant in a specifi-
cally Roman Catholic doctrine of redemption because, according 
to Aquinas (following the line of St. Anselm's Cur Deus Homo), 
it was the loving and obedient spirit in which Christ suffered 
that made satisfaction to God. (See ST 3a, q.48, a.2). 
Vatican II assumed this doctrinal base, while emphasising 
the concepts of man's redemption, liberation, sanctification and 
hUill.all unification, more than that of satisfaction. 
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the obediehce of Christ in action and attitude. For the sake of 
our analysis in this sub-section we shall concentrate mainly on 
the use of the hymn from Philippians, as being representative of the 
Council's treatment of the complete motif. 
It is the very fact of concentrating on the concrete and 
earthly obedience of Christ which makes it possible for the image to 
be set before Christians as an example to be imitated. It is employed 
by the Council as a model for the entire Church to follow in relation 
to God (LG 8.3, UR 4.6), and also, in regard to the individual, Christ 
is given as the exemplar for two distinct types of obedience. Firstly, 
there is a group of texts which refer Philippians 2.7-11 to the basic 
obedience towards God which constitutes a fu.Uy Christian life 014 an 
underlying willingness to submit one 1 s will to that of the creator 
and redeemer. LG 36.1, for example, speaks of the power of obedience 
communicated by the exalted Christ, so that men might be set free 
from sin through the self-abnegation of their lives. Abnegation, 
holiness, and freedom express themselves in service to others, but, in 
the c®text in which LG 36.1 is presented, there is no imnediate con-
cern for obedience to other human beings; it is a question of obedience 
rendered immediately to God. 
AG 24.1 does not actually cite that part of the Christo-
logical hymn which refers directly to Christ's obedience, but it 
speaks of t'1e obedient response of someone who feels himself called 
to missionary work by God, in terms of his entering upon "the life and 
mission of him vvho 'emptied himself, taking the nature of a slave"'• 
Christ 1 s act is here used as an example of the self-denial and 
faithfulness that is involved in obeying God's call. 
The missionary virtue of obedience is mentioned again in 
the following paragraph: "he should be convinced that obedience is 
the peculiar virtue of the minister of Christ, who by his obedience 
redeemed the human race" (AG 24. 2) In this text it is not clear 
whether 'obedience' specifically means submission to human superiors, 
or is an inclusive description of all that the missionary does and 
suffers for the sake of God's vdll. Probably both layers of meaning 
are present: The Council was no·t afraid to translate the idea of a 
general attitude of submission to God in hwnility into that of a 
willingness to obey human beings. This we can see by exrunining LG 42.4. 
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LG 42.4 quotes part of the Christological hymn once, 
and refers to an overlapping portion in the footnotes. In the 
firs·t case, vv. 7-8 are used to inculcate the attitude of love and 
hurnili ty which is "the mind of Christ" as a basic requirement of 
Christian discipleship. In the second instance, vv.S-10 are cited 
in reference to those who actualise and express these qualities 
concretely in subjecting themselves "to man for the sake of God, 
beyond the measure of what is commanded, in order to conform them-
selves more fully to the obedient Christ." This is a specific 
reference to the obedience of those under religious vows (see also 
PC 1.3 and 5.3 for similar uses of the hymn). However, this 
exemplification of the principle that obedience to God can be 
expressed through obedience to men introduces us to our second group 
of texts- those which use the example of Christ's obedience as a 
model and inspiration for ecclesiastical obedience. (Some of them 
we have already mentioned, but they will receive fuller treatment 
here). 
PC 14 speaks of ·the special obedience peculiar to the 
religious life as being the means of a more permanent and secure union 
with God 1 s saving will: "After the example of .Jesus Christ, who came 
to do the Father's will ••• and 1ta1dng the form of a servant' • o • 
learned obedience through what he suffered • • • religious, moved by 
the Holy Spirit, subject themselves in faith to those who hold God's 
place, their superiors." (PC 14.1). 
While the Council did not treat the obedience of secular 
priests as being of the same nature as that of members of religious 
institutes, again it spoke of their spirit of faith in obedience: 
"'rhey will accept and carry out in a spirit of faith the commands and 
suggestions of the Pope and of their bishops and other superiors • 0 • 
by this humility, and by responsible and voluntary obedience, priests 
conform themselves to Christ. They reproduce the sentiment of 
Christ Jesus who 1 emptied himself, taking the form of a servant 
• • • 
and became obedient unto death' ••• and who, by his obedience, over-
came and redeemed the disobedience of Adam, as the Apostle declares: 
'For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by one 
man's obedience they will be made righteous'" (PO 15.2 and 3). 
A third text which speaks of the obedience of one group of 
men to another is LG 37. 2, where it is said: "Like all Chrj_stians, the 
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laity should promptly accep·t in Christian obedience, whatever is 
decided by the pastors who, as teachers and rulers of the Church, 
represent Christ. In this way, they will follow Christ's example, 
who, by his obedience unto death, opened the blessed way of the 
liberty of the sons of God to all men. 11 
The reader will have noticed that in two out of these 
last three texts, the atti-tude of obedience to men is associated w:i th 
a spirit of faith. In the very last passage, faith is not explicitly 
mentioned, but its object is implied - 1t is an object of faith that 
the pastors of the Church represent Christ. The formal qualification 
for holding the authority of Christ representationally is contained in 
their position as legitimate "teachers and rulers" in the Church; 
that which is required if they are to carry out this task in a way 
which represents the concrete will of Christ must be the object of the 
Church's prayer. 
The idea of obeying in faith implies that the agent would 
not necessarily have chosen this particular action himself, on 
rational grounds and on his ovvn assessment of the best course to take; 
his obedience, in faith, rests upon the formal legitimacy of the 
authority which commands him, and upon a generalised confidence in the 
providence of God as it indefectibly protects the life of the Church. 
We see, therefore, that by linking obedience to faith in these 
passages where Christ's obedience is used as a model, Vatican II gives 
positive value to the very act of obeying the legitimate connnands 
of authority, over and above the individual's assessment of the worth 
and helpfulness of the action he is asked to perform. 
'iie may go beyond this, however, and discover another signifi-
cance in the Council's use of the model of Christ's obedience. The 
picture of the redemptive submission of Jesus to the Father's will is 
used to indicate that obedience in the Church is always motivated by 
a redemptive concern to serve others and for the life of the Church, 
since all acts of obedience which may legitimately be required in 
the Christian community have an inner, salvific dynamic, whatever their 
outward con·tent. 
The inner, redemptive dynamic of obedience which is rendered 
in faith results from the fact that it expresses and actualises the 
Christian's underlying attitude of humility and willingness to obey 
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God; that is to say, it expresses a union with God's saving will 
for men. This is made clearest in the Council's treatment of the 
obedience of religious (see PC 14.1), though even there it is 
possible to overlook the fact that obedience itself is situated 
by the Council in the "mystery of Christ" (34) because of the renewed 
stress on the concrete service of others to which the commands of 
a superior should lead his subjects. Nevertheless, the · theme of 
union with Christ's mystery is present in the clause, "through the 
profession of obedience religious ••• are united more permanently 
and securely to God 1 s saving will 11 , and it must be remembered that 
all that is said of the value of their service to the Church applies 
as much to enclosed contemplatives as to those professed for the 
active life. (Indeed, AG 40.2 stresses the value of contemplative 
foundations in the Church's mission for the conversion of souls.) 
Although the obedience of religious is of a different ldnd 
and degree from that of either presbyters or lay folk, it is never-
theless comparable to theirs in that all are modelled on the obedience 
of Christ. Therefore, although the documents of Vatican II tend to 
stress most strongly the obvious, functional,and man-directed values 
attached to obedient actions in the Church's corporate mission, their 
employment of the model of Christ's submission unto death indicates 
that there is a 1 depth 1 or mystery underlying the obedience of all 
Christians. One might say that legitimate obedience effectually 
'represents' Christ's redemptive action, and actualises it for the 
world, just as the representational teaching of Church authority 
effectively communicates truths about God to men of this age (without 
actually being an epiphany of truth it self) • 
Conclusion 
At the beginning of this chapter we asked ourselves whether 
the Second Vatican Council stressed the inner responsibility and 
responsiveness of those called upon to obey, to a degree which 
corresponded to the Council's emphasis on the invitatory role of 
(34) See J .• M.R. Tillard, 11 J.J 1 obeissance religieuse 11 in, Vatican._}!: 
1 I Adaption et la renovation de la vie rhigiey.~ (Paris, 1967) 
P• 467. 
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authority. \Ye may now, I believe, answer i.n the affirmative. 
Obedience rendered out of sheer respect for the formal rights of 
authority is presented as an unusual state of affairs (indeed, all 
obedience should also have in view a union with God's saving will, 
and its effective representation in the world). Normally, the one 
who obeys should see the point of what he does, in relation to the 
effective upbuilding of the Church, and the carrying out of her 
- mission; because he is motivated by these goals, his obedience will 
include the willingness and readiness to take initiatives, and to 
volunteer h3lp which is rooted in his competence or cha.risms. Such 
obedience will even cover the confidence which should be his in 
making his opinion known, whether he is in sacred Order, or simply 
a member of the laity. All this constitutes a significant shift of 
emphasis When viewed against the backcloth of the official teaching 
of the preceding century. Like the shift of emphasis by which 
representational authority comes to be seen in terms of mission and 
sacrament, more than in terms of sheer jurisdiction, I do not believe 
that Vatican II 1 s nuancing of the idea of obedience should be under-
valued or overlooked. 
Indeed, the shifts of emphasis which we have noted do not 
abolish either the representational hierarchy or the ultimate 
requirement for prompt obedience once decisions have been taken. 
It is on this ground that the Council's teaching has been criticised 
for :failing to modify its concepts of authority and obedience 
sufficiently. However, I would argue that, while there are some areas 
of tension subsisting in Vatican II's attempt to reconcile the 
authority of representa-tion with the idea that the entire Church embodies 
the presence of God in a diffuse way, these tensions appear not so 
much, nor so clee.rly, upon the theological plane, but rather arise 
because the Council's ecclesiology does not prove viable or plausible 
in the Church 1 s social context. 
It is because of the social expectations of much of the 
twentieth-century world, that the theories which attribute greater 
responsibility to all members of the Church for the community's life 
are often effectively given a weight which makes them incompatible 
with continuing doctrines of representational authority and due 
obedience. The tension of doctrines which might, on the purely 
theological level be adjudged fruitful, is thereby made a likely 
181 
source of real instability for the Church's life, as it is 
worked out in the social context of the late twentieth century. 
This instability can only be aggravated by those cases in which 
members of the lLi.erarchy fail to respond to the call for a fully 
pastoral, invi tatory exercise of authority, bu·'c; rather fall back 
upon the use of representational power in a way more suited to a totallyr 
jurisdictionaL notion of authority's nature end justification. 
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CHAPTER IV: VATICAN II'S TREATMENT OF OBEDIENCE AND ASSENT TO 
THE AUTHORITY OF THE MAGISTERIUM 
In Chapter II we saw that the hierarchy of the Church con-
tinued to be treated by the Second Vatican Council as being made up 
of those who represent Christ in the apostolic office; however, the 
concept of the apostolic office was qualified by being grounded in 
mission, rather than in an act of institution with a more sheerly 
legal aspect. At the same time, the sacramental roots of the bishop's 
representational function were also brought more fully into view. 
In Chapter III we found that the representational status of the minis-
terial hierarchy continued to be a justification for the requirement 
of obedience in the Church, even in cases where members of the 
hierarchy have no guarantee of inerrancy or prudence attached to their 
commands; however, we also saw that other motives for obeying were 
brought more to the fore, and that the pattern of obedience was con-
ceived in such a way that initiative and dialogue were included in 
it as normal constituents. 
As we turn to the question of the hierarchy's authority in 
teaching, we enter a new field of problems. To demand assent on a 
matter of doctrine or moral theory, whether or not those under 
authority accept the reasoning which leads up to the proposition they 
are asked to accept, imposes constraint upon their interior processes 
of thought. It requires that understanding should be subordinate to 
will, and that the will should be determined on the formal grounds 
of the authority which inheres in the teachero As we shall see, this 
was the concept of magisterial authority which was largely put for-
ward between the First and Second Vatican Councils: 
"According to many textbooks of this vintage, 
magisterial teaching is itself an act of juris-
diction. Instead of enlightening the mir4, as 
teaching is ordinarily supposed to do, the action 
of the magisterium is held to impose an obligation 
on the will. The response is not understanding 
but rather obedience." (1) 
This requirement of obedient assent was not confim:ed to 
teaching given under the guarantee of 'infallibility' (in the case of 
(1) Avery Dulles, "The Theologian and the Magisterium" in 
Catholic Mind, 75, (1977) P• 10. 
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which a new element is introduced which makes it possible for the 
one who accepts the doctrine of'infallibility'in faith to accept a 
defined proposition not sheerly through obedience, but also through 
trust in God's promise and guarantee); the requirement was also 
applied to teaching given where no such guarantee was claimed. This 
was the result of allying the teaching function fully with that of 
representational government. (See Chapter~~' pp. 85-88) In this 
chapter we shall have to ask whether the Council's increased stress 
on the fact that teaching authority is grounded in the preaching 
mission of the Apostles modified the inherited concept of obedience 
and assent in this field. 
The question of assent or obedience to the Church's moral 
teaching is still more complex than that of assent or obedience to 
doctrinal propositions. The moral teaching of the Magisterium 
requires not only acceptance, but also that it should be made the 
immediate principle of action. It is, of course, possible to act 
according to moral teaching without thinking that it is correct; 
according to the nature of the case, this might involve the agent in 
acting in radical contradiction to the demands of his conscience. 
He might, however, be motivated by a conscientious desire to serve the 
good of the Church, believing this to be fostered through conformity 
to authority in a matter of relative indifference or doubt. A series 
of questions arise, in any case, regarding someone 1s moral 
behaviour: Is he obeying his conscience? How has the content of 
his conscience been determined? How far is it right to allow the 
content of one's conscience and moral behaviour to be determined by 
hetreronomous factors, such as the Church's authority and requirements? 
In the present chapter we shall examine Vatican II's ex-
plicit and formal teaching on the Kind of assent and obedience which 
is required by the Magisterium in matters of faith and morals; we 
shall then go on to consider those elements of the Council's theology 
which in fact gave substantive grounds for dissent from the non-
'infallible1 teaching of the hierarchy in matters of doctrine; lastly, 
we shall consider the way in which the Council prepared the ground for 
dissent and pluralism in the field of morals. The issue of the 
Council's effect upon the way in which the doctrine of'infallibility' 
can concretely be understood will be left to the next chapter. 
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A) Vatican II's Teaching on the Assent and Obedience Required 
by the Magisterium 
In the first part of this section of the chapter we shall 
examine Vatican II 1 s explicit concept of the kind of assent which 
should be given to the teaching of the Magisterium when it teaches 
in the ordinary wa:y, and without the guarantee of'infallibility•. 
In the second sub-section we shall consider the Council's 
theoretical teaching onlinfallibility•, and the assent Which is due 
to it (leaving to Chapter V. ·&he question whether such assent might be 
a plausible social reality). In bo·l;h r,mb-seotions we shall concentrate 
mainly upon the content of LG 25, which was the Council's 
restatement of the inherited doctrine of magisterial authority. 
1 Assent, Obedience, and the Teaching of the Ordinary 
Magisterium 
Although LG 25.1 begins its description of the hierarchy's 
prophetic task in terms which denote the activity of preaching and 
heralding, it goes on to speak of "the religious obedience of the 
spirit" which is due to episcopal teaching (see p. 107). The 
half-sentence which leads into the article's treatment of this 
obedience makes a bridge between the idea that, on the one hand, 
bishops are witnesses, and the idea that, on the other hand, they are 
responsible for a formal body of "divine and Catholic truth"; the 
same half-sentence also introduces the idea that their teaching 
authority is of the kind which rests on respect for their persons 
and for the responsibility which is invested in themo 
The meaning of the phrase "religious obedience" ("relig-
iosum obsequium") in this context is not a simple one. It is 
generally taken to cover a variety of degrees of assent, all less 
certain than the irreformable assent of an act of faitho Such 
religious obedience may be attenuated to the extent of becoming mere 
"obedient silence" concerning one's own, contrary, view. (2) This 
HD. For useful discussions of religiousm obsequium see Karl Hahner's 
commentary in Vorgrimler, 1, p. 209; Co Colombo, "Obedience to 
the Ordinary Magisterium11 in Obedience and the Church, pp. 84-86; 
and J o McHugh, 11The Authority of Humanae Vitae" in Clerg.y 
Review, 54, (1969) PPo 680ff. 
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obedient silence, some theologians would argue, may itself only 
involve desistance from public dissent, for the sake of avoiding 
scandal among the faithful. It should be noted that LG 25.1 
speaks of religious obedience of this kind as being due only to the 
teaching of one's ~bishop and the Pope. It is an attitude, 
therefore, which is required within the terms of specific pastoral 
relationships; it is not required in the case of the bishop who puts 
forward his views simply as a private theologian. 
In a very serious matter, in which someone believes that 
a bishop's official teaching is not that of a "witness to divine 
and Catholic truth" the matter may be delated to the judgement of 
the Pope. However, as Leo XIII put it, "whilst [the bishop) remains 
in communion with the Roman Pontiff, no one, certainly, is permitted 
to weaken the respect and obedience due to his authority in any way 
whatsoever." (3) From this we may deduce that the notion of religious 
obedience to a bishop's magisterium traditionally includes the idea 
that all public acts of controversy should be avoided, even while a 
matter is being considered at Rome. However, the fact that a bishop's 
teaching may be delated indicates that his hearers should retain 
the faculty to make interior assessment of his words, even to the 
point of disagreeing with them and finding them alarming. We may say, 
then, that the notion of "religious obedience of the spirit", used by 
Vatican II in relation to episcopal teaching carries the connotation 
that while real, inner assent is normally to be given a pronounce-
ment as being a morally certain interpretation of the Catholic faith, 
there may come a time when serious motives arise for doubting this. 
If such doubts should arise, dissent should not be public, for that 
would destroy the atmosphere of authority surrounding a bishop's 
teaching, and dissolve the general obedience of spirit which his 
flock owes towards it. 
What of the special degree of "religious obedience of the 
mind and will" that LG 25.1 says is due to the ordinary teaching of 
the Pope? There is no higher earthly authority to which papal 
teaching may be referred, and so there appears to be no safeguard 
a·ttached to the attitude whereby Catholics "are prepared to accept 
(3) Litt. Est Sane MolQstum (17 Dec. 1888) ASS 21 (1888-89) p. 322. 
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as right and true a great body of teachings and judgements of 
the popes, without requiring to know that it is guaranteed 
infallible, trusting to the Providence of God over the teaching 
authority of the Church, and the promised guidance of the Holy 
Spirit, satisfied that such pronouncements w.ill not be made rashly 
or without proper care and prayer". (4) Is ruch trust in the 
providence of God enough to justify "religious obedience of the 
mind and will" which has no outlet beyond obedient silence when 
the papal teaching appears to be erroneous? 
At least one nineteenth-century theologian, Franzelin, 
held that the assent given to the ordinary teaching of the Pope 
(or of a body inunediately representative of him, such as a curial 
congregation) should be so positive as to be an interior affirmation 
that the teaching in question is 1 safe 1 for Christians to hold, and 
that to refuse to embrace it would be 'unsafe', for it would 
violate the submission which is due to a Magisterium which is not 
only divinely constituted, but also providentially kept in the path 
of security. (5) Others, however, have held that even in the case 
of papal teaching, if sufficient motives for doubt arise, it is 
prudent to suspend assent, and opt, instead, for obedient silence. 
In the case of moral teaching, the suspension of assent may even 
lead to action which is formally disobedient to the teaching of the 
Pope. (6) We see, therefore, that it has been disputed whether 
the indefectibility of the Church can be tied down in such a way as 
to guarantee at least the 'security' of the Pope's teaching as a 
determinant for the individual's belief and conducto (The reader 
may remember that St. Thomas, and other tradi tio:nal a.uthori ties, 
taught quite positively that conscience should be obeyed rather than 
the Pope; it seems, therefore, that Franzelin's teaching mentioned 
above was a step out of the line of earlier Tradition.) Where does 
Lumen Gentium stand in this debate? 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
Cuthbert Butler, describing reli 'osum obse uium, in~ 
Vatican Council, 2, (2nd. edition London, 1936 Po 227o 
See J. Bo Franzelin, Tractatus de Divina Traditione et 
Scriptura (3rd edition, Rome, 1882) pp. 127-133. 
See D. Palmieri, Tractatus de Romano Pontifice (2nd edition 
Prado, 1891) p. 719, and Pesch, Praelect. Dogmatica (Freiburg/Br., 
1924) pp. 369f. Also McHugh, art. cit., P• 687. 
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First, we may note that LG 25.1 uses the expression 
"religious obedience of mind and will11 in reference to the 
attitude which should be taken to the Pope's ordinary teaching, 
whilst the attitude due to the bishops' ordinary magisterium is 
"religious obedience of spirit" (emphasis mine). The first of these 
seems to be the stronger. Because the mind is specifically 
mentioned, some such interior assent as that recommended by Franzelin 
seems to be indicated. However, this statement must immediately 
be qualified by noticing an important omission which Vatican II made. 
In order to note this omission, we must once more venture back into 
history - though this time, not so far as the nineteenth centuryo 
In 1950 Pius XII heightened the concept of security in 
papal teaching to such a degree that he could say, "if Supreme. 
Pontiffs deliberately pass judgement in their writings on a matter 
which has previously been an object of controversy, it is clear to 
everyone that, in the mind and intention of the same Popes, this :matter 
can now no longer be treated as an issue of free debate among 
theologians. 11 ( 7) Clearly, for Pius XII, the Church could rest secure 
with the ordinary teaching of the papal magisterium to such an 
extent that obedient silence should thenceforth reign even in the 
restricted spheres of academic debate. It seemed that changes and 
developments to make the ordinary teaching of the Church appropriate to 
changing conditions, would only be able to be brought about by the 
Magisterium1 s own decision, whilst the pressures of theological 
criticism would be excluded on all matters on which the Pope had ever 
pronounced. However, this pronouncement of Pius XII was, itself, 
very soon challenged in the theological press, so that its unconvin-
cingness was demonstrated both by argument and by act. Although the 
passage was repeated in the early draft of Lumen Gentium (10 November 
1962), it was omitted in the final text. When seven members of the 
Council requested that there should be an explicit statement of 
scholarly freedom of investigation, the commission replied that no 
such statement should be needed, and that approved theological 
commentaries should be consulted in the matter. In saying that a 
statement of scholarly freedom should not be needed, the commission 
(7) Encycl. Humani Generis, p. 568. (Dz 2313/DzS 3885). 
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indicated that those commentaries were in view that allow for 
further academic debate and publications on questions already 
treated by the Pope. 
The teaching of LG25.1 therefore stands in a rather 
ambiguous positiono It does not overtly mention any possibilities 
of dissent from the ordinary teaching of either Pope pr bishops, 
and, indeed, it seems to make a very strong claim for the quality 
of religious obedience which is due to the Pope's teaching. At the 
same time, scholarly dissent was not explicitly ruled out (and, as 
we shall see in Section B of this chapter, Vatican II's own theology 
was the fruit of substantial academic dissent from the official 
teaching of earlier periods). However, what is clear is that the 
Council's view of appropriate religious obedience to magisterial 
teaching aimed at least to exclude public debate of pastoral 
teaching. (8) 
We may question whether such an exclusion of public debate 
is really socially plausible, and even whether it is theologically 
plausible. Its social implausibility would seem to arise both from 
the high value which is given in many - especially Western - societies 
to the kind of sincerity which moves people both to dissent in practice, 
and · to wish that their dissent may be known and discussed. This desire 
for discussion does not necessarily arise from aspirations after any 
personal advantage, nor from a despite of authority, but rather from 
a conviction that the majority of people are better served if they 
are not excluded from the debates of 'experts•, and that it is 
(8) It is interesting to note the argument against public discussion 
put forward by Jer8me Hamer, the Secretary of the Sacred Congre-
gation for the Doctrine of the Faith, to American bishops in 
1978: this argument is that when a theologian cannot, after, 
effort, agree with the Magisterium, he should go to the competent 
doctrinal authority to put forward his arguments, inspired by a 
wish to serve the good of all. HA direct appeal to public 
opinion to contradict a clear teaching of the magisterium, using 
for this purpose the resources of press and television, is an 
act that no theologian can justify. The theologians who, under 
different circumstances, have not hesitated to do so, have taken 
a fearful responsibility upon themselves. If so many minds are 
confused, and so many consciences are perplexed in the Church 
today, it is partly owing to initiatives of this kind. 11 
(Osservatore Romano - English edition - 29 Jan. 1979.) 
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certainly unnecessary and unwise to let them think that there is 
no debate at all. In addition, the past history of the Church has 
led some to fear personal injustices which may occur if ecclesiastical 
autnority and theologians deal with each other only outside the range 
of public discussion. We may also adduce the fact that even those 
who would not wish their theories and dissent to be the property of 
the market-place cannot always avoid the importunities of the press 
and broadcasters. 
Over and above this catalogue of reasons why a ban on 
public discussion and dissent has an air of social implausibility, 
there looms the argument that it is theologically difficult to sustain: 
The theory of obedient silence, in even its most attenuated form, 
must be allied to some concept of the general security which inheres 
in the Magisterium1 s ordinary teaching. A doctrine of security, 
however, which is content to allow ordinary Catholics to accept 
teaching which may be substantively wrong or dubious, while restrain-
ing debate to academic spheres, seems increasingly to rest upon too 
narrow a view of what constitutes the indefectibility of the Church. 
It also rests upon a division of the Church into the teachers and 
the taught, the cognoscenti and the simple faithiul, ~Jhich is made no 
more acceptable than the similar divide made in the nineteenth 
century simply by reason of including the theologians within the 
privileged circle. All in all, the restriction of debate may hamper 
the effective exercise of the sense of faith by Catholics, and 
prejudice the integrity of their belief. To say that the Church is 
indefectible, in a way that is adequate to truth and sincerity, may 
have to mean that it lives with shared uncertainties and discussions, 
rather than that the simple faithful are left in undisturbed peace 
and questionable certainty. Vatican II, however, did not address 
itself to these questions. 
2 Assent to the Teaching of the'Infallible'Magisterium 
In this sub-section we shall examine first the scope of 
doctrines which may be deemed'infallible~ and, secondly, the 
conditions under which these doctrines m~ come to be pronouncedo 
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a) The scope of 1infallible1 doctrines 
In LG 25.3 the 1infallibilit.y'of the papal magisterium, 
as taught at Vatican I, is restated. The conditions of this 
'infallibility' are that the Pontiff should be teaching "as supreme 
pastor and doctor of all Christians", that he should be proclaiming 
a doctrine concerning faith or morals, and that he should make his 
definition in an unmistakably definitive act. (LG 25.3). (9) 
'Infallibility' of his teaching is, in such a case, the result of the 
Holy Spirit's assistance, promised to the Pope in the person of 
Sto Peter. LG 25o3 makes it clearer than does the equivalent passage 
in Pastor Aeternus that the gift of 1infallibility'does not belong 
to Peter's successor as a personal qualification, but that he is, 
under these circumstances, one in mom "the Church's own gift of 
infallibility is present in a singular way". It is because the 
whole Church is kept by the Holy Spirit in 1infallible'faith that the 
Council could affirm that the assent of the Church is never lacking 
to 1infallibl~ definitions (loc. cit.). This statement is made, however, 
not as an indication that the Church's assent should be taken as 
the sign of an 1infalli ble' pronouncement, nor as an argument that tm 
lack of such assent would signal an errant proposition, but rather 
as an assertion of faith. The doctrine of Vatican II did not differ 
from that of Vatican I on this point; the Fathers of the later 
Council felt able, however, to bring more clearly into view their 
faith in the consensio of the entire Church, without fearing that they 
would be misunderstood as saying that the Pope required a consensus 
before he could make a definition'infallibly~ (10) Similarly, they 
felt able to affirm that papal definitions, as well as those of the 
(9) See also Pastor Aeternus capo 4o (Dz 1839/DzS 3074) 
(10) At Vatican I there were calls by various members of the Council 
for a statement that the Pope is under the norm of revealed 
sources when he defines, and that the consensio of the Church 
is a characteristic of 1infallible1 teachingo The deputation 
recognised the truth of these assertions, but would set down no 
obligatory procedure whereby the Pope should consult revelation 
and the Church, although it mentioned several which had been 
used in the past (Dz 1836/DzS 3069). (See Go Thils, L'Infaill-
ibilit~ pontificale (Gembloux, 1969) pp. 230-233). 
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episcopal college, are made "according to revelation itself, to 
which everyone is bound to conform" (LG 25.4), without fearing that 
any particular method of consulting revelation might thereby be 
deemed to be required of Pope and bishops. before they defined. 
Being 'infallible', papal definitions necessarily require 
the absolute assent of mind and will that a Christian would give 
to a teaching guaranteed by God. However,1infallible'statements are 
divided into two classes in Catholic theology. The first contains 
pronouncements which are deemed to be the direct exposition of what 
is contained in revelation; to these are due the assent of "divine 
and Catholic faith", a "full assent of mind and will to God as he 
makes revelation". (11) The second type of absolute assent is some-
times known as "ecclesiastical fai th11 , and it is due to truths not 
revealed in themselves, but necessarily connected with revealed 
truths ('connexa cum revelatis')o These connexa may also be ter.med 
'tenenda', since they are 'to be held by ecclesiastical faith' rather 
than 'to be believed ( 1 credenda 1 ) by divine and Catholic faith'. 
There is a long-standing controversy concerning what con-
stitutes part of the connexa; the idea of necessary connection with 
revealed truth arises from the idea that the Magisterium must not 
only expoUnd revelation faithfully, but also guard it religiously 
(see LG 25.3). The connexa are considered to be those teachings 
which are necessary for the protection of the truth of revelation 
within the life and belief of the Church. But what teachings are 
necessary to the protection of truth? Even at Vatican I there was 
debate over whether one particular class of pronouncement ('doctrinal 
dogmatic facts') should figure among the things to be held by ecclesi-
astical faith. (12) More recently it has been argued that the 
Church cannot know which of its teachings is necessary to the 
( 11 ) Dei Filius cap. 3. (Dz 1789/DzS 3008) 
(12) Kleutgen, one of the official relators at Vatican I, expressed 
surprise at the debate. He held that the gift of 1infallibility1 
extends as far as the Pope's power to teach in the Church, and 
therefore includes judgements concerning doctrinal dogmatic 
facts. (Mansi 53, col. 325 D)o Although this view has great 
weight, it has not convinced all subsequent theolo~ians, nor 
did it express the agreed view of all the Council \see Thils, 
op. cito, PP• 234fo). 
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protection of faith in revelation (13), while Hans KUng has 
objected to the indefiniteness surrounding the subject, which 
allows some theologians to cover all kinds of statements with the 
mantle of•infallibility' .(14) 
We may take as our example of the way in which the concept 
m~ be used, the categorisation given by one influential, though 
distinctly conservative commentator: J. Salaverri divides the tenenda 
into three classes: (i) Speculative truths logically connected with 
matters of direct revelation, whether as consequences or direct pre-
suppositions, (ii) 'Dogmatic facts', whether simple or doctrinal. 
(This means those facts or assertions about the concrete life of the 
Church which have a bearing on the way in which dogmas have been 
defined or expounded. A 'simple dogmatic fact', for example, covers 
a subject such as the validity of a council; the much more contro-
versial class of 'doctrinal dogmatic facts' comprises rulings by the 
~isterium concerning the orthodoxy or heterodoxy of different 
writings in the sense intended by their authors.) (iii) Decrees 
com erning dispositions of Church life and worship, particularly the 
canonisation of saints and the approval of religious orders and their 
rules. (15) All these classes of pronouncement Salaverri holds to 
be made up of "secondary objects of infallibility" because he says 
they have a bearing on the salvation of souls. But do they really 
have a necessary role in protecting the truth of revelation? 
LG 25 does not seem to favour the view that there are .!!£. 
tenenda, nothing which is necessarily connected with the truth of 
revelation. Its third paragraph says that the Church's'infallibilitT 
extends as far as the deposit of revelation which has to be carefully 
guarded and faithfully expounded, while the preceding paragraph 
( 13) 
( 14) 
( 15) 
See, for example, Gregory Baum, "The Magisterium in a Changing 
Church" in Concilium, 1, no. 3 (1967) pp. 38f.: "The Church often 
does not know what she knows. It is rather the actual life of 
the Church, the doctrinal reflection within the Church and the 
need to clarify certain pastoral issues, that eventually lead 
to a clearer realization of what the Church holds infalliblyo" 
"What cannot be regarded as forming part of the protection of 
the deposit of revelation?" (Infallible? p. 60o) 
Sacra Theologiae Summa, pp. 688-703. 
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teaches that the college of bishops, "even dispersed throughout 
the world", enjoys the privilege of'infallibility'when "they concur 
on a single judgement as something which should be definitively held" 
(emphasis mine). (The condition for the'infallibility'of the college 
of bishops is that its members should preserve the bond of com-
munion between themselves and with Peter's successor, and that they 
should be authentically teaching in matters of faith and morals. 
We shall return shortly to the significance of this statement 
attributing 1infallibility'to the college, but first we must pursue 
our consideration of the importance of Vatican II 1 s attitude towards 
the question of tenenda.) 
While LG 25 does not seem to suggest that there are no 
tenenda, we may still see it as highly significant that the Council 
did not define their content and extent; the matter has long been 
debated, yet Vatican II left it unsettled. The importance of this 
continuing ambiguity is that it maintains space for theologians to 
hold that there are very few secondary doctrines with which the 
central truth of revelation necessarily stands or falls. This means 
that the Magisterium cannot expect a universal attitude of 
absolute assent to attend upon any of its pronouncements, unless 
they are unequivocally said to be solemn definitions of revealed 
truth itself. At the same time, it remains possible for some 
Catholics to assent in docility to all teachings of the types 
which might be considered to be tenenda from a conservative point 
of view. Such implicit, conservative belief cannot, however, be 
made a condition of Church membership, nor even of theological 
respectability. Vatican II's continuing ambiguity, therefore, 
ratified the existence of a diversity of beliefs concerning the 
scope of infallibility. 
There is one viewpoint from which the inherent ambiguity 
of Vatican II 1s position may seem totally unsatisfactory: This is the 
view that magisterial pronouncements outside the scope of the direc-t 
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exposition of revelation (or even within it) are by no means the 
subject of an indefectible ~security' stemming from Christ's 
promise to the Church that she would not fail. According to this 
standpoint, (which is that of Hans KUng), it would be possible for 
the Magisterium to make pronouncements, capable of being viewed by 
some Catholics as tenenda, which would not only be untrue, but 
would also have a really deleterious effect on the life of the 
Church and the faith of those who assented to them. According to 
this view, the Church's indefectibility would be displayed only in 
her capacity to correct such statements in the course of time, and 
to recover herself from the harm they had done while they stood 
unchallenged. 
We must now return to the subject of the'infallibility'of 
the college of bishops: Vatican II appears to have claimed for this 
body, teaching together in communion with the Pope, a greater range 
of areas of'infallibility'than that which Vatican I claimed for it. 
Whilst Pastor Aeternus ,said that 11 vihen the Roman Pontiff speaks ~ 
cathedra •• o and defines a doctrine on faith or morals to be held 
("tenendam") by the universal Church ••• he enjoys that infallibility 
with which the divine redeemer wished his Church to be endowed in the 
definition of doctrine concerning faith or morals" (16), the consti-
tution Dei Filius said of the universal, ordinary magisterium of all 
the bishops that it may propose matters for belief ("credenda11 ); 
these must then be believed by divine and Catholic faith, on the same 
basis as the contents of the word of God in Scripture and Tradition 
and the definitions of solemn councils. (17) The teaching of the Pope 
appears to have a more inclusively'infallible' scope, since the word 
"tenendam" may be taken to cover a matter either of ecclesiastical 
or of divine and Catholic faith. The teaching of the bishops 
appeared, according to the expression of Vatican I, to be 1infallible' 
only in matters directly concerned with the exposition of revelation. 
At Vatican II, on the other hand, the magisterium of the universal 
college is attributed the privilege of'infallibility'in the area of 
(16) cap. 4. (Dz 1839/DzS 3074) 
(17) See capo 3. (Dz 1792/DzS 3011): Dei Filius was taking up a 
doctrine on the authority of the universal ordinary magisterium 
of the bishops which had first been put forward by Pius IX in 
Tuas Libenter in 1863o (Dz 1683/DzS 2879)o 
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tenenda as well as of credenda. The'infallibility'of the college has 
"exactly the same implications as that of the Pope, must be exercised 
in the same manner and is subject to the same limitations." (18) 
The irony of this new attribution is, of course, that the 
scope of possible tenenda was not defined, and that the statement 
was made in a period in which increasing numbers of theologians 
came to hold that this scope should be viewed as minimalo In addition, 
LG25.2 did not make it clear~ it might be said that the college 
had concurred in a single j'\ldgement that something "should be 
definitively held". Therefore, a new area of doubt and ambiguity 
is opened up about what constitutes an 1 infallibl~ statement. Many 
commentators would agree With Karl Rahner in saying that if LG 25.2 
is read together with n.4 of the Nota Explicativa (19) it would be 
best to say that the bishops are'infallible'not in incidental 
concurrence in their customary teaching, but only when they resort 
to an explicitly collegial act. (20) Therefore, while Vatican II 
expands the theoretical scope of collegia1 1infallibili ty', at the 
same time it gives grounds for, theological. connnentators· to·:suggest 
quite a stringent limitation to the conditions under which the 
entire college may be said to deliver a teaching which requires 
absolute and irreformable assent. In fact, the notion of a collegial 
act may even prove a restriction upon the degree to which the 
'infallibility' attributed to the bishops even by Vatican I is taken to 
be operative. 
If it did anything, Vatican II's teaching on the scope 
of the privilege of 1infallibility'increased the areas of ambiguity 
and debate, by introducing the bishops into the same area of 
authority as the Pope, while at the same time putting forward the 
idea that the bishops only teach'infallibly1 under certain undefined 
(18) Karl Rahner in Vorgrimler, 1 P• 210. 
(19) "Although the college always exists, it does not thereby always 
act in a strictly collegial way, as the Church's Tradition makes 
clear. That is to say, it is not always 1in actu pleno', or 
rather, it only acts in a strictly collegial way at intervals, 
and then only with the consent of its head." 
(29) Rahner, op. cito, Po 211. See also Baum, art. cit., p. 38. Both 
Hahner and Baum refer to H. Pissarek-Hudelist, "Das ordentliche 
Lehramt als kollegialer Akt des Bischefskollegiums11 in 
Gott in Welt (Freiburg/Br., 1964) pp. 166-185. 
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conditions. I have also suggested that the Council's lack of 
solution to the question of what constitutes the field of tenenda 
gives space to minimalist views. To this we must add that the 
Council's teaching on the college, undefined as it was, effectively 
shifts the stress away from the impression that the Pope is the 
major vehicle of truth in the Church. In the pages which follow, 
we shall consider another element of Vatican II's teaching which 
also has this effect. 
b) The conditions under which dogma requiring absolute assent 
may be pronounced 
A recent writer has said that "the defining role of the 
papacy is restricted to occasions when there is doctrinal dissension, 
and when God's revelation cannot be identified by means of either the 
unanimity of the faithful, or that of the bishops." (21) The same 
author also implies that it might not be correct to suppose that the 
definition of the Assumption was an 1infallible1 act. He bases his 
argument upon a commentary given at the First Vatican Council by 
Gasser, on 11 July 1870. These were Gasser's words on that date: 
"(the Pope] only enjoys the divine assistance promised to him that 
he should not err on those occasions when he really and truly 
exercises his office of supreme judge in controversies of faith, 
and of supreme doctor in the Church. 11 ( 22) 
If Gasser's words on 11 July were the only interpretation 
we had of the mind of Vatican I, or if they expressed the way in which 
the doctrine of the'infallibility' of the papal magisterium has been 
accepted in the Church generally, we migh-t agree that there was a 
strong case for cutting down our view of the content of the doctrine. 
However, the statement of 11 July was not Gasser's last word on the 
subject, and the Roman Catholic Church has not in fact restricted its 
belief in papal 1infallibility1 to forensic contexts only. On 16 July 
1870 Gasser told the assembled members of Vatican I that in the meaning 
of the deputation, the word "defines" (as it occurs in the definition 
(21) Garret Sweeney, "The Forgotten Council11 , in Bishops and Writers, 
edited. by A. Hastings (Vfueathampstead, 1977), p. 164. 
(22) Mansi 52, col. 1213A. 
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of the'infallibility'of the papal magisterium), 
11 is not to be taken in a forensic sense, as 
though it only meant the act of putting an end 
to a controversy over what is heretical and 
what is a matter of faith; rather, the word 
'defines' means that the Pope directly pronounces, 
with final intention, on a doctrine of faith 
and morals, in such a way what every single 
member of the faithful can be sure of the mind 
of the Apostolic See - the mind of the Roman 
Pontiff.u (23) 
It is hard to sustain the argument, therefore, that the 
doctrine of thetinfallibility1 of the papal magisterium envisages tbe 
privilege as only being exercised in a si tua"!;ion of "tension, 
polarisation, uncertainty, crisis, etc., which puts in danger the 
communion in faith of a particular Church, or even of the universal 
Church. 11 ( 24) Such a concept might make the doctrine more palatable 
in ecumenical contexts, but it would not represent the meaning of 
Vatican I 1 s teaching. However, perhaps it might represent the mind 
of Vatican II? 
In order to approach the teaching of Vatican II, we must 
once more return to the pontificate of Pius XII, and move on from 
there. That Pope defined the dogma of the Blessed Virgin's bodily 
Assumption into heavenly glory on 1 November 1950. The dogma was 
not called forth by acute controversy in the Church, but rather by 
the demands of the faithful: "Not only individual Christians, but 
also those representing nations or ecclesiastical provinces, and 
also many Fathers of the Vatican Council begged earnestly for this 
(definition) from the Apostolic See." (25) Pius XII called his 
act a "dogma", (26) so showing that he intended it as an exercise 
of the 'infallible' magisterium. The conditions under which it was 
proposed were not those of lively opposing views, threatening to 
(23) Mansi 52, col. 1316A, 
(24) P. Huizing, "Magistere: Pouvoir ou temoignage?" in Revue de 
Droit Canonique, 25 (1975) p. 202. 
(25) Const. Apost. Munificentissimus Deus (1 Nov. 1950) AAS 42 
(1950) P• 755. 
(26) ibid. P• 770. (Dz 2333/DzS 3903)Q 
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tear the Church apart, but rather a "singular harmony between 
Catholic bishops and faithfulo 11 (27) This was discerned by a 
process of consultation which preceded the promulgation of the 
dogmao However, the Apostolic Constitution was promulgated on the 
Pope's authority alone, and not on that of the entire episcopate. 
These were the conditions under which the only, generally acknow-
ledged, exercise of the papal privilege of 1infallibility'between 
the two Vatican councils came abouto 
Pius XII's dogma rested on a consensus, which he had 
ascertained by consultation of the bishops concerning the faith of 
their churches. This concept of a consensus had gradually been 
brought to the fore during the last part of the nineteenth century 
and the first half of the twentieth century. An exploration of the 
belief of the entire Church had been one of the means which Pastor 
Aeternus said that Popes of the past had used before defining 
doctrine. (28) It had, in fact, been the approach taken by Pius IX 
before defining the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception in 1854. 
Therefore, both the most recent non-conciliar definitions had 
rested on consensus rather than on forensic judgement. This was the 
historical background lying behind Vatican II. 
In LG 12.1 (see pp.143fJ the idea of the consensus of the 
entire Church is mentioned explicitly for the first time in a 
conciliar document (for the reference to the process of consultation 
in Pastor Aeternus had only presupposed the concept). In DV 8.2 
there is a description of the role of the faithful in the development 
of doctrine, which is also new in official Roman Catholic teaching. 
The introduction of these ideas at Vatican II marks a high-point in 
the modern evolution of the idea that the Pope or bishops make 
definitions as the mouth of the Church 1 s faith, rather than as 
separate organs of truth. We shall be examining these passages more 
closely in the next chapter; here we may simply note that Vatican II 
held to the fore not the idea of forensic judgement, but rather that 
(27) ibid. p. 756. Pius XII is here quoting a phrase from Pius IX1 s 
definition of the Immaculate Conception (see Coll. Lac. 6, 
col. 842)o 
(28) cap. 4. (Dz 1836/DzS 3069). 
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of consensus as the basis of definitive doctrine in the 
Church. This is a matter of emphasis, but it is an emphasis which 
gains force from its association with the pattern of the history 
which preceded ito 
Conclusion 
We have seen that Vatican II left the question of 
representational teaching, and the authoritative teaching of 
representatives, in a state of qUite considerable ambiguity and 
confusion. While continUing to assert the duty of religi. ous obedi-L 
ence of spirit, or of mind and will, to the non-infallible pronounce-
ments of the hierarchy, the Council did not make it at all clear 
what such r·9ligious obedience should involve. The situation was 
left particularly unclear in relation to the task of theologians, 
for the Council spoke so positively of the obedience which all 
should render to the Pope's teaching, and yet did not renew the 
effort of Pius XII to put theologians under severe constraints when-
ever the papal magisterium had been exercised on a controversial 
question. Over and above this, as I have argued, the concept of 
obedient silence, or of restricted and private debate and objection, 
lacks plausibility in itself, because of the social context in which so 
many major Catholic theologians live - a context in which critical 
enquiry and constant openness are counted as high values. 
With regard to the'infallible'teaching of the hierarchy 
Vatican II did not so much settle old problems as raise new ones. 
Superficially it looks as though the Council extended the net of 
1infallibility'to take in all teaching universally put forward by the 
episcopate. However, on closer examination it transpires that it 
would be hard definitively to establish which teachings of the 
bishops are strictly collegial teachings, and which touch on matters 
which are really essential to the protection of the authentic faith 
of the Church. 
When we turn to the main body of the Church - those who 
are under the obligations of obedience and assent - we find that the 
doctrine of consensus, attached to the idea of an active sense of 
the faith, is brought to the foreo The idea of the Holy Spirit's 
embodiment in the Church is therefore stressed in this field, as we 
have already remarked (see pp. 143f. )o The result of this must be 
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that increased emphasis is put upon the interior grasp of doctrine 
which each member of the Church has, and that this concept counter-
balances the continuing demands that assent ahd obedience should be 
rendered on the grounds of the hierarchy's formal authority. 
So far we have not seen evidence that the idea of witnessing 
substantially modified Vatican II's concept of the concrete 
authority of the Magisterium, although it was placed at the 
theoretical root of the hierarchy's teaching authority. However, we 
shall find the idea of preaching emerging in the following sections, 
particularly Section Co In these two following sections we Shall 
examine parts of the documents which do not all explicitly deal with 
the authority of the Magisterium, but whose content is none the less 
relevant to the way in which non-infallible teaching must be received 
by Catholics. (As has already been stated, the ideas of Vatican II 
which qualify the notion of absolute assent to'infallible' teaching 
will be dealt with in Chapter V.) 
' B) The Relationship of the Magisterium1s non~Infallible'Teaching 
to the Intellectual Life of the Church: Shifts of Emphasis 
Giving Increased Possibilities of Dissent 
We have seen that Vatican II propounded anew the doctrine 
that a religious obedience is due to the teaching of the Magisterium, 
even when it does not claim to be'infallible~ This obedience is 
due whenever a bishop seeks to put forward the Church's teaching, and 
not his own private views, and it is particularly owed to the pastoral 
pronouncements of the bishop of the place, and to the Pope. It is 
understood by the Council that such pastoral pronouncements should 
normally win support and adherence as being morally certain, and that 
at the very least they should not be met by publicised dissent. 
I shall now suggest, however, that there were aspects of 
Vatican II's teaching which positively fostered the roots of possible 
dissent, or rather, which indicated that the ordinary teaching of the 
Magisterium should not have the character of being didactic, but 
should rather take the form of open dialogue with other members of 
the Church, allowing a pluralism of opinion and expression to flourish. 
So long as such pluralism and dialogue remain the basis of relation-
ships between the hierarchy and others in Whom the sense of faith is 
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active, dissent should not be a relevant term. However, where 
religious obedience of spirit, mind,and will is demanded on sheerly 
formal grounds, the elements of the Council's theology which we are 
about to consider, are likely to provide the impetus for real 
tension, and for academic, and even public, dissent. 
:&'irst, we shall examine Vatican II 1 s teaching concerning 
the proper intellectual independence of Catholics. Second, we 
shall consider elements of the Council's teaching which positively 
fostered the existence of theological pluralism in the Church. 
Thirdly, we shall review ways in which Vatican II in fact validated 
dissent as an authentic Catholic stance. 
1 The Intellectual Independence of Catholics 
In the first par·t of this sub-section we shall highlight 
the freedom which Vatican II explicitly gave to the study of 
theology. Our analysis will mainly concentrate upon the Council's 
theory of the proper methods of biblical study, and the relationship 
between exegetes and the Magisterium. This is a subject which was 
.. tre.ated fully in the Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation (Dei 
Verbum), and we must particularly notice that it was the area of 
biblical study whose opening-up to critical methods was most 
thoroughly treated by the Council. The lack of a correspondingly 
detailed treatment of freedom of method in other spheres of theology 
is a significant unevenness in Vatican II's approach, with great 
potential for producing problems in the post-conciliar era. However, 
we shall see that there were indeed openings to criticism and 
freedom in theology in general, despite the fact that the rules 
governing non-biblical subjects were not so fully mapped out. In 
our second sub-section we shall find that these general openings 
result partly from the Council's teaching on the relationship bet-
ween theology and secular disciplines, and on the question of the 
autonomy of such disciplines when carried out by Catholics. 
a) The conditions under which theological study should be pursued 
Both GS 62.7 and GE 10.2 speak of the access to theological 
study which should be available to lay people. Although this was 
not strictly a new possibility (for Pius XII had spoken warmly of 
such study in the very moment of warning that it should not 
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extract itself from the control of the Magisterium, (29)) the 
practical provisions made for it in GE 10.2 were new, and repre-
sented a substantial step towards overcoming the effective barriers 
between teachers and taught in the Church. (30) At the same time, 
GS 62.7 made a very significant statement concerning the proper con-
ditions of theological study of both clergy and laity: "So that they 
can carry out their task effectively, the faithful, whether clergy or 
laity, should be allowed a just liberty in enquiry, in thought, and 
in expressing their ideas humbly and courageously in those fields 
in which they enjoy expertise." We see renewed here a theoretical 
respect for the responsibility, if not for the authority, of 
expertise - a respect which had earlier been eclipsed in Catholic 
thought by the rise in prestige of the hierarchical Magisterium as a 
body which led the way in giving theology its approved forms. (31) 
We are to turn now to Vatican II's particular approach to 
the question of scriptural study. The Council's treatment of this 
subject was mainly significant in that it ratified in a solemn setting 
a process of liberalisation in the official attitude over the pre-
ceding years. In particular, it followed the lines of an Instruction 
given by the Pontifical Biblical Commission in 1964 concerning the 
critical study of the Gospels. (32) The Council not only followed 
this line of approach, but also extended it, by applying it to the 
whole Bible, and also, in an important phrase in DV 11. 2, went beyond 
it in the principles it lays down for biblical study. The phrase 
is this, "the books of Scripture teach firmly, faithfully and with-
out error, that truth which God wished to have consigned to holy 
writ for the sake of our salvation. 11 (emphasis mine). The addition 
of the phrase which I have stressed "made it possible to restrict 
(29) Six ans sont ecoul?s, p. 931. In 1954 (three years previously) 
Pius XII had felt it necessary to oppose an independent "lay 
theology"; then, he had also spoken of the possibility that lay 
people might deepen their theological knowledge, but his tone 
had been less encouraging. (See alloc. on canonisation of 
Pius X (31 May 1954) AAS 46 ( 1954).) 
(30) Even in 1967 F. Klostermann could note that it was still not 
possible everywhere for women to take theological degrees in 
Catholic faculties. (Vorgrimler, 3 p. 335.) 
(31) See Congar, "Bref historique des formes du 'Magistere 111 , p. 103; 
also P• 105: "The encyclicals of Leo XIII and Pius XII give 
theology. They are not purely expressions of apostolic witness 
according to the needs of the time, but doctrina of the 
1 cathedra magistralis 1 assuming data of natural law, human 
wisdom and classical theologyo 11 
(32) (21 April 1964) AAS 45 (1964). PP• 712-718. (See DzS 3999)o 
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inerrancy to the essential religious affirmations of a biblical 
book made for the sake of our salvation." (33) This allows not only 
that the Bible is not a text book for science, (34) or for ancient 
history in general, but even that a critical view may be taken of 
some of the religious assertions in Scripture. 
Within this large space for critical study, what were the 
principles which Vatican II laid down for the conduct of such work? 
DV 12.1 teaches that the meaning of God in Scripture is to be 
ascertained by investigating the meaning of the sacred writer. This 
is a sophisticated development of the idea that the 1li teral' sense 
of Scripture should be preferred to any allegorical or symbolic 
sense. (35) It is an important statement because it clearly gives 
the pre-eminence to scholarly investigation over any meaning which 
the Magisterium might impose upon a text in the name of Tradition or 
{33) R. E. Brown, Biblical Reflections on Crises Facins the Church 
(London, 1975) P• 115o 
_(34) Leo XIII had been the first to note officially that the Bible 
should not be looked to to provide information of no importance 
for men's salvation, such as the inner constitution of visible 
things. Rather, the biblical writers used common terms and 
expressions of the time to describe things as they appeared to 
be. This, said Leo, was God's way of speaking to men compre-
hensibly. The Pope then went on to treat the historical content 
of Scripture, prefacing his remarks with the sentence, 11i t will 
help to transfer these principles to cognate disciplines, 
especially history." (Enc;ycl. Providentissimus Deus, p_;; 287 
(Dz 1947-49/DzS 3288-90).) We shall examine the historical 
development of the road first opened by Leo XIII in sub-section 
(3) of the present section of the chapter. 
(35) The necessary pre-eminence of the literal sense of Scripture 
was forcefully stated by the Biblical Commission in 1941 in a 
letter to Italian bishopso (20 Aug. 1941) AAS 33 (1941) PP• 466ff. 
(DzS 3792ffo) See also Pius XII's encyclical Divino Afflante 
(30 Sept. 1943) AAS 35 (1943) P• 310o (Dz 2293/DzS 3826)o 
204 
the sense of faith's witness to God's deeper meaningo (36) The means 
of scholarly interpretation are summed up in the idea of investigating 
literary genres, and historical modes of thinking and communicating 
(DV 12. 2). 
The critical e~egete of the post-Vatican II era has, then, 
varied tools at his disposal, and two major objects in view. First, he 
aims to discover the history behind Scripture, and then, on the basis 
of this, to elucidate the theology expressed in the Bible. The bound-
aries within which he must work are summed up in the injunction that 
he should have respect to the unity of Scripture, understood in the 
light of the living Tradition of the entire Church and the 'analogy of 
faith 1 (DV 12. 3); finally, "all these methods of interpreting 
Scripture are ultimately subject to the judgement of the Church, which 
exercises the mandate and ministry of preserving and interpreting the 
tibrd of God." (loc. cit.) 
To accept the unity of Scripture according to the 'analogy 
of faith' (37) means to work on the presupposition that the estab-
lished points of the Catholic faith are rigrtly established. However, 
to accept that they are rightly established may or may not include the 
idea that they can be reinterpreted. We shall be considering the 
question of the reinterpretation of dogma in the next chapter; here 
let it suffice to say that it is not straightforwardly simple to de-
termine when an exegete has departed from the 'analogy of faith'. It is 
not a fixed, external criterion which can be unambiguously applied in 
(36) Despite Pius XII's insistence on the primacy of the literal sense 
of Scripture, the definition of the Assumption reinforced other 
views. Thus, an author could, in 1954, defend the superiority of 
the sense of faith as an interpreter of the Bible, over against 
elucidation of the literal meaning alone, by seying, "the basis of 
dogmatic development ••• is not only what God has said, but also 
what he intended to say in his profoundest intentions in the in-
spired text. 11 The author argues that therefore it is not suff-
icient to analyse the text by human reason alone, for the richness 
of the revelation communicated by God to the Church 11 surpasses in 
extent the understandin which the ins ired authors had of it 
themselves" emphasis mine. C. Dillenschneider, Le a:ens de la 
foi et la Jrogres dogmatique du myst~re marial. (Rome, 1954) PP• 
39 and 73. 
(37) The 'analogy of faith' (the 'proportion of faith') decrees that 
those presuppositions which, of themselves, would be hostile to 
established Catholic dogma, be rejected as unserviceable. But if 
Catholic dogma mey be reinterpreted in some way, the bare concept 
of the'analogy of fait~ does not tell us which presuppositions are 
unacceptable criteria of reinterpretation. 
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judgement; to ask scholars to work with it is to ask them to 
work in good faith as Catholics. (38) 
If we turn to the "living Tradition of the entire Church" 
as a criterion by which biblical scholars' work may be judged we run 
into similar difficulty. The critical approach to Scripture is, we 
may say, itself effectively incorporated into the concept of the 
Church's living Tradition. Because Vatican II envisages the theological 
and critical disciplines as being made more accessible even to laity 
(seep. 201) one can expect an acquaintance with the fruits of modern 
biblical study to be much more general throughout the Church. Since 
DV 8.2 makes of all the faithful the vehicle of Tradition and its 
development, we may expect the critical principles they learn to be 
incorporated into the pattern of that development. Although it might 
be argued that DV 8.2 concentrates on the contemplation and a 
'spiritual' inner experience of believers in their contribution to 
the Church 1 s understanding, we must note that the word 11 study11 also 
appearso Moreover, I believe it is impossible for the critical and 
discerning attitudes of study and debate simply to be divorced from 
the prayerful meditation of Christians upon the content of their 
faith, when once these critical attitudes have been adopted. Therefore, 
we find that Vatican II's picture of living Tradition is not that of 
a body of belief which can be set against scholarly opinion, or used 
to provide 'additional information' of a supernatural kind which is 
closed to academic access; it is, rather, a picture of 
process of investigation and understanding, into which 
principles are fully integrated. (39) 
a corporate 
critical 
(38) During the Modernist crisis it was alleged that Loisy worked 
outside the'analogy of faith' by, for example, taking as a pre-
supposition the denial that Christ had any transcendent know-
ledge. 
(39) We may compare with this the picture of the sense of faith, and 
its relationship to academic scholarship, contained in the 
following quotation: 11 The theologian, like anx good Catholic, 
gives his assent (to a magisterial definitionj, but he does so 
only on extrinsic grounds, namely that the Church has defined 
the proposition ••• he himself does not have the keenly 
developed sense necessary to sei~e the truth directly and by 
itself. 11 (Po Rousselot, cited by Go Philips in The Role of the 
Laity in the Church, p. 78J The implication of the passage is 
that academic attitudes inhibit the sense of faith which, in a 
non-critical member of the laity, enables him illatively to 
affirm the truth of a doctrine even before it has been defined. 
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Ultimately, then, it is the "judgement of the Church" 
which Vatican II sets up as the control over the work of biblical · 
analysis. (40) We should note here the use of the term "Church", 
rather than 11Magisterium11 • It expresses the idea that, although 
the Magisterium has been entrusted with the task of "authentically 
interpreting the Word of God, whether in Scripture or Tradition" 
(DV 10.2), this body is not set over God's \1110rd 11 but serves it, 
only teaching that which has been handed on." (loc. cit.) That is 
to say, the Magisterium does not impose on Tradition, but expresses 
it - and the faith and understanding of all the faithful is, as we 
have seen, the dynamic vehicle of Tradition. 
This is a very significant shift of emphasis away from the 
idea that the Magisterium is the major organ of Tradition, looking 
back only to the unanimous consent of the Fathers for a near 
rival. (41) The hierarchy is placed in a position where it, too, 
will learn from the critical scholars of the Bible, for "exegetes 
should work • • • at the task of penetrating and expounding the sense 
of Holy Scripture most profoundly, so that the judgement of the 
Church may mature by using their work in some way as a preparation" 
(DV 12o3). The Magisterium thus stands in a relationship of 
dialogue with exegetes. 
Nevertheless, there remains a "vigilance" (DV 23) which 
the living teaching authority is to exercise over biblical study. And 
here we reach the nub of the problem which Vatican II left behind 
in this area, as in all areas of theology: The Magisterium appears to 
be both a player and the referee in the game of developing biblical 
insights. The Council's emphasis on critical study and dialogue 
(40) DV 12.3 gives a reference to Dei Filius, cap. 2. (Dz 1788/DzS 
3007), which also speaks of the Church's mandate to judge of 
the true sense and interpretation of Scripture. But in this 
passage, 11 the Church" represents the Church of the past - the 
criterion of interpretation is the sense which has always been 
held by mother Church. The First Vatican Council did not come 
to grips with the problems of development in doctrine and under-
standing. DV 12.3, by contrast, is explicitly concerned with 
the deepening understanding of faith which can be brought about 
by the Church's attention to biblical exegesis. 
(41) The passage of Dei Filius mentioned in the note above concludes: 
"No one therefore may interpret sacred Scripture in contra-
diction to this sense, or even in contradiction to the unanimous 
consensus of the Fathers." 
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creates an atmosphere of expectation that the Magisterium will blow 
the whistle on scholarly biblical investigation less and less often, 
and that it will certainly never take disciplinaxy action simply to 
restrain critical methods in themselves, since it was these very 
methods that the Council promoted. Indeed, it may even be supposed 
that views which are canvassed by a significant number of thorough 
biblical scholars on good, critical grounds~carrying the conviction 
of responsibility in argument, are unlikely to be censured by the 
Magisterium, however difficult it may be to harmonise them immediately 
with generally received doctrine. On the other hand, there still 
exists the potential negation of this atmosphere and expectation, in 
the form of the Magisterium 1 s power - perhaps arbi-trarily - to call 
a halt to discussion on any particular scriptural point. 
Finally, we must note an important omission in the Council's 
picture of the biblical scholar's role: While Leo XIII's Provident-
:j_ssimus Deus had already given the exegete the task of preparing the 
way for the Church's judgement to mature in the same way as DV 12.3, 
it had also said that "in the case of passages which have already 
been defined, the private doctor can • o • render service by ex-
pounding them more clearly to the simple faithful, more subtly to the 
learned, and by vindicating the definitions more outstandingly in 
the face of adversaries" (42)o We have seen in Chapter II (p. 86) 
that this principle was taken up by Pius XII in Humani Generis, and 
extended, so that he could even say that theologians have the task 
of 11 showing in what way the teachings of the living Magisterium are 
to be found in holy Scripture and divine 'tradition', whether 
explicitly or implicitlyo 11 It is highly significant that no such 
statement is to be found in Dei Verbum, for the constitution's 
approach to Scripture is thereby delivered from the taint of~ 
priorismo Rather than imposing a meaning on the text (43) and rather 
than acting as a 'proximate norm of faith', the Magisterium is to 
"listen reverently" to God's Word in Scripture and Tradition before 
it expounds it (DV 10o2, see also DV 1). This listening is aided by 
(42) P• 280 (Dz 1942/DzS 3282). 
(43) Hegy notes several uses of Scripture by the Magisterium in which 
the meaning was imposed against the sense of the original text. 
Among them, the use of Acts 19.19 in Gregory:XVI's encyclical 
Mirari Vos ( 1832). Hegy also notes that a large part of the 
Modernist crisis constituted a conflict between a view of Scrip-
ture in which the Church could impose such dogmatic meanings, 
and the protest against this aroused by the genesis of modern 
scientific criticismo (L'Autorit~, pp. 47fo) 
208 
the exegesis furnished by scholars. We find, then, that the 
Council invested them with a primary role of responsibility in the 
Church without depriving the Magisterium of its final authority. 
b) Theology and secular disciplines 
Both Vatican I end Vatican II were concerned to establish 
that the arts and sciences should enjoy a 11 just liberty" in the use of 
their own proper methods and principles, since these differ from the 
methods and principles of theology. GS 59.3 takes its point of de-
parture from Dei Filius, cap. 4 (44) in making this affirmation. How-
ever, the whole issue of the relationship between theology and other 
disciplines occurs within the context of remarkably different 
problematics in the thought of the two councils. 
Vatican I 1 s concern was mainly with the theoretical rela-
tions between faith and reasono In Dei Filius the Council argued that 
there is a role for natural apologetics, based on the philosophical 
evidences for God (although the nature of these evidences was not 
specified) but that the supernatural assent of faith to divine 
mysteries is qualitatively different from the assent of reason in the 
natural sphere. Therefore, as principles of knowledge, faith and 
reason inherently have different objects - the truths discoverable by 
natural reason, on the one hand, and revealed mysteries on the other -
and so they form a "twofold order of knowledge." (45) The knowledge 
which faith attains is direct cognitio of its supernatural object; 
however, if reason is applied to the mysteries which faith presents 
to it, it can come to a limited but fruitful understanding 
( 1intelligentia1 ) of them. (46) This understanding is reached by the 
use and analysis of analogy, and by examination of the interconnections 
between the mysteries, and their relationship to man's final end. (47) 
At this point we may pause, and note that at Vatican I, the 
prevailing idea of reason's function in the science of theology was 
that which was held in the nee-scholastic system of the day. The 
understanding of divine mysteries which the redactors of Dei Filius 
had in mind was that which could be achieved through en Aristotelian 
method of speculationo Vfuile a divine mystery, known through 
(44) Dz 1799/DzS 3019. 
(45) Dz 1795/DzS 3015o 
(46) Dz 1796/DzS 3016. 
(47) lac. cit. 
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revelation, might provide a major premise, reason might provide 
a 'natural 1 minor premise, from Which a theologically certain 
conclusion could then be drawn. In this way, theology could develop 
through an ever-expanding chain of speculative understanding. (48) 
At the same time, philosophical reason could form the apologetic 
prologomena to this study of revealed truth. 
Returning to the text of Dei Filius as it stands, we find 
that faith is superior to reason as its object is superior, and 
that faith gives greater certitude. If a clash should seem to arise 
between the conclusions of the two, it must either be because the 
dogmas of the Church have not been understood according to the mind 
of the Church, or that the inventions of mere opinion have been mis-
taken for the verdicts of reason. (49) In reality, there can be no 
clash, because the one God is the God of both orders of knowledgeo 
Because of the superiority and higher certitude attained by faith, 
the Council could say that "every assertion which is contrary to a 
truth of enlightened faith is completely false 11 o (50) 
We find, then, that the autonomy allowed to the arts and 
sciences by Vatican I rested on a theory that reason's sphere is 
distinct from that of faith. What this theory failed to take into 
account was the fully historical nature of Christian faith, and the 
fact that God's revelation has taken place in historical conditions 
which can also properly be investigated by secular means, while the 
Church's understanding of the divine mysteries is couched in terms 
(48) The importance of neo-scholastic thought for the teaching of the 
Magisterium in the late nineteenth century is particularly 
evident in Leo XIII's encyclical Aeterni Patris (promoting neo-
Thomism in particular). (4 Aug. 1879) ASS 11. (1878-79). The 
encyclical is widely believed to have been drafted by Kleutgen 
and Liberatore, the first of whom was also chiefly responsible 
for the final form of Dei Filius o In Aeterni Patris we read of 
the part played by philosophy in making theology a 11 trne science" 
and in collating the many and diverse parts of heavenly 
teaching. (p. 101) 
(49) Dz 1797/DzS 3017 
(50) loc. cit. 
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which are open to cultural and historical variation and criticism. 
Let us look a little more closely at the areas in which 
it was admitted that seeming clashes might appear: First, there are 
the occasions on which mere opinioni has been put forward as the 
verdict of reason; we m~ associate with this supposition the confi-
dent assertion of Dei Filius that faith frees reason from errors. (51) 
The faithful, it is said, should not defend conclusions which 
contradict the doctrine of faith, especially if the Church has 
reproved them; rather, they should hold them to be complete errors, 
having only a deceptive appearance of truth. (52) But is it not 
true that the Church has reproved positions which it later had to 
accept as right? The case of Galileo immediately springs to mind. 
Are the faithful then to make up their minds, and change them again, 
only on the word of the Magisterium, without regard to their own 
assessment of the arguments? This seems to be a real threat to the 
independence and integrity of Catholics practising the secular 
disciplines. 
The case of Galileo is really a model of the second type of 
seeming clash: The Church did not, at the time, understand how his 
conclusions might be accommodated with her doctrine of the inerrancy 
of Scriptureo In addition, as Franzelin remarked, Galileo could 
provide no demonstration of his theories Which would satisfy the 
Church authorities that one ought to interpret the Scriptures in a 
figurative sense; (53) therefore he was forced to retracto The 
difficulty of the case in historical retrospect lies in the fact that 
it was the official teachers of the Church who had effectively mis-
understood the import of the Church's doctrine; it was not until they 
could be persuaded of the possibility of understanding Scripture 
figuratively, and of the soundness of Galileo's case, that it could 
be considered acceptable for a Catholic to propound a solar-centric 
view as something convincing to himself. Franzelin justifies the 
action taken by the Inquisition in regard to Galileo by an appeal to 
the Church's need for security in believing, saying that the 
Cardinals acted with the "authority of ecclesiastical providence" in 
(51) Dz 1799/DzS 3019 
(52) DZ 1798/DzS 3018 
(53) Tractatus de Divina Traditions et Scriptura, PP• 150-152. 
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requiring his obedience. (54) The fact that Dei Filius could show 
no clear mechanism whereby the teachers of the Church might necess-
arily be persuaded to accept the neccesity for re~ssessments of 
doctrine in cases such as this, displays the fact that Vatican I 
had not truly found a way to protect the legitimate independence of 
method and conclusions in the secular disciplines; Catholic prac-
titioners of them might still remain under pressure from an obsolescent 
understanding of faith entertained by Church authorities. 
Turning to Vatican II's treatment of the autonomy of the 
secular disciplines, we find that this Council was not concerned to 
apportion different objects to faith and reason (55), but rather to 
explore faith's relationship to the world in which man liveso In 
other words, the matter arises in connection with Vatican II's theology 
of the secular. 
Faith itself was differently conceived by Vatican II than 
by Vatican Io It was not seen as being comprised purely of super-
natural assent to revealed mysteries given in propositional form. 
Rather, DV 5 defined "the obedience of faith" as that by which man 
"freely comrni ts himself totally to God, giving 1 full assent of mind 
and w-111 to God who reveals' and assenting voluntarily to the 
revelation given by him" o By integrating the idea of full personal 
self-comrnit:rnent in the.concept of faith (rather than.treating it 
separately as the action of charity), the Council laid the ground 
for seeing theology (faith's formal discipline) as itself integrating 
both practical and theoretical concerns. That is to say, the dis-
tinction between systematic and moral theologies was partially dissolved, 
so that it becomes more difficult to treat them in isolation. In no 
case is this more true than in that of Vatican II' s treatment of the 
nature of man's secular concerns and activities; these become matters 
of properly theological interest, for they are seen to be immediately 
integrated with man's grasp of the mystery of God. 
(54) loc. cit. The fact that the Inquisition would have had to act 
otherwise had Galileo satisfactorily demonstrated his theory is 
an admission of Franzelin 1s which does not appear in Dei Filius. 
(55) It is notable that GS 59o3 echoed Dei Filius in speaking of the 
proper methods, principles;and fields of human arts and sciences; 
it did not speak of their distinct objects, however. 
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'iihat aspect of God's mystery forms faith's principle 
when it is applied to human secular activity? Is it a principle 
which compromises the autonomy of the methods of secular disciplines? 
The constitution Gaudium et Spes and the decree Apostolicam 
Actuositatem present it as being of a complex nature; it is com-
pounded of the assertion that God is creator (GS 36.3, see AA 7o2), 
and that man is the centre and smmnit of all earthly things because 
he is made in the image of God (GS 12.1 and 3). All things will find 
their final perfection in and through Christ, God's Word made flesh, 
the perfect man (GS 45, see also AA 7.2). These elements of faith 
are, respectively, drawn from the doctrines of creation, of moral 
value, and of the last things (in so far as these doctrines can be 
artificially separated). None of these elements immediately draws 
upon the evidences of history, and yet their place in the theology of 
the secular shows that they have an immediate bearing upon the 
Christian's view of historical activity. Their bearing, however, is 
not of the kind that necessarily robs secular disciplines of their 
autonomyo Rather, all man's activity in the world which can be 
carried out in the light of this faith is confirmed both in its proper 
autonomy (AA 7.2) and in its value,because the world is the theatre 
of a history in which goods and values are to be nourished which will 
reappear in God's ~ingdom (see GS 39.3); this orientation is what 
gives secular activities their proper, theologically-based, signifi-
cance. And this significance, viewed within the horizon of creation, 
morality and the last things, enhances the Christian's respect for 
their autonomy. However, this autonomy is not to be misunderstood 
as meaning that temporal things are not in themselves dependent upon 
God, their creator (GS 36.3), nor are they to be used without moral 
reference to this relation. Faith is to provide the englobing 
attitude in which human activity is carried out, but within this 
englobing attitude there can be real and fruitful dialogue 'between 
man's immediately theological ideas and his knowledge in other 
fieldso The faithful, GS 62.6 says, 
11 should marry knowledge of the new sciences, 
theories and discoveries, with morality and 
Christian teaching, so that their religious 
sense and moral rectitude may progress at the 
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same rate as their knowledge of the sciences 
and the daily progress of technology; in this 
way, they will be able to test and interpret 
everything with an authentically Christian 
awarenesso 11 
The projected dialogue of secular knowledge with theology, 
within the broad horizons of attitude and moral value dictated by 
faith, has two results for Christian thought. The first is that 
theology must continually engage itself in new investigations, arising 
from movements in other fields; the second is that, traditional 
doctrines must sometimes be re-expressed to remain comprehensible and 
credible. By giving better grounds for the independence of method 
of secular arts and sciences, and by showing how closely these dis-
ciplines are of interest to Christian faith, Vatican II laid the 
foundation for a clearer acknowledgement of the fact that the Church's 
· theology must for ever remain under obligation to take account of 
secular thought and come to ter.ms with it. The only conditions that 
the Church lays down, are that the broad principles inhering in the 
attitude of faith should not be denied. On historical, epistemo~ 
logical~and factual grounds, theology's immunity from the pressures 
of dialogue is considerably reduced. 
We see, then, that Vatican II suggested much more room for 
manoeuvre for Catholic scholars in fields where faith should be inte-
grated with their secular knowledge. This room for manoeuvre is 
largely parallel to the Council's admission of the critical impulse 
and method in the sphere of biblical studyo Indeed, the two areas of 
concern cannot really be separated, for the critical disciplines 
employed in study of the Bible are only specific applications of the 
general approach end method of modern academic sciences. In nearly all 
spheres with practical import, men start from the data of the universe 
and of history, rather than from first principles of a transcendent 
or abstract kind. Meanings and conclusions are not imposed-upon 
evidence, but drawn from it by patient attention both to the evidence 
itself, and to the structures of human understanding. This patient 
attention creates, in almost every academic discipline, a flux of 
opinion and debate. In very many cases, working hypotheses take the 
place of settled conclusions, and where fixed agreement is reached, 
it only serves as a stepping-stone to yet further hypothesis, debate 
and experimentation. This constant flow is likely to make itself felt 
in the field of theology, because of its universal scope, and its 
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responsibility to situate in the realm of meaning and value the ideas 
which are thrown up in the course of human activity and study. What, 
then, is the significance of this for the kind of obedience which 
the Magisterium can require? 
The Magisterium is set in relation to a field of theological 
endeavour in which the substance of a plurality of ideas and approaches 
is foreshadowedo Pluralism in theology is likely to arise both from 
the uncertainties and flux within other disciplines with which it has 
to do, and also from the fact that different theologians will respond 
to the pressures and demands of secular knowledge and circumstance in 
different ways. ~ approving critical methods in matters directly 
touching revelation, and by enhancing the autonomous basis of secular 
disciplines, the teaching of Vatican II suggests that the ordinary 
exercise of the teaching office should neither attempt to prescribe 
a route for theological thinking, nor infringe the independence and 
integrity of the work of Catholics in other fieldso The authority of 
the Magisterium should be engaged to guard the rights of faith not in 
disputable particulars of history and science, but in faith's funda-
mental grounds, conclusion~and consequences. However, it also 
remains true that the Magisterium is the body which retains the power 
to decide what is the real expression of faith's fundamental prin-
ciples. That is to say, whilst theology's-dialogue with other dis-
ciplines was strongly promoted at Vatican II, this was done on the 
condition that the Magisterium might remain the referee, and even, to 
some degree, the rule-maker. We may say, then, that the Council con-
tributed to Catholic theology the idea that a large area of freedom 
for manoeuvre exists, whereby the Catholic intellectual is less ham-
pered in thought over a wide variety of subjects than he was even 
thirty years ago. But what the Council did not contribute was a set 
of clear rules to govern the limits of this freedom; rather, it left 
the matter for the Magisterium to settle in the heat of controversy 
and discussionQ 
2 The Fostering of Theological Pluralism 
We have already broached the subject of theological plural-
ism in our analysis of Vatican II's approach to biblical study and the 
relationship between theology and other disciplines. I have suggested 
that by nurturing the grounds for pluralism in these fields, 
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Vatican II indicated a shift in view of the lVIagisterium' s authori-
tative role; it becomes less the organ of theology for the Church, 
than the protector of faith's fundamental principles. In the present 
sub-section we are going to focus on two further ways in which the 
Council fostered the growth of theological pluralism in the Church: 
In both these cases, pluralism is likely to arise not because of 
differences or debates over the contingent matter with which theology 
has to deal, but because of differences in human ways of expressing 
and understanding faith itself. Such pluralism can give rise to debate 
within the Church concerning the appropriateness of different modes 
of expression for conveying the truth of God. 
The two kinds of pluralism of expression which we are to ex-
amine are, respectively, pluralism arising from the admission of 
different .philosophical conceptualities within the Church, and that 
which springs from the expression of Christian faith in a variety of 
cultural contextse 
a) Vatican II and philosophy 
From 1879 the Magisterium of the Roman Catholic Church 
particularly promoted the use of a neo-Thomist framework for philo-
sophical and theological speculation in the Church. The encyclical 
Aeterni Patris set forward St. Thomas as the "prince" arnong the 
scholastics (56), working with "the serene conviction • • • that 
scholastic philosophy was a single metaphysical system, common to all 
the scholastic doctorso 11 (57) The encyclical spoke of the essential 
relationship of philosophy to theology, bringing about as it does 
"that more accurate and more fruitful knowledge of matters believed, 
and that more lucid understanding (as far as possible) of the mys-
teries of faith themselves ••• It belongs to philosophical disci-
plines religiously to guard divinely handed-down truths, and to resist 
those who dare to attack them." (58) For these purposes, the scholastic 
philosophy which reached its crown in St. Thomas was recommended both 
for use in the education given within the Churclj., and also as a basis 
for the evangelisation of alienated intellectualso (59) So great was 
(56) Po 108o 
(57) G. A. McCool, Catholic Theology in the Nineteenth Century (New 
York, 1977) P• 233o 
(58) Aeterni Patris PP• 101f. 
(5~) ibid. P• 112o 
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Leo XIII's confidence in the Thomist metaphysic and epistemology, 
as they were understood at the time, that he could claim that their 
promotion would aid all human disciplines, including the natural 
sciences. (60) However, this restoration and promotion was not to 
take the form of mere imitation, but was to be a renewal and extension 
in which necessary corrections might be allowed: It was primarily 
the wisdom of Sto Thomas which was commended, rather than individual 
doctrines. (61) 
The result of Leo XIII's move was that 
henceforth "Catholic speculative theology 
would evolve in its dialogue with the 
modern world, but, for decades, its 
intellectual evolution would take place 
within a Thomistic framework. The achieve-
ments, reverses, and painful conflicts of 
Thomistic theology's dialectical develop-
ment would become the leitmotif of the 
history of Catholic theology during the 
decades between Aeterni Patris and the 
Second Vatican Council. 11 (62) 
The pre-eminence of neo-Thomism was confirmed by further 
measures of later Popes, reaching a pitch of insistence during and 
after the Modernist crisiso (63) What is the significance of this 
for the kind of obedience which the Magisterium could require for its 
teaching? 
A positive doctrine (i.e. one that is not simply a 
proscription of another position) must have a form of words which 
evokes positive concepts in the hearer; if we lay on one side those 
doctrines which are frankly paradoxical in both form and intention, 
we may say that a positive doctrine must be thinkable within the 
terms of a coherent conceptualityo However, the same form of words 
may be thinkable in different ways, according to different conceptual 
(60) ibid. p. 113. 
(61) ibid. P• 114o 
(62) McCool, op. cit., p. 236. 
(63) Pius X required that scholastic philosophy, especially Thomism 
be the basis of all seminary studies (encycl. Pascendi (8 Sept. 
1907) ASS 40 (1907) p. 640), and this was followed up by 
further measures in 1910, 1914, and their ~ry in canon law 
in 1917 (ere, cano 1366.2)o 
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frameworks; for example, the statement that Mary was, "at the end 
of her earthly life, assumed body and soul into heavenly glory" (64) 
is capable of being understood in different ways, according to the 
connotations attributed to terms such as "body", "soul" and "heaven" 
in different conceptual systemso 
Although the Roman Catholic Church has favoured and promoted 
the "perennial philosophy" of the scholastics, and borrowed termin-
ology from their scheme of thought, (65) it has never absolutely claimed 
that theology is bound to this philosophy (66). Sometimes, indeed, 
the Magisterium has been careful to phrase its definitions in such 
a way as not to impose a particular conceptuality; both the Marian 
definitions were objects of this care. (67) We find, then, a theore-
tical openness concerning philosophy accompanying the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries' concrete insistence on the education 
of all the clergy according to neo-Thomist principles and methods. 
Concretely, for a long time, the great mass of theology was worked out 
according to this system, while the 'instinct' of most Catholic 
faithful was imbued with neo-scholastic assumptions. 
The significance of the practical ascendancy of neo-
Thomism lay in the fact that it created a generally uniform mode of 
theological discourse in the Church at the very time that the 
Magisterium was propounding theology, moulded according to this 
(64) Munificentissimus Deus, p. 770. (Dz 2333/DzS 3903). 
(65) Notable uses of scholastic terminology occur in the teaching of 
Trent, for example concerning sacramental 'character' (see 
Chapter II pp. 92-94 ) and the doctrine of transubstantiation 
(Sess. XIII, Decree on the most holy Eucharist (de eucharistia) 
can. 2. (Dz 884/DzS 1652).) 
( 66) "It is allowed that the Church cannot be bound to any single 
system of philosophy which has a limited life-span". - Humani 
Generis Po 566. (Dz 2311/DzS 3883)· 
(67) Just before the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception was defined 
solemnly, Pius IX removed a clause relating the doctrine to the 
philosophical idea of the infusion of the soul into the body. 
Similarly, the choice of words "heavenly glory11 in the dogma of 
the Assumption, was specially made to avoid including a necessary 
spacial connotation in the doctrine. 
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pattern, for general acceptance, through the device of encyclical 
letterso (68) The promotion of neo-Thomism created the conditions 
in which the religious obedience of Catholics could be won for an 
increasing body of doctrina issued mainly by Rome; some of this 
teaching took the form of decision on disPuted questions - decision 
reached on the basis of nee-scholastic argumentation - and in other 
cases the doctrine of the ordinary papal magisterium led the way 
for Catholic thought - again, through nee-scholastic reasoning. A 
break-up of the shared conceptual world of Catholicism would consti-
tute a grave limitation on the power of the ordinary '·Mr!l:gisterium to 
give so much doctrine, filled with positive content, in a way which 
would find easy acquiescence and understanding throughout the Church. 
In the field of philosophy, the teaching of Vatican II 
introduced elements which presaged the break-up of the common conceptual 
world of neo-Thomismo Most significantly, these elements are largely 
to be found in the provisions of the Council for the education of 
future priests. The decree on the Training of Priests (Optatam 
Totius) ratified the reduction in the status of Thomistic philosophy 
in relation to other patterns of thought, although it by no means 
projected St. Thomas' expulsion from the curriculum. OT 15.1 advocates 
a philosophical education for seminarists which should rely upon "the 
perennially valid philosophical heritage", but which should also take 
account of the "philosophical investigations of the more modern era, 
particularly those which are especially influential in their own lands. 
They should also have a knowledge of the modern progress of the 
sciences. 11 The aim of this is that seminarists should have 11 a solid 
and coherent knowledge of man, the world and Godo 11 (loc. cit.) The 
second paragraph of the same article speaks of history of philosophy, 
which should be taught so that seminarists can grasp the foundational 
principles of the various systems, and hold on to what proves true in 
them, while being able to detect and refute their errors at the root. 
At this point, St. Thomas is not mentioned by name, and the 
phrase "the perennially valid philosophical her:i.tage" replaces the 
phrase given in an earlier draft - "the principles of the perennial 
philosophy". This change, requested by Cardinal Leger, implies that 
(68) See note (31~ p. 202, above$ 
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scholasticism may be perennially valid, but this does not mean that 
it is perennially apposite for the Church's expression of her faith. 
In addition, the new phrase does not suggest that there is a single, 
scholastic system of philosophy to be 'swallowed whole' in its 
Thomistic synthesis, or even to be extended and corrected as though it 
were a unified body of thought ready to be updated. One commentator 
says of this passage that it means that seminarists are to be taught 
to "make fruitful the lasting insights of the scholastic heritage". (69) 
In the case of dogmatic theology we find that St. Thomas 1 s 
place as the foundation-stone of study is to be taken by the Bible, 
whose themes are to be expounded first in the curriculum. Later, the 
mysteries of faith can be more deeply investigated with the help of 
speculative theology, and it is here that St. Thomas is to be the 
students' master, as they seek to gain a profounder knowledge of. the 
mysteries and of their interconnection (see CT 16.3). The way in 
which this paragraph is phrased suggests that although Aquinas's 
insights are of permanent value, the effort of the student is to be 
directed towards his own penetration of the mysteries of faith, and 
not simply towards learning the Angelic Doctor's systemo Sto Thomas 
is a 'master' chiefly in his systematic and coherent approach. 
A similar point is made in GE 10.1, which speaks of the task 
of co-ordinating theology and secular knowledge "so that it may be 
more profoundly understood how faith and reason work together in 
revealing the one truth". To do this is to walk in a path already 
marked out by the Church, "especially by Sto Thomas Aquinas". It 
is clearly the saint's aims and synthetic approach which are the 
model here, rather than his actual conclusionso 
We see, then, that St. Thomas still continues to hold an 
honoured place in Roman Catholic education, but, having ceded his 
foundational role to the Bible in the sphere of theology, and'being 
taught alongside other philosophers in the seminaries, the all-
embracing grasp of Thomistic systems on Catholic thought is loos~ned. 
The result of this is the Church's openness to theological pluralism 
in systematics: 
"The nineteenth century debate over ·· 
theological method, which the official 
option of Aeterni Patris seemed to have 
(69) J. Neuner, in Vorgrimler, 2 P• 396. (emphasis mine). 
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closed definitively, has been reopened. 
The disciples of St. Thomas and the 
partisans of the 'new theologies' are 
free once more to submit their diverse 
theological methods to the jud~ement of 
their fellow theologians11 o {70) 
b) Vatican II and cultural diversity 
Having noted the shift away from a unified conceptual 
universe Which was signified in the Council's treatment of 
scholastic and neo-scholastic philosophy, we may now turn to its 
introduction of an entirely new factor into doctrinal calcu-
lations. (71) This is Vatican II's recognition of the existence and 
significance of different social and ethnic cultures, which 
influence the way in which the Gospel is understood. In the decree 
on Ecumenism (Uni tatis Redintegrati,q) 'the Council admitted the 
radical effect that such differences of understanding might have: 
"The heritage handed on by the Apostles has been received in diverse 
ways and forms, and since the Church's very origin has been under-
stood in various ways, according to the diversity of human character 
and conditions of life. All these things ••• have been the 
circumstance of separations, because of lack in mutual comprehension 
and charity" (UR 14.3).,- Of course, one of the greatest barriers to 
mutual understanding is the claim made by some cultures to represent 
'Culture' itself; Vatican II's recognition of the existence and 
equal validity, of a variety of cultures therefore represents a ground-
work of charity, which may provide necessary conditions for unity in 
diversity. But how did the Council view the cultures of the world, 
and what precisely is the effect of this view upon its concept of the 
theology which may legitimately go on within the Church? 
GS 53.2 defined 'culture' in general as meaning "everything 
by which man refines and develops the multiple attributes of his body 
and spirit"; in the following paragraph the text goes on to spell out 
(70) McCool, op. cita P• 6o 
(71) On the newness of this treatment of cultural diversity, see 
A. Dondeyne, "L'Essor de la culture" in L'Eglise dans le monde 
de ce temps, 2, edited by Y. M-J. Congar and M. Peuchmaurd 
(Paris, 1967) PP• 456-458. 
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the sociological and ethnological signification of the word: "The 
diverse life-styles and scales of v~lue 11 which arise out of different 
ways of using things, of working, expressing oneself, practising 
religion, and formulating morals, legislating and setting up judicial 
institutions, developing science and the arts, and cultivating beauty. 
The existence of diverse cultures is not only acknowledged, but even 
welcomed in Gaudium et Spes; GS 56.2 says that the different cultures 
of the world give access to ancestral wisdom and form the genius of 
different peoples. It is through various cultures that the nature of 
man is more fully disclosed, and new ways of reaching truth are 
opened up (GS 44.2). The contributions of different cultures, there-
fore, can be taken into Christianity in a purified and elevated form, 
finding their consummation in the Church (LG 17, AG 9.2, 22.1). In 
a universal Church, composed of individual local churches, the cultural 
riches of all may be shared (see LG 13.2 and 3, AG 15.4, SO 37). 
The cultural elements derived from many sides do not simply 
accrue to the Church as additions, for it is through the concepts and 
languages of different peoples that the Church has always expressed 
the message of Christ, trying to illuminate it by the wisdom of the 
philosophers (GS 44.2, see also 58.1 and 2). The reader should notice 
here the acknowledgement that the Church uses not only different 
languages, but also different forms of conceptuality; this, of course, 
is the source whence dissension may ariseo Nevertheless, GS 44o2 
teaches that this adaptability in expression of the Gospel should 
"remain the law of all evangelisation. 11 Discernment and even deeper 
understanding in this field is the task of the entire Church, so that 
the Church and the different cultures may have a lively exchange of 
influence. 
Vfhat are the problems requiring discernment which arise 
from the Gospel's relationship with various cultures? They arise, 
for the theologian, mainly in the field of judgement concerning the 
adequacy of different kinds of concept, because the relationship of 
human concepts to a central idea or notion is a complex one. In order 
to express the Gospel in different cultural contexts, one may search 
for equivalent concepts through which to express the central idea, 
identifying concepts cross-culturally. For example, one might seek 
in African culture for a concept of a supreme being, and identify 
it with the central idea which the classical Judaeo-Ohristian 
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concept has traditionally expressed for the Western world. 
However, to do this without any qualifications would generally be 
considered inappropriate, for the connotations of the different 
cultural concepts may differ in important ways. Therefore, if the 
Gospel is preached by way of identification, it must be identifi-
cation with explicit qualifications. Importantly, this procedure 
should raise for the European evangelist the question, 1how far is my 
concept of God the bearer of connotations which may not properly 
belong to the idea of the Father of Jesus Christ?'. 
A parallel instance of complexity occurs because central 
themes of the Christian message are traditionally expressed through 
specific analogies, which are recognised as such, but are deemed to 
be appropriate for expressing ideas for which there are no individual 
evocative words. For example, the meaning of Christ's death is often 
described in ter.ms of sacrifice and reconciliation. When it is ack-
nowledged that such analogies are culturally conditioned, one may seek 
alternative analogues in non-European cultures - which leads to the 
problem of determining whether they do, in fact, convey the same 
truth successfully. The problem is further complicated by the fact 
that even in the context of traditional Christendom and its 
culture, the original analogies will have evoked differing responses 
and contents of understanding from different believers. Although 
there are strong arguments against the view of cultural relativism 
which suggests that men can never imaginatively enter into the 
understanding of another culture, and never adequately convey ideas 
to one another, the project is undoubtedly fraught with difficulty, 
and productive of debate and dispute. 
Finally, with regard to the Church's need for discernment 
concerning different cultures, we may instance the problems associated 
with the adoption or adaption of rites and 'events' from other 
religions into the Christian Tradition. Here, the question may be 
raised as to whether these rites and practices harmonise with what we 
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already know of God through the Gospel, or whether, on the reverse, 
they evoke responses which distort the Christian's grasp of faith. 
It cannot be doubted that the Church has 'baptised' practices, customs, 
and even beliefs belonging to those she converted in the past; 
indeed, she adopted the religious history of Israel as a type of her 
relationship to God, and made it part of the very foundation of 
faith. Can the religious histories and practices of other communities 
also provide types and insights which will strengthen men's grasp 
on the Christian message? 
There are two kinds of problem, then, ar~s~ng from the 
Church's acknowledgement of the validity of cultures other than that 
of Christian Europe: Firstly, there are problems arising because the 
same ideas are to be expressed in different ways; and secondly, 
there are problems arising from the fact that different cultures may 
be deemed to have additional contributions to make to the general 
store of Christian wisdom. (As in the case of theology's relationship 
with secular disciplines, the contribution of new ideas leads to the 
kind of pluralism which arises from the process of coming to terms 
with new data.) Although Vatican II gives an expansive welcome to 
the contributions and different modes of expression which various 
cultures can bring to the Church, it did not allow their value without 
qualification. There are, among the nations, "seeds" of goodness, 
to be healed, elevated and completed by the preaching of the Gospel 
(see LG 17); it is a secret presence of God, which must be freed from 
connections with evil (see AG 9.2), and all kinds of syncretism must 
be avoided (see AG 22.2, and also NA 2). 
The pluralism of theology which arises from the Gospel's 
contact with many cultures is twofold. First, there is that which 
the Council envisaged, when it said that 
"in each great socio-cultural region ••• it 
is necessary to encourage a renewed consider-
ation and investigation of the deeds and words 
revealed by God, which are contained in 
Scripture and explained by the Fathers of the 
Church and the Magisterium. This is to be done 
in the light of the universal Church's Tradition. 
In this way, it will be more clearly seen by 
what.routes faith can seek understanding through 
taking account of the philosophy or wisdom of the 
nations." (AG 22.2) 
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This is the pluralism of expression which represents the breakdown 
of a single conceptual system in the Church, in much the same way as 
the pluralism which arises from the use of different philosophical 
frameworks in the training of clergy. But there is a second source 
of variability here, too: It is the diversity which must arise as 
different people come to different assessments of the appropriate-
ness and significance of the additional contributions which the 
cultures of the world may be allowed to make to Christian Tradition, 
and especially to Christian practice. 
While our study of the significance of Vatican II's 
attitude to philosophy indicated most clearly the extent to which 
pluralism in expression should lead to a withdrawal of the Magisterium 
from some of the areas in which it formerly exercised its authority, 
the analysis of the Council's treatment of cultural diversity high-
lights the kind of situation in which ordinary magisterial authority 
is still likely to be engaged. By allowing pluralism of expression 
generally, Vatican II indicated that it is not primarily the 
Magisterium's role to give positive leadership where the content and 
direction of theology is concerned; but by opening the field to 
pluralism in an area so delicate as inter-cultural interpretation, 
and by allowing that there are contributions which different societies 
may make, the Council stirred up a hornets' nest of potential debate 
and disagreement. Because the pluralism which arises from cultural 
differences and contributions is not likely to be confined to 
speculative theology, but may impinge directly on liturgy and other 
practices, there arises an immediate, practical need for a referee 
in this debated area. It is the Magisterium, of course, which 
reserves to itself1the final authority to make such judgements, as 
part of its government of the life of the Church. 
The overall result of the different ways in which Vatican II 
fostered the growth of theological pluralism, therefore, is to shift 
the emphasis away from the idea that the ordinary exercise of the 
magisterium should be the occasion for positive and content-filled 
teaching, given in an authoritative way and requiring religious 
obedience. However, pluralism does not abolish the need for the 
Magisterium to act as a disciplinary referee, making discerning 
judgements as to the propriety of different forms of expression, and 
different ideas and practices assimilated from outside the Church's 
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traditional borders. On the basis of such discernment the 
hierarchy makes decisions with practical effect. We see here, quite 
clearly, a re-expression and clarification of the idea that the 
exercise of the magisterium at this level is part of the function 
of governing the Church. 
Vfuether the use of a disciplinary referee's authority in 
this way is to be socially plausible depends upon the delicacy with 
which the Magisterium pays respect ·t;o the pluralism which it, itself, 
has encouragedo Insensitive decisions and censures will run up 
against the tide of expected freedom which Vatican II's own teaching 
unleashed. In addition, positive teaching, utilising the arguments 
of one particular conceptual scheme, will not appear plausibly able 
to demand religious obedience which precludes debate and reinter-
pretationo If members of the hierarchy are to give positive direction 
to thought in the Church, rather than simply acting as restrained 
though vigilant watchdogs over theology and liturgy, their role in 
communicating ideas should be that of preachers (appealing to inner 
assent through the inherent persuasiveness of their argument and 
invitation) rather than that of teachers who can require obedience 
of mind, will,and spirit on a formal basis. The documents of Vatican II 
do not make this distinction clear, and failed to work out 
adequately a categorisation of the different roles which the 
Magisterium may take, but the relief pattern of their different argu-
ments and admissions suggests that the way the Magisterium should 
normally play the theological game is through the medium of 
preachi:1g; occasiona~ly and discreetly it may make disciplinary 
decisions relating to the practice and teaching of others; it should 
not normally, however, put forward formal and positive doctrine which 
claims obedient acceptance simply on the basis of the representational 
status of members of the hierarchyo 
3 The Validation of Dissent as an Authentic Catholic Stance 
We have already briefly remarked that Vatican II 1 s theology 
was largely influenced and formed by thinkers who had earlier been 
seen as dissident from the official position of the Magisterium. 
As Avery Dulles says, 
226 
"Indirectly o • • the council worked powerfully 
to undermine the authoritarian theory and to 
legitimate dissent in the church ••• 
Vatican II quietly reversed earlier positions 
of the Roman magisterium on a number of 
important issues ••• As a result of •• o 
revisions of previously official positions, the 
council rehabilitated many theologians who had 
suffered under severe restrictions with regard to 
their ability to teach and publish ••• By its 
actual practice of revisionism, the council 
implicitly taught the legitimacy and even the value 
of dissent. In effect the council said that the 
ordinary magisterium of the Roman pontiff had 
fallen into error and had unjustly harmed the 
careers of loyal and able theologians. 11 (72) 
Among the revisions of the Council, Dulles instances 
reversals of position on ecumenism, religious freedom, the theology 
of secular reality,and biblical study. Among theologians 
rehabilitated he mentions John Courtney Murray, Teilhard de Chardin, 
Henri de Lubac, and Yves Congar. 
If we turn once more to the subject of biblical study, we 
sha11 see a concrete example of the way in which the Council's 
teaching put the seal on a reversal of position. It is important to 
note that decisions of the past which Vatican II marked off as 
definitely "archival" (73) had once been binding, under the Catholic 
obligation of religious obedience to the ordinary teaching of the 
Magisterium. The decisions were originally taken on the grounds of 
'security' for the Church's faith, but we shall see that they not only 
involved stifling frustration for eminent and loyal scholars, but 
also had deleterious pastoral effects in the long run. 
The critical study of Scripture has had a chequered history 
in the Roman Catholic Church. Since the pontificate of Leo XIII 
there has been a gradual opening up to textual, literary, and historical 
criticism of the Bible, but the progress of this movement has not 
always been smooth. Both Benedict XV's encyclical of 1920, Spiritus 
Paraclitus, and a warning from the Holy Office in 1961, marked steps 
(72) "The Theologian and the Magisterium", pp. 10fo 
(73) Brown, op. cit. P• 110. 
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back towards conservatism from positions which had previously seemed 
acceptable. If we focus on the effect of Spiritus Paraclitus, we 
find tbat .. it had an important influence in retarding the growth 
and refinement of historical criticism. We saw that in 
Providentissimus Deus Leo XIII had said that the principles which 
should be applied to the Bible's description of natural phenomena 
might also helpfully be applied in relation to history (see p.203 note 34). 
Some biblical scholars saw Leo XIII's words as an encouragement to go 
ahead With treating historical problems in Scripture by appeal to 
the idea that they arose because the writers of the Bible had 
employed conventional usages, forms of speech, and recordso However, 
this approach was discouraged by Spiritus Paraclitus, which censured 
as erroneous any idea of a "relative truth", created by the opinions 
of the era in which Scripture was wri·tten; ( 74) Benedict XV upheld a 
theory of history as correspondence to factso 
Among those who felt that Benedict XV was closing a road 
which they had believed that Leo XIII had opened to them was the 
pioneer scholar Mo-J. Lagrange. He wrote in his memoirs, "I ••• 
believed that I could discern in the encyclical 1 ~rovidentissimus 1 
an invitation to make these distinctions (between popular modes of 
expressing history, more detailed and systematic accounts, etco]o 
But I was mistaken, since H.Ho Benedict XV interpreted his prede-
cessor's words in another senseo 11 (75) Lagrange's response to papal 
censures and restrictions was that of obedient silence; 1920 was not 
the only occasion in his life when he withdrew from fields of study 
which had come under official suspiciono 
The results of the position taken up in Spiritus Paraclitus, 
as well as in a series of decrees of the Pontifical Biblical Com-
ll)ission given from the time of the Modernist crisis, (76) was that 
( 74) (15 September 1920) AAS 12 (1920) P• 395o (Dz 2187/DzS 3653)~ 
('75) Au service de la Bible (Paris, 1967) P• 129. 
('76) The decrees began to be issued in 1905, and came in great spate 
till 1915. T.Ao Collins and R.E. Brown sa;y of them, "these 
decrees were precautionary in intent and, while conservative in 
tone, were often phrased with perception and nuance. 11 ("Church 
Pronouncements" in Jerome Biblical Commentary (London, 1970) 
p. 625.) The decrees took the form of questions and answers on 
particular points, which enabled the Commission to establish the 
nuance it wished in its formulation of official position. 
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a decline in Catholic biblical exegesis became more and more marked, 
and scholars were unwilling to treat the Bible as a whole or to 
tackle major problems. Their attitude became defensive, and the 
lack of biblical education among clergy became a source of pastoral 
embarrassment when, during the inter-war period, the Catholic lay 
movements stimulated a return to Scripture among the faithful. (77) 
It was in 1943 that a papal encyclical, Divino Afflante 
Spiritu opened the way forward again, giving instructions for future 
work rather than warning against dangers. The encyclical recognised 
the necessity of knowing the circumstances of a writer in order to 
understand what he had to say, (78) and sanctioned the analysis of 
literary forms (79). It acknowledged that exegesis should accord 
with established conclusions of secular disciplines as well as with 
Church doctrine, Coo) and reminded scholars of the freedom that is 
theirs because little of Scripture has had its meaning authoritatively 
declared by the Churcho (81) 
FolloWing Divino Afflante, in 1955 the secretary of the 
Biblical Commission declared that Catholic scholars now enjoyed full 
liberty with regard to matters treated in the Commission's earlier 
decrees, except where they touched on faith or morals - and few of 
them did directly. (B2) This openness to critical conclusions was the 
position ratified and extended at Vatican II, (despite a setback in 
1961). The significance of this is that the earlier measures, which 
were now fully superseded, had all, in their time, been binding on 
the consciences of Catholic scholarso (B3) They had been promulgated 
(77) See Jo Levie, The Bible; Word of God in Words of Men (London, 
1961) PP• 70 and 122-24o 
(78) P• 314 (Dz 2294/DzS 3829)• 
(19) p. 315 (Dz 2294/DzS 3830). 
{so) p. 319 (DzS 3831). 
(sl) loc. cit. 
(82) See this statement in .catholic Biblical QuarterlJz 18 (1956) pp.23-29~ 
(83) Pius X spoke of the decisions of the Pontifical Biblical Com-
mission in these terms in a motu proprio of 1910: ttAll are 
bound in conscience to submit to the decisions of the Biblic·al 
Commission • • G and they cannot be free from the stigma of dis-
obedience and temerity, nor be free from grave guilt whenever they 
impugn them these decisions either in word or writing. 11 
(Praestantia Sacrae Scripturae (Nov. 18 1907) (Dz 2113/DzS 3503).) 
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for the sake of •security~ but their value for the life of the 
Church had been dubious. We may say, then, that the history of 
Catholic biblical study, and the course of official pronouncements 
as they culminated at Vatican II, does not provide a strong and 
plausible recommendation for the use of disciplinary measures in con-
trolling scholarship, while the concept of 'security' is shown to be 
ambivalent in relation to academic research of integrity. 
Conclusion 
In this section we have seen all the ways in which Vatican 
II's teaching pointed towards the idea that the Magisterium 1 s 
ordinary role should be reduced by comparison with its exercise in the 
nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century. In 
particular, the Council both acknowledged and welcomed forces which 
would break up the single conceptual system of Catholicism and provide 
the basis for substantial theological pluralism. This dissolution 
makes it considerably less plausible for members of the hierarchy to 
lead the way in theology through authoritative statements argued 
according to the pattern of a particular culture and set of formal 
conceptual referents. Rather, they are given the role of vigilant 
protection of the Church's faith and practice, by making discerning 
judgements and provisions concerning the creative work of theologianso 
However, the complexity of the philosophical and cultural factors 
which the Council admitted into the formation of theological thought 
makes this task a very delicate office, open to much debate and 
challenge, particularly if it should seem to be exercised arbitrarily. 
The ground is laid for the existence of vocal dissent in the 
Church both by the ways in which the Council encouraged Catholic 
scholars to act with liberty, and by its acknowledgement of the weighty 
autonomy of secular disciplines. These moves, together with the fact 
that Vatican II drew upon the fruits of what had previously been 
deemed dissent, create an impetus and an atmosphere in relation to 
which obedient silence in the face of over-reaching magisterial 
decisions seems increasingly implausible. 
So far we have seen the extent to which the Second Vatican 
Council indicated that the members of the hierarchy should withdraw 
from a formal, representational teaching role (except in the sphere 
of infallible statements, which we shall consider in the next chapter) 
and the way in which it highlighted their task in simply guarding 
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broad boundaries of acceptability for the Church's belief and 
expression. We have not, however, seen substantial indications as 
to the force of their invitatory preaching, despite the fact that 
the Council located the origin of the Magisterium primarily in a 
preaching missiono The section which follows, however, will throw 
the apostolic commission to preach into sharper relief, and we 
shall consider the significance of the fact that this aspect of the 
magisterial task is made most clear in relation to the hierarchy's 
authority over the moral decisions taken by Catholicso 
C.) The Relationship of the Ordinary Map;isterium to the Moral 
Decisions of Catholics: Shifts of Emphasis at Vatican II 
In this section I shall argue that Vatican II posited a more 
modest role for the Magisterium than that which it previously held 
in the field of ethical authority and direction. However, in this 
field, the shift in the Council's effective concept of the 
Magisterium 1 s authority was not so pronounced as the shift which we 
have already noted in its idea of the normal exercise of doctrinal 
authorityo In the field of ethics and moral teaching the Fathers of 
Vatican II still clearly envisaged that the Pope and bishops might 
put forward positive, content-filled teaching on occasion, and that 
it might be expected to gain the obedient assent and application of 
the faithful. The pressures of pluralism which the Council admitted 
in the doctrinal sphere were not so fully acknowledged in the area of 
moral decision and direction; the Magisterium does not so markedly 
retreat here from its position of authoritative leadership, to one 
of merely marking out broad boundaries of acceptable behaviour and 
belief in the Church. There is a shift, then, but it is a smaller 
shift than that occurring in the doctrinal sphere - and because this 
shift in the moral sphere was less complete and less explicit 
than the other, it was quickly to become the' source of tensions 
which were even more acuteo 
What were the points of relaxation and shift in Vatican 
II's picture of the Magisterium 1 s authority over moral questions? 
Firstly, we shall take note of the fact that the Council allowed 
greater freedom of decision and choice than had been normal at some 
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points during the preceding century, but that this greater 
freedom for Catholics was allowed specifically in certain areas_ 
of ethical decision, and not in all. Secondly, we shall note that, 
just as in the sphere of doctrinal formulation and understanding the 
Council admitted a principle (that of critical, historical awareness 
of the cultural conditioning of Christianity) which was potentially 
explosive in the context of traditional, authoritative teaching, so 
too in the area of ethical understanding Vatican II introduced 
principles of thought and behaviour whose momentum and influence 
might eventually override the claims of traditional, authoritative 
teaching. The seeds of acute tension and dissension over moral 
questions are therefore quite clearly visible in the position put 
forward by the documents of Vatican IIo 
The section will be divided into three sub-sections. The 
first of these will deal with the way in which the Council partially 
withdrew the authority of the Magisterium from certain areas con-
cerning the concrete application of moral principles, thus leaving 
Catholics more freedom in regard to these matters. The second sub-
section will deal with Vatican II's use of a modified natural law 
theory, since this modification of the basic pattern of Catholic 
ethical thought constituted one of the principles which was potentially 
explosive of the claims of authority. Finally, we shall focus upon 
the Council's stress on the importance of the Christian's interior 
attitude for the value of his moral actions, for this stress, too, 
prepared the ground for the challenges to magisterial authority which 
were to ensue after the Council. 
1 The Withdrawal of the Magisterium from some areas of Detailed 
Precept 
It is particularly in the sphere of social ethics that we 
can note a certain withdrawal of the Magisterium from the field of 
detailed precept in the teaching of the Second Vatican Councilo 
Previously, although it had been theoretically acknowledged that the 
Church's general competence in formulating natural law principles did 
not always amount to a competence to make detailed practical judge-
ments in 'mixed questions' , the Popes had nevertheless often not 
desisted from giving rather precise injunctions in matters of politics 
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and social ethics: "When we look back o • • we are struck by 
the wealth of pronouncements, based on natural law, which went 
into detail on every issue. Natural law included not only first 
principles, but also all corollaries which were deduced from these 
' . 
principles. 11 ( 84) Vatican II laid out the groundwork of a position 
in which the laity were more fully entrusted with responsibility 
for their decisions in political and social matters; this aspect 
of the Council's teaching must be associated both with a growing 
confidence on the part of the Magisterium, leading it to be less 
defensive and dominative, and also with Vatican II's more highly 
developed theology of the laity and of the autonomy of the 
secular sphere (see Chapter II, ·PPe :144f.). 
In order to illustrate the shift in thought concerning 
political matters we may look back to Leo XIII's encyclical of 1890, 
Sapientiae Christianae. Leo wrote this: 
"besides the perfect concord that must reign 
in thought and deed, the faithful should 
accept religiously as their rule of conduct 
the political wisdom of ecclesiastical 
authority •" ( 85) 
The Pope 1 s aim in 1890 was not specifically to support particular 
political parties, but at least to exercise an indirect power over the 
outcome of individual issues through the obedience of enfranchised 
Catholicso (The encyclical Sapientiae Christianae had as its most 
immediate aim the winning over of French Catholics to the existence 
and legitimacy of the Republic.) The theory of the indirect power 
was further promoted in several countries by the birth of movements 
of "Catholic Popular Action" and "Christian Democracy" during the 
pontificates of Leo XIII and Pius Xo The Popes intended these move-
ments to remain above party strife, but to influence the course of 
events indirectly by putting forward the Catholic position on social 
and political questions. This position was laid out in quite some 
detail from the time of Leo XIII onwards in the great series of social 
( 84) 
(85) 
P. Herder Dorneich, "How can the Church Provide Guidelines in 
Social Ethics?" in Concilium, 5 no. 4 (1968) P• 43c 
ASS 22 ( 188Q/90) :p. 400 o 
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encyclicals which began with Rerum Novarum in 1891 o (86) 
By the time of Vatican II the series of social encyclicals 
had by no means come to an end, but the theological approach of the 
Council makes it unlikely that a Pope might in future speak of 
11poli tical wisdom" as residing in the Magisterium, or that he might 
claim overall authority to make "judgements on social and economic 
matters". (87) Rather, the pattern put forward is more clearly that 
by which ecclesiastical authori ti.es preach the principles of social 
and political justice in very general terms, leaving it for the layman, 
whose special sphere it is, to make concrete decisions in the light 
of the hierarchy's preaching: 
"Secular duties and activities belong to the 
laity particularly (though not exclusively) 
•• o Recognising what their faith requires, and 
strengthened by it, let them zealously take new 
initiatives at suitable moments, and carry them 
througho It is a matter for their properly 
formed conscience to inscribe the divine law on the 
life of the earthly cityo Indeed, the laity may 
expect light and spiritual strength from priests, 
but they should not look upon their pastors as 
being so expert in every question that arises, however 
grave, as to be able to provide an immediate concrete 
solution; nor should they think that such is the 
pastors' mission. Rather, they, the laity, enlightened 
with Christian wisdom and paying respectful attention 
to the teaching of the Magisterium ( 1 ad doctrinam 
Magisterii observanter attendentes') should shoulder 
their own part." (GS 43. 2, emphasis mine). 
This is the explicit teaching of Vatican II, and it is 
accompanied by the picture of the hierarchy as a body of preachers; 
"Now the bishops, who have received the charge 
of governing the Church of God, should so 
preach the message of Christ, along with their 
(86) 15 May 1891, ASS 23 (1890-91) PPo641-70 (see Dz 1938/DzS 3265-
3271 ). 
(87') Pius XI, encycl. Quadragesimo Anno (15 May 1931) AAS 23 (1931) 
Po 190 (see Dz 2253-70/DzS 3725-44). · 
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priests, that all the earthly activities 
of the faithful are bathed in the light of 
the Gospel." (GS 43. 5) (88) 
It is interesting to note that the language of Vatican II 
represents a shift of emphasis by comparison not only with the 
expressions of Leo XIII and Pius XI, but even by comparison with the 
teaching of John XXIII. In GS 43o3 there is a passage which deals 
with the legitimacy of different views among Catholics concerning 
secular matters; it is very similar to a passage in John XXIII's 
encyclical Mater et Magistrao However, where Pope John went on from 
his discussion of legitimate differences to say: 
"it is clear that when ecclesiastical authority 
has made pronouncements on a subject, Catholics 
are plainly bound to conform to its directives, 
because the Church has the right and duty not 
only of defending principles of morality and 
religion, but also of intervening authoritatively 
when it is a question of judging the application 
of these principles to concrete cases ••• " -(89) 
Gaudium et Spes, on the other hand, has no parallel strong statement 
concerning the Magisterium 1 s authority over pracUcal applications. 
All that we find within the article we are particularly studying is 
GS 43o2 1 s reference to the "respectful attention" which Catholics 
should pay to the Magisterium. "Respectful attention" is not 
quite the same thing as the 11 confonnity" to directives which John 
XXIII mentioned. There is, therefore, a distinct, if slight, shift 
in emphasis concerning the role of the Magisterium with regard to 
social and political matters. 
It would be wrong to claim that this was anything more 
than a shift in emphasis, since the "prompt obedience" of the laity 
(88) For further passages relating to the responsibility of the 
laity in the secular sphere, see LG 31o2, 36.2 & 3, AA 4.5, 
7.5, 13.1, 16.3, 31.4, AG 15.6, 21.3. 
Concerning the hierarchy's duty to preach moral principles, see 
AA 7.4, 24o7, GS 76o3e 
($9) P• 457 (emphasis mine)o 
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to the hierarchy is mentioned elsewhere by Vatican II. (LG 37.2). 
However, the general conclusion may legitimately be drawn that the 
Council's concept of the hierarchy's task in secular matters is more 
closely allied to the idea of preaching than of teaching. The 
general principles of justice and respect for humanity which the 
Church puts forward are to win the hearts of the faithful through 
their inner relationship to the Gospel; any more concrete proposals 
enunciated by the Magisterium in the social and political area 
generally have the nature of suggestions or invitations to actiono 
On the occasions on which the hierarchy does deal with this area of 
concern in a formally authoritative way, we may expect the obligator,y 
character of what is said to inhere in negative injunctions ("this 
must be changed", "this is unacceptable in the light of the Gospel") 
which function to mark out boundaries of acceptability for 
Catholic moral behaviouro (90) 
Finally, we should notice that because the shift of 
emphasis is integrally related to Vatican II's developed theology 
of the lay task in the secular sphere, it is by no means surprising 
to find that the laity themselves are to work for the development of 
the Church's social doctrine, as well as for its application (AA 31b). 
2 The Modification of Natural Law Theory 
We noted in an earlier section of this chapter that the 
thought of Sto Thomas Aquinas and the other scholastic doctors was 
removed from its place of dominion in Roman Catholic philosophy by 
the measures of Vatican IIo One might therefore expect that the 
theory of natural law, the child of classical thought which was so 
thoroughly hallowed and systematised by the scholastics, would perhaps 
be treated, along with the rest of scholasticism, as a valid but 
(90) see E. Schillebeeckx, "The Magisterium and the World of Politics" 
in Concilium, 6 no. 4 (1968) PPo 20fo 
In the same article, Schillebeeckx points out the necessity for 
the positive, but invitatory kind of social teaching by the 
hierarchy, because the mere abstract statement of general principles 
is not sufficient to galvanise Christians into actiono (po 15) 
Vatican II creates a situation in Which it is appropriate for the 
Church's leaders to act as social prophets, though not as social 
legislatorso 
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replaceable conceptual scheme for ethics. In fact, Vatican II 
revitalised the idea of natural law as a current Y!J.Oral norm. Its 
use of the concept, however, owes much to post-Enlightenment 
humanism as well as scholasticism, and undercuts nineteenth-century 
nee-scholastic interpretations. 
The idea of natural law was not dislodged from its 
normative role by the Council because it is a concept which permeates 
all that is distinctively Catholic in Christian thinking; it is 
directly intertwined with the assertion that human reason has a 
capacity to attain the truth concerning God and the world, on the 
basis of nature's evidence. In the case of natural law, it is 
asserted that men can know what is morally right through the witness 
of a law inscribed on their hearts. The idea is founded scripturally 
on Romans 2.14-16, and at Vatican II this passage was cited in GS 16, 
on the subject of conscience: "Man possesses a law inscribed on his 
heart by God; it is in obedience to it that man's dignity consists, 
and it is in accordance with its standard that he will be judged. 11 
Similarly, we are told in DH 14.3 that "the principles of the moral 
order ••• flow from human nature itself. 11 (91) The Second Vatican 
Council, therefore, held to traditional assertions concerning natural 
law. However, there has been a distinc·t; shift of emphasis concerning 
the character and criterion of the law which human conscience 
naturally perceives, and which the Church clarifies. The documents 
of the Council were by no means the initiators of this shift, for 
it was already to be found in the social encyclicals of John XXIII, 
preceding the Council, and even before that, the teaching of 
Pius XII provided a bridgehead to the new approach. 
The essence of the renewal of natvxal law theory is this: 
Conscience is not treated as something which responds so much to 
abstract principles of nature, but rather is seen as finding its 
criterion through dialogue and relationship, and particularly through 
1 openness 1 to the transcendent: "Conscience is the most secret centre 
and sanctuary of man, in which he is alone with God, whose voice echoes 
in his heart 11 ( GS 16). This capacity for relationship is the apex 
( 91) The nctural law, or the natural moral order, is 
several points in the documents of Vatican II. 
example, IM 5, 7, AA 7.2, GS 89.1 • 
referred to at 
See, for 
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of a hierarchy of values which form·the shape of the moral law; 
therefore, the qualities which make men open to one another and to 
God are the overriding criteria by which moral decisions should be 
reached. Man, then, and more specifically, man-in-relationship, 
becomes the central point of ethical thought. 
We may say that Pius XII provided a bridgehead into this 
kind of humanistic thought because he brought forward the idea that 
11 human rights" forms a first chapter in social morality. (92) 
However, from another point of view, Pius XII may be called the 
last proponent of classical natural law ethics, for he saw the 
concept of a hierarchy of values as being dangerous - it might 
lead Catholics to relativise the precepts of natural and divine law 
which are based on aspects of man's nature other than those of 
openness and relationship. (93) Admittedly, Pius XII condemned a 
concept of a hierarchy of values which, he believed, attached to 
an ethic which simply made man the creator of his own moral law; (94) 
he did not conceive of the possibility that there might be a 
(92) Pius made "the dignity and rights of the human person" the 
first of his five points for the pacification of society in 
his Christmas message in 1942. He included among human rights 
those of access to social structures which permit and guarantee 
entire personal responsibility in the temporal, as well as in 
the eternal order (AAS 35 (1943) p. 19). This may be con-
trasted \nth the earlier, more paternalistic view of Leo XIII 
concerning what is due to the dignity of man; employers, for 
example, were told in Rerum Novarum not to treat workers as 
slaves, but to respect their human dignity: "It is for employers 
to ensure that the worker has enough time to consecrate to 
religion, that he is in no way made prey to corrupting temp-
tations and incitements,that nothing weakens the family spirit 
in him, nor habits of economy ••• 11 (p. 649) · 
Despite the contrast between the part ascribed to active res-
ponsibility as a constituent of human dignity's expression, we 
should note Leo XIII was the father of the movement which 
brought consideration of human dignity more and more to the 
fore in Catholic thought. 
(93) See alloc. to World Federation of Catholic Young Women (18 
April 1952) AAS 44 (1952) PP• 413-19. 
(94) ibido PP• 414-16 
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mediating point between traditional concepts of abstract natural 
laws and the "situation ethics" which he denouncedo Yet such a 
mediating position is possible, and was developed through the 
encyclicals Gf John XXIII who used the idea of a "law printed on 
man's heart" interchangeably with that of a hierarchy of values. (95) 
Similarly, Pope John located man's dignity and central place in 
ethics both in the fact that he enjoys a status of relationship -
being a creature, a son of God, first and last cause of the whole 
creation - and also in the fact that man possesses the abstract qual-
ities of intelligence and free willo (96) 
In this way, then, Pope John prepared the way for Vatican II, 
which stresses the relational concepts of the Bible in its 
description of man (97), and tends to neglect the classical' .. · · 
definitions of humanity in terms of abstract notions. We may term 
the chief emphasis of Vatican II, 'personalism', because it stresses 
the fact that personality, the capacity for openness in relationship, 
is the crown of ethical valueso Although sub-personal values do not 
lose their status as part of the objective moral order, it is clearly 
stated that "the order of things must be subject to the order of 
persons" (GS 26o3). 
Although the Second Vatican Council represented a step 
forward towards a more personalist concept of natural law, the teaching 
of the Council was not unambiguous; there are points at which we see 
(95) For example, in Mater et lVIagistra John XXIII spoke of the need 
for Catholics to retain a lucid and vivid consciousness of the 
hierarchy of values in their approach to the idolatry of modern 
life (p. 457)o In Pacem in Terris (encycl., (11 April 1963) 
AAS 55 ( 1963)) he spoke of the laws inscribed on men 1 s hearts which 
should ~overn international relations (p. 258), of the law of 
nature \p. 264) and also of the fact that the foundation of the moral 
or.der is found in a personal, transcendent God, whose attributes 
he described with the help of a quotation from St. Thomas 
(pp. 266f. ). 
(96) See Pacem in Terris Po 259 and Mater et Magistra PP• 452fo 
(97) Vatican II's Christian anthropology makes extensive use of the 
motif of God's image in man, and expounds this in terms of 
capacity for relationship (see especially GS 12). This theme 
will be investigated more fully in Chapter VII of this thesis. 
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a personalist view struggling to come to tenns with an ethical 
structure which was erected on the foundations of a classical concept 
of natural lawo This is particularly the case in Gaudium et Spes' 
chapter concerning marriage and the family. 
The tension between traditional concepts of natural law, 
and the newer stress on relationship between persons, appears most clearly 
in GS 50 and 51, which deal with questions of marriage and parent-
hood. Some members of the Council hoped that these articles would 
form the preamble to a new papal teaching on birth control, and 
elements of the newer style of ethical thinking appear in them which 
appear to open up that possibilityo At the same time, however, the 
Council Fathers were not allowed to make a definite and clear-cut 
decision on the issue, which would cut across previous magisterial 
teaching; indeed, reference is made in these articles to earlier 
teachings, which had relied on concepts of traditional natural law, 
based on the essence of thingso 
Concretely, then, the tension is one between two sets of 
criteria for ethical decision-making: On the one hand, there appear 
the norms which are based on the essence of things - norms to which 
married couples should conform their consciences, remaining docile 
to the Magisterium of the Church, which is the law's authentic 
interpreter (see GS 51.3 and 50.2) -and on the other hand there 
appear the demands which arise out of responsibility for the future 
and from the requirements of self-giving love (see the same passages). 
The members of the Council explicitly recognised this tension 
(GS 51o1) and attempted to find a point of reconciliation between 
the two sets of moral criteria. To do this, it utilised the concept 
of the human person: 
"When the question arises of finding the moral 
way in which conjugal love and the responsible 
transmission of life should be harmonised, the 
answer is not dependent solely upon sincerity of 
intention and motivation; it also depends upon 
objective criteria, drawn from the nature of the 
Rerson and his actions -criteria which respect 
the full sense of mutual self-giving and.fully-
human procreation in the context of true 
love." (GS 51.3, emphasis mine). 
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It was in this concept of the human person that the 
Council tried to find a norm which would combine the idea of an 
eternal, fixed order of morality, with that of responsible open-
ness to the present and future demands of loving relationship. 
The logic behind this use of the notion of the person appears to be 
unassailable, in a formal sense, because the human person may be 
said to be that part of creation which is open to the future 
precisely because of the nature which it has been given from all 
eternity. However, the formal solution does not in this case 
really resolve the tension concerning the practical determinants 
of action: Is the eternal nature of t~e person, which acts as a 
norm, to be located by reference to a biological 1 given 1 , or by 
reference to experimental and relational factors? 
The argument of GS 50 and 51 , for all its ambiguity in 
practical terms, represents a distinct shift in favour of what we have 
termed personalism , for, despite its references to the eternal 
nature of things, it attempts to integrate such older-style teaching 
within a framework which makes the human person in relationship as 
the prevailing norm, rather than impersonal or abstract 'nature'. 
The significance of the shift, which we have just traced 
through one concrete case, is this: Whereas in the sphere of 
doctrine the Council opened up the possibility of re-expression and 
reinterpretation of Catholic faith according to a variety of 
conceptual schemes, in the sphere of moral teaching Vatican II itself 
set out upon the road of a specific kind of reinterpretation. The 
classical natural law theory was brought into dialogue with post-
Enlightenment humanism, to give birth to a Christian humanism of 
persons -persons who are essentially and not merely 'accidentally' 
social, and whose dignity lies in their capacity for relationshipo 
This modification of the theory of natural law is 
potentially subversive of the authority of future magisterial 
teaching for two reasons. Firstly, although the Council did not 
consistently work out the application of its ethical theory in regard 
to every issue (and it particularly failed to do so in relation to 
the moral decisions of married couples, as we have seen above) its 
shift towards the adoption of this theory is too marked to be reversedo 
That is to say, the Council helps to create a situation in which it 
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becomes socially implausible for the Magisterium to enforce moral 
teaching solely based on a concept of 'law' with its corollary of 
'offence against God 1 o A simple return to appeals to traditional 
natural law ethics would fail, because it would fail to take account 
of the sense (which most modern ideologies express) that man is the 
subject of his history, both collective and personal, and that human 
history and relationships are the centre of moral concern. 
Secondly, we must note that the concept of a hierarchy of 
values in which the values of personhood-in-relationship form the 
crown, encourages the elevation of the individual conscience as a 
criterion in ethical decisiono Conscience expresses personal freedom, 
and also (as it is presented in the theology of Vatican II) a 
capacity for dialogue with others, with God, and with the situation 
it faces. The exercise of conscience becomes, itself, a value to be 
protected and nurtured, because it bespeaks the existence of fully 
personal life. Once the exercise of conscience begins to appear as 
a value in itself, and not simply as the means to an end which is 
essentially external to the individual's freedom, there arises a 
tension between personal decision and the demands of heteronomous 
authorityo 
This second point must not be overstated, because the 
aim of a moral theory such as that expressed in the documents of 
Vatican II is to trace a middle way between abstract legalism and 
an individualist ethic of autonomous decisiono In doing so, it aims 
to preserve the idea that there~ objective normative principles, 
and that the individual does not simply manufacture his own 
hierarchy of valueso Nevertheless, it is clear that the status of 
freedom and conscience are heightened as ethical objects, and it is 
significant that they are particularly heightened in relation to 
values from a lower place on the scale than those which are immediately 
concerned with personality and relationship. Therefore it is not to 
be wondered at, in this context, if the exercise of conscientious 
decision over matters such as birth control has been widely 
championed against the Magisterium's insistence that biological, 
natural factors should be accepted as sacrosanct norms- norms·which 
the Magisterium integrates uneasily within the theory ofhuman 
relationships' necessary conditionso 
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We find, then, that the approach tru{en by Vatican II to the 
matter of moral theology, and particularly to the character of 
natural law, effectively reduces the scope of authoritative ethical 
teaching which can plausibly command assent. In the first place, 
it restricts the theology o;t; the teaching which can plausibly be 
given,to pronouncements which express a broadly person-centred ethic, 
(or at least some ethic which comes to terms equally well with post-
Enlightenment humanism)o Secondly, within the terms of such an ethic, 
teaching is likely to be concretely authoritative .Precisely in proportion to 
its concern with the central values of personhood-in-relationship. 
3 The Importance of the Christian's Interior Attitude 
In Chapter II we saw that the traditional teaching of the 
Church has always suggested that one should obey conscience rather 
than the voice of the Church, if there should be a clash between them. 
It remains for God to adjudicate whether the person who follows his 
conscience in such a case is culpable - because of a failure to 
conform his reason to what is objectively morally true - or whether 
this is a case in Which the Magisterium is objectively at fault (see 
PP• 81f. )o However, because of the theory of indefectibility, 
the idea which has been prevalent has strongly given the balance of 
probability to the rectitude of the Church's official pronouncements. 
With Vatican II, however, a principle has been introduced which not 
only tilts the balance towards conscience as a norm, but also makes 
the exercise of conscience into an object and aim of moral endeavour 
and nurture. 
We move now from the question of the importance of 
conscience seen from the point of view of those who might be excluded 
from the Church because of their obedience to it, and turn instead 
to the question of the interior attitude of those who are to remain 
within the Church, obedient to its teaching. LG 14.2 proclaims that 
"someone who is incorporated in the Church, but does not persevere in 
charity, is not saved; he belongs to the Church 1in body' but not 1in 
heart'." 
It is very significant that Lumen Gentium's teaching takes 
this form; it shows a real concern with the question of the 
Christian's interior attitude. Pius XII, for example, had felt it 
necessary to stress a very different point - namely, that not every 
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evil deed, not even mortal sin, necessarily breaks someone's 
incorporation in the Church. (98) His argument focused upon the 
outward reality; Vatican II prefers, however, to direct its 
attention to inward relationships. 
A second point of contrast can be drawn between LG 14.2 1 s 
statement and the assertion of Pius XII: While the latter 
described the one who cuts himself off from grace as one who commits 
"gravely evil sin11 ( 1 admissum o • • grave sc elus 1 ) , Vatican II, on 
the other hand, speaks of a failure to persevere in charity. Now, 
of course, the distinctively Catholic notion of mortal sin derives 
precisely from the idea that certain acts, by their very nature, cut 
one off from the life of chaxity and grace; therefore, Vatican II's 
phrase might be understood in a restrictive sense as referring simply 
to the commission of formal mortal sins. However, the concept of 
failing in charity also has wider connotations, for it removes the 
emphasis from particulax acts and concentrates it rather upon man's 
inner dispositiono Even outwardly correct actions can lack charity, 
and it is charity which counts for salvation. 
This stress on man's inward disposition raises a further 
question concerning the implications of the Council's teaching, 
which we shall have to leave open at this point: Namely, can charity 
not only subsist alongside objectively sinful tendencies (which 
is St. Thomas' teaching (99)), but even also be expressed through 
acts which do not in fact conform objectively to the natural law as 
it is taught by the Church? For example, might involvement in 
abortion be undertaken in 'good faith', although in error, and be 
suffused with a real, though misdirected charity? 
We can sum up Vatican II's position on the importance of 
practising obedience in the Church (without attempting to answer the 
above question) by saying that the text which deals most directly 
with the connection between Church membership and salvation threw 
the emphasis very firmly onto the issue of human disposition as the 
determining factor. vVhile the importance of man's inner disposition 
has always been recognised by the Roman Catholic Magisterium, 
(98) Encycl. Mystici Corporis (29 June 1943) AAS 35 (1943) p. 203 
(DzS 3803 
(99) See Aquinas ST la 2ae, q. 65, a. 3. 
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the teaching of LG 14 differs from that of some previous docu-
ments of the hierarchy, in that it does not suggest that inner 
disposition is primarily to be measured against a formal, 
extrinsic table of the degrees of sinfulness of actions. This 
shift is very slight, and takes place wi·thout offending any of 
the canons of classical Catholic moral theory. The life of charity 
in the Church can still be understood as a life of conformity 
to the Magisterium 1 s teacrung, moved by virtue within. However, an 
opening is also left for another possibility, and for a wider notion 
of the charity which leads to salvation. In addition, the stress 
on interiority harmonises well with the Council's enhanced teaching 
on conscience, and also with the idea that many of the Magisterium1 s 
moral pronouncements take the form not of command, but of prophetic 
appeal and invitation, because they deal with 1mixed questions•. 
The authority of an appeal lies not in Hs formal power to require 
conformity, but in i·ts substance, and in its capacity to cqmmend 
itself to the inner dispositions of the hearers' heartso 
Conclusion 
I have argued that Vatican II did not withdraw the 
teaching aut11ori ty of the hierarchy from the field of morals to the 
same extent as it pulled back this authority in the area of 
doctrine and theological expressiono Only with regard to social and 
political issues was there a clear shift towards the role of 
preaching rather than teaching; as regards other kinds of moral 
decision, the Council continued to envisage that the Magisterium 
should have the concrete capacity to give quite detailed teaching in 
the form of precepts based upon divine and natural law. However, by 
modifying the traditional concept of natural law, and by stressing 
the importance of personalistic and interior criteria for the 
formation of ethical decisions, Vat~can II effectively introduced 
principles which were potentially subversive of heteronomous, 
magisterial authority in moral questionso 
Why was it that the Council did not explicitly allow for 
greater freedom of interpretation in relation to moral law? Partly, 
of course, because it has always been recognised that in individual 
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cases calling for moral decision there is necessarily an exercise 
of prudence in application of the lawo Therefore, to some degree, 
the individual's freedom is written into basic Catholic pre-
suppositions about morality; this degree of freedom in minute 
application is so clearly understood that it need scarcely be adverted 
to in documents such as those of Vatican II. Nevertheless, the 
crucial point at issue here does not concern the well-understood 
necessities for the use of prudence and for acts of conscience; 
rather, it concerns the question, why were these forms of freedom 
and individualisation not explicitly extended by the Council in any 
area other than that of social ethics? 
The answer must lie in the nature of human action, as 
contrasted to the nature of human belief and profession: Whilst 
the man who re-expresses traditional doctrines through the medium 
of different cultures or conceptual schemes may be attributed the 
quality of 'good faith' in his efforts to reinterpret the traditions 
positively, the man who, on the other hand, reinterprets the norms 
of actions, may carry through his ' 1 reinterpretation 1 into acts which, 
only too clearly, directly contradict the settled requirements of 
Church membership. There is an 'either/or' quality about many forms 
of human action, which does not inhere in human language and 
expression. For this reason, the Catholic hierarchy, actualising 
the authority to define boundaries of what is acceptable in the 
Church community, appears able to be more directive as concerns 
moral issues than it does in regard to doctrinal issues. Only in 
the field of secular concerns, where Vatican II had developed a 
more thorough theology of the autonomy of that which is worldly 
from that which is churchly, does the Council overtly allow greater 
scope to the individual's interpretation and decision. It must 
also be said that in the field of social morality, issues are 
rarely clear-cut in terms of 'either/or'; this is an area of what 
has been termed 'mixed questions', involving expertise and judge-
ment of facts, as well as purely moral decision. 
It is outside the field of what are acknowledged to be 
1 mixed questions' that particular problems arise, for the effect 
of the Council's elevation of conscience, interiority, and values 
of personhood, is to create an area in which Christians may claim 
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that they have a right and duty to form their own judgements; 
their possession of active conscience gives them the capacity to 
make such judgements, while the idea of a hierarchy of values gives 
them ~ for assessing the claim of one value against anothero 
These two factors combine to create an area in which the laity may 
be expected to dispute the Magisterium's moral expertise, seeking 
to extend the boundaries of independence, and to reduce the area 
covered by precept. An extension of the Christian's moral inde-
pendence would, in turn, implicate an extension of the boundaries 
of what is acceptable in the Church. This is one of the points of 
greatest tension bequeathed by the Second Vatican Council; we shall 
refer to it again in the chapter which followso 
CHAPTER V: 
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VATICAN II AND Tfill NATURE OF THE ASSENT IlWPLIED IN 
ITS TREATMENT OF INFALLIBILITY 
The purpose of this chapter is to develop our analysis of 
Vatican II's concept of Catholic obedience in relation to the 
Council's presentation of the doctrine of'infallibility~ It will 
not be a long chapter, and it will approach the subject of 
'infallibility'only from those angles which are connected to our 
concern with obedience and assent. Although it is not appropriate 
here to deal with all the manifold philosophical and theological 
implications of the idea, it is yet necessary to give a limited 
treatment of the doctrine of'infallibility'within the context of this 
thesis, because the di.stincti ve Roman Catholic appropriation of 
the notion holds such a pivotal place in the theology of that 
communion. 
As I have indicated since the beginning of the thesis, 
the issue of social plausibility is a dimension of discussion which 
will particularly come to the fore in this chaptero This is because 
the issue of absolute assent· to teaching which claims inherent 
'infallibility'provides a particularly interesting example of the 
problem of plausibility in a post-Enlightenment age: The idea of 
'infallibility'ultimately suggests that authority need make no appeal 
to any functional, experimental, or historical validation before it 
demands assent to certain teachings. This is a dramatic claimo We 
shall consider what kind of assent might nowadays plausibly be 
expected as a response to 'infallible' authority, and the extent 
to which V~tican II's picture of appropriate assent matches up to 
that which we might plausibly expect Catholics to yield, in the 
post-Conciliar era. 
In setting the agenda for this chapter we are not 
intending to undertake an exhaustive exercise in the sociology of 
ideas, nor are we assuming that twentieth-century Catholics all 
share the same plausibility structures, nor that their response to 
the demand8 of the Magisterium will be similar. If something is 
described as 'implausible' this does not mean that it would· seem so 
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to all - or even to a majority - of Catholicso Rather, it means 
that the doctrine or idea described in this way is likely to be 
unacceptable to a significant number of Roman Catholics - a 
number whose exit from the Church would make a major statistical 
difference in some countries at least. Thus, something which is 
plausible in Poland or Zaire might be seriously implausible in the 
United Statas, and its implausibility within that country alone 
would have implications for the nature and effectiveness of Church 
authori-ty in general. Further, to clarify our use of the idea of 
implausibility in this chapter, we must note that one effect of an 
implausible teaching may not be the exterior defection of Church 
members, but rather an 'interior emigration', whereby loyalty to 
doctrinal authority is rescinded without the repudiation of Church 
membership or even, perhaps, of other forms of warm loyalty 
towards the Church's leaders. At this point we may recall what 
was said in the Preface: 11The doctrine of obedience put forward 
might have concrete effects which were not intended or envisaged, as 
it comes into interaction with the Church's social context" (p. 9). 
It is in this perspective that questions about the social plausibility 
of Vatican II's idea of 1infallibility• and absolute assent vdll be 
examine do 
A) Assent to Definitions Made in the Past 
vVhen we analyse the question, 1What kind of assent 
should be afforded to past statements of the 1infallible1 Magisterium? 1 , 
we find that we are dealing with the issue of reinterpretation and 
re-expression of formal definitionso How far do dogmas and 
definitions require reinterpretation if assent is to be a plausible 
requirement throughout the Church? If they do need reinterpretation 
or re-expression, who is to control it, and what is the force of 
the statements through which such control is exercised? The first 
of these two questions is the starting point for sub-section 1; 
in sub-section 2 we shall examine some examples of the way in which 
the Magisterium has concretely acted as controlling referee in the 
activity of reinterpretation andre-expression of the deposit of 
faith. This will lead us to consider the social plausibility of this 
control, and of the disciplinary decisions based upon it. 
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1 How far do Definitions of the Past require Reinterpretation? 
In this sub-section we shall partially retrace some of 
the ground covered in Chapter IV, when we considered the fac-tors 
leading to pluralism of theological expression which Vatican II 
allowed (see pp. 200-30). We shall here be examining the effect 
of these factors upon the way in which defined doctrine is to be 
understood and expressed in different generations. For the sake of 
clarification, we shall begin by setting up three models of ways 
in which the language of dogma may be said to function in relation 
to the divine truth which it expresses. 
Three theories of the nature of dogmatic language: 
Theory (i) 
'l'heory (ii) 
Theory (iii) 
The language of dogma reflects what is true in 
such a way that the relations between one truth 
and another dictate the structure and form of the 
language used, so that other structures and forms 
of language would be less accurate. 
The language of dogma is culturally-conditioned, 
and may therefore change, but man's grasp of divine 
truth (which he expresses through a variety of 
different cultural forms) is objectively accurate, 
and may successfully be communicated through the 
use of a conceptual form appropriate to the hearer. 
1rhere is, then, an unchanging t:r.-ue sense, or 
central idea, underlying different kinds of expression 
through which it is communicatedo 
The language of dogma is man 1 s attempt to articulate 
an attitude or experience which has been evoked by 
divine realityo The divine reality itself, however, 
remains ultimately inexpressible, eluding the 
grasp of language. 
These theories have been very crudely delineated, and we 
shall see that they shade into one another to some extent. In 
particular, Theory (ii) and Theory (iii) may easily be confused with 
one another, since both support efforts constantly to re-express 
doctrineo ~Iowever, there is also an interesting area where Theory (i) 
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shades into Theory (ii) in connection with the idea of limitation 
in doctrinal statements, and their need for development. 
The philosophy underlying Vatican I's treatment of Church 
doctrine was primarily related to Theory (i); the First Vatican 
Council did not envisage the replacement of definitive formulae 
by others, but instead tried to fix in a permanent way the sense 
in which the formulae of the past should be understood: "If 
anyone says that, because of the progress of knowledge, it might 
sometimes be possible ·to attribute to the dogmas which the Church 
has proposed a meaning other than that by which the Church has 
understood them, and by 'Ahich it continues to understand them, 
anathema sit." ( 1) Although the text of Dei Filius quoted Vincent 
of Lerins to the effect that the Church might have an ever-deepening 
understanding of its own doctrine (2) the prevailing nee-scholastic 
concept of this deepening understanding, was that an ever-increasing 
body of deductions, might be reached by Aristotelian syllogisms 
from first premises afforded by fixed, and well-understood formulae. (3) 
Therefore, for Vatican I, any limitations in the Magisterium 1 s 
solemn definitions did not derive so much from the historical 
relativity of the concepts and language used, but rather from the 
incompleteness of a chain of deductions which might always be 
further extended and polished ~dthin the terms of the original 
conceptual framework. 
We find this idea of incompleteness very clearly expressed 
by Pius XII in his encyclical of 1950, Humani Generis: "Anyone can 
see that the expressions of this kind of idea which are given to us 
either by the schools or by the Magisterium are capable of being 
completed and polished," he acknowledged, (4) but nevertheless, the 
(1) Dei Filius, cap. 4, can. 3 (Dz 1818/DzS 3043)· 
( 2) "There is a growth • • • and a great strengthening in the under-
standing, knowledge, and wisdom of both individuals and of us 
all corporately, both of each man, and of the entire Church, as 
age or the centuries progress; but always according to its proper 
kind, that is, according to the same line of teaching, according 
to the same sense, and the same meaning" ('.in suo • • o genere, 
in eodem scilicet do ate eadem sensu eadem ue sententia'). 
Vincent of Lerins, quoted in Dei Filius, cap. 4, Dz 1800/ 
DzS 3020). 
(3) See G. Ao McCool, Catholic Theology in the Nineteenth Century, 
PP• 9f • 
(4) encycl. Humani Generis, P• 566 (Dz 2311/DzS 3883). 
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terms of definitions which have been reached by the common agreement 
of Catholic doctors over several centuries: 
11 do not rest on such a fragile basis (as that of 
a passing philosophy); of this there is no 
doubt. They rest, rather, on principles and 
notions deduced from a true knowledge of the 
nature of created things. In making these deductions 
and coming to this knowledge, the human mind 
was enlightened by divinely-revealed truth, which 
shone upon it like a star through the Church. 11 ( 5) 
Therefore, while Pius XII admitted that the Church's 
official and traditional formulae of faith might be limited, it was 
a limitation in the extent of human knowledge which he saw as the 
root cause, rather than a limitation caused by the historical and 
cultural relativity of different conceptual schemes and linguistic 
forms. His picture of the nature of do~aa derived primarily from 
the premises of Theory (i): The nature of created things is 
changeless, and a true understanding of them provides man with a 
changeless conceptuality which is a fit analogical vehicle for 
conveying divine truths and their relationship to each other and 
the worldo The Church's language enshrines the universally true 
conceptuality, and sets forth teachings ·which - although analogical -
are not dependent for their lucidity and accuracy in conveying 
truth upon any historically contingent factorso 
By contrast, Vatican II moves more fully towards Theory (ii), 
allowing that the form of our analogical knowledge about God is 
affected by factors of culture, history, and the advance of studies 
in non-theological fields. This is why the Council did not merely 
admit pluralism into the area of undefined doctrine, but also spoke 
of the need to re-express the content of the central deposit of faith: 
"theologians • • • are invited always to look 
for a more fitting way of communicating doctrine 
to the men of their time; for the deposit of 
faith is one thing, but the way in which it is 
expressed is another, providing it is always 
according to the same sense and meaningo 11 (GS 62. 2) 
Because of the insistence of this passage upon the "same 
sense and meaning, (6) it is clear that Vatican II did not espouse 
(5) loc. cit., emphasis mine. 
(6) 1 eodem ••• sensu eademque sententia 1 -compare note (2), above. 
This passage of Guadium et Spes follows a lead given by Pope 
John XXIII in his opening address to Vatican II on 11 October 
1962 (see iA 54 (1962) Po 792)o 
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Theory (iii) • At the same time, however, it did not follow 
Pius XII in identifying all moves towards re-expression and re-
interpretation of the defined deposit with an ineluctable drift 
into scepticru. relativism. (7). The problem remains, of course, 
of determining the one true meaning and sense which attaches to 
Catholic doctrine, and Which must survive the process of re-
expression and reinterpretation. Who is to say what are the essen-
tial truths contained in Catholic dogma? And how can the appro-
priateness of new forms of expression be evaluated? 
Before we turn to consider the lVIagisterium1 s role in 
controlling and vetting possible forms of re-expression, we must 
briefly take note of the fact that Vatican II 1 s theology of faith 
has a bearing upon its theory of dogmatic language. We have seen 
that the Council treated faith as an integral whole, in which both 
assent and attitude are intimately united (see PP•211f. ). By 
and large, it abandoned talk about 'the mysteries' of faith, and 
(7) In the following passage from Humani Generis we find a pro-
gression of thought which, by association, finally links pro-
ponents of our Theory (ii) with thorough-going relativists: 
"they say that the way lies open to satisfy the 
necessities of the day by expressing dogma according to 
the concepts of modern philosophy o •• In addition to 
this, some even claim that it is possible and necessary 
to be bolder still, because the mysteries of faith can 
never be expressed adequately in correct concepts 
('notionibus ••• veris') but only in 'approximate' 
ideas as they call them; and these are always change-
able, indicating truth in some way, but always, perforce, 
distorting it, tooo Therefore they see no absurdity in 
substituting new concepts for old, holding, rather, that 
this is completely necessary for theology, which should, 
over the course of years, use various philosophies as 
tools. Thus, in different ways (and sometimes even 
through contradictory ideas all of which are said to have 
equal value) the same divine truths are rendered into 
human terms. They even go on to say that the history of 
dogma consists in translating the various forms which 
revealed truth has taken into the forms which succeed 
them, according to differing doctrines and opinions which 
have arisen in the course of the years. 
"It is clear • • • that endeavours of this kind do not 
only lead to dogmatic 'relativism', as it is called, but 
in fact contain it; indeed, it is very much favoured by 
any disrespect for the traditional common doctrine, and 
the forms in which it is expressed. 11 
(Humani Generis, p. 566 (Dz 2310f./DzS 3882f.). 
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instead stressed a single, central 'mystery', which is the object 
of relationship as much as of objective knowledge. (8) In doing 
this, the Council Fathers did not by any means adopt a theory of 
man's knowledge of God which conforms to Theory (iii) in our scheme, 
but they did stress the fact that our objective (or abstractive) 
knowledge of divine truth - expressed in the analogical language of 
doctrine - exists in immediate relation to a horizon of personal 
(and not fully expressible) knowledge of the divine mystery. V/hat 
man can say about God must ring true with what he knows of God 
in the personal, inexpressible knowledge of love. This renewed 
emphasis given by the Council to the human being's interior relation-
ship with the mystery of God's love and action, tends to indicate 
that the individual's inner experience must, to some degree, be taken 
into account as a criterion for adjudging the validity of any re-
expression of Christian doctrine. 
In order to answer briefly the question posed on po: 2483, 
namely, 'how far do dogma and definitions from the past require 
reinterpretation at all?', we may say that Vatican II gives the 
answer: They require re-expression in so far as the conceptual schemes 
in which they are couched do not remain clearly comprehensible in 
relation to changing cultural and epistemological conditions. They 
require re-expression simply in order to continue to communicate 
the same essential truths to men of different generations and cultures. 
2 How can the l'IIagisterium concretely and effectively apply 
Criteria Controlling Doctrinal Reinterpretations? 
So that we may clarify the issues surrounding the 
l'IIagisterium's control of the reinterpretation of doctrine, it will 
be helpful to have a concrete case before uso After examining this, 
we may ask what theological questions it raises, and how far 
magisterial control of this kind is socially plausible. We shall 
take as our example the debate in the Roman Catholic Church con-
(8) For example, 
"This conversion, although it is to be considered 
only a beginning, is enough for man to see himself 
as turned away from sin through it, in order to be 
introduced into the mystery of God's love; for God 
calls man to enter into personal relationship with 
himself in Christ." (AG 13.2) 
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cerning monogenism - the doctrine that the entire human race is 
descended from a single couple, from whom, in some way, original 
sin is transmitted. This debate is particularly interesting for 
us, because important episodes in it occurred both before and 
after the Second Vatican Councilo 
1'he issue of monogenism relates to quesUons concerning 
both the relationship between the Bible and dogma, and also the 
relationship between dogma and natural science. As regards the 
first of these, we should note that Pius XII reminded scholars in 
1943 that 0!1ly relatively few scriptural passages were, in themselves, 
the subjects of definitions concerning their meaning and signifi-
cance. (9) In 1948, a letter of the Pontifical Biblical Commission 
clarified what this meant in relation to the early chapters of 
Genesis: The details of the Genesis stories do not belong to the 
body of defined truth, because they belong to the field of "popular 
description" of the origin of the human race, and they take the 
form of "simple and figurative language, suited to the understanding 
of less sophisticated peoples"; (10) however, within the 'husk' of 
these details are enshrined "fundamental truths presupposed in the 
economy of salvation"o (11) We see, then, that dogma is not necessarily 
lifted directly from the pages of the Bible, nor even from any other 
pre-existent 1 source of revelation 1 ; dogma is not always immediately 
vulnerable to the effects of criticism directed against the literal 
accounts afforded in Scripture. 
With regard to the origins of the race, however, there 
has been a certain ambivalence over the question as to whether a 
single proto-couple's existence is a necessary part of the body of 
fundamental Christian truth. Pius XII could not, in 1950, see how 
the doctrine of original sin could be kept intact if Catholics came 
to accept that the human race was descended from more than one 
couple: 
(9) encycl, Divino Afflante, p. 319 (DzS 3831)o 
(10) Letter from the Secretary of the Pontifical Biblical Commission 
to Cardinal Suhard, (16 Jan. 1948) AAS 40 (1948) p. 47 
(DzS 3864) .. 
( 11 ) lac • cit. 
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"It is by no means clear how such a view 
can be made to accord with what the sources 
of revealed truth and the teachings of the 
Magisterium propose concerning the original 
cin which proceeds from a sin actually 
committed by an individual, Adam, and which 
is transmitted by generation to all men, 
so that it is present in every individual. 11 ( 12) 
Because of this incompatibility, as he saw it, between poly-
genistic theories and the dog1na concerning original sin, 
Pius XII said that Christians could not hold the view either 
that men existed after Adam who were not descended from him, or 
that 'Adam' signified a multitude of men. (13) However, the 
careful phrasing of the Pope's assault on polygenistic theories 
indicated that such prohibitions sprang from the motive of 
1 security' for the Church 1 s doctrine. If this 'security' could be 
maintained in another way - that is, if it could be shown how 
polygenism mQght be made to accord with the Church's essential 
dogma -the need for the prohibition would disappear. The idea of 
a single first couple, and its parenthood of the entire human race, 
could then be disposed of, if necessary, by being deemed merely a 
further layer of the symbolic 'husk' in which a central core of 
essential truth had been communicated inviolately throughout 
the centuries~ 
We have examined some of the theological problems 
associated with the idea of 'security', as well as its social 
implausibility, in Chapter IV (see pp.184-89) o One of the effects 
of Vatican II was to malce the principle of 'security' relatively 
even less weighty than formerly, particularly in a case such as that 
of the debate over monogenism. This was because of the Council's 
strong statement of the autonor~ and value of secular disciplines 
and their conclusions (see PP• 211-14 ); in the face of this 
affirmation, the idea of prohibiting Catholic anthropologists from 
supporting academically respectable theories in their own field, 
becomes less and less plausible if the motive is that of doctrinal 
1securi ty1 alone. 
It is significant, therefore, that after the Council, in 
(12) encycl. Humani Generis, p. 576 (Dz 2328/DzS 3897), 
( 1 3) loc. cit o 
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1968 when a Commission of Cardinals produced a declaration on the 
contents of the controvertial Dutch Catechism, the position of 
Pius XII was not taken up. Instead, a greater area of acknowledged 
uncertainty was allowed among Catholics cone erning man 1 s origin. 
The Cardinals did not specifically prohibit theories of polygenism; 
instead, they set out the bare boundaries within which Catholics 
must think if their ideas are to be compatible vv~ith what is seen as 
an essential core of the doctrine of original sin. Namely, it 
must be maintained that "man ••• rebelled against God at the 
beginning of history", and the impression must not be given by 
Catholic teachers that the effect of original sin is mediated to the 
individual simply through his environment. Within these boundaries 
the scientific debate of anthropologists concerning human origins 
is open to Catholics. (14) 
The example of the debate over monogenism is particularly 
instructive for us, because it shows that the atmosphere fostered 
by Vatican II was one in which it had become more possible to admit 
that the Church had, in the past, mistaken the symbolic 'husk' of 
a doctrine for the essential truth which lay at its core. Further-
more, the Council's encouragement of honest dialogue and mutual 
enrichment between theology and other disciplines tended to make 
any insistence upon the maintenance of the 1husk 1 of dogmas, for 
the motive of 'security', look outmoded. If real autonomy is truly 
to be allowed to the secular disciplines, and if theology is 
genuinely to step from its protected pinnacle into the arena of 
dialogue, reinterpretation of dogma is bound to take place. Wide 
areas of potential debate and uncertainty, concerning the exact 
meaning and scope of essential dogmatic truth are thus opened up by 
the Council. 
Where does the authority of the Magisterium stand, and 
what is its concrete power? In relation to the atmosphere which 
Vatican II fostered, a foreclosure of areas of debate through the 
exercise of sheer authority looks increasingly implausible. Whilst 
a decisive prohibitive move would not exceed the theoretical scope 
(14) Declaration of the Commission of Cardinals (15 October 1968) 
AAS 60 (1968) PPo 687fo 
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of magisterial power as set forth by the Council, it would almost 
certainly overreach the Magj_sterium 1 s effective power to elicit 
assent from all Catholics. 
We find, then, that the fruit of Vatican II 1 s admission 
of the necessity for re-expression and reinterpretation of the 
truths of faith has an inbuil t potential to create a situation in 
the Church rather different to that which the Council intended; for, 
whilst the Council Fathers held that there was a constant and 
unchanging meaning to doc·trine which might readily be expressed 
through different forms in relation to man's increasing and 
changing knowledge, it seems, in fact, that this constant meaning 
may be difficult to locate. Not only may one debate whether or not 
a meaning is appropriately communicated in any particular setting, 
but one may also question whether a particular idea belongs to the 
essence, or merely to the 'husk' of Catholic dogma. Because Vatican 
II ratified the social end cultural pluralism which sparks off 
such debates and questions in the first place, it contributed a 
powerfUl element to an atmosphere in which the halting of debate 
through sheer authority increasingly seems arbitrary, even when 
the concept of 'securi ty 1 in believing is called upon as justification 
for the Magisterium 1 s action. 
What, then, must be the concrete results of Vatican II's 
teaching? Either the Magisterium must be prepared to leave many 
areas of debate and uncertainty open, even at the risk of seeming 
to cede ground over what is essential in the Church 1 s doctrine; or 
else, it may use the powers which Vatican II left to it for the 
talcing of decisions with disciplinary effect - decisions which uphold 
its own interpretation of the defined body of doctrine inherited 
from the past. In taking such decisions, particularly if they should 
seem to have been taken without delicacy, the hierarchy runs the 
risk of creating a set of demands for belief which are implausible 
to a significant body of Catholics, and which may therefore prompt 
either interior emigration from the norms of obedience, or else 
large-scale public defections from the Church. We may say, then, 
that the Magisterium can only apply criteria controlling reinter-
pretation and re-expression of dogma effectively if it does so with 
the greatest delicacy, and with arguments which convince by their own 
merits; otherwise its theoretically great authority may become 
increasingly ineffectual in the hearts and minds of Catholicso 
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Conclusion 
We return to the overarching question of this section: 
What kind of assent should be afforded to past statements of the 
'infallible' Magisteriurn? Clearly, assent does not amount to mere 
verbal repetition of fonnulae of the past; indeed, Vatican II 
shows that active assent may involve a degree of reinterpretation 
and re-expression. Clearly, too, the Magisterium of the present 
has an interest in such reinterpretations and re-expressions, and 
the Council does not rescind the Catholic's duty to be guided by 
the boundaries which the hierarchy sets upon the hermeneutical 
process. However, there are factors within the Council's own 
teaching which add impetus to rebellions against the Magisterium 1 s 
decisions - namely, the factors which encourage pluralism, enhance 
the autonomy of secular disciplines, and make the idea of 1security1 
a more questionable ecclesiastical value than it used to beo Finally, 
we should add that most decisions of the Magisteriurn concerning the 
interpretation of defined doctrine inherited from the past do not 
themselves have the form of 'infallible' pronouncements. Therefore, 
although any such decision may have immediate and concrete effect 
upon the disciplinary activity of the hierarchy, it is not itself 
immune from debate - by theologians at least! (See Chapter IV, 
pp.l87-89 ) • 
B) The Plausibility of Future Dogmatic Pronouncements 
Karl Rahner has asserted that the Magisterium may not, 
in future, be able to formulate~ emphatic doctrinal pronounce-
ments, because the unity of theology, which is their presupposition, 
no longer exists. (15) We have already exffinined in some detail the 
ways in which Vatican II contributed on several fronts to.the 
break-up of a common conceptual scheme among Catholics, and thus to 
~ 
pluralism in theology. To this, we must add the fact that the 
Council so strongly emphasised the role of cQnsensus in the 
fonnation of dogma (see PP• 196-99 ) • I promised in Chapter IV to 
consider further the importance of Vatican II's concept of 
consensus, and the time has now come to do so. In the present 
(15) See "Pluralism in Theology and the Unity of the Church's 
J!"'aith" in Conciliurn, 6, no. 5 (1969) p. 56. 
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section, therefore, we shall first examine in the abstract the 
relationship of the idea of consensus to the plausibility of the 
proposal of future dogmas; secondly, we shall consider the links 
between consensus and pluralism in theology, and look at the 
combined effect of these factors upon the Magisterium 1 s capacity ·' 
to give plausible definitions. 
1 Consensus and the Proposition of Dogma 
I suggested in Chapter IV that Vatican II 1s explicit 
treatment of the role which consensus plays in the formulation of 
Church dogma should be viewed in intimate combination with the 
actual history which preceded the Council - namely, the fact that 
both the definition of the Immaculate Conception and the dogma of 
the Assumption had been pronounced by Popes after they had carried 
out a process of consultation, aimed at discovering the mind of the 
faithful. I hinted that, in terms of social plausibility, this 
association of events with Vatican II's teaclung on consensus has the 
effect of creating an atmosphere in which a groundwork of harmony 
in the Church is the normal and necessary condition for the accept-
ability of a new solemn definition. Strictly speaking, the 
Magisterium continues to reserve to itself the power to make 
defini tiona without a preceding consensus (and this is clearly stated 
in LG 25. 3, in connection with the Pope 1 s 1infallible1 teaching 
authority); nevertheless, it seems highly unlikely, if not absolutely 
impossible, that a magisterial statement which did not embody or 
cohere with the previously existing belief of the great bulk of the 
Church could, in the future, create conviction through the force of 
its sheer au.thori ty. 
It might be argued that this assertion in fact claims 
nothing that is new. There have been occasions in the past when the 
definitions of the Roman See have failed to win universal assent in 
the Church. This has not prevented Peter's successor from giving 
such teaching, even though the result has been to strengthen or create 
barriers of belief, communion, and discipline between those of the 
Roman obedience, and those who could not accept it. Why should there 
be new significance in the fact that any conceivable future dogmatic 
pronouncement would probably cause a rift between those who are at 
present united in communion with the Petrine See? 
260 
The answer to this is twofold: In the first place, we 
must note that the teaching of Vatican II confirms the Roman 
Catholic Church's place within the modern ecumenical current. 
This current, driving towards the visible unity of all Christians, 
runs absolutely counter to any moves which would create or formalise 
new divisioDs among Christians. The ecwnenical atmosphere which 
Vatican II endorsed, therefore, gives added sharpness to questions 
about what is or is not plausible within the Roman Catholic Church. 
Secondly, the problem of creating heartfelt conviction through the 
sheer authority of solemn pronouncements is much more complex in 
the light of the Council's theology than it was in earlier contexts: 
Because of the new emphasis on interior belief- the individual's 
sense of faith- and on the value of the Church's corporate consensus, 
those who wish to remain loyal to the teachings of the Roman See and 
the bishops may nevertheless be open to an inner tension in the face 
of controversial decisions given from on hi§h. The weight of external 
authority has to be put in the balance against the weight of other 
factors in a sincere Catholic 1 s mind; conviction is less easily 
attained than it used to be through the bare requirement for assent. 
To illustrate this argument, we shall examine more closely 
Vatican II's teaching on the role played by the individual's sense 
of faith, particularly in the development of doctrine. It is, 
after all, in the course of doctrine's development that new definitions 
are born. 
The term 'sense of faith' ('sensus fidei') is used in 
LG 12o1 for the first time in a magisterial document. However, this 
is not to say that the idea was new in Catholic theologyo An 
interior sense of the faith had long been recognised by theologians 
as being an essential characteristic of the Christian life. It is 
a grace-given capacity for the apprehension of Christian truth; it 
has never been seen as the guarantee of each individual Catholic's 
1infallibility 1in belief, but the use of the concept indicated 
that: 
"the Christian • • o enters into the truth 
in an interior way, and his active relation to 
it is never that of a stranger. It is, indeed, 
the task of each member of the People of God 
to appropria~he content of the Church's 
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faith so profoundly that he becomes -in the 
unity which he maintains and develops with the 
magisterium - a living depositary of this 
faith, and an aware witness of its object. 11 (16) 
The consensus of the faithful, of which LG 1 2.1 also speaks, is 
the corporate manifestation of the interior activity of the sense 
of faith in all catholic Christians. It is in this corporate form 
only that the sense of faith is deemed to give 1infallible'witness 
to what is trueo Clearly, however, the corporate witness depends 
upon the reality of individual faith from which it springs. 
How does the individual's s'ense of f'ai th operate? This 
is the question at issue. Franzelin saw it as being a chiefly 
receptive and reflective capacity; through the sense of faith 
which he possesses the individual Catholic is enabled to receive and 
'. 
to reflect back the teaching of the hierarchy. Corporately, the 
entire Church reflects this teaching with indefectible accuracy. (17) 
If we turn from this example of classic nineteenth-century thought 
to the teaching given by Vatican II, however, we find that the 
individual's sense of faith is conceived very differently; indeed, 
it is attributed an active role in the development of doctrinal 
understanding in the Church: 
11
.rhe Tradition which comes to us from the 
Apostles progresses in the Church under the 
assistance of the Holy Spirit; this is 
because the apprehension of both words and 
other things which have been handed down 
increases by means of the contemplation and 
study of believers, who mediate on these 
things in their hearts • • o also through 
the deep knowledge of spiritual matters 
which they attain through experience, and 
also through the preaching of those who have 
received a sure charism of truth with their 
succession in the episcopate. 11 (DV 8. 2) 
Although the precise term 'sense of faith' is not 
used in this passage, we see here a very clear picture of the 
active operation of the Holy Spirit in the hearts and minds of 
( 16) Go Martelet, Les idees ma1:tresses de Vatican II (Paris, 
1969) PPo 56fo 
(17) See Tractatus de Divina Traditione et Scriptura, pp. 103-106. 
262 
believers, giving them a dynamic relationship to the things they 
receive through Tradition. The order in which the passage mentions 
the different factors involved in the development of Tradition -
putting the contribution of the hierarchy's preaching last (18) -
serves to stress the high significance which Vatican II gave to 
an active sense of faith among Christians. 
What is the Tradition which is developed by the contem-
plation, study, and experience of believers? The use of the word 
'Traditiont has at least a double-sided meaning in Dei Verbum. On 
the one side, it designates a process of transmission, and on the 
other, the content which is transmitted by that process - that is, 
the content of the Gospel and the Christian way of life as they are 
received and understood throughout the ageso Therefore, the 
believer's sense of faith is related to Tradition in two ways: Its 
activity is a part of Tradition, in as much as Tradition is a 
process; it contributes to Tradition, and helps to form it, in as 
much as Tradition is the content or object of a processo 
Within the content of Tradition is to be found Scripture, 
the "speech of God" ( 1 locutio Dei 1 · (DV 9)), but Scripture is not all 
there is to the "vlord of God" ('verbum Dei' (loc. cit.)) which 
Tradition transmits. Scripture is the b~iding norm for the Church, 
as Dei Verbum freshly emphasises, but it cannot be understood apart 
from the living Tradition which passes it on and deepens the 
Church's apprehension of its meaning. 
What does this mean for the authority of the Magisterium? 
The answer must be that the hierarchy's responsibility for the 
formulating of developed doctrine is not removed, but that it cannot 
make solemn formulations in isolation. DV 10.2 says that the 
Magisterium is not above God's word; in the context of the Council's 
teaching on Tradition we see that this suggests that the teaching 
authority h1.s to t hear 1 God 1 s Word from the community, as well as 
from Scripture itself and from the great teachers of the pasto There 
is a complex interplay between the Bible, the Magisterium, 
(18) The fact that there is any mention at all in this passage of 
the hierarchy's role in developing the Church's understanding 
of doctrine is the result of a late addition to the text. See 
B.,,.;D. Dupuy, "Histoire de la constitution" in Vatican II: La 
Rev~lation Divine, 1, ed. Dupuy. (Paris, 1968) PP• 113f. 
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theologians, and the interpretation of life and faith which makes 
sense to the great bulk of Catholicso 
This is not to say that the voice of the majority has 
been made straightforwardly normative for magisterial teaching. 
However, as part of the great stream of Tradition, it is a factor 
which cannot be ignored or simply overruled. Vatican II's teaching 
on the nature of Tradition entrenches the active role of the 
generality of Catholics in bringing new understandings and dogmas 
to birth. In doing so, the Council mqy be said to have made a 
significant contribution to a new atmosphere in the Church - an 
atmosphere in which Catholics may find the Magisterium plausible 
as the voice of their developing faith, rather than as an 
independent interpreter of revelation, or as the judge of the 
community's developing understanding. 
2 Consensus 2 Theological Pluralism, and the Plausibility of 
Future Definitions 
As we have seen, the Council brought the concept of 
consensus in belief firmly to the fore. At the same time, however, 
its openness to theological pluralism made it more difficult to 
conceive that such a consensus might ever be reached with regard to 
any point of faith which is as yet unestablishedo Not only does a 
breakdown in unified conceptuality and language militate against 
the finding of universal satisfactory formulas for new definitions, 
as Ra!mer pointed out (see P•258', ) , but we may also note that the 
questions and issues raised for Christian theology in the context 
of varied cultural and philosophical settings seem likey to differ 
radically, so that it becomes hard to envisage a unified world-wide 
desire for a single solemn pronouncement arising, in the way that 
a consensus -desire for the definition of the Assumption existed 
prior to 1950. Finally, we should also comment that the Council's 
openness to critical approaches in biblical study, and its encourage-
ment of theology's dialogue with other disciplines, shifts the 
emphasis towards the analytical exposition of what is given in 
Tradition, and particularly towards the endeavour of hermeneutics, 
so that the construction of dogmatic certainties loses its pride of 
place in the pattern of Catholic theology. 
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It might be argued that this shift is of interest only 
to academic theologians, and that the 'simple faithful' are less 
affected by elements encouraging pluralism in faith and its 
expression. One might suggest that the non-academic body of believers 
is united in spiritual certainties which are universally communicable, 
and that these certainties are elaborated and penetrated more 
deeply through interior contemplation, rather than through the 
culturally-conditioned and historically limited discussions of 
theology. During the period surrounding the definition of the dogma 
of the Assumption a similar contrast - between the intuitive faith 
of the simple faithful, and the logically based movements of 
scholarship - was certainly drawno (19) It was suggested that 
theologians should properly record the verdict 'not proven' upon 
a doctrine which was supported only by an ensemble of converging 
indications; the simple faithful, on the other hand, could whole-
heartedly affirm this doctrine's truth, by virtue of the intuitive 
grasp upon divine reality afforded by their sense of faith. Once 
the doctrine came to be defined solemnly by the Magisterium however, 
it was the theologi~1s 1 attitude which had to change, for they had 
now to accept the doctrine as certain because of the papal act. The 
sense of faith of the laity, on the other hand, was merely confirmed and 
vindicated by the magisterial pronouncement. 
If this contrast is translated into the terms of the 
contemporary situation, one might suppose that a great body of popular 
belief could be reinforced by the Magisterium's declaration, in such 
a way as to provide a definitive barrier against any further critical 
study or philosophical debate on a certain point. A popular 
acclamation might provide the substance of a new dogma, despite 
hesitations and controversies among theologians concerning the 
definition's appropriatenesso 
(19) For example, P. Rousselot contrasted the assent given by theologian 
and layman to a dogma such as that of the Assumption in this way: 
"The theologian, like any good Catholic, gives his assent, but 
does so only on extrinsic grounds, namely that the Church has 
defined the proposition ••• he needs the mediation of the authori-
tative Church inserting the verb~ and offering her testimony 
to satisfy him, for he himself does not have the keenly developed 
sense necessary to seize the truth directly and by itself. He is 
in harmony with the truth, but in its more dilute and less personw. 
stat eo 11 (Note sur le developpment du dogma" in Recherches des 
Sciences R;ligieuses, 37 (1950) p. 120). It appears here that 
theologians are at a positive disadvantage, as compared to laymen 
who have not blunted their intuitive ( 1 illative 1 ) sense of faith 
by too much logic! 
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Against this argument we may bring these points: 
Firstly, as has already been noted, belief exists in people's 
minds alongside a great variety of different questions and concerns. 
As Vatican II fostered the sense of individuality of local and 
regional churches, so too, by implication, it fostered a sense that 
Christian faith must come to terms with local issues and forms of 
thought - in the minds of simple believers as much as in the work 
of theologi.ans. Secondly, we have seen that the Council enlarged 
the access of lay people to the arenas of fonaal theological study 
(GS 62.7, GE 10. 2), speaking clearly of the f'reedom which students -
both clerical and lay - should enjoy in their thinking, and in 
expressing the fruits of their considerations (GS 62.7). The results, 
therefore, of all the shifts we have noted towards critical and 
analytical attitudes, and towards hermeneutics and pluralism in 
theological expression, are not to be confined to a closed, clerical 
circle. This kind of thinking is to be accessible to the laity too, 
in so far as they take an interest in theology. Indeed, through 
the education of their pastors, the laity are bound to be influenced 
by the moves towards pluralism to some extent, even when they do not 
consciously set out to broaden the scope of their thinking and con-
templation. Finally, we must notice that Vatican II made no 
artificial divide between a spiritual apprehension of the truth and 
an academic understanding, for in DV 8.2 the Council explicitly said 
that doctrine progresses both through the contemplation and also 
through the study of believers. The two stand together, and cannot 
really be ceparated, for it is impossible to divorce one's spiritual 
understanding of faith entirely from the effects of any convincing 
critical approach to it which one has imbibed, whether consciously 
or unconsciously. 
We find, then, that the factors making for pluralism in 
Christians! concerns and means of expression, are by no means 
debarred from influencing any part of the Tradition-process in the 
Church. Critical pluralistic, and analytical attitudes were given 
the possibility of becoming embedded in the very heart of Catholic 
belieYing and thiruting. As a result, it is difficult to envisage 
a smoothly unfolding movement of near-universal belief and expression, 
such as might be the basis for a new dogma evoked by consensus. 
266 
So far we have discussed the likelihood (or rather, 
the unlikelihood) of a consensus being achieved on a new formula 
for the definition of a doctrine; we have not, however, con-
sidered the issue of consensus in the Church on a moral question, 
and to this we must now turn. 
I suggested in Chapter IV that there is an 'either/or' 
quality about many forms of human action - a quality which does 
not inhere in the srune way in for.ms of language and expression 
(see Po 24~j). It is because of this that the individual may not be 
so free to reinterpret points of official moral teaching simply by 
sheltering under the claim of 'good faith'. There are moral 
sticking-points, at which one either obeys or disobeys the ethical 
norms of the Church. These sticking-points of established teaching 
may serve to rally consensus in the Christian community, so that the 
hierarchy does not act in a controversial way if it excludes from 
the sacramental life those who transgress certain commonly accepted 
and officially established norms. 
However, we have also commented upon the fact that there 
are pressUl~es for pluralism in moral understanding and behaviour, 
but that Vatican II did not cede su£ficiently to these to avoid 
tensions between the Mag'isterium and the individual in the era 
following the Council (see Chapter IV, p.230 )o These pressures 
arise both from the fact that ethical decisions have to be taken in 
areas where practical expertise and judgement concerning the results 
of any action may be decisive (the area of 'mixed questions'), and 
also from differing evaluations of the relative weight of different 
a priori moral values (see ppo235-46 ) • These factors making for 
pluralisn are probably forceful enough to inhibit the proclamation 
of new moral definitions on many, as-yet unresolved questions. How-
ever, there may be some cases where an activity whj_ch has not yet 
been proscribed explicitly nevertheless appears to be so plainly in 
contradiction to the established patterns of Catholic morality that 
there is a basis for definj_tive action to be taken by the hierarchy 
without antagonising any signj_ficant section of Church opinion. 
Such definitive action may take the form of excmmnunication rather 
than of a solemn, universal pronouncement on the matter in question. 
However, we may see excommunication as the practical expression of 
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that power which defines the boundaries of the Church. Therefore, 
the plausible and effective use of the authority to excommunicate 
individuals or groups must be correlated with a broad consensus in 
the community which supports such judicial action, in the same way 
as a solemn definition would have to be correlated with a consensus. 
I suggest, then, that in regard to the moral teachi.ng 
of the Church the definitive action of formally excommunicating 
someone remains effectively open to the hierarchy in cases where the 
defence of 'good faith' in the reinterpretation of teaching cannot 
be adduced. The offender may either incur excommunication for actions 
which clearly contravene explicit and established teaching, or he 
may have committed actions of such a kind as to be plai.nly incompatible 
with any moral system measured by a Christian hierarchy of values. 
The hierarchy's decision to cut him off from the sacramental life of 
the community may well express a broad consensus within the People 
of God on such issues. On the other hand, if the relationship of 
the action in question to the moral values of the Gospel is a matter 
of controversy within the Christian community, the hierarchy's act 
of excormnunication might seem implausible to some other Catholics, 
and lead either to a state of 'interior emigration' from loyalty, 
within the minds of people who would yet remain officially within 
the Church, or to open defections. 
Conclusion 
In this section we have followed a line of- argument which 
leads us to broad agreement with Karl Rahner's statement that the 
Magisterium may not, in future, be able to formulate new emphatic 
doctrinal pronouncements, because of the breakdown in unified 
theological discourse. We have also seen that this breakdown in 
the unity of discourse gains force through association with Vatican 
II's stress on consensus, and the atmosphere of expectation which 
this fostered concerning the relationship of the Magisterium to the 
sense of faith of the universal community of Catholics. 
On the other hand, I have argued that there may be some 
areas of moral decision in which unity of thought and expression 
within the Jhurch is attainable, enabling the Magisterium to take 
a judicial stand which is generally found plausible. Such areas 
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will be rare, because so many new ethical problems arise 
precisely because moral thought must come to terms with more and 
more 1mixed questions•, in which factors of technical and practical 
judgement are closely bound up. In addition, the concept of a 
hierarchy of values throws some of the traditional Catholic 
patterns of thought into doubt and debateo Nevertheless, there 
may be new moral questions whose elements bear a sufficiently 
analogous relationship to established and accepted moral positions 
and prohibitions for there to be a new consensus within the 
Catholic community, giving plausible grounds for definitive action 
by the hierarchy in its guardianship of the boundaries of Church 
membership. 
The argument of this section does not amount to a claim 
that the Roman Catholic Church after Vatican II is likely to be 
held together more by orthopraxis than by orthodoxy. It does not 
amount to such a claim precisely because a wide variety of concrete 
ethical decisions and attitudes remain acceptable within the broad 
boundaries which the hierarchy guards. There is, then, no single 
orthopraxis on many, many issues. Nevertheless, we may tentatively 
suggest that one of the results of the teaching of the Second Vatican 
Council is to make the Catholic Church relatively more intolerant 
of un-Christian behaviour than of unfamiliar expressions of faith 
amongst its members. 
CHAPTER VI: 
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A REVIEW OF VATICAN II'S CONCEPT OF OBEDIENCE IN 
THE CHURCH, AND A CONSIDERATION OF ITS IMPLICATIONS 
FOR THE DOCTRINES OF GOD AND MAN IN THEIR 
RELATIONSHIP 
In Chapter I of this thesis, I put forward the argument 
that the idea of obedience which appears within the context of any 
ecclesiology should be amenable to correlation with a consistent 
set of doctrines concerning the nature and relationship of God and 
man. This is because ecclesiology is the major area of theology 
dealing with the conditions of the divine-human encounter (see p. 32). 
I went on, in the same chapter, to give a typology of correlations bet-
ween different ways in which ecclesiastical obedience may be 
presented, and the various concepts of God and man which they entail. 
Since we have completed our examination of the doctrine of obedience in 
the Church which the Second Vatican Council put forward, we may now 
review the results of this study in the light of Chapter I 1 s typology 
of correlations. 
The reader will remember that the first part of our 
typology was concerned with the Church's mediatorial role- that is, 
the way in which the Church functions as a sign of God 1 s authority 
and truth, or the way in which it mediates the conditions which are 
necessary if man is to have a conscious and explicit relationship 
with God. l put forward three motifs by which we may analyse 
different presentations of the Church's mediatorial role. They were: 
(a) The idea of the Church as a witness; (b) the idea that the 
Church embodies the divine presence and authority; and (c) the idea 
that God is represented in the Church. These motifs are relevant 
to the idea of obedience because they qualify the concept of 
ecclesiastical ~thority's source and justification, according to its 
mediatorial function in relation to God's own authority. 
The second part of the typology presented four pictures 
of God which should be correlated with the different possible kinds 
of 1 content 1 in the obedience which the Church may require. The 
pictures in question were: (a) The God who is eternal king and judge; 
(b) the God who is creator and legislator of the universal natural 
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order; (c) the God who is liberator and covenant lord; and (d) the 
God who shares his creative activity with man. We also explored the 
correlations between these four pictures of God and one aspect of 
the Church's mediatorial role -namely, its role wlth regard to 
revelation. 
Finally, in the third part of the typology we focused 
particularly upon man, in his relationship to God, drawing out the 
concepts of man entailed in the different ideas of ecclesiastical 
obedience. We made a special study of the history of man's relation-
ship to God; in connection with this we particularly examined the 
concept of sin and its effects upon man's openness to the divine at 
different 'moments' -namely, in the basic human condition of 
createdness, in the condition of fallenness, in the state of grace 
which may be enjoyable in this world, and in the state of final 
salvation. 
The present chapter will fall into three sections, 
corresponding to the three parts of the typology. In each section 
we shall r£rview the teaching of Vatican II which has been studied 
in Chapters II-V, and try to draw from it the concepts of God and 
man which are its proper correlates. 
A) Obedience and the Church's Mediatorial Role 
This section will be divided into three sub-sections, in 
each of Which we shall explore the implications of one aspect of 
Vatican II's ideal. of ecclesiastical obedience. The aspects which 
we shall examine are: (1) The Council's concept of the canonical 
obedience which is due to the government of the hierarchy; (2) the 
Council's teaching on the assent and obedience which it is proper to 
render to the doctrinal teaching of the.Magisterium; and (3) the 
Council's teaching on proper obedience to the Magisterium in ethical 
matters. 
Because we are considering the question of the ideal of 
obedience which the Council intentionally put forward, we shall no 
longer be concerned with the issue of the social plausibility of 
its teaching. Our analysis at this stage of the thesis bears upon the 
question of inner, theological coherence in the documents of Vatican II, 
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rather than upon issues of the document's external consistency vvith the 
factors of social behaviour. 
1 What Kind of Mediatorial Role Belonging to the Church is 
Implied by Vatican II 1 s Ideal of the Canonical Obedience which 
Should be Rendered to the Government of the Hierarchy? 
In Chapter II of this thesis I suggested that the Church 
was pictured by Vatican II as having no jurisdiction over the seculax 
affairs of the world; her approach to the world must therefore be a 
, pastoral and invitatory one, as she seeks to stimulate the growth of 
the terrestrial city towards its true end -the summing up of all 
things in Christ (see pp. 138f. and 144). This theological 
elaboration of the idea that the secular world has its own autonomy 
and destiny was worked out particularly in connection with the Council's 
treatment of the status and role of the Christian layman. He invites 
the world to find its true end both by witnessing to that end 
(pointing to the kingdom which is yet to come), and also by embodying 
in himself something of that kingdom, through his baptismal character, 
which gives him real participation in the present activity of God to-
wards the world. The Church, then, being made up of such Christians, 
is both a witnessing, inviting sign in the face of the secular world, 
and also a substantial sacrament of the world's salvation, partici-
pating already in the divine unity to which the whole created order is 
called by God's authority. (1) 
I argued that the Second Vatican Council's concept of the 
authority of the hierarchy was modified, at least partly, by the 
( 1) LG 1 
LG 9.3 
LG 48.2 
- "the Church is, in Christ, like a sB,Grament, or sign and 
instrument, of communion with God, and of the entire 
human race's unitY." (see also GS 42.3). 
- "God ••• called the Church together, and founded it, to 
be the visible sacrament to one and all of this saving 
unity." (see also SC 2~.1), 
- "through (the Spirit) he founded his body, the Church, 
to be the universal sacrament of salvation." (see also 
AG 5.1 and GS 45.1), 
GS 43.6 - "the Church ••• has never ceased to be the sign of 
salvation in the world" 
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location of this authority within a Church which has such a primarily 
invi tatory function: "The picture of hierarchical authority as largely 
invitatory reflects the fact that the Church has no jurisdiction 
in the secular sphere" (p. 138). The hierarchy has to relate its 
authority to persons who clearly have their ovfll sphere of theologically 
guaranteed autonomy, that is, to the laity which lives at the inter-
face between the Church and the world, and whose task it is to issue 
God's invitation there. The hierarchy has to exercise canonical 
power over those who, in themselves embody something of God's active 
presence, and witness to his invitatory authority in a way proper 
to themselves. This is the contextual constraint which modifies the 
Council's picture of the hierarchy's role in representing God's demands 
to men. 
It is not only this new context, however, which modifies 
Vatican II's concept of hierarchical authority. The Council also 
qualifies the idea of representational authority's origin, and sets 
forward a renewed and modified picture of the way in which canonical 
power should properly be exercised. Together, these qualifications 
and shifts of emphasis combine to suggest that it is repre~entational 
authority's primary function to be an invitatory sign within the 
Christian community itself (see pp. 117ff.). 
The qualification in the Council's concept of the original 
nature of representational authority stems from the fact that it 
correlates the bishop's role as vicar and legate of Christ with the 
doctrine that all his powers flow from his sacramental consecration 
(see p. 124). Here we find the idea that a substantial embodiment 
of God's power (through sacramental consecration) is the grounds for 
the exercise of representational authority. We also find an 
imrnediate association of this embodiment and representation, on the one 
hand, with the role of being a witness, on the other. Therefore, 
because the hierarchy's representational role is so closely and 
organically linked with other 1nodes of expressing God's presence and 
authority, we may say that canonical authority comes to share largely 
in the invitatory qualities of sacrament and preaching (see pp. 122-26). 
The qualification in Vatican II 1 s delineation of the proper 
exercise of canonical authority is found ih the Council's great 
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emphasis upon pastoral and ministerial themes (see pp. 101-05). 
One might say that this emphasis on a certain way of acting when in 
ecclesiastical office amounts to no more than mere exhortation; 
however, as exhortation it is deeply rooted in theological ideas -
it is not, therefore, merely cosmetic. Nor does it lack parallels in 
the Council's concept of obedience, for we saw that Vatican II stressed 
that the Christian under authority should show quali-ties of initiative, 
responsibility, readiness to make his views known, and active love 
(see pp. 171-73). In this way the Catholic m~ actively contribute 
to the ministry and mission of the Church, which is his concern as 
well as the hierarchy's. 
Both the internal qualification in Vatican II 1 s concept of 
the very nature and source of representational authority, and also 
the qualifications in its description of the practical exercise of 
authority and obedience, constitute significant shifts on the 
theological plane. They should not be overlooked or undervalued 
simply because the Council gave these modifications no power to 
impose themselves on behavibur, save through the influence of theo-
logical argumentation and the atmosphere it prcimoteso The limited 
concrete constraints which Vatican II did place upon the exercise of 
representational authority in the canonical sphere arise more from 
the logical development of its doctrine that the entire Church embodies 
and witnesses to the presence of God - that is, from the ecclesiastical 
context within which the hierarchy exists -than from any aim to 
give concrete expression to modifications in the doctrine of repre-
sentational authority in itself (see pp. 156-64). 
We find, then, that the Second Vatican Council's picture of 
canonical authority and obedience is linked to a very complex notion 
of the way in which the Church mediates the presence and authority of 
God. In relation to the rest of the world, the Church speaks with 
the authority of a witness to what God has done and will do, yet its 
authority is greater than tha:t of a~ witness pointing only to 
something beyond itself, because the Christian community also 
embodies the divine presence, (albeit in a diffuse way which does not 
admit one strictly to identify the actions of the Church with the 
actions of God). Because the Christian community mediates God's 
presence to the world in this complex way, compounded of witness and 
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diffuse embodiment, it speaks to the world with the authority not 
of command, but of invitation ( 1 We witness that this is the way of 
the kingdom; accept it if you will, and so be ordered according to 
God's purpose.' 'Come, share with us the divine resources which God 
has embodied in the Church~') 
Within the Church, there is a group of people who mediate 
the divine authority by representing it to all who will obey. 
Their representation is not solely based on an exterior, quasi-legal 
commission to stand in Christ's place of authority; no, their 
commission is also grounded in the particular degree to which they 
participate in the consecrating presence of God, and in the peculiar 
nature of their vocation to the apostolic mission of witness. However, 
even these components of their qualification to stand as God's 
representatives in authority do not have the effect of guaranteeing 
identity of their commanding activity with the commands which God 
himself would issue. The capacity to make requirements, and to 
exercise discipline, does continue to inhere in the holders of 
representational authority in such a way that, as persons, they set 
forth the pattern of relationship subsisting between God and men: He 
can impose limiting requirements upon his saving relationship to 
individuals, and he holds the role of judge. In the same way, the 
hierarchy can limit enjoyment of the benefits of Church membership, 
and can act in the role of a disciplinary judge. This is not to say, 
however, that the hierarchy's concrete decisions necessarily correspond 
to the divine decision concerning the conditions of salvation, nor 
that its juigements reflect with complete accuracy the judgements of 
heaven. 
If there is pain involved in obeying the decisions and 
demands of the ecclesiastical authorities, this pain may have its 
source in one of two facts: either, it may originate simply from the 
inherent cost involved in fulfilling the divine will (cost from 
which the incarnate Son was not exempt); or it may originate from the 
fact that, at any given time, the commands of the hierarchy may indeed 
rightly offend the individual's assessment of what is necessary for 
the good of the Church community and for its mission. Whatever the 
real grounds of the pain, however, the Council continues to teach that 
obedience has, of itself, representational and redemptive value in 
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the world, Tbis value is correlated to the hierarchy's 
representation of the pattern of God 1 s authoritative relationship to 
men (see pp. 175-79). We find, then, that in the sphere of 
canonical authority and obedience the Second Vatican Council 
ultimately pinned representational significance onto persons and 
their typical roles in relation to one another, rather than onto 
the representational validity of these persons' specific, concrete 
acts. 
2.. 1Jifhat Kind of Mediatorial Role Belonging to the Church is 
Implied by Vatican II 1 s Ideal of Assent and Obedience in 
Matters of Doctrinal Teaching? 
As in the case of canonical authority, we find that the 
Second Vatican Council effectively qualified the earlier idea of 
representational teaching both by setting it within a new context -
in which the entire Church's function of embodying God's truth, and of 
witnessing to it, is emphasised - and also by nuancing the very 
concept of the nature of doctrinal formulation. 
The modification in conte%t comes about through the 
Council's renewed stress on the creative role of the sense of faith 
in appropriating and developing doctrine within the understanding 
of the People of God (see Chapter II, pp. 142f. and Chapter IV, 
pp. 197-99 and p. 205). This concept of the Christian's sense of 
faith brings to the fore the interiority of faith; faith constitutes 
not just a formal profession, but an entire attitude to life in 
which the springs of both action and of outward confession are 
integrated: 11 DV 5 defined 1 the obedience of faith 1 as that by 
which man 1 freely corrmd:t s himself totally to God, giving 1 full 
assent of mind and will to God who reveals' and assenting 
voluntarily to the revelation given by him.' 11 (p. 211). Faith 
is defined by relationship to God, and it is in the context of this 
relationship that the sense of faith comes to ever deeper under-
standing of doctrine, and is able to test the contemporary adequacy 
of outward expressions and formulations. This is the living 
Tradition through which doctrine is developed, until it is manifested 
by a consensus on a certain formulation - a consensus which gives 
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witness to the interior perception of a truth by the whole People 
of God (see pp. 198f.). 
I have used the phrase 1gives witness' on purpose here; 
it expresses a shift in Vatican II's concept of the function of even 
representational language. Such language points to something 
beyond itself. It does not enshrine truth in an unalterable way, 
although it should convey it or evoke its recognition. The language 
of dogma may, in itself, be expendable if it becomes culturally 
obsolete: This is the position towards which the though-t of Vatican II 
moves (see pp. 214-25 and Chapter V, PP• 249-53). However, in order to 
examine more fully this nuancing in the notion of the very nature of 
representational mediation of truth, we must first consider Vatican II's 
treatment of the wider motif of witnessing. 
The idea of the witness which is borne to God's revealing 
acts is immediately to be correlated with Vatican II's increased 
stress on the interiority of faith. Not only does the person who 
bears witness give testimony to that which he knows and understands 
through the knowledge of love within himself, but he also makes his 
appeal or invitation directly to the heart of his hearer. The 
effectiveness of witness is not usually to be measured by the 
accuracy with which the formulae used are adopted and reproduced by 
the hearer, but rather by his interior response, to which outward 
fruits bear evidence. It is only in some cases that accuracy of 
formulation may be counted muong the necessary outward fruits. These 
special cases are those in which witness, or preaching, takes the 
form of a sub-species- 'representational teaching'. Even in these 
cases, accuracy of formulation must be relative to cultural and 
epistemological context. 
Since Vatican II treated appropriate representational 
teaching as a sub-species of the wider function of preaching, we 
find that the dynamic function of doctrinal teaching is brought to the 
fore in the Council's thought. Similarly, the Magisterium 1 s special 
teaching role is located within a general apostolic context of 
mission, and we also find that the hierarchy's missionary endeavour is 
posited wii;'1in a general movement of witness belonging to the whole 
Church (see Chapter II, PP• 98-100 and 106-08). 
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Our analysis of the relationship between witness and 
interiority of belief gives us the necessary background against which 
to consider the particularly problematical area of doctrine 
concerning the nature of dogmatic language. This language should be 
a guaxanteed expression of the truth which the entire Church conveys 
when it witnesses to its faith, or at least an expression to which 
all ca:&holics may assent as a proper statement of the condition 
and form of their interior relationship to God. It is the task of 
the lVIagisterium to supply, or protect the form and signification of 
dogmatic language. 
Vatican II's modification of the idea of dogmatic language 
arises through the Council's acceptance of the notion that human 
language only conveys concepts adequately and accurately when it is 
understood within its appropriate conteoct. Contexts of expression and 
understanding change and vary from culture to culture, and in 
relation to the lG1owledge attainable in the broad sweep of other 
disciplines. We have seen that one of the particular problems raised 
by the shift in modern contexts of understanding takes the form of a 
pressure to reduce the essential details to be believed as part of cer-
tain dogmas. I have described this pressure as one which leads to the 
search for a real kernel of a dogma, while tpe husk is stripped away 
(see Chapter v, p. 256). This search for the kernel or heart of a 
dogrnatic truth creates a shifting ground concerning what is acceptable 
as an expression of that truth within the Church. The control of 
that shifting ground lies ultimately with the members of the 
Magisterium. 
The Magisterium1 s control and discipline in relation to 
the re-expression of .doctrine is ultimately founded in the hierarchy's 
power to command 'religious obedience'. That is to say, it is 
ultimately founded in the authority invested in Pope and bishops as 
persons. iVhen Vatican II opens the door to reinterpretations and 
re-expressions of the truths which dogmatic formulations proclaim, it 
necessarily throws a greater potential weight of responsibility upon 
the monitoring and controlling activity of members of the hierarchy, 
and this activity is rooted in their role in representing the authority 
of God in their persons. We find, once again, therefore, that the 
teaching of Vatican II invested value in the roles of persons in their 
relationship to one another, while, at the same time modifying its 
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concept of the absolute representational nature of particular acts 
(in this case, linguistic formulations). 
To sum up: the mediatorial role which the Council attributes 
to the Church as a whole through its doctrine of assent and 
obedience in matters of belief is a complicated one: The Church 
witnesses to a fa.i. th which is experienced as an interior relationship 
with God within each believer. It witnesses to elements of history 
and the interpretation of history which create the necessary 
conditions for such a faith and relationship. At certain points, the 
witness of the Church is 'guaranteed' by God as being incontrovertible; 
such 'infallibility', however, is only valid when the guaranteed 
expressions of the Church's faith are understood within their proper 
context. The defence of such proper understanding is constituted by 
the fact that, at the centre of the Church's life, certain persons are 
endowed with authority to represent the 'yea' or 'nay' of God himself. 
The particular acts of these persons require obedience because of the 
divine constitution of the Church; they are not themselves, however, 
acts which always carry the guarantee of 1infallibility1 in themselves. 
3 What Kind of Mediatorial Role Belonging to the Church is Implied 
by Vatican II 1 s Ideal of the Obedience which should be Rendered to 
the Mural Teaching of the Magisterium? 
As we have already reminded ourselves, Vatican II 1 s concept 
of faith integrates the springs of both belief and action in the 
interior relationship of the Christian to God who reveals. Everything 
which has so far been said about the Church's witness to this 
encounter applies to its moral implications, as well as its doctrinal 
expression. The hierarchy gives voice to something which coheres 
with the experience of the corporate sense of faith, and which may be 
developed through the deepening understanding which the sense of 
faith acquires through study and contemplation. 
In addition, we may note that Vatican II 1 s concept of the 
hierarchy of values effectively promotes the importance of personal 
conscience as the locus of moral response to God, and therefore 
enhances the Council's emphasis upon Christians' interior grasp upon 
God's reality- their embodiment of his truth for the world (see 
Chapter IV, p. 241). This high valuation given to the operation of 
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conscience is expressed in the way in which the Council treated the 
relationship between IVIagisterium and individuals in matters of 
social and political decision (see pp. 231-35). 
However, as in the case of doctrinal pronouncements, there 
stands at the centre of the Church's embodiment and witness concerning 
God's moral invitation, a body of persons whose teaching may some-
times claim to represent moral truth, and who, in themselves, are 
invested with God's authority to require obedience. We have noted 
that the 'either/or' quality of human actions tends to make the 
authority of the Magisterium in this area more clear-cut than in 
others (seep. 245), whether that authority takes the form of actually 
defining in a dogmatic way what the law of nature demands, or whether 
it takes the form of simply exercising discipline in accordance with 
what is or is not to be accounted acceptable within the Church. (We 
have also nJted the tensions to which such claims and disciplines 
are likely to give rise, when faced with the rival claims of 
interiority, see pp. 245f.). 
As in other spheres of mediation, therefore, Vatican II's 
teaching on the way in which the Church conveys knowledge of God's 
will for man's moral life holds in tension the representational 
motif, and the ideas of witness and embodiment. The representational 
motif comes to the fore when it is said that the Magisterium can 
give the correct exposition and application of natural and divine law. 
The other ideas are brought forward when the Magisterium is seen to 
be witnessing to the evangelical principles of morality, and inviting 
Catholics, and all men of good will, to respond by searching out 
appropriate ways of acting. 
Conclusion 
Our examination of the Church's mediatory role, as it is 
entailed in Vatican II 1 s concept of proper Christian obedience, 
illustrates very clearly the fact that there has been a shift of 
emphasis in ecclesiology, but not a fundamental change of doctrine. 
Among the different motifs which may be used to characterise the 
Church's role in making God and his will known to men, the idea of 
witness and embodiment have been brought into greater prominence 
than that which they enjoyed during the preceding century. 
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Nevertheless, the Church as a whole still carries out its functions of 
witnessing to the acts and presence of God, and of embodying that 
presence in a diffuse way, in dependence upon a cent,ral structure of 
authority which represents divine truth and God's demands upon men. 
In our analysis of the representational structure we have 
distinguished two elements, or modes, of representation: The first, 
an e:xtrinsic representation of God's authoritative status over men, 
this pattern of authority being exemplified in certain persons; 
the second, a capacity for human acts or words actually to mirror or 
represent God's revelation and will to men. It is with regard to this 
second category of representational thought that the most significant 
shifts of emphasis are apparent in the teaching of Vatican II, 
although the origin and character of the first mode of representation 
were also treated in ways that differed importantly from the mnphases 
of previous documents. 
Despite all shifts of thinking, however, Vatican II continues 
to put forward a picture of the Church in which man may locate a 
central point at which God provides truth about himself and his will 
in human language and concepts. Vihat is admitted, however, is that 
the expressions of this truth only make sense within a proper matrix 
of understanding. It is to preserve the Church's grasp on this 
matrix of understanding that the personal form of representational 
authority exists. We may put forward a parable of the hierarchy's 
two-fold role: the Pope and bishops are like the servants of the 
great king who held a wedding feast. Their primary task is to go 
out and invite men in, by describing the character of the feast and 
the enjoyment which all the participants experience. It may also 
fall to their lot, however, to preserve the character of the feast 
by ejecting from the hall anyone who refuses to don any one of the 
range of garments which the servants deem to be suitable to the 
occasion. In doing this, they represent their master's authority; 
they may fail, however; accurately to represent his taste. 
B) Obedience and Pictures of God 
As in the previous section of this chapter, we shall 
approach our topic from three perspectives: Firstly, we shall draw 
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together threads of our analysis concerning Vatican II's treatment 
of the content and character of canonical obedience; secondly, we 
shall exarn:L:1e the formal nature of the doctrine which the 
IVlagisterium proposes for assent; finally, we shall sum up what the 
Council indicated about the content of obedience in matters of 
moral decision. Each sub-section will go on from its swnming.up, 
to suggest what picture of God is most strongly entailed by the 
content of obedience which the Council described. 
1 What content of Obedience do the Documents of Vatican II 
describe as being Appropriate in the Canonical Sphere, and 
what Picture of God does it Entail? 
The Second Vatican Council was not, by and large, occupj_ed 
with questions of discipline. Therefore, it sketched only broadly 
the nature and content of obedient action as it should be practised 
by members of the Church. It also presupposed the general acceptance 
of certain, well-known tenets of Roman Catholic obedience to 
ecclesiastical law and custom, such as the obligation to worship on 
Sundays and holy days, and to make confession. By way of comment 
upon these types of obedience presupposed by the Council, we may say 
that such actions quite clearly set Christians apaxt from secular 
society. Only if religious acts such as Church attendance are 
interpreted in the most broadly functionalist terms of the social 
sciences (in such a way that they are seen as analagous in social 
purpose to other ritual acts of assembly, etc.) can they be seen as 
continuous with the demands of the secular life. Once the avowed 
purposes of religious acts of obedience are taken into account, their 
discontinuity with purely secular reasoning and needs becomes clear. 
Moving on from this, we may say that the very fact that the 
Christian community has ultimate aims and purposes which differ from 
those of secular social groupings gives to all acts of obedience 
within the Church an orientation which differs from that involved 
in achieving non-religious objectives. Nevertheless, within the 
general orientation of the Church to ends other than those of a 
secular group there may yet be areas of obedience which can be 
explained most readily by canons of appropriateness which are common 
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to all groups existing for the achievement of corporate purposes. 
Among such types of appropriate obedience we may number those acts 
which foster social collaboration and the communication of ideas among 
members, those which build up or maintain harmony among members, 
and, in sum, all acts of obedience whose primary object is the good of 
the group in its nature as a community. Obedience which is 
directed towards a clearly definable social good in the Church, in 
the way just described, may be said to be in harmony with secular 
norms of behaviour. 
We have seen in Chapter III that Vatican II brought the 
idea of serving the common life of the Church more centrally.into 
the theological line of vision in describing obedience (see p. 180). 
It was in this perspective that obedience was described as including 
active collaboration, the taking of initiatives, the communication 
of ideas and needs, etc., by persons at every level of the Church's 
life. However, the Council also maintained the idea that obedience 
has an inherent value, as something which is due to God's 
representa,tives, by virtue of their formal role. This continues to be 
the case even when obedience does not have any immediately obvious 
value for the upbuilding of community. The motif of Christ's 
obedience is introduced at several points to indicate that there is 
a higher logic to God 1 s action in the life of the Church than that 
which is obviously apprehensible through the normal course of human 
interaction. Therefore, ascetical acts of sheer obedience do serve a 
common good, but it is a good which transcends any ultimate goal 
which a secular community might conceive for itself (see p. 179). 
We may say, therefore, that the picture of canonical 
obedience which Vatican II puts forward is, in formal outline, both 
harmonious and disjunctive with secular social behaviour and 
requirements. It is harmonious with them, in so far as it increasingly 
holds in view action which contributes to normal communal growth 
and effectiveness. It is disjunctive, in so far as it includes an 
explicitly ascetical element, and in so far as the restraints put 
upon men by those in authority can be made to bear an ascetical 
character, and to have a value transcending their outward nature and 
immediately observable effects. 
What picture of God is entailed in this delineation of the 
content of canonical obedience? :B'irst of all, it is a picture which 
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allows value to the prescriptive indications of human nature; 
God's representatives in the Church exercise authority very largely, 
though not completely, for the sake of a common good which is 
humanly apprehensible and assessable. But beyond this, they 
exercise a degree of authority which transcends human reasoning, 
and which has goals beyond those indicated by the nature of persons in 
earthly community. However, the kind of obedience which they 
require within this perspective is not a set of actions or self-
negations which is orientated towards gaining a reward beyonQ; this 
life, in a heaven which is completely cut off from earthly 
conditions. No; it is an obedience which enters into the saving 
will of Christ for others, and which looks for the beginnings of its 
own fruition in the present life of the Church, its members, and 
even those outside it (seep. 179). The act of obedience, of itself, 
enters into the redemptive mystery of Christ, and is taken up into 
the service of the Church and its mission. 
According to the pattern of correlations which I built 
up in Chapter I, the content of canonical obedience as described by 
the documents of Vatican II entails a p~cture of God which combines 
features of the one who shares his act of creation with men (and 
therefore the obedience which may be required in the Church is usually 
directed towards the building up and creation of natural human 
community) , with features of the God who is a supernatural liberator 
and covenant lord (and thus there is a fruition promised to acts 
of obedience - a fruition which transcends purely human expectations, 
a fruition which takes the form of the milk and honey of a promised 
land which the Church may even now enter). 
2 What is the Nature of the Church's Authoritative Doctrine 
According to Vatican II, and what does this suggest about the 
Council's Picture of God? 
This sub-section is something of an excursus, because when 
the four typical pictures of God were put forward in Chapter I, they 
were derived from the different possible kinds of active obedience 
which the Church might require (see pp. 45-4 7). It is true that we 
then went on to consider the correlation of the possible picture of 
God with different concepts of the Church's role in regard to 
revelation (pp. 47-50), but we approached even this correlation by 
way of a study of the nature of moral teach~ng. Here, however, I 
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want to consider the contribution to a picture of God which is made not 
by the content of the moral teaching of the Church, but by the nature 
of its doctrinal teaching. In this regard, it is not possible to 
ask exactly the same kind of questions about disjunction and h8xmony, 
conformity and orienta-tion towards future goals, as those which we 
pose when examining the content of the action which the Church may 
require of its members. Therefore, this sub-section will not produce 
an answer to the question 'what is Vatican II's picture of God?' in 
quite the same way as the sub-sections which precede and follow it. 
It will not gi.ve us an answer frame'd in terms of the types set up 
in Chapter I -but it will help to elucidate aspects of the Council's 
picture of God which will enrich the ideas which we draw from our 
four types or categories. 
The Council's shift in the theology of faith lays more 
emphasis than did the thought of earlier magisterial documents upon 
the immediacy of God 1 s encounter with man. This immediacy of 
encounter is the correlate of the totality of hum8n self-commitment 
which is involved inn.the obedience of faith" (Chapter IV, p. 211). 
The act of faith is only partially constituted by free, rational 
assent to abstract, discursive infonnation about God. Such assent 
forms an essential factor in faith, indeed, but the nature of the 
object of such assent has changed; no longer is it a set of 
propositions which analogically represent the tru-th about God in the 
only way possible - the way determined by the internal structure of 
intelligibility afforded by the world -but rather, assent is given 
to a knowledge of God which may be conveyed through a kaleidoscope of 
changing formulae. This kaleidoscope is created by the historical 
conditioning of the structures of human conceptuality. 
In the theology of Vatic8n II it is maintained that the 
re-expression of the Church's teaching about God need not affect its 
substance, and should not, therefore, affect the certainty which the 
assent of faith affords. However, I have suggested that the very 
fact of change and re-expression must introduce some element of 
subjective uncertainty within the Church, because there always remains 
room for debate as to whether particular expressions continue success_.:,:. 
fully to convey their original meaning, or whether they should not 
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rather be reformulated. 
We may say, then, that the result of Vatican II's 
admission that Christian doctrinal formulae may be culturally and 
historically relative, is a picture of God j_n which he is less amenable 
to the kind of description which universally conveys shared, 
abstract certainty about his nature and relation to us. In the 
abstract sense he seems to elude us more than before. But in 
another sense the Council has laid stress upon his closeness; he 
stands in immediate encounter to the individual's interior attitude 
of faith. God is near to us, then, precisely through being immersed 
in the historicity of the world -or rather, man's knowledge of him 
is a direct one, but a knowledge which is immersed in historicity. 
We encounter a mystery which expresses itself in and through the 
patterns of human history, rather than a set of trans-historical 
1myster:lles 1 which were once-upon-a-time objectified in a moment of 
revelation and have ever since bee.n immutably conveyed as the 
content of a divine deposit of truths which are universally 
comprehensibleo 
Because God is known under the conditions of human 
historicity, and because he is immediately present to the man of 
faith, his picture emerges as one of a God who is in constant 
dialogue with human beings. He invites them ever anew to discover the 
meaning of his mystery and his will. They must use the formulae 
provided b;y the past to point them back to the fact of the incarnation 
(a mystery immersed in the contingencies of history); but they must also 
look outwards to the prospect of the world which is at present 
available to them. These two views must be united to provide the 
perspective necessary to grasp and communicate the truth and the 
presence which are unchanging, yet which must be re-expressed in 
accessible terms. 
3 What Content of Obedience do the Documents of Vatican II 
Describe as being Appropriate in the Moral Sphere, and what 
Picture of God does it Entail? 
We have seen in Chapter IV that the moral requirements of 
God were still conceived by Vatican II as being capable of objective, 
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representational expression by the lVIagisterium on occasion 
(see P• 230). \"'e saw, too, that the Council could demand docility 
from Catholics in regard to such teaching (see p. 239). Yet we 
also saw that in some areas the teaching function of the Magisterium 
was partially withdrawn, in favour of preached principles of the 
Gospel which should enlighten the secular activity of Christians, 
without giving detailed precepts (see pp, 231-35). Finally, we 
noted the Council's increasing use of an ethical backcloth which was 
broadly humanistic, or personalistic, and against which the value of 
the exercise of a free conscience was highlighted (see pp. 235-40); 
it is to this latter theme - that of the 'new humanism' - t4at we 
must return in order to consider the content of the Church's moral 
teaching ih relation to secular systems of moral thought. 
Because Vatican II maintained the necessity· of docility 
towards the Magisterium's moral teaching, it suggested that there is 
some degree of disjunction between the Catholic grasp of ethical 
issues, and that which is accessible to human reason outside the 
sphere of the lVIagisteriutn' s authoritative teaching. lVIan 1 s 
apprehension of the objective moral law is imperfect without the 
light of the Gospel and the Church's doctrine, However, the dis-
junction between human ideas of morality and those ideas which stem from 
the Gospel and divine law is not total, for the Council's stress on 
the new humanism makes it clear that there are many elements in 
common between the Church's moral principles and a secular hierarchy of 
values. Both believers and unbelievers recognise that all things on 
earth should be ordered to man as their centre and summit (GS 12.1), 
and while the conscience naturally recognises a law which finds its 
fulfilment in love (GS 16), it is the fulfilment of this law in love 
which is also the message of the Gospel (see GS 38.1). Vatican II 
therefore shed new light on the ancient Thomist idea that the revealed 
law covers the same points as the natural law, and has the function 
of being a corrective promulgation of this law, purifying, clarifying, 
and elevating human morality. (2) 
12) According to St. Thomas, the new Jaw of the Gospel does more than 
simply reveal the true consequences of the e:ternal lan to man (who 
would otherwise apprehend these consequences only imperfectly); the 
new Law ::1lso directs man to a higher end than that implied in the 
e~~rnal law - an end which is supernatural, over and above man's 
natural capacity (see ST la 2ae. q.91 a.3). It does not do this, how-
ever, by prescribing any further external works, apart from partici-
pation in the sacraments, but rather by being 11 the very grace of the 
cont. p. 287 
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Through its stress on the centrality of persons, and the 
supremacy which it attributed to communion between them (see pp. 236f.), 
Vatican II did not simply assert that there can be agreement between 
Catholic moral teaching and the ethical systems which can exist 
outside the Church; it did, in fac-t, substantially unite magisterial 
teaching with central aspects of some modern humanisms, or 
personalistic philosophies. However, the union was not complete, 
nor all-englobing, because Vatican II 1 s presentation of the Catholic 
hierarchy of values has a greater extent than that of secular 
ethical thinking. At its highest level, the Catholic scale neces-
sarily includes values flowing from man's capacity for communion, not 
just with his fellow-man, but also with God. At the other end of the 
scale, the M.agisterium 1 s teaching unambiguously affirms values which 
are not immediately those of personal communion and relationship, but 
which are derived from seeing all things, and all aspects of man's 
being, as God's creation (see GS 36.3). We could express this another 
way by saying that while, for a secular humanism, the values of 
personhood might be both the concrete and the formal criteria of ethical 
thinking, for Catholic theology they are the highest concrete 
criterion upon this earth (and they include values relating to man's 
communion with God), but the formal criterion of moral thinking 
remains the fact of God's relationship to the universe as its creator. 
The content of the Church's moral teaching appears, then, 
as being partly harmonious, and partly disjunctive, with moral ideas 
which can b3 arrived at outside the Church. The disjunction arises 
from two sources: Firstly, from a restriction in the non-Christian's 
view of the relaity of human nature in its capacity for communion with 
the divine, and in its status as a created being; secondly, from 
actual errors which may arise in conscience's apprehension of certain 
issues because of ignorance and weakness. However, it remains true 
that the fundamental orientation of the law which may naturally be 
lcnown through conscience is towards love of both God and neighbour. 
In this sense, the Gospel and its ethical consequences come as the 
Note (2) continued from p. 286 
Hol;y Spirit given to those who believe in Christ" (ST la 2ae q.106 
a.1). The principle of the new l·aw in in fact an inner 
dispositj_on- faith, working through love (ST la 2ae q.108 a.1). 
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fulfillment of the very law of human nature. 
Turning from the question of the harmony and disjunction 
between Catholic moral teaching and ethical ideas attainable 
outside the Church, we must now ask what is the connection between 
the content of morally obedient action and Vatican II 1s concept 
of the way in which man achieves his eschatological destiny. 
The passages which we have studied in Chapters II-V of 
this thesis are rather reticent on the question of morality's 
connection with final salvation. In the cases in which the Council 
documents speak of the Magisterium's task of preaching and 
teaching in the ethical sphere they do not usually indicate the 
consequences of obedience or disobedience in ultimate terms. 
However, there is one passage which we have already examined which 
does make a rather vague reference to a life beyond this one: "It 
should certainly be known by everyone that human life, and the 
office of transmCLtting it, cannot be understood and measured 
restrictively by reference to this age alone, but they always have 
reference to man's eternal destiny." (GS 51.4) In this passage it 
is not at all clear as to whose destiny is the primary focus of 
concern - that of the parents, or that of the children. Nor, if 
we take the passage to refer to the eternal consequences which 
may be experienced by the parents as a result of their decisions, 
is it clear what the exact relationship will be between their moral 
choice and their attainment of a heavenly destiny. 
In order to make a little more progress in understanding 
Vatican II 1 s idea of the connection between moraJ.ity and eschatology 
we may refer to the Council's treatment of the nature of human 
secular activity. We have seen the way in which the secular sphere 
of both knowledge and action was treated as having its own 
consistency and autonomy, and yet as being orientated towards the 
kingdom of God, or a final consummation of all things in Christ 
(see Chapter II P• 144 and Chapter IV p. 212). We may elucidate 
this observation by looking a little more closely at article 39 of 
Gaudium et Spes, to which I referred on p. 212. 
In GS 39 we find that the Fathers of Vatican II stressed 
the saving significance of an interior principle of human actions, 
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namely, the principle of charity. In paragraph 1 of the article 
they speak of "charity and its works" as forming the thread of 
continuity between this world and the final kingdom, and in the 
third paragraph they say, 
"We shall find anew these goods of human 
dignity, brotherly love, and liberty, all these 
good fruits of our nature and industry which we 
have nurtured on this earth in the Spirit of 
the Lord and in accordance with his conrrnandmen·t;. 
But we shall find them then purged of every stain, 
illuminated and transfigured • • • The kingdom 
is already present on earth in a mystery, but 
when the Lord comes it will be consummated." 
This paragraph evidently sets out in greater fullness the 
implications of the phrase "charity and its works". The works of 
charity are those actions which foster the values of dignity, 
communion, and freedom. Charity is not something superadded to 
such works; it is the principle from which they take their form 
and impulse. The phrase "fruits ••• of our industry" suggests 
that the works of charity which are to be found anew in the 
kingdom of God are those which are orientated towards very specific 
results in this world; for example, the building up of a community 
is a work of both charity and human industry. Charity is not a 
nebulous, abstract reality, but is concerned with the stuff of 
human action in all spheres of life; it is expressed through the 
better ordering of society, and this, says GS 39.2, is of very 
great importance for the kingdom of God. 
'N-a find, then, that Vatican II uses the idea of the 
fruition of human action in the eschatological sphere as its way 
of expressing the connection between man's obedience and his 
experience of final salvation; the principle of continuity uniting 
this world and the kingdom is the interior reality of charity. 
This theme of fruition, then, is intimately connected with the 
Council's stress on the interior disposition through which men 
belong to the community of grace (see pp. 242-44). 
We must note, however, that the idea of the fruition of 
the works of charity is accompanied by words concerning their 
redemption and transfiguration as well. 
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How can we sum up Vatican II 1 s delineation of the 
content of moral obedience, and how can we relate it to the 
Council's picture of God? Our answer must be very complex because 
it was in the area of moral theology that some of the most 
starkly unresolved problems of the Council's thought lay. 
On the one hand, moral obedience to the teaching of 
the hierarchy can involve docility to its representation of 
natural law, even where it seems to cut across the conclusions 
which conscience might reach when havlng the future in view; on 
the other hand, the Catholic lives with a moral system which is 
increasingly determined by the concept of future goals - goals, 
such as that of 1 the better ordering of society in view of the 
kingdom 1 , which are at least partially comprehensj_ ble in terms 
of non-Christian aspirations. However, to give these goals their 
full, eschatological dimension, the Council also draws upon the 
idea that there will be a time when the kingdom breaks in upon 
the world, and transfigures and redeems the very fruits of loving human 
action. We may say, then, that at least three of our pictures of 
God are entailed in the Council's complicated presentation of 
moral obedience. 
]'irstly, the God who is the legislator of a stable natural 
order, demanding conformity, appears in those aspects of magisterial 
teaching which simply require obedience to principles said to be 
derived from the very nature of things but which do not have 
immediate reference to future goals. This picture, however, is 
subordinated to that of a God who has given men the capacity to share 
in his work of creation, for Vatican II introduces strongly the theme 
that all men have the tendency, innate in their consciences, to seek 
creative goals, particularly in the social sphere. The third picture 
whj_ch appears in the Council's thinking is related to this future-
orientated concept of morality; it is the picture of God as liberator 
and covenant lord, who does not simply bring human action to 
fruition, but redeems and transfigures it by his sovereign act, the 
bringing-in of the kingdom. Amongst these three pictures of God, 
the greatest area of tension is to be found between a picture based 
on conformist morality, on the one hand, and the pair of pictures based 
291 
on future-orientated morality, on the other. :B"'inally, we should 
note that the Council does not do m~ything to suggest that God 
should be pictured as the eternal king and judge whose requirements 
bear no immediate relation either to the evidence of human nature, or 
to man 1 s strivings for the future (see Chapter I, p. 45). 
Conclusion 
We have seen in our examination of the content of canonical 
and moral obedience that Vatican II worked with a variety of 
pictures of God; of these, the most dominant are those under which 
he is viewed as a God whose commands orientate man towards the 
future - towards the consequences of his actions. The achievement of 
God's will through obedient human actions is partly comprehensible 
in purely natural terms, and is partly comprehensible only in 
relation to mystery of God's own redeeming action. The redeeming 
action of God is located both in the mystery of the cross - which 
provides the supernatural 1 environment 1 for Christian choice - and 
also in the future consummation of the ldngdom. That is to say, it 
provides both the presupposition of man's effective obedience, and 
also the term towards which human obedience strives. 
Alongside the pictures of God associated with a view of 
obedience orientated on goal-seeking, there subsists also the picture 
of God in which he appears as the eternal creator of a stable moral 
order. This picture is entailed most clearly in the Council's 
tackling of sexual morality, although it also appears in other areas 
where the Council gave more detailed teachings (see, for example, 
Inter Mirifica,(Decree on the Media of Social CommunicationJ},,~This 
picture sits uneasily alongside the others. 
When we examined the implications of Vatican II 1 s 
presentation of the nature of doctrine, we found that it shed this 
light upon the Council's picture of God: He appears as one who makes 
himself available to men's apprehension through a mystery. This 
mystery's meaning has to be expressed and understood under fully 
historical conditions. This historical dimension to man's knowledge 
of God (which enters the Council's theology specially in the 
contribution of Gaudium et Spes) reinforces those piotures of God v1hich 
refer to hj.s invitation and command to man to create a new future. 
It reinforces them by suggesting, as they do, the fact that God is 
constantly involved in the processes of human historyo History has 
meaning and direction, because it is the context in which God makes 
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himself known. His involvement is not merely episodic (at creation, 
at the incarnation, at the end of time); nor is it the involvement of 
a God who superimposes the reality of a supernatural order upon the 
relatively stable workings of a natural order; history is not merely 
the theatre of human activity, from which we must escape to a 
higher realm, of which we have been allowed a glimpse. No; hurnan 
history is the very stuff through which the presence of God is 
constantly mediated, and what is more, it is the very stuff of the 
coming kingdom. 
C) Obedience and the Doctrine of Man in his B.elationshil2 to God 
The reader will remember that in ·!;he third part of the 
typology presented in Chapter I we drew upon elements of correlation 
found in both the preceding parts of the typology. Therefore, in the 
present section we shall summaxise some of the conclusions of the 
first two sections of this chapter, in order to draw from them 
implications concerning man's relationship to God, as this doctrine 
is entailed in Vatican II's ecclesiology. I•'irst, we shall draw out 
the anthropological implications of the Council's treatment of the 
Church's mc1iatorial role; secondly, we shall examine the content of 
obedience required in the Church from the point of view of anthro-
pology; thirdly, we shall bring these considerations together, 
indicating what patterns of man's relationship to God through different 
'moments' of human history are entailed in Vatican II 1 s picture of 
authority and obedience. 
1 vVhat Doctrine of Man in his Relationship to God is Implied in 
Vatican II 1 s Concept of the Church 1 s Mediatorial Hole? 
In Section A of this chapter I have argued that the 
Second Vatican Council continued to maintain that the hierarchy of 
the Church represents the authority of God in three spheres - canonical, 
doctrinal and moral. I also made the distinction between 
representational acts, and representational 2-ersons; it is in the 
spheres of doctrine and morality that the power of the hierarchy may 
take the form of representational acts when, under certain restricted 
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circumstances, the Pope and bishops give formulae of teaching 
deemed to be 'infallibly' tri:te- about God and his will. In the 
sphere of canonical authority, however, the hierarchy acts with the 
authority of representational persons, the servants of the great 
king who are empowered to make decisions, but whose decisions are 
not guaranteed to reflect inerrantly the mind of the monarch himself. 
I have further suggested that because of a shifting epistemological 
theory, which affects the way in which representational verbal acts 
are recei vcd. and interpreted, we may see more clearly the crucial 
role which members of the hierarchy play through their designation as 
representational persons, because the authority of persons is 
called into play to preserve the boundaries vdthin \~ich acceptable 
interpretation of representational acts may go on. 
I have also argued that the documents of Vatican II 
supplement and partially modify the picture of the represent.ational 
role of the hierarchy in mediating divine authority, by giving 
increased emphasis to the ways in which the hierarchy, together with 
the entire body of the Church, witness to divine truth, while 
at the same time they embody the presence of the Holy Spirit in a 
diffuse way and in varying degrees, through sacramental participation 
in his powers. However, since, as I suggested, the fundamental 
doctrine of representational authority was not abolished nor radically 
changed by this shift of emphasis, we shall concentrate here upon 
the Council's continuing use of the representational motif in both 
its aspects (ie. as it relates to persons and to acts). Even though 
we shall concentrate on the representational motif, it should also 
become clear during the course of this examination that the increased 
emphasis on the ideas of witnessing and embodiment is not without 
significance for the Council's concept of man's relationShip to God. 
We turn first to the questions raised by the idea that 
members of the hierarchy can be representational persons: This idea 
does not entail a clear-cut concept of the capacity of human nature 
to convey God's will to other men. On the one hand, representational 
persons are not attributed such an affinity with God as to identify 
their actions and words with his; yet, on the other hand, their acts 
and decisions are deemed to be sufficiently open to the influence of 
God for the guarantee of the Church's indefectibility to hold true. 
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However, it is not clear whether the acts and decisions of 
representational persons should always be seen as adequate instruments 
in positively preserving and furthering the Church's mission and 
constitution, or whether one should rather say that the promise of 
indefectibility relates merely to the fact that the exercise of 
authority can never ultimately destroy that mission and constitution. 
(:I!'or discussion of the scope of indefectibility, see Chapter II, 
p. 84.) vYhat we may say, however, is that in general the actions of a 
representational hierarchy are deemed to assist and protect the 
Church in the fulfillment of God's purpose for her. This is the 
usual grounds upon which members of the hierarchy can require 
obedience from Christians -the obedience which God's children owe 
to the purposes of his providence. 
The capacity to represent God 1 s authority is, then, bound 
up both with guarantees of extrinsic protection, and also with the 
real possibility of positive assistance from the Spirit in the 
forrnation of concrete actions and decisions. These guarantees, and 
this possibility, are operative within the Church in a peculiar way; 
a secular ruler cannot represent God's authority under exactly the 
same conaitions. What is it, then, in the constitution of the 
Church which creates these conditions? 
As far as the extrinsic condition of protection from the 
ultimate destruction of the Church is concerned (indefectibility 
understood in its negative and most restricted connotations), we may 
say that this condition is correlative to the formal, quasi-legal 
status of members of the hierarchy. They stand in an office instituted 
by Christ through the Apostles, and the negative guarantees of 
indefectibility are attached by God to this office. However, with 
regard to the possibility that men may represent the authority of God 
in a more positive way - actually preserving, guiding, and furthering 
the Church's fulfillment of her mission- we may say that some 
conditions must exist whereby the inner being of members of the 
hierarchy is affected; they are laid open to the influence of the 
Spirit in the formation of their decisions. Again, as in the case of 
the negative guarantees of indefectibility, this inner assistance may 
simply be seen as being attached to the quasi-legal status of the 
Apostles' successors; that is to say, the positive guidance of the 
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Spirit is the subject of a promise conjoined to Christ's institution 
of the apostolic ministry. On the other hand, we have seen that 
Vatican II increased the stress put upon the sacramental conditions 
under which bishops and priests are representational figures; this 
shift of emphasis towards the intrinsic, sacramental grounds for 
representational authority highlights the theological idea of 
embodiment. The indwelling of the Spirit, through sacramental 
participation in his presence and power, is the source and explanation 
of the positive use of authority in the Church's life. 
In the case of bishops, the Spirit-given authority is 
rooted in their sacramental participation in the fullest reality of 
priesthood, and it intersects with the negative guarantees Which are 
attached to their quasi-legal institutional status, and which 
protect their decisions extrinsically from ultimate harmfulness to 
the Church. However, we can see too that in the case of all 
Christians there is also an embodiment of the Spirit 1 s presence through 
baptism. All, therefore, represent Christ in their persons in the 
sacramental sense. In addition, all Christians live under the 
umbrella of indefectibility, negatively understood (that is, none of 
them can destroy the Church by his actions or decisions); but it is 
given to the hierarchy in particular to exercise representational 
authorit;z which is guaranteed in this way. 
We turn now from the subject of personal representation of 
God in the Church to that of representational acts of moral and 
doctrinal teaching. Here we have found that the Second Vatican Council 
effectively admitted the historical conditioning of even dogmatic 
formulae, whilst at the same time reasserting the possibility that man 
may have inerrant knowledge of the divine through the medium of 
such statements. In this way the Council reaffirmed, and even 
reinforced, the classical Catholic assertion of the epistemological 
gap which exists between man and God 1 s mystery. (The traditional 
assertion is found in St. Thomas' theory of analogy.) By showing that 
human knowledge of God must remain tied to structures of under-
standing which are derived from historical existence, and which may 
change as the conditions of that existence alter, the theology of 
Vatican II illustrated in a fresh way how it is that man's 
creatureliness debars him from immediate participation in the divine 
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self-knowledgeo Man's linguistic formulae give him access to 
an objective knowledge of God, it is true; but because this 
o bj ecti ve knowledge may have to be e onveyed through a kaleidoscope 
of changing expressions there is room for constant debate about the 
meaning of divine truth. This debate seeks to conquer certainty 
ever-afresh, rather than to produce an expanding chain of 
1 theologically certain' truths, reached by a process of Aristotelian 
deductions from fixed principles. 
The structure of representational teaching about God and 
his will in the Church is, then, characterised both by the 
historical conditioning of human subjectivity, and also by the inner 
mysteriousness of Godo It is the vehicle of objective or abstractive 
knowledge only, and this knowledge does not seem to be as 
accessible to extension through sheer logical development as was once 
thought possible. However, we have also seen that the representational 
teaching of the Magisterium, as well as its preaching and the witness 
of ordinary Catholics, give testimony to another kind of knowledge of 
God. This is the knowledge of God which is constituted by the 
indwelling of the Holy Spirit. 
The constitution Dei Verbum speaks of the conversion of 
the heart in man's encounter with the revealing God (DV 5), and when 
the same document speaks of the development of doctrinal understanding 
in the Church it refers to "the deep lmowledge of spiritual matters 
which (the faithful] attain through experience 11 (DV 8. 2). These 
references to the J.r..nowledge gained by experience, the knowledge 
grounded in conversion of the heart, speak of the immediate encounter 
of man with God. This is the encounter of God's action and man's 
response in love; it is the context of experience in which abstract, 
discursive or objective knowledge of God's revealed truth makes sense, 
and in which man's apprehension and expression of its meaning may 
develop. Indeed, the abstractive formulae of doctrine may 'trigger' 
the interior knowledge of the heart, just as the Church's witness 
to the historical encounters of God and man which stand at the fount of 
its faith r.:ay do so. Nevertheless, the immediate experience or 
apprehension of God's reality and truth is not to be identified with 
the knowledge conveyed in linguistic formulae. 
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We find, therefore, that Vatican II characterised human 
knowledge of God in two ways, drawing upon the motifs of 
representation, on the one hand, and of witness andembodiment, on 
the other. What does this suggest about the structure of man's 
relationship to God'? 
It suggests that the most immediate affinity of the 
Christian with his creator is not in the dimension of objectified 
knowledge. Objectified knowledge is limited, in that it never 
penetrates to the heart of the divine mystery, and also in that the 
representational language in which it is expressed is irreducibly 
conditioned by its historical and cultural matrix, even though its 
adequacy within that context may be guaranteed by the extrinsic 
conditions of 1infallibility', The intrinsic openness of man to God's 
reality is, on the other hand, to be found in the Christian's 
openness to encounter with the Holy Spirit who can indwell him as the 
principle of personal knowledge, love, and action. The capacity 
to be indwelt and moved by the Spirit is a trans-historical and trans-
cultural characteristic of human nature; it is the true dimension in 
which the temporal creature finds an affinity with the heart of the 
mystery which is God. 
2 What Doctrine of Man in his Relationship to God is Implied in 
Vatican II 1 s Concept of the Content of the Obedience Due in the 
Church? 
If the capadi ty to be indwel t and moved by the Holy Spirit 
is the fundamental dimension of the Christian's openness to God, we 
may ask whether this openness is something which is created entirely 
anew in the context of Church membership -is it an openness which 
can come about only because human nature is entirely recreated and 
refashioned through ecclesiastical grace? Or is there a more 
fundamental openness still, inhering in all human nature as it 
concretely exists, and making it potentially receptive to God and his 
ways? To answer this question we must re-examine the extent to which 
Christian activity - activity which is obedient to the Spirit's moving 
as it is known in the life of grace and in the representational 
authority of the Church - is harmonious with the kind of action which 
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would be prompted by 1natural 1 human motivation. 
I have argued in the second section of this chapter that 
the documents of Vatican II exhibit a great degree of harmony between 
what is considered appropriate as the expression of Christian 
morality and what is considered appropriate according to the canons 
of human reason operating outside the Church, The Council allied 
Catholic morality very largely with the perspectives of a new 
humanism , an ethic which is centred on the human person as the 
highest concrete criterion, and which tends to orientate action towards 
the creation of a new futureo This ethic was described as something 
which was already influential in the world, apart from the Church 
(GS 55), but Vatican II saw the Christian message as a means through 
Which humanism might be extended, clarified, and stabilised upon the 
foundation of God 1 s intentiono Most significantly, the Council treated 
conscience as a natural locus of human contact with God. This was the 
major thrust of the Council's ethical theory. However, we also 
saw strands of thought relating to a static concept of natural law 
(conformity to the inner nature of things), and to the redemption of 
human actions and aspirations in the kingdom of God. These strands of 
thought introduce, in different ways, the possibility for Catholic 
morality to be radically disjunctive with the conclusions of secular 
or natural reasono 
As concerns the issue of canonical obedience (as opposed to 
obedience in the strictly moral sphere) we find that here, too, the 
Council indicates a great extent of harmony between what is appropriate 
in the Church and what is appropriate in the context of other kinds of 
human community. The Christian's obedience is largely orientated 
upon the common good, which he seeks to foster through responsj_ble 
activity, decision, and co-operation -means which are all accessible 
to the valuation of secular thoughto However, the conunon good of the 
Church also has a paradoxical dimension, a dimension of redeeming 
grace which is bestowed upon h~an beings when they open themselves up 
to it through self-denial. Therefore, the logic of Christian 
obedience goes beyond that of secular action, and embraces the 
salvific logic of the crosso However, I have suggested that we should 
notice that Vatican II does not present self-denial in obedience as 
being the condition of an individual's eschatological reward; rather, 
it is shown to be the condition of participation in Christ's redemptive 
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will for otherso Therefore, even this paradoxical kind of obedience is 
analagous in its motivation to the obedience required in other 
groups, for it is directed towards the common goodo 
In both the moral and the canonical spheres Vatican II 
described the principles underlying the obedience of Catholics in 
such a way as to indicate that it should lead to the fulfillment of 
universal and innate human aspirations, even though man's movement 
towards these ends should sometimes need to be radically reorientated, 
Whether the Cpuncil was describing the kind of dec:Lsi on which would be 
totally harmonious with a secular personalism, or indicating the 
paradoxical nature of redemptive self-denial in obedience, or even 
prescribing to an established and immovable law of nature, it 
affinned the high value of human dignity within community, justice, 
brotherhood, and the transcendent importance of the person. These are 
also the objects of 'natural' human concern and moral aspiration. 
Therefore we may say that Vatican II presented Catholic obedience as 
being the fulfillment, even through radical reorientation, of the 
innate desires of human natureo 
What does this mean in the context of our consideration of 
the structure of huMan nature as it exists outside the Church? It 
means that man is seen as fundamentally open to God's coming and to 
his wayso The action of the Holy Spirit as he encounters and indwells 
an individual is one of healing and redirecting, but it is not the 
total recreation of a nature which would otherwise be closed and 
opposed to the divine. God 1 s action elevates human aspirations to an 
eschatological end, but the kingdom is a sphere in which all moral 
actions are not put aside, but are rather brought to fruition even 
through being transfiguredo 
3 A Synopsis of the Correlations between Vatican II 1 s Concept of 
the Obedience Due in the Church and the Doctrine concerning Man's 
Helationship to God at Different 'Moments'. 
By examining the structure of human relationship to God 
as Vatican II sees it existing in the Church, we have come to the 
conclusion that the closest affinity of humari.ty to the mystery of 
God consists in the immediate presence of the Holy Spirit within the 
3oo· 
spirit of man. This indwelling presence is the principle of charity, 
and therefore of Christian obedience; it gives a horizon of 
personal encounter which is not fully expressible in language, but 
which makes sense of the Church's objective doctrine, as well as of her 
witness to the historical encounters of man and God, by locating 
them within a personal context of experience and action. In 
contrast to this immediate :V.nowledge of the Spirit's presence and 
action, the Church's objectified doctrine is simply extrinsic (though 
guaranteed) language about the mystery-language which never penetrates 
the essence of God's self-knowledge. 
Having located the intrinsic affinity which the Christian 
has with God in the area of an unobjectified experience, which gives 
rise to action in charity, we then went on to consider the basis 
of this affinity in concrete human nature as it exists outside the 
Churcho I argued that the theology of Vatican II suggests that there 
is a fundamental openness to God in the consceince and aspirations of 
even non-Christian man as he strives towards c01mnunion and love. The 
indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the life of grace answers to this 
striving, whilst at the smne time reorientating it, healing it, and 
pointing it towards the kingdom in which the fruits of human industry 
and nature are to be transfigured. 
H is the classical teaching of Thomist theology that grace 
elevates nature, and does not cancel its activity, but perfects it. 
There is, then, traditionally in Catholic thought an openness to God, 
an 'obediential potency' in human natureo The significance of 
Vatican II's treatment of this theme is that it locates the root of 
this openness rather clearly in the active principle of human life, in 
the area of interiority where man is moved to actions of love. To 
put it another way, the natural law known to conscience is not self-
enclosed, prescribing a set of virtues which have no 'supernatural' 
reference at allo Rather, it opens out into man's need to love God and 
his neighbour. Human virtue is not simply heightened by grace; it is 
fulfilled. It could have no lower perfection which might subsist 
independently of this fulfillment; the obediental potency of human 
nature is not a passive receptivity to the coming of the Spirit, but 
an active aspiration. 
By locating man's fundamental openness to God in the need 
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which human morality has for fulfillment by charity, the Second 
Vatican Council rejected the idea that a state of 'pure nature' 
might be conceived, a state in which humanity could find a self-
enclosed perfection in the 'natural order' which would be distinct 
from the higher perfection which grace might bestow in a separate 
1 supernatural order'. ~rhe structure of man's beinp;, even from 
creation, has included a moral openness to God. consisting of nature's 
aspiration after chari tyo Hum;:m beings were made for a communion of 
love vnth one another and with their creator, and this characterises 
their personhood as those made in the ima,ge of God. 
We have, then, looked backwards from the standpoint of man's 
relationship to God in the Church, and we have discovered that 
Vatican II 1 s concept of this relationship presupposes an active 
aspiration for the divine as the characteristic structure of created 
human natur9- a.structure which persists even in the state of fallen-
ness. We must now turn to look forwards from the vantage-point of the 
life of grace known in the Christian cowaunity, and explore the 
implications of the Council's teaching on obedience for its doctrine 
of the eschatological structure of the divine-human relationshino 
I have argued that the concept of obedience put forward 
by the Council hi&hlights the way in which the experience of salvation 
is to be a fruition of obedience, rather than a disjunctive rewardo Even 
in those cases where the action of the obedient Christian is unlike 
any action which secular ratione~i ty would commend., and vvhere the 
connection between act and fruit is not humanly comprehensible, the 
Council's stress upon the significance of such obedience for the 
corporate life and mission of the Church indicates that these acts are 
conjoined to the redemptive grace of God in a directly fruitful way. 
They are not gestures of submission undertaken solely to render 
honour to the will of an external. king; rather, they are part of a cov-
enant relationship in which man's deeds form part of the necessary 
substance of his community's corporate experience of liberation. 
The concept of fruition (even through transformation) 
coheres with the idea that human nature finds its true affinity with 
God through its aspiration after charity. The Christian's imperfect 
participation in the presence of the Spirit, who is the principle of 
charity within, is the root of effective obedience now. That 
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obedience vv:i.ll reach full fruit when man shares completely 
in the Spirit's activity of charity -the activity of full com-
munion - in the kingdom of God, when all the acts of earthly love vv:i.ll 
be caught up and transfigured in their essence and effect. This 
will be the channel through which human nature is di vinised: Jjove, 
which on earth has reached out for its goal in the ldngdom, will find 
it, and in the activity of communion will make man like God. "We 
shall be like him," says St John, "for we shall see him as he is. 11 
(I Jn. 3.2; quoted in LG 48.4.) 
The idea of 'seeing' God is parallel to that of knowing 
himo We have found that knowledge of God has a double aspect, and 
that the objectified knowledge of the earthly reason is not the kind 
of knowledge which penetrates to the heart of the divine mysteryo 
Only the unobjectified, inexpressible knowledge found in the encounter 
of love touches it. The Council's admission of all the ways in which 
human rationality is determined and characterised in its objective 
knowledge by its context in history, suggests that this kind of 
knowledge would dissolve apart from the historical transcendentals 
from which it derives its structure. The theology of Vatican II does 
not draw the conclusion of this train of thought, but the drift of its 
thinking indicates a tendency to give the primacy to the knowledge 
of love rather than to the objective, abstractive, knowledge of 
rationality. One might say, then. that the idea of man's eschatol-
ogical relationship to God which the Council sup~ests is this: In the 
kingdom "mystery constitutes the relationship between God and lVIan, and 
hence the fulfilment of human nature is the consummation of its 
orientation towards the abiding mystery". (3) The concept of 1 seeing 
God' at the last which coheres best with Vatican II 1 s epistemology is, 
therefore, the concept of knowing the divine mystery intui tionally 
through love, rather than that of applying the activity of abstractive 
rationality to his essential nature. 
Conclusion 
The anthropology implied in Vatican II 1s ecclesiology is one 
-------------------------------------
(3) Karl Hahner, "The Concept of My~tery in Catholic Theology" in 
Theological Investigations, 4 (London, 1966) p. 49o 
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in which man is seen as being open to God through all the 'moments' 
of his existence. Sin does not destroy the fundamental openness of 
the human conscience and of human moral aspirations; it distorts 
and warps it, or -to change the metaphor for a dynrunic one which 
better sui-ts the goal-seeking character of moral obedience described 
by the Council - it disorientates the active tendency of the human 
heart in its aspiration after God. However, the openness and the 
dynamism remain within hwnan nature. They are a constituent part 
of the character of the person, the image of God, who was made from 
the beginning for communion with his neighbour and with his creator. 
The communion of charity is brought about incipiently in 
this world by the indwelling presence ro1d activity of the Holy 
Spirito He is the principle of the Christian's action in love. The 
actions of love, which constitute the inner nature of Christian 
obedience, will find their fruition in the kingdom when they will be 
transfigured and renewed in man's final relationship to God. It is 
love, or charity, then, which is the intrinsic bond between man and 
his creator at every stage of human existence. At creation and in 
the state of fallenness the bond is a potential one, an openness to be 
moved by God 1 s love; in the life of grace lmown in the Church, and in 
the final kingdom of God, the bond is that of a substantial inner 
affinity between the redeemed human spirit in its activity, and the 
activity of love which characterises God himself. 
The Church creates the extrinsic conditions in which men 
may have objective, abstract knowledge of God - knowledge which can be 
transmitted and interpreted from one conceptual scheme to anothero 
However, this kind of knowledge never penetrates the essence of the 
divine mystery, because it is dependent on historical transcenderrtals 
which structure it and give it the material of ru1alogy by which it 
becomes objective. Therefore, objective knowledge about God and his 
will, although it may attain to certainty and security within the 
structure of the Church's guaranteed authority, does not form the 
inner bond which unites the Christian to the mystery of redeeming love. 
The Church 1 s representational structure and function simply exists as 
the extrinsic conditions of temporal actualisation of an interior 
affinity between God and mano 
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This suggests that the Church, in so far as it ;~·emains in 
the final kingdom, rem·ains not in its authoritative struoture, but as 
the fruit and expression of love. The aspect in which the Church 
is a communion of persons is its truly eschatological dimension. 
Its representational, mediatory structure will fall away, when the 
form of obedience is cast off in the activity of pure love, as man 
is united to God and his neighbour in the eternal, unmediated 
c orrununion of the kingdom. 
CHAPTER VII: 
305 
AN EX.AJVIIN.ATI ON OF V A'riCAN II'S romRINES OJ!"' GOD 
AND lVlAl\J IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH EACH OTinm, 
FROIVI THE POINT OF VIEW 0:1!1 THESE DOCTlTINES t 
CONSISTENCY WITH 'l'HE COUNCIL 1 S CONCEPT OF 
OBEDIENCE IN THE CHURCH 
We now reach the final stage of this thesis, in which we 
shall test the teaching given by the Second Vatican Council con-
cerning the overall nature of the divine-human relationship for 
consistency wi-th the Council's picture of the ideal obedience which 
the Christian should render in the Church. On what grounds do we 
do this? The answer is that systematic theology forms a circle of 
interrelated ideas; an ecclesiology should entail a set of anthro-
pological presuppositions and a certain doctrine of God, and both of the 
latter should also have important implications for each other. I-t 
is therefore generally impossible -to treat any one doc-trine -totally 
in isolation from the others. 
Because of this circularity of ideas, although up -till now 
we have tried to treat the ecclesiology of Vatican II separately from 
its overt anthropology and doctrine of God (trying to draw implici-t 
anthropological and theological presuppositions from its ideal of 
ecclesiastical obedience) it has nevertheless been necessar,y -to 
examine already certain issues which might be said to belong strictly 
to the wider doctrines of man and God. For example, we have con-
sidered the Council's teaching on human conscience in relation to the 
question of the harmony of ecclesiastically-taught morality with the 
ethical ideas of non-Christians; we have aLso examined the Council's 
theology of the secular, in relation to its teaching on the laity 
and to the question of authoritative Catholic moral and doctrinal 
teaching. In the present chapter we shall study these issues again, 
in more detail, as we analyse the Council's anthropology and 
doctrines of God and Christ. 
Before we move on to consider the Council documents 
further, let us first remind ourselves in more detail- of the purpose 
of this chapter: 
ln so far as it has been possible to separate the ecclesiology 
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of Vatican II from other areas of doctrine, we have analysed the 
Council's concept of obedience in the Church in Chapters II-V of 
this thesis. We have discovered certain significant shifts of 
emphasis appearing in Vatican II 1 s ideal of Christian obedience when 
it is set against the background of the teachings of the preceding 
century. We have also derived from the Council's concept of 
obedience a fairly complex implicit anthropology, and a set of pictures 
of Godo It is now my purpose that we should review a wider spectrum 
of passages from the documents, in order to test them for consistency 
with the doctrines which we found to be implicit in the conciliar 
teaching on obedience. 
In the Preface I suggested that the field of ecclesiology is 
one in which the intermesh between theology and social determinants is 
particularly tight (seep. 8); therefore, it might be g~ite possible 
for shifts of emphasis to come about in ecclesiology - tbrough 
pressures arising from the social environment of the Church, and 
changes in the intellectual atmosphere in which Cbristians live - which 
wo1lid not be reflected by corresponding shifts of emphasis in 
areas of theology which appear to be more speculative and less 
immediately involved in social reality, w.L th all its problems of 
plausibility. The major aim of this chapter will be to ask, 1does 
the explicit anthropology of Vatican II, and does its doctrine of God, 
correspond to the pictures of man and God entailed in its 
ecclesioloey, and particularly in its concept of obedience in the 
Church?' We might find that the shifts in the doctrine of obedience 
are mirrored in the doctrines of God and man, or, on the other hand, 
we might find that these latter areas of thought have not experienced 
so rrru.ch shift, because of the conservative effect of dogmatic 
forrrru.lations concerning fundamental issueso 
We shall examine the Council's doctrines of man and God 
in their relationship according to the 'moments' wDich were used 
in the preceding chapter; that is to say, we shall consider the 
divine-human relationship as it is condit-ioned by '4he 1mome:irb 1 of 
creation, as it is conditioned by the fact Of man's fallenness, as 
it is conditioned by the gift of grace bestowed through the 
incarnation and the Church, and finally, as it may appear in the 
'moment' of eschatological fulfillment. It will become clear during 
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the course of the chapter that some of these 'moments' in fact 
overlap in the thought of Vatican II, for the Council's Christo logy 
has a scope which shows grace to be co-extensive with human 
history. Nevertheless, the articulation of this chapter into four 
sections, corresponding to the four 'moments' mentioned above, 
will remain a convenient analytical device, particularly because it 
will enable us to compare the Council's anthropology and doctrine 
of God against the ideas which, we concluded, were implicit in its 
ideal of obedience. 
The reader will realise that there has been some uneven-
ness so far between my treatment of the doctrine of man entailed in 
Vatican II's ideal of ecclesiastical obedience, and the pictures 
of God which were derived from the same source. The reason for this 
is the fact, mentioned above, of the close interrelationship of 
doctrines of God and man in any system of theology. If I had 
articulated the doctrine of God entailed in conciliar ideas of 
obedience in all its fUllness, I should have repeated much of the 
same materj.al again in my derivation of the corresponding anthropology. 
Instead, bare pictures of God were elicited from our study of the 
content of ecclesiastical obedience, whilst more complex doctrinal 
statements were left to the anthropological sphere. The time has now 
come, however, to expand more fUlly upon the pictures of God which 
we have examined, incorporating them into a more extensive doctrine 
of God. Therefore, in the sections Which follow the reader will find 
that the order of attention is reversed, by comparison vdth previous 
chapters, so that we shall consider first the Council's doctrine of 
man; then, dravdng upon this as well as upon the pictures of God 
Which we have used so far, the doctrine of God will be dealt with. 
Thus, the organic relationship between the two areas of doctrine 
should be absolutely clear. 
It will be necessary at the beginning of some sections 
of this chapter to examine yet more closely the material Which 
afforded our conclusions in Chapter VI. By this closer examination 
of the doctrine of man 8Xld the picture of God entailed in 
Vatican II's concept of ecclesiastical obedience we may hope to 
clarify the ques-t;i ons Vlhich it is relevant to pose Vlhen considering 
passages from the Council documents vJhich concern the wider pattern 
of divine-human relationship. 
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A) Vatican II 1 s Doctrines of God and Man in the 'Moment' of 
Creation and Createdness 
1 A Closer Examination of the Doc trine of Man in the 1 Moment 1 
of Creation, as H is Entailed in the Passages which we have so · 
far Studied 
According to the ecclesiology of Vatican II as we have 
viewed it, from the standpoint of its teaching on obedience, man is 
founded from his creation in a moral openness towards God. This 
openness is constituted by his natural ap.prehension of God's lat-J and 
will through conscience, and by his aspiration after the values 
which are summed up in love of God and neighbour. Such is the nature 
of the human being to wDom the Church addresses its message; he is 
one who has been made, from his creation, for communion vdth God, a 
communion in which love of his fellow-men will also be caught upo 
This is the destiny which will fulfill him; i't is towards this 
destiny thai; all his truly moral actions tend, al·i;houga in order to 
reach this end they must be completed by charity and find their 
transfiguration and redemption in the coming of the kingdom. 
This doctrine of man as one who is made for cormnunion 
(see Chapter IV ppo 236-38) is encapsulated by Vatican II 1 s use of 
the bi blic a1 phrase "made in God 1 s image" ( GS 12.3), expounded as 
meaning "cap able of knowing and loving his creator11 (loco cit.). 
'rhis definition Vlhich is given to the meaning of "God's image" is, 
in fact, an expansion upon Genesis 1.26, and it owes its form to a 
background of patristic theology.(1) Bven up tothe time of 
St. Thomas, the idea of the 'image' was associated with man's 
activity in knowing and loving God, rather than vv.i. th static or 
abstract qualities of his nature. (2) However, in nee-scholastic 
( 1) 
(2) 
See Ph. Delhaye, 11La dignite de la personne humaine" in L'Eglise" 
dans le li2.Qnde de ce "IBmps, 2, edited by G, Barabna (B:r:uges, 1968)p. 344. 
See Aquinas, ST la. q.93. St. Thoma.s' thought represents a 
turning point on the subject of the 1image 1 , for he says that man 
is the image of God by :reason of his intellectual nature (an 
abstract quality), but that this nature is the grounds for man's 
imitation of God in being and life because of the processions of 
the word from intelligence, and of love from the will. That is 
cont. p.309 
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thought the concept of the image of God in man had firmly become 
that of 11 a rational nature • endowed with free will". (3) The 
idea of the image as an active openness to dialogue, then, 
represents a breakthrough by Vatican II to older ways of conceiving 
the matter. We shall see that the patristic orientation in the 
idea was of profound significance both for the Council's anthro-
pology, and also for its Christology. 
We may expand our analysis of the concept of God 1 s image 
in man here by considering its link with the Council's use of 
the notion 1 person 1 , for it is the human person vmo is the subject 
of the description, 1man, made in God's image' in GS 12, and it is 
"the Dignity of the Human Person" which is the subject of the 
chapter of which GS 12 is the introduction. 
The term 1 person 1 has different meanings in different 
conceptual schemes; in particular, the meaning attached to the term 
in neo-scholastic thought and in post-Enlightenment humanisms should 
be considered in relation to the term's use at Vatican II. The most 
important difference between .these meanings attaches to the value and 
role given to freedom and reason as attributes of the person. In the 
neo-scholastic picture, freedom is subordinate to reason, for it is 
rational nature Vlhich distinguishes man. Late nineteenth century 
Homan theology follows St. Thomas in taldng up the dictum of Boethius, 
"the person is the individual substance of a rational m.ture 11 • (4) 
However, the neo-scholastics understood 11 rational m.ture 11 , or 
11 reason", in a particular and restricted way; "rational nature 11 is 
that which can and should conform to the norms of objective truth; 
its dignity lies in doing so under the power of its own initiative. (5) 
cont. p. 308 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
to say, man is the image of God because he imitates him in action. 
Therefore the concept of the image for St. Thomas is on the level 
of analogy, whereas for Bonaventure, for example, man is the image 
of God through being a 1living mirror' of his very being (see II 
Sent. do 16o aoloqol. concl. ). 
This description is drawn from the first draft of the Pastoral 
Constitution on the Church in the Modern World (unpublished notes 
presented to the Co-ordinating Commission, May 23 1963, p. 14) 
This text of Boethius is cited by St. Thomas as the basis of his own 
concept of the person in ST la. q.29 a.,_l.adol; q.30o a.l. ad.l. 
(vol. 6, pp. 41 and 65)o 
See Aquinas, ST la. qo 29. a.l resp. : 11particulari ty and 
conto p.310 
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This is the point at which freedom is important: Freedom con-
stitutes the power to conform to truth rationally, rather 
than in a sub-personal way. It is not, essentially, simply the 
power to act according to one's own volition, whether rationally 
or not. 
This way of conceiving freedom appears in Leo XIII's 
encyclical Libertas Praestantissimum (6) vlhich the P9pe introduced by 
saying that freedom belongs solely to natures which possess 
intelligence or reason, and it gives to men the dignity of being 
under their ow-.a counsel end of having power over their own actionso 
But, he went on to say, 11 this dignity's greatest significance lies in 
the fact that it is exercised by reason". (7) The wei@.t of this 
last comment appears when JJeo addresses himself to the question of 
liberty in society: 
"Therefore in human society, liberty which is 
true to its name does not subsist in the 
power to do what you please ••• but in the 
fact that the civil laws make it easier for 
you to live in accordance with the prescriptions 
of the eternal law. 11 ( 8) 
From this, he goes on to draw the conclusion about religious 
freedom: 
11lVIen widely preach what they call freedom of 
conscienceo Now, if this is understood to 
meen that everyone should worship, or not 
worship, God equally, according to his own 
opinion, the arguments gi. ven above are 
sufficient to prove thaG this idea is ~istakeno 
But, it is acceptable in this sense: A man 
should suffer no obstacle in the state which 
cont. from p. 309 
individuality are found in a still more special and perfect 
way in rational substances which have control over their actions, 
and are not only acted upon as other beings are, but act of 
their own initiative. For to act is proper to individual or 
singQlar substances. Hence, among all other substances 
individual beings with a rattonal nature have a special name, 
end this is 1person 1 • 11 (vol. 6, p. 43)~ 
(6) 20 June 1888, (ASS 20 PPo 593ff.). 
(7) ibid.,p. 593 (DzS 3245). 
(8) ibid., p. 598 (DzS 3250). 
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would prevent him from follovving the 
will of God and doing his cor.o.mands 
according to his awareness of his dutyo 
Now, this is true freedom, worthy of the 
sons of God, which protects the dignity 
of the hunian person most properly. 11 ( 9) 
We see then, that despite a shade of ambiguity, the 
basic idea shines through that the freedom which gL ves men 
dignity is the freedom to live worthily as God's children, as 
beings who follow the law of raUonali ty given to them through 
their consciences and through the Church. Rational nat-ure, which 
is the universal suppositum of humanity, is the norm of the 
individual person 1 s dignity in his exercise of freedom. Preedom 
does not have a self-subsistent dignity. 
The thinkers of many forms of post-Enli§'ltenment humanism 
begin their understanding of man 1 s dignity not from the point of 
view of a universal human nature, but from the point of view of the 
individual subject as a superconscious unity of intentional acts. 
This individual subject becomes the norm of ethics, and freedom 
(the power of self-determination and intenti anality) is an 
essential part of his dignity. 
Between these two conceptual schemes there opens up 
a mediating possibility (as we have already seen in our study of 
passages from Vatican II) o :Man's ethical norm may be neither 
purely objective (a 1law'), nor purely subjective. It may, 
rather, be the norm which is imposed upon the individual by hi.s 
own character as a being vmo essentially exists as one in dialogue 
with others. That is to say, the subject only fully finds his 
identity in relationships, and ethical reality cannot be abstracted 
from this relational character of the human person. 
· This is the p o si ti on which begins to appear in GS 1 6 on 
human conscience, for in conscience is heard the "voice" of 
God; (10) it is, therefore, a locus of ~ialogue. In addition, 
although the article also draws upon a concept of a divine, 
objective law, inscribed upon man's heart (in obedience to which 
(9) ibid., P• 608 (DzS 3250). 
(10) The idea of the "voice of God", heard in conscience, was not 
entirely new within magisterial theology at Vatican II; 
cont. p. 312 
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he attains dignity), this law is to be :fulfilled in relationships 
of love with God and neighbouro Therefore, such relationship117 or 
communion, becomes the norm of human freedom and dignity. 
1:he concept of loving relationship requires as its 
concomitant the existence of true freedom in the subjecto Whilst 
rationality may be constrained (that is, I may be persuaded by 
argument or demonstration to acknowledge something as true, even 
against my will), love, on the other hand, loses its value if it is 
not a free self-donation without constraint. Freedom, then has a 
dignity of its own, the dignity of being the potential for love, 
even when it is abused, and turns away from communion vvi th God 
and neighbouro 
cont. from p. 311 
indeed, GS 16 gives a direct reference to a radio broadcast 
of Pius XII using the same image. However, Pius's use of the 
idea that the voice of God echoes in conscience did not 
really break through to a dialogical concept of conscience, 
because he went on to speak of it as a "pure reflection of 
the norm of human acts'', and to use the language of 
'enlightening' conscience through education on the subject of 
Christ's will, law, and life. These, then, are expressions which 
introduce more fixist, legalistic notions of the content and 
function of conscience. (See Radio broadcast, 23 March 1952, 
AAS 44, pp. 271 f o ) 
We have, of course, seen that GS 16 uses the idea of a 
law in conscience, as well as that of a voice (Chapter IV, P• 236)o 
However, it is very important that GS 16 orientates this law 
upon its fulfillment in charity (rather than simply in 
obedience to the 'Golden Rule' of M.7. 12f., which was a 
favourite traditional definition and summary of the content 
of the natural law), and we may also note the contrast between 
the ideas of the education of conscience in accordance with 
norms derived from the past, and the more future-looking idea 
contained in GS 16 of "searching together for the truth, and 
solving the great number of moral problems ••• in the truth". 
This contrast is not a stark one, for the 1 edU<l"ated' conscience 
must necessarily apply norms learnt from the past to the 
problems of the present and future, and, as we have seen, in 
other passages Vatican II speaks of the education of conscience, 
and of docility towards the Church's teaching. Nevertheless, the 
shift of emphasis between Pius' broadcast and GS 16 is 
appreciable. 
Turning to conscience, we find that it derives its 
dignity not only through the fact that it expresses freedom, but 
also from the fact that it is the faculty whereby man apprehends 
the law of love and -the voice of God. The dignity of conscience, 
then, consists in freely seeking that law and trying to understand 
that voice - in displaying the attitude which is orien-tated towards 
loveo It does not lose its dignity if it errs invincibly with 
regard to the objective moral law (see GS 16), although it does 
lose its dignity if it turns aside from its proper orienta-tion 
through sinful neglect of the question of what is good (loc. cit o). 
Human dignity, therefore, exists on several different 
levels; man has a dignity on the level of mere potentiality for 
love, which is expressed in the fact of his genuine freedom; he has 
a dignity which consists in follovdng his conscience, whether or 
not i-G accurately conforms to the law end voice of God; finally, his 
fullest dignity blossoms vvhen he fulfills the divine law through 
charity, in a communion of love with God and neighbour. 
We find, then, that we have moved away from the problematic 
of truth and rationality to that of communion and love when 
considering ethical norms end human dignity. This is how Vatican II's 
concept of the human person provides a philosophical counterpart 
to its doctrine of man as made in God's imageQ From the beginning, 
man has possessed freedom and the capacity for moral lmowledge of 
God's will; these together constitute an openness to love of Godo 
In addition to this moral openness to God, the human m~ind 
also has a created capacity to attain to lmowledge of the creator 
from the evidence of what he has made (see DV 6. 2). However, within 
the general structure of the Council's theology of man's relationship 
to God it is clear that this intellectual capacity is subordinate to, 
and supportive of, man's openness to loveo Human dignity subsists 
in the moral spheres of freedom and conscience, vn1ether or not the 
intellectual possibility of knowing about the creator is taken up. 
Correct beliefs about God (or even about his vdll) are not the means 
whereby man gains his fundamental dignity as a person, although they 
do enable him to live according to the fullness of that dignity o 
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2 A Closer Examination of the Doctrine of God the Creator, as 
it is Entailed in the Passages which we have so far studied 
When we exrunined the ideal of obedience which Vatican II 
presented, in order to elicit the picture of God underlying it, we 
found that he appeared most predominantly as one who shares his act 
of creation vvi th men, and as one who is liberator and lord of a new 
covenant. However, we also saw that there is a _picture of him as 
legislator of a stable moral order requiring conformity contained 
in some aspects of the Council's teaching on obedience. Therefore, 
whilst the documents of Vatican II stress most strongly that it is 
the future which provides the criterion and goal for moral and 
ecclesiastical obedience, they also assert that certain unchangeable 
norms exist vvithin the universe -norms which are determined by the 
essence of how things are in God's creat~on. 
The future-orientated pictures of God, and that which 
shows him in relation to a stable, fixed order do, of course, stand 
in tension to one anothero ~Vhen they are correlated with human 
actions the former pictures set the moral criterion for the Christian 
more in effects, while the latter direct his attention to that 
which pre-exists him as the essence of what is gpod. However, to say 
that these pictures of God are in tension vvith one another is not to 
say that they are completely irreconcilable. We have seen in 
Chapter IV (pp o 239f.) how the Council sketched out the formal 
structure of a reconciliation by correlating its picture of God vvi th 
the idea of the human person, ''that part of creation which is open to 
the future precisely because of the nature which it has been given 
from all eterni ty11 o 
Therefore, on the fonnal level at least, a basis is 
provided upon which the different pictures of God may be synthesised: 
God the creator relates to man the person through eternal norms, 
through inviting him to share in creating a new future, and also by 
redeeming and liberating human action so that man's future may be that 
of the kingdom and not merely of this world. In the human person 
0 
an eternally decreed structure of being opens out (according to its 
own noms) to communion and futurity 9 
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However, 'if the pe~csonhood of man is the correlative 
concept which may serve to hold together the different elements 
of a composite picture of God, it is also a concept which imports 
some new elements into the doctrine of God with which it is 
co-ordinated. If God relates to men as persons, destined for 
comrnunion with him by the very structure of their being, the entire 
creative act which brought them into existence begins to appear as 
an act of loveo Whether this creative act and ordinance is seen 
primarily in terms of a process which is directed towards a goal in 
the future, or whether it is seen as being fUndamentally a 
once-for-all determination of a stable physical and morel universe, 
it appears as an act in which humanity comes to be because God wills 
to bave loving connnunion with ito 
How does this compare with the doctrine of God put 
forward by magisterial documents of the preceding hundred years? 
Loold..ng back to Vatican I 1 s teaching concerning creation we see no 
explicit mention of love: 
11 This one only true God, of His own goodness 
and almighty power, not for the increase of 
His own happiness, but to manifest His 
perfection by the blessings ~mich He bestows on 
creatures, and vdth absolute freedom of counsel, 
created out of nothing, from the very beginning of 
time, both the spiritual and the corporeal 
creatures."(11) 
Now, this passage mentions the goodness and blessings of 
God, but it does not mention the sort of love which seeks 
comrnunion with the objects of its creation. 'rhe act of creation 
appears to be something occurring very much outside God's self-
subsisting essence, and having no fundrunental effect upon it. 
It is an occasion, simply, for the manifestation of the divine 
perfectiono The creatures upon whom the blessings are bestowed 
have the role of witnesses to this perfection more than that of 
partners in loving comrnuniono This suggests that the glorification 
of God consists in the rational apprehension by men and angels of 
(11) Dei Filius, cap. 1, (Dz 1783/DzS 3002). (Translation from 
c. Butler, The Vatican Council, 2 (London, 1936) P• 255)" 
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God 1 s perfection, and their due response of giving honour to 
him to whom it is due. 
The stress of Dei Filius on the fact that God was free 
from all necessity in creating the world is, if anything, sharpened 
in the canon which is attached to the constitution: 
"If anyone • • • shall say that God created, 
not by His will free from all necessity, 
but by a necessity equal to the necessity 
whereby He loves Himself; or shall deny that 
the world was made for the glory of God; let 
him be anathema. 11 ( 12) 
We see, then, that the major thrust of Vatican I 1 s teaching on the 
nature of God as creator is concerned with affirming his freedom 
and gl,orification in creation. 
In 1887 the Holy Office specifically opposed the doctrine 
of God's freedom to the concept of a necessity imposed upon him 
by love, when it condemned the proposition (alleged to be drawn 
from the philosophy of Rosmini-Serbati) that "the love by which God 
loves himself even in his creatures, and which is the determining 
principle of creation, constitutes a moral necessity, and a moral 
necessity always comes to effect in the most perfect of beings11 • (13) 
A similar issue cropped up again among the 11new theological 
tendencies11 reproved by Pius XII in 1950: Among their consequences 
he included the contention that 11 the creation of the world was 
necessary, because it proceeds from the necessar.y liberality of 
divine love 11 • (14) 
We should view the implications which we have drawn from 
Vatican II 1 s ideal of obedience against this background of polemic, 
in which the Magisterium avoided explicitly stating that the 
creation flowed from divine love, lest it might imply th~t God was 
constrained by an inner necessity. 
(12) ibid. Canones de Deo Creatore, can. 5 (b & c) (Dz 1805/DzS 3025) 
(Butler's translation, Po 269)g 
(13) Deer. s. Officii, Post Obitum (14 Dec. 1887), Error 18. (Dz 1908/ 
DzS 3218). 
(14-) E11cycl. 1-Iumani Generis, p. 570 (Dz 2317/DzS 3890). 
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Vatican II did not avoid all mention or implication 
of love in creation in this wayo It suggested that men were made 
for communion vv.ith God, and thus because of God's love. This is 
not to say that the idea of inner necessity or moral constraint 
upon the creator is part of Vatican II 1 s doctrine; nor is it to 
ruggest that the Fathers of the Second Vatican Council would have 
denied the proposition that if the universe had not been brought into 
being God would nevertheless still be 11 of supreme beatitude in and of 
himself11 • ( 15) However, the idea that he created out of love, and 
with a view to loving co®nunion, does suggest that in the act of 
calling the world into being he surrenders something of his self-
subsistent beatitude freely, and henceforward makes it somehow 
dependent upon co®nunion with the object of his love and creati ono 
From this point of view we may suppose that the glorification of 
the creator consists in more than the mere honouring of his 
perfection by created witnesses, but rather in the substantial response 
of the creature to him in the fullness of co~nunion. 
Summary to sub-sections 1 and 2 
By examining the pictures of God which were derived from 
Vatican II's concept of ideal Christian obedience, and by showing 
that both the future-orientated pictures, and also that which posits 
God as the author of a stable order, are correlated by the Council 
with the doctrine of the human person, we have been able to explore 
further dimensions of that doctrine of God which best co-ordinates 
with the conciliar ideal of obedience. We have fotm.d that the idea 
of divine love as the motive force behind creation is brought 
forward when God the creator is set in relation to the human persono 
The doctrine of God's love, in turn, modifies the concept of what 
glorification might mean: Just as the hwnan person will find his 
fulfillment in the perfect communion of the eschatological kingdom, 
so too this will constitute the final glorification of God. He 
cannot, then, be indifferent about the fate O.f the creatures which 
are made in his image, for their attainment of co~union with him 
is intimately involved in his glory. 
(15) Dei Filius, cap. 1 (Dz 1782/DzS 3001)o 
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We c.11n set out a series of questions, relating to these 
conclusions, arid use then as a way of finding out whether the 
passages of conciliar anthropology and doctrine of God which we 
have not yet studied harmonise with the anthropology and doctrine 
of God entailed in Vatican II 1 s concept of the Christian 1 s proper 
obedience in the Church: 
i) Do the documents consistently attach human dignity to 
human freedom in the way which we have seen in sub-
section 1? 
ii) Do they consistently teach that the human person is 
open to God by the very structure of his nature? 
iii) Do they present God 1 s act of creation as an act which 
is radically orientated towards the attainment of 
loving cmnmunion with man? 
iv) In what do the documents locate the glorification 
of God? 
3 VaticM II 1 s Treatment of the Doctrine of Man in the 'Moment' 
of Creation in those Parts of the Documents Which we have not 
yet Studied 
The Christian anthropology of Vatican II is, to a great 
degree, found in the final document of the Council, The Pastoral 
Constitution on the Church in the Modern World (Gaudium et Spes). 
J?or example, the article devoted to the specific consideration of 
human conscience, which we have already analysed in some detail, 
belongs to that constitution. It was from Gaudiurn et Spes, too, 
that vve drew the Council's concept of the human person as a 
creature made in God's image. 
In order to test the consistency of Vatican II 1 s 
anthropology it vdll be necessary in this sub-section to carry out 
a double operation: First, we Shall examine the doctrine of man 
the creature as it is found in documents other than Gaudium et Spes, 
in order to see whether it harmonises with the doctrine which we 
have already unearthed from that constitution. Secondly, we must 
study further areas of anthropology contained in the Pastoral 
Constitution, in so far as they have not already come under our 
scrutiny, in order to ascertain whether the themes we have seen were 
developed evenly throughout the document. This two-fold approach 
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will indicate whether the theology of the Council's last 
constitution stands apart from that of the documents which 
preceded it in regard to the doctrine of man (which is Gaudium 
et Spes 1 major concern). ( 16) 
a) The Christian anthropology of documents other than Gaudium 
et Spes 
The presentation of man's status and condition as a 
creature is fairly sparse in documents apart from Gaudium et Spes; 
nearly all that is said on the subject elsewhere is said 1 in 
passing', in the context of the treatment of other themes. We may 
begin by considering two short references which are cast in rather 
neo-scholastic terms. 
In IM 6, the Council addressed the question of the 
relationship between art and morality. Insisting upon the primacy 
of the demands of the objective moral order, the text asserts: 
11 only the moral order touches man in his 
whole nature as a rational creature of God 
WDO is called to a supernatural destiny 
( 11 ad superna vocatum11 ); likewise, if it is 
kept completely and faithfully, it leads 
man to his perfection and to the full 
attainment of his beatitudeo 11 
The two pairs of concepts used in this passage (rational 
creature/called to a supernatural destirry; perfectio~fUll 
beatitude) are drawn from the neo-scholastic division between 'pure 
nature 1 , on the one hand, and 1 supernature 1 , on the othero Of 
these, the former appears to have self-enclosed, created possi-
bilities of attaining a purely natural perfection, whilst the 
supernatural grace of God supervenes upon it as an add:ition,,as 
a power which elevates it to a higher destinyo This articulated 
view of man is also found in the following passage: 
( 16) In introducing Text 6 of the constitution on 21 September 1 964, 
Archbishop Garrone said "the whole scope of the schema is 
swmued up, as it were, in man and the human condition; this is 
the real soul of the schema". (Quoted by J. Ratzinger in 
Vorgrimler, 5, Po 118)o 
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"God, creating and preserving all things through 
his Word, continually offers to men a testimony 
of himself in the things he has made; and 
determining to open up the way to a higher 
( 'supernae') salvation, he also showed himself to 
our first parents from the beginning. 11 (DV 3) 
T:1e two-fold view of man which is expressed through the 
pure nature/supernatural distinc-tion was founded upon the 
philosophical rigidity with which an Aristotelian concept of 
nature was treated by comrnentators upon St. Thomas from the time 
of Cajetan onwardso (17) The philosophical division between that 
which is 'natural' and that which is 'supernatural' - genuinely 
useful in as much as it expressed the sheer gratuitousness of rnan's 
salvation - came so to dominate the thinJd.ng of the school of 
commentators upon St. Thomas that it fractured into two parts the 
theological concept of God's will for man. It came to seem that 
human nature had a double destiny arising from a t;~-fold 
relationship to God - through creation, first of all, and then 
through elevating grace; the creation and elevation of human nature 
came to be seen as intrinsically different acts. 
This double-layered concept of man was overcome, as we 
have seen, in Vatican II' s return to the biblical and patristic 
idea of the creature who is made af'ter God's image, that is, a being 
who finds fulfillment only when his knowledge and actions are 
completed in the love of God which comes as grace. Are we, then, to 
see the two short passages which have just been quoted as 
fundamentally inconsistent vdth what we unearthed earlier of the 
Council's anthropology? Not necessarilyo The two-fold fonn of 
God's relationship to man may be seen as merely an expression of two 
aspects, or 'moments', of a single determination. God calls man to a 
supernfftural destiny because of, and through, the structure of 
(17) See Ho de Lubac, Surnaturel (Paris, 1946) po 105, 
De Lubac defined the concept of 'pure nature' thus: "The 
concrete possibility of an order of things in which man, left by 
the creator to his own strength, or using natural aids only, 
could lay claim to an inferior destiny, limiting his rational 
desires to a 'natural' state of felicity. 11 It was de I1ubac 's 
argument that this concept contained an erroneous understanding 
of Sto Thomas' teaching, and a misrepresentation of Christian 
ffllthropology. 
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rational human personhood; the perfection ~~1.ich man pursues 
through the moral order opens out into fulfillment in charity; 
man was created in and through the Word of God, and therefore 
destined from the start for a heavenly end. 
We may see in the second and third articles of Lumen 
Gentium a pair of statements in vmich the first articulates the 
'moments' of God's relationship to man, but the second views the 
whole synoptically: 
"The eternal Father, through the absolutely 
free and secret plan of his vvisdom, created 
the entire world, determined to elevate 
men to a share in his divine life, and did: 
not desert them when they had fallen in 
Adam. 11 (LG 2) 
"Therefore the Son came, sent by the Father 
who chose us in him before the foundation of 
the world, and predestined us for adoption as 
sons, because it pleased him to restore all 
things in him (see Eph. 1 4-5 and 10). 11 
(LG 3, emphasis mine.) 
We may say, then, that although the neo-scholastic notion 
of pure nature, and of a double human destiny, is hinted at in one 
or two short passages of Vatican II, these passages may, even yet, 
be patient of another interpretation which would make them conform 
to the integrated anthropology which we have already discovered 
underlying the Council's concept of obedience. Vie may also note 
at this poirrt the significance of a Christological theme (that of 
God 1 s predestination of man in Christ) as the lens through w.o.ich we 
gain the synoptic view of the Father's intentions and ac-tions 
towards uso This theme vvill reappear later in the chapter and be 
treated in greater detail; but now we shall consider just one 
aspect of the idea of God 1 s choice of us in Christ - an aspect which 
arises from study of LG 3. 
The article, LG 3, which is quoted above in part, gives 
an exegis of the thought of Ephesians Chapter I which suggests that 
the persons whom God chose in Christ are not a restricted group, 
but rather, all mankindo I say this because the article moves on from 
the passage which we have quoted (speaking of the restoration of 
all things in Christ) to a description of the relat-ionship of Christ 
to the Church, and of the Church's existence as 11 the kingdom of 
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God already present in a mystery". It- then proceeds to indicate 
that the Church and the kingdom have a universal dimension: "All 
men are called to this union with Christ • 
• • from whom we 
proceed, through whom we live, and to whom our lives are directed 11 • 
From the beginning, then, all men exist within the sphere of 
God 1 s choice, with a vocation to the Church and the kin,gdom, a 
vocation which is rooted in their predestination to sonship in 
Christ. 
In one aspect man's vocation consists in the call to 
become part of the people of God, the Church, as noted above (see 
also LG 13.1 and 4), but the call also has a scope which is wider 
than the merely ecclesiastical. In AA 7.2 we find the phrase, 
"man 1 s integral vocation", (see also AG 8) and here the context is 
that of a discussion of activity in the secular order, and of the 
proper autonomy of that sphere. AA 7. 2 argues that all things are 
to be summed up in Christ at the end, but that this does not 
deprive the natural order of its autonomy or own proper ends. 
Rather, the final swnming up perfects the secular order, and makes 
it "correspond to the integral vocation of man on earth". The 
term 1 integral 1 appears in order to show that the use of the 
natural order in human life is part of the fUlfil~nent of a calling 
which is not restricted in its orientation to this life alone. At 
the same time, however, activities in the natural sphere are not 
merely instrumental in forming a superna,tural perfection in ma;a for 
the sake of a higher life o Rather, man is caJ.led to a response to 
God in which hir? earthly activities will maintain their ovvn intrinsic 
value, yet at the same time being open to consmrunation in Christ at 
the end. The human vocation is one and indivisible; God addresses 
us in the totality of our relations, and calls us to a fulfillment 
which is not 1 high~r' in the sense of being separate from our 
natural fulfil~nent, or imposed upon it, but which is the completion 
and transfiguration of our lives in all their natural relationships 
and activitieso 
In this context it is interesting to note how the Council 
treated the idea of "self-perfection" through work (LG 41 o5). The 
very phrase 'self-perfection' seems to be redolent of the older 
-323 
conceptuality in wbich the natural order first contributed to man's 
inferior, natural perfection, and was only seconoJ.y subordinated 
in an instrumental way to the higher perfection which might be 
attained in the supernatural ordero However, in this passage, 
self-perfection is attached to the idea of "moving the v1.hole of 
society and creation forward to a better state", We see, therefore, 
that activity in the secular sphere is given a value ~\&'J.ich is more 
substantial than that of being a mere instrument of the individual's 
. . 
perfection, whether merely natural or even alpernatural. The 
work through which sanctity is attained is directed towards future 
goalso LG 41.5 therefore suggests that man's response to God is one 
and indivisible: It must be through the totality of his relations 
with the world, and it will find its fulfillment along with the 
fulfillment of all things in Christ. 
We are beginning to see the outlines of the great 
Christological theme of Vatican II vVhich will fonn the subject of 
a later section of this chapter: Man 1 s vocation is founded in God 1 s 
choice of him in Christ; it is in the same Christ that God wills 
to sum up and restore all things at the end. Therefore man's 
vocation is not only rooted in his interior nature as a person, but 
also involves all his exterior contacts with the rest of the 
nat1-1ral order, which is to find its consummation with and through 
man, 11 for whose service (it] was created" (AA 7.2). 
Although the theme of the integral vocation of man is 
not one vVhich we have already explicitly seen in the anthropology 
of Gaudium et Spes, it is clear that it is closely related to the 
doctrine of God's image in the human person: Man is called in the 
totality of bis relations: vVhat is he called to? He is called to 
that communion with God and his neighbour in which all secular 
activities will find their proper orientation and finally their 
consummation. The call is implicitly written into the very 
structure of his being, in that he is open to the love of God, 
and aspires after the values of the kingdom vVhich are shown forth 
perfectly in Christ: 
11 In showing forth Christ, the Church at the 
same time reveals to men the real truth about 
their condition and integral vocation; for 
Christ is the principle and example of that 
324 
renewed httro.e.nity wl1ich is imbued vvi th brotherly 
love, sincerity, and a peaceful spirit, and 
after which all men aspire." (AG 8) 
In exploring the theme of man's vocation, therefore, as 
it appears in documents other than .'laudium et Spes, we have been 
examining a concept which can be organically co-ordinated with the 
anthropology of the pastoral consti tu"ti on. 
Before we turn to consider the teaching of Gaudium et Spes 
in greater detail, however, we must first notice that the idea of 
the hwnan person 1 s dignity is to be found also in the Declaration on 
Religious Liberty (Dig.nita;t;is Humanae). 
This declaration first defines the concept of human 
digrli ty in terms which aim to sum up the general modern view of the 
subject - "that men should enjoy the possibility o:f acting according 
to their own opinions, in responsible freedom and without coercion, 
but guided by their awareness of duty" (DH 1.1) o It is this rtght 
to dignity in freedom which the declaration affirms, because men are 
persons - that is, "because they are endowed with reason and free 
will, and therefore possessed of personal responsi bili ty11 (DH 2.2) o 
The reader will notice here the definition of personhood in terms 
of abstract qualities rather than in terms of man's concrete 
openness to relationship with Godo From the qualities of reason 
and free vdll is derived the mors~ obligation wluch lies upon men 
of 11 seeking the truth, especially in matters concerning religion", 
and of 11 adhering to the truth which is found" (loc. ci to). This 
problematic of truth forms a different context from the idea of love 
which we saw in Gaudi1Rfi et S,2es; ( 18) it fo nns a context which is less 
( 18) The argument of Dignitatis Humanae is, of course, compatible with 
that of Gaudium et Spes: IVIan 1 s power to 'know' God is one of the 
constituents of his openness to the divine, and, as we have 
seen, rational assent is part of what is meant by knowing God in 
this vvorld. In DH 3. 3 the character of religion is described as 
that by which man "orders himself directly to God in voluntary, 
free, interior acts." This description approaches, a1 though it 
does not fUlly attain, the concept of love as the essence of 
religious acts. We may say, then, that Dignitatis Humanae lays 
down abstract foundations, whereas Gaudiurn et Spes presents the 
concrete concept of communion in love as the reality of man's 
structure of openness to Godo 
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theologically rich inasmuch as it is nearer to secular moral 
philosophyo 
It is also a problematic which resembles that which led 
Leo XIII to quite other conclusions concerning religious liberty 
than those reached by Vatican II. (19) In order to differentiate 
their approach from that of Leo, the Fathers of the Second 
Vatican Council had to call upon the idea of "psychological liberty!' 
as the necessary condition for the respons:i. ble exercise of 
freedom (loco cit.). We find here, therefore, a shift of thinJdng 
in comparison with the neo-scholasticism of the nineteenth century, 
which is concentrated in a shift in the use and connotations of the 
ideas 'reason', 'rationality', and 'freedom'. Reason appears, in the 
thought of Vatican II, as an activity which has its dignity in its 
free exercise, rather than as a pattern of conformity to objective 
truth - a pattern which the hurnan mind is call$d upon to displayo 
Freedom is assimilated to the definition of man's 
:rational activity more anphatically than to the concept of love in 
Digni tatis Humanae. Of course, the free and reasonable act by 
which man puts his faith in God (see DH 1 0) leads to an adherence to 
God in the adoption of sonship (see loc. ci to) which goes beyond 
mere rational assent. Howe·ve1~, it is not the love which man may have 
towards God, but rationality working within the conditions of 
''psychological liberty11 , which is the focus of the declaration's 
argument that human dignity demands freedom in matters of religion. 
The stress on the activity of human reason i-s correlated 
with a view of man 1 s participation in "the eternal, objective, divine 
law11 , the ''unchangeable truth" by which God governs the whole world 
and the ways of human conununity (see DH 3. 1) o The idea is highlighted 
that participation in this truth is achieved through gradual growth in 
knowledge of God 1 s law, and that this growth comes about through 
free and social means of inquiry such as teaching, education, com-
munication, and dialogue (see DH 3.2). The declaration thus suggests 
that man's ethical responsibility for what he believes is discharged 
when he enters into the activity of seeking what us true, and not 
( 19) See above, pp,. 310f. 
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simply when he attains to conformity with that vvhich is, in fact, 
the objective and divine truth. This picture corresponds with that 
of GS 16, when it claims that the dignity of human conscience is not 
lost through actual error, but through neglect in seekLng out what 
is true and right. 
We may say that the treatment of the dignity of the human 
person given in_Dignitatis Humanae approaches, but lacks the concrete-
ness of, the governing concept of loving communion which we saw in 
GS 12 and 16o The argument of the declaration depends largely upon a 
redefinition of the nature and ethics of rationality. This redefinition 
is effected by introducing the notion of "psychological li berty 11 , and 
that of a dynarnic quest after truth, as qualifications of what is 
meant by acting rationally. 
In su.rn, then, there is a certain unevenness in the treatment 
of anthropology outside Gaudium et Spes; this unevenness bears 
relation to the different subjects tackled in the various documents, and 
the constituencies to which they primarily addressed themselves. On 
the one hand, Lumen Gentium, Apostolicae Actuositatem and Ad Gentes 
are highly theologi.cal documents, addressed to the Church itself. 
Their contribution to anthropology is made through a biblical stress 
on the vocation by which man is eternally called to participate in the 
divine life. On the other hand, Dignitatis I-ltunanae is a document 
addressed to an immediately practical issue which concerns those 
outside, as well as those within, the Catholic Church o The document 
directs its arguments, then, to both groups, and draws upon both 
philosophical and biblical concepts. However, in that section of the 
declaration which discusses the dignity of the human person, it is 
the philosophical argument - accessible to non-Christians as well as 
Christians - which predominates, and it is ideas drawn directly from 
a modern picture of human rationality which effects changes in 
Catholic thinking. 
By comparison, in what we have seen so far of _9-audium et 
.sl?es, there is an explicit attempt at synthesis between the Catholic 
philosophy of man, developed along the lines of a personalism, and 
a biblical and patristic stress, which contributes the idea that man 
is made after God 1 s image, a being who finds the law of his heart 
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fulfilled in love. It is the concept of love which provides the 
context of the synthesis in which human dignity and freedom are 
affirmed as being necessarily conjoined. In the pages ~1ich follow 
we shall exanine further passages from Gaudimn et Spes, in order to 
see whether the constitution consistently maintained this synthetic 
position. 
b) The Christian anthropology of Gaudium et Spes 
My suggestion that the Pastoral Constitution on the 
Church in the Modern World provides the point of explicit synthesis 
between Vatican II's philosophical and theological anthropologies 
was made on the basis of a very few texts, all of vJhich we had 
previously studied in connection with the question of obedience in 
the Church. It is now our task to consider the constitution's 
picture of man, God 1 s creature, further, and to ask the questions: 
(i) How far did the personalist emphasis on relationship condition 
Gaudium et Spes 1 overall picture of man? (ii) What connections 
were made between hmnan liberty and dignity? (iii) How does the 
anthropology of the constitution relate to the biblical idea of 
vocation which we have discovered in Lumen Gentium, Apostolicae 
Actuosi tatem, and Ad Gentes? We shall address ourselves to each 
of these questions separately. 
i) How far did the personalist ero:phasis on relationship 
c ondi ti on Gaudium et Spes 1 overall picture of man? 
The idea of the human person is particularly related to the 
essentially social nature of man. This immediately becomes clear 
within GS 1 2 when the mutual society of man and woman is described 
as "the primary form of the cmmnun:ion of persons"; the text goes on 
to say, 11 for man is, by his deepest nature, a social being, and 
can neither live nor develop his gifts without relatj_onships with 
others" (GS 12.4). 
It is significant that the constitution locates 
sociability within the very centre of the person's being, and shows 
its orientation towards cownunion as its fulfillment, for this m1ows 
a profound congruence between the anthropology of personalism and 
the idea that obedience in the Church is aimed towards the building-up 
of the community, first of all (see Chapter III, p. 180). We may 
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contrast this treatment of the social nature of man with the way 
in which earlier magisterial documents had posited society as an 
innate and necessary, but nevertheless an instrumental~ good for 
human beings: Leo XIII, for example, taught that it is innate in 
man to live in society because 11he cannot attain perfection of mind 
and spirit in solitude", (20) and Pius XI similarly stated that: 
1111Ian is endowed with a social nature and placed 
on this earth to live in society ••• and thus to 
cultivate and develop all his faculties to the 
creator's praise and glory, and to attain both 
temporaJ_ and eternal felicity by faithfully 
fulfilling the work to vlhich he is calledo 11 (21) 
With Pius XII we find a breakthrough to the vievv that 
society, in itself and not merely instrumentally, has a value, 
but the idea of the communion of persons as its end-term does not yet 
appear, and the Pope's language tends to remain that of 
'perfection'. Society exists, said Pius XII, 
11 to preserve, develop, and perfect the human person, 
helping him to realise as perfectly as possible 
the principles and the religious and cultural ideals 
assigned by the creator to each man in particular, 
and to the whole of humanity together, in all its 
ramifications. 11 (22) 
It is with John XXIII that the way is everrcually prepared for 
the full theology of GS 12, for in his encyclical Pacem in Terris 
he founded his statement of the harmony ·which should prevail among 
men on a theology of God's image in man. (23) 
For Gaudium et Spes the concept of the person is 
intimately connected with that of communion among men, and this, in 
its turn~ is the counterpart to the capacit-y for conununion with 
God which constitutes the other dimension of the person. The theme 
of the conununi ty of human persons is the keynote for the second 
chapter of Part I of the constitution (see GS 23.1), and the 
significance of this connnuni ty is shown to lie in the fact that it 
is bound up with man's response to his vocation (GS 25.1); this 
(20) Encyclo Immortale Dei, Po 162 (DzS 3165)• 
( 21) Encycl. Quadragesimo .Anno, p o 21 5 (Dz 2270/DzS 37 43), 
(22) Christmas Message, 1942, AAS 35, P• 12. 
(23) p. 258 (DzS 3855f.) 
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response consists in his self-expenditure for God and others 
(GS 31o2), or the "sincere gift of himself" (GS 24.3). A human 
community founded on such self-giving is both a place wherein men 
find their true selves, and also, in their self-giving, one where 
they show some likeness to the unity of the Trinity (see loc. cit.). 
The person is, therefore, by the very structure of his being, open 
to others to the same extent as he is open to God. 
Nevertheless, the person is not fully defined through 
his outward relationships, for he is also constituted by an 
'interiority' to which he can withdraw; it is the place where God 
awaits him, "and where he makes his decision as to his own destiny 
under the eyes of God" (GS 14.2). (24) This relationship to God in 
man's innermost being appears to be the primordial fact which 
conditions his other relationships. It is, of course, the primordial 
fact of being made after God's image. 
If we look at the attributes of the human person as they 
are presented in Gaudium et Spes, we find that there is consistently 
a shift from descriptions which lean on classical, neo-scholastic 
formulae, to those which are drawn more from the pattern of theology 
established in the idea of the person made in God's image. For 
example, GS 15.1 begins in the classical vein with the assertion that 
man participates in the light of the divine mind, and goes on to 
reaffirm the doctrine of Vatican I (already asserted in DV 6.2) that 
human intelligence can attain to intelligible reality, despite the 
obscurities left in it as a result of sin. Nevertheless, it should 
be noted even here that Vatican II does not speak of the operation 
of bare rationality ('ratio') (25), but rather of the more 
englobing faculty of knowing, man 1 s intelligence ( 1 intellectus 1 ). 
This tiny, verbal shift is followed in the second paragraph of the 
(24) In GS 14.2 there is a tension which is parallel to the tension in 
GS 16 between the concept of "the voice of God" in conscience, and 
an objective lawo The tension of GS 14 is that between the 
"interiority" of man, which is constituted by the idea of his 
inner dialogue with God, and the traditional idea of the "spiritual 
and immortal soul" o However, the structure of the article 
indicates that the concept of the soul is to be understood in 
terms of the way man's interiority is describedo The possession 
of a soul, then, indicates the person's openness to God. 
( 25) Coro.pare Dei ]':Llius, cap. 2 (Dz 1786/DzS 3005), 
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same article by an even more definite move away from any stress 
on mere ratiocination, for it is said tl1at the intelligent nature 
of man must be completed and perfected by wisdom, "which gently 
attracts man's mind to seek after the true and the good, and to 
love them, so that being imbued with (this wisdom) man is led 
through what is seen to what is unseen','• 
Wisdom is gi. ven the aspect here of a moral quality or 
attitude, and the Council 1 s use of it recalls the Dionysian 
tradition, mediated through St. Bonaventure, wherein wisdom is the 
gift through which men achieve contemplation of God; in this 
mystical tradition, wisdom is only partly a cognitive gift, and 
also partly affective. Wisdom begins in lmowledge and ends in 
love. This penumbra of meaning attached to the idea of wisdom 
suggests -as does the concept of the image- that mm1 1 s most 
fundamental openness to God lies elsewhere than in sheer rationality; 
it lies in the moral orientation which qualifies the conditions of 
human lmowing. Josef Hatzinger, in his commentary upon this passage, 
notes however, that the Council separates off the gift of faith 
from the attitude of wisdom ( GS 1 5. 4). He says that behind this 
separation there is "an attempt 
natural orders separate". (26) 
with GS 16 we do find that the 
to keep the natural and the super-
Indeed, if we compare this passage 
latter posits only a two-fold 
division- between man's lmowledge of God's law in conscience, m1d 
its fulfillment in charity - whilst GS 15.4 adds a third term to 
the degrees of openness to God which are found in lmowledge. We 
may cautiously suggest, however, that there is appropriately in both 
the spheres of conscience and of lmowledge the possibility of 
differentiation into a three-fold pattern of openness which does not 
necessarily follow the hard and fast distinction between the natural 
and the supernatural. First, there is man's capacity to lmow what 
is moral through his conscience, and what is true, through his 
intelligence; secondly, there is, perhaps, the openness to God which 
is expressed through divine, if inarticulate, charity towards men, 
and through grace-given wisdom about life which does not rise to an 
explicit knowledge of the creator. Finally, there is that overt 
affinity with God in the Spirit vmen man "contemplates the mystery 
(26) Vorgrimler, 5, PP• 133f. 
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of the divine will in the wisdom of faith" (GS 15.4), and loves 
God explicitly, thus fulfilling the law of his heart in complete 
awareness, and recognising the voice which he hears in conscience 
to be that of the creatoro This three-fold division depends on 
the idea that men can share in the grace of wl sdom and charity vvi thout 
conscious Christian faith. This question is to be explored 
further in the next section of the present chaptero 
If we turn from the cognitive attributes of man to the 
attribute of natural equality we find, once again, a classical 
neo-scholastic formulation modified by its conjunction with personalist 
ideas: 
"Since all men possess a rational soul and 
are created after God's image, and all have 
the same nature and origin; and since, through 
their redemption by Christ, they rejoice in 
the same vocation and divine destiny, a 
fundamental equality between them Should gain 
greater and greater recognition ••• although 
there exist legitimate differences among men, 
t:J.eir equal dignity as persons demands that 
they should attain more human and equal con-
ditions of lifeo 11 (GS 29o1 and 3) 
' Here it is obvious that the themes of the person and the image 
dominate over the conceptuality vvhich focusses upon the 11 rati onal 
soul'1 end "nature". Indeed, the latter ideas are integrated within 
a theological personalism which is itself integrated within a 
view of man founded upon the history of sal vationo 
Finally, we should look at Vatican II's picture of the 
relationship of man to culture. The reader vdll remember the 
view of the relationship of social life and the development of 
human faculties put forvvard by Leo XIII, Pius XI, and Pius XII (see 
p. 328, above). The same idea appears in Gaudium et Spes, but 
here under a consideration of the place of culture. Culture is 
not, itself, considered as a universal norm - that is to say, the 
Council did not support the idea that the cultural synthesis of 
Europe expresses the very essence of human cultivation - but 
rather, culture is recognised in its ethnological sense as a term 
denoting "a diversity of ways of using things, of working, of 
expressing oneself, of practising religion and formulating morals, 
of legislating and setting up judicial institutions, of developing 
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science and the arts, and of cuHivating beauty" (GS 53. 3). 
It is through this diversity of culture that man attains to 11 true 
and full humani ty 11 (GS 53.1). Attaining to true and :full 
humanity is the key idea explaining the development of man's 
gifts (see GS 53.2); it takes the place, in this context, of the 
neo-scholastic idea of 1 attaining perfection of mind and spirit 1 , 
or of 1 realising as perfectly as possible principles and ideals 
assigned by the creator' o Verbally, the shift is slight, but 
within the context of Vatican II's concept of the person and his 
integral VO'Jation, the idea of attaining to full humanity 
is significantly different from that of reaching perfection. The 
former integrates the fundamentally social nature of mM into 
its goal in a way that the latter does not. Therefore, it is 
not surprising to find GS 59 o 1 saying that culture should be 
subordinated not only to "the integral perfection of the human 
person", but also to 11the good of the community and of society in 
its entirety". 
We have examined the presentation of the idea of the 
human person in Gaudium et Spes_, and we have found that the consti-
tution consistently carries through the personalist theme. Even 
where older styles of anthropology appear to emerge, such 
formulations are taken up Md integrated within a broadly personalist 
pattern of thought which coheres with that which we discovered 
when examining the Council's ideal of Christian obedience. This 
pattern of thought founds its concept of the human person on the 
idea of openness to communion, cormnunion primordially with God, but 
also withmano The possibility of this second kind of communion, 
and men's aspirations after the values in which it is expressed, 
constitutes the grounds of dialogue between Christian humanism and 
the 'new humanism' (GS 55) of the secular world. However, for the 
Council it is the primary fact of man's being made in God 1 s image, 
and so open to him, which is at the root of anthropology and the 
description of man as a creature. 
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ii) What connections were made between human liberty and 
dignity in Gaudium et Spes? 
I have suggested on p.313 that human dignity, as we have 
so far seen it in the Council documents, is a three-layered concept. 
The fundamental dignity of man - that which is the object of 
respect in ethical norms - consists of his potential for openness 
to God; of this potential, genuine freedom of choice is a 
necessary part and condi tiono The highest dignity of man, on the 
other hand, consists in the fulfillment of this potential in the 
affinity of charity. In between, there lies a certain dignity 
inhering in human conscience and man's obedience to it, even vvhen 
it errs with regard to the objective truth about God's vvill. Is 
this three-fold picture of human dignity consistently expressed in 
Gaudium et .Spes? 
If we look first at GS 14.1, we find the statement that 
11 the very dignity of man requires him to glorify God in his body, and 
not to allow it to serve the evil inclinations of the heart". 
How is this to be understood? Clearly, the glorification of God 
represents the highest kind of openness to the creator, and therefore 
we may say that it is man's highest dignity which demands this of 
him. But the reference to the human body also throws our attention 
baclc to the fund8lnental form of dignity, that of potential; man's 
bodily existence is to be nwnbered among the necessary conditions 
of his personal openness to God; it is not 'accidental' to the 
human capacity to be God 1 s image in knowledge and love. li.ather, 
it is an essential part of the fully human conditions of openness 
that, in man, are summed up "the elements of the material world, 
so that, through him they may achieve their highest dignity 
('fastigium') and find a voice in free praise of the creator" (loco 
cit.)o We see here how the Council grounds its idea of man's 
fundamental dignity (his potentiality for God in freedom); this 
constitutes a true dignity because of its relationship to the rest 
of the universe and the role which it gives to man vis-~-vis the 
material world. By virtue of his freedom he is "the centre and 
su.m:mi t 11 ( GS 12 o 1 ) of all things on eartho 
Turning to GS 21 o3, we see that Vatican II affirms the 
link between the recognition of God and true human digfli ty. In 
this passage, both the fundamental and the highest forms of 
dignity are asserted, and we see clearly how they are articulated: 
111'he recognition of God is in no way 
opposed to man's dignity, since this ver.J 
di@1ity is both founded and perfected in 
God. For man was created by God as 
intelligent and free, and as a member of 
society; but above all, he is called to very 
communion with God as a son, and to share in 
his divine felicity. 11 
Man 1 s fundamental dignity is associated with his created nature, 
but its perfection or fulfillment is associated with the fact of 
his vocati.on; indeed, the two are hardly separable, except as 
1 moments' of the same divine intention. 
In GS 41.3 we find mention of the conditions under Which 
human dignity perishes; this occurs when man disengages himself 
from every norm of divine law in the name of his rights. Clearly, 
the meaning here is similar to the statement of GS 16, w:Lth 
regard to the culpably neglected conscience: Ih8n deprives himself 
of that degree of dignity which consists in obeying his conscience 
if he intentionally turns his back on all restrictions which are 
ultimately founded in the authority of divine law. It is 
purposefulness in this rejection which does damage to hwnan dignity, 
and not mere error as to the content of divine law. 
There is, then, in Gaudiura et Spes, a consistently 
articulated, complex concept of human dignityo Freedom belongs to 
that dignity as a fundamental condition. It is the object of 
protection in a proper ethical system. We find a synthesis of these 
thoughts in G-S 17, an article devoted to "the excellence" of 
freedom": 
11 Now, true liberty is the highest sign of the 
divine image in man, for God wished to leave 
man in the povver of h.i.s ovm counsel so that he 
might, of himself, seek after his creator and 
freely attain full and blessed perfection by 
adhering to him. It is the dignity of man, 
therefore, which requires that he should act by 
conscious and free choice, moved and guided 
personally from within, and not under the 
pressure of blind interior impulse, nor of 
exterior coercion. Man obtains this dignity 
~35 
vv'Den he frees himself from all captivity to 
his passions and pursues his end by free 
choice of what is good, and by laying hold on 
suit~ble aids to this end by his diligence 
and sld.llo 11 
This passage moves from the freedom of choice which 
exists in man as a sign of God's image, to the dignity and freedom 
which are achieved when this potential is rightly used. A similar 
affirmation of the sacredness of freedom is found in GS 41 • 2 in 
which, once again, the Church's message appears as the protector 
of liberty, because it reveals the heights of the dignity for which 
freedom is the potential and conditiono 
The affirmation of freedom as an essential consti tuerrl; of 
human digrrity, and therefore as an object of ethical decisbn, has 
very practical consequenceso We have already seen how the argument 
of Digni tatis Humanae connected man 1 s dignity with his right to 
religious freedom in the state. In GS 71 o 2 we find another 
consequence which flows from the exigencies of liberty: "Private 
property • • o assures to everyone a necessary zone of personal 
and frurrilial autonomy, and should be considered as an extension of 
human li berty 11 • This idea of the connection between property and 
freedom is linked with the assertion in GS 71 .1 that private 
property "contributes to the expression of the person". The person, 
as we have seen, is the being whose liberty should be respected and 
protected, and so, in this case, his right to ownership should be 
fosteredo But man's freedom only gives him dignity because it is a 
condition for his response to his vocation; therefore, in the 
case of property, freedom must be linked to responsibility (see 
GS 7'1.2). Indeed, the requirements of the common good can be the 
basis for legislation concerning property (see GS 71.4) o Thus, by 
a gradual process, Roman Catholic theology- as it has come to be 
expressed at Vatican II, has virtually reversed some of its ideas 
of the powers the state should possess. For Leo XIII, the responsi-
bilities attached to freedom should be more enforceable in the case 
of religion than in the case of property. (27) For the Second 
(27) We have seen on lW• 310L. Leo XIII '-s argument against the legi t:iima.cy 
of real religious lib@rtyo With regard to the question of 
property, he was the first Pope to issue a systmnatic attack on 
cont. Po 336 
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Vatican Council, freedom remains a primary norm, but because it is 
viewed as a quality which should direct man to communion (more 
than to truth) the responsibilities which should be socially 
enforceable are those relating to ownership and exploitation in 
social relations, and not those concerning the profession of 
religion. 
Social relations, then, are the context in which man 
should "come to an awareness of his dignity" (GS 31. 2), because the 
liberty which is enshrined in this dignity exists for the sake of 
communion with others. This is the human vocation; awareness of 
dignity, and awareness of vocation, are one and the same. Therefore, 
we turn now to a fuller treatment of Gaudi um et Spes 1 concept of the 
integral human vocation. 
iii) How does the anthropology of Gaudium et Spes relate to the 
biblical idea of vocation which we have discovered in Lumen 
Gentium, Apostolicae Actuositatem, and Ad Gentes? 
The theme of vocation is one m.ich we derived. from 
documents other than Gaudium et Spes, and yet we have already seen 
that constitution mention something to which man is called. However, 
as well as the concept of man's calling, there also appear notions 
which express a similar thought, but in the fonn of ontological 
assertions. Just as in GS 14 the notion of the soul lies alongside 
the concept of interiority and dialogue with God, and in GS 16 there 
is a duality between the ideas of a law inscribed on the heart and a 
voice of conscience, so too, in GS 18 we find the notion of "a seed 
of eterntty" in man, lying alongside the idea that "God bas called, 
and continues to call man to adhere to him with the whole of his 
nature in the perpetual communion of an incorruptible divine life" 
(see GS 18.1 and 2). 
In earlier cases we ba ve found that the traditional language 
which designates ontological notions (such as law, and soul) is 
Cont. P• 335 
the exploitation associated with nineteenth century liberal capi-
talism, and to enjoin the duty of paying a "just wage"; but he did 
not see the powers of the state with regard to the distribution of 
property as being very great. Indeed, he particularly stressed 
the idea that only moderate taxes should be exacted on private 
property. Generally, he preferred private solutions to the problems 
of social injustice, rather than imposed and enforceable civil 
solutions. (See encycl. Rerum Novarum, especially the passage 
quoted in Denzinger at Dz 1938/DzS 3265, 3267, 3269, 3270.) 
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subordinated in meaning to the theme of God'' s dialogue with man. The 
law of the heart directs man to the relationship of charity; his 
soul is to be understood as being the capacity for openness to God 
which gives him particular significance in the universe (see note 24, 
P• 329 ) • So, here too, the "seed of eternity" in the human person 
is to be understood in terms of the total structure of one Who exsits 
as a being whom God has called. This is clear from the fact that in 
the article 11all the emphasis falls on the historical consideration 
that eternal life is made possible by the saving work of the Lord". (28) 
In other words, the metaphysical idea of a soul, or seed of 
eternity, is not developed, While the action of God on behalf of man 
is the central focus of what is said. However, although the central 
focus is clear, it must be noted that the synthesis between classical 
ontology and the theology of vocation and salvation is not effected 
altogether happilyo 
A clearer and less ambiguous assertion of the idea that 
personal existence is constituted by God's call is found in GS 19.1: 
The highest argument for human dignity consists in the fact of man 1 s 
"vocation to cormnunion with God ••• For man is invited to join 
in dialogue with God from his very origin". This call is something 
which characterises every man; it is also the norm of worthy human 
activity (see GS 35.2). As in Apostolicae Actuositatem and Ad Gentes, 
the vocation of man is an integral one, touching and gathering up 
all his relations with the world. 
It is as an integral vocation that man's calling to 
cormnunion with God opens out into a vocation to serve his fellows, 
and to be in connn.union with them; every part of human life is 
involved in responding to this calling, and particularly social 
relations, for we are all called "by the same human and divine 
vocation", and our principle and end are the same -God (GS 92.5). 
Associated with the idea of human vocation is that of 
God 1 s purpose ::j.n history. It is the divine purpose that man should 
subdue the earth for the sake of better living conditions, and thus 
develop ('evolvere 1 ) the work of the creator (see GS 34.1 and 2); 
so it is emphasised that that to which man is called is an affinity 
(28) J. Ratzinger, in Vorgrimler, 5, P• 142. 
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with God which is expressed through an affinity of activity (see 
also GS 57.2 and 67.2). (29) 
We are led, then, full-circle; the theme of vocation 
which appears in Gaudium et Spes, as well as in other documents, 
links up fully with our conclusion that the capacity to love God 
constitutes the fundamental dimension of man's openness to him, 
for the capacity to love is rooted in the conditions of human action -
freedom and the possession of a moral conscience. 
I have suggested that the structure of man's being as the 
image of God constitutes a desire or aspiration after God and the 
values of the kingdom. We have already seen in AG 8 that the 
revelation of Christ is said to be the revelation of that pattern 
of hum~ty after which men ~spire (see p.323 ). Similarly, the 
Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World affirms the 
real desire which lies at the heart of man for the reality to which 
he is called: 
"The Church knows that her message 
corresponds to the most secret desires of 
man's heart when she defends the dignity 
of the human vocation, thus restoring 
hope to those who despair of any higher 
destiny. Her message by no means diminishes 
man, but sheds light, life, and liberty on his 
progress; and without it the heart of man 
can never be satisfied." (GS 21.2, see also 41.1) 
The theme of man's vocation, therefore, is found in 
Gaudium et Spes in close correlation to its theology of the image 
of God in the person, with all its connotations of openness to 
God as the fundamental structuration of the creature, an openness 
which is expressed through man's desire, albeit an inarticulate 
one, for affinity with God in the activity of charity. Man 
struggles for brotherhood; Christ affirms it as something which 
becomes possible in the power of divine love. Man struggles to 
transform the world, and Christ shows that the law of this 
(29) Klein suggests that the use of the term 1propositum1 (purpose) 
rather than the term 'voluntas' (will). in GS 34.1, expresses 
the idea that God is concerned with the substantial results 
of human activity, and not simply with its moral worth as a 
formal quality. (See Teilhard de Chardin und das Zweite 
Vatik~ische Konzil (Munich, 1975) P• 2~3.) 
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transformation is the new commandment of love (see GS 38.1). 
This love -this communion with our fellows comprised within our 
communion with God -is what we were made for, and what we are 
called to from the moment of our creation. 
In its theology of vocation, then, as in its personalism 
and its concepts of dignity and freedom, Gaudium et Spes is 
broadly consistent, both within itself, and also in relation to the 
ideas which we have discovered in other documents. We must now move 
on to consider Vatican II' s picture of the creating God - the one in 
relation to whom man stands as a called and free person from his very 
origin - and we turn to consider the doctrine of God the creator 
in those passages of the documents in which we have not alreaqy con-
sidered this theme. 
4 Vatican II' s Treatment of the Doc trine of God, Man 1 s Creator, 
in those Parts of the Documents which we have not yet 
Studied 
I ruggested that the doctrine of God which emerges from 
Vatican II's ideal of Christian obedience is one in which various 
pictures of God are all formally united by the fact of being 
correlated with the doctrine of man the person. However, this very 
correlation bears its own connotations, suggesting that God should 
appear as one vho created men for the sake of loving communion, and 
as one whose very glorification is involved in the issue of whether 
his creatures enter into that communion. In our study of further 
passages relating to the creator we must ask whether the Council 1 s 
doctrine consistently presents him as creating out of love and 
for loving communion, and as looking for the substantial glorification 
which would arise from that consummation, 
The affirmation concerning God's freedom which were so 
central to the teaching of the previous century reappear in the 
documents of the Second Vatican Council when they treat of the 
divine creator, but they reappear in a new context in which the 
emphasis is markedly altered: 
340 
"The eternal Father, through the absolutely 
free and secret plan of his wisdom, created 
the entire world, determined to elevate men 
to a share in the .divine life, and did not 
desert them when they had fallen in Adam." (LG 2) 
We have alreaey examined this text in relation to the 
question of the created status of man (see p.~21 ) , but now we 
must notice the traditional affirmation which it contains con-
cerning God's freedom in creating. However, this is immediately 
conjoined with the doctrine of his saving and elevating will, and, 
as I have already argued, in the light of what follows in LG 3 we 
are directed to see the actions of God whereby he founds the 
world and is turned lovingly to man as being of a single piece, 
and rooted in a single determinationo 
In AG 2.2 the freedom of God in creation is set more 
explicitly in relation to his love, and is once again conjoined 
to the vocation of man. The paragraph says that the design of 
God which is unfolded in the missions of the Son, the Spirit, and 
the Church, "flows from the 'fountain-like love' or charity of God 
the Father who ••• freely created us out of his immense and 
merciful goodness and, in addition, graciously called us to com-
munion with himself in life and glory". Once more we see the 
doctrine of creation treated in the same breath as that of man's 
elevation to divine life in the purposes of God. The two acts are 
not strictly identified, but they are so closely knit together that 
they cannot be separated, and both are marked by merciful goodness 
and c har.i ty. 
As in matters of anthropology, the synthesis of Vatican 
II 1 s thought is most fully worked out in Gaudium et Spes. Creation 
and salvation have the same Lord, it proclaims (GS 31.2), and the 
order of salvation confirms the order of creation in its proper 
autonomy (loc. cit.). Since salvation issues from love and confirms 
the order of creation, we may infer that the latter proceeds from 
love as well. Indeed, the fact is openly stated at two points: 
"This is the world which Christians believe to have been founded, 
and to be preserved, by the love of God" (GS 2. 2); "fjl.[an] only exists 
because he is created by the love of God, and always preserved by 
love" (GS 19.1). 
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We find, then, that the final document of the Council 
presented most explicitly the role of God's love in creation, but 
that the idea was already present in earlier documents. The 
assertion of divine freedom is not cancelled by the affirmation of 
the part played by love in creation, but the way in which this 
freedom appears is altered, by comparison, say, with the doctrine 
of Vatican I (see P•315. )e Creation is no longer presented as an 
almost totally disinterested display of perfection; the God who 
creates by love must, in some way, be involved in the fate of his 
creatures. This is why the close linking of God 1 s creative and 
salvific decrees in passages such as LG 2 has such an inescapable 
inner logic. 
If we turn from the question of God's freedom in creating 
to that of his glorification in his works we find, once again, that 
the teaching of magisterial documents of the preceding h~dred years 
reappears, but once more set within the context of God's love. 
"The faithful should recognise the inner nature of all 
creation, its value, and the fact that it is ordered to the praise of 
God;" so reads the first sentence of LG 36.2. This amply affirms the 
traditional idea that God created for his own glory; but the 
sentence goes on to speak of the world as reaching its goal in justice, 
charity, and peace - all of them values associated with communion 
among men. Several lines later the text urges Christians to work 
"so that created goods may be cultivated • o • for the benefit of 
absolutely everyone, according to the creator's ordination and the 
illumination of his Word" o This implies that God 1 s praise is linked 
with the substantial good of mankind, and that his glory consists not 
simply in the worship and acknowledgement which is rendered to 
perfection, but intrinsically in the human values Which are fostered 
on earth. 
A text we have alreaqy examined, AG 2.2, similarly links 
God's glory w.i th human happiness, the end towards Vlhich the creator 
works in his integral disposition of love towards mankind. Likewise, 
GS 37.3 speaks of human progress, sa;ying that the Church, "trusting 
in the plan of the creator", recognises that this progress "can be 
of service to men 1 s happiness". This leads us to infer that human 
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happiness forms the object of God's plan. Another passage which 
we have already considered from the point of view of a different issue, 
GS 34.1, shows that human efforts to better living conditions 
correspond to the purpose of God. It then goes on to say that the 
end of all human activities is the subjection of all things to man, 
so that through him, and in the recognition Which he gives to the 
creator, they may be referred to God for the glorification of his 
name (see also GS 14.1). In this passage, the fact that God's glory 
is linked with human happiness and well-being is only implied, 
in the idea that the improvement of human living conditions corresponds 
to the divine purpose. It is also clear that the praise of the 
divine name depends upon conscious recognition and worship of God on 
the part of man; in this, traditional theology is echoed. However, 
man does not appear as a mere witness in the act of glorifying God, 
nor as a simple recipient of blessings. Rather, he is an active 
partner in the process through which God will be glorified, so long 
as human action is accompanied by recognition of the divine source 
and end of creation. 
It is clear from all the above passages that the glori-
fication of God has a substantial content - that of the fulfillment 
of his creative and loving purpose through human activity. But is 
this subst~ce of God's glory to be identified or connected with the 
communion for which man was made? We have already seen how the 
Council developed the idea of an integral human vocation, in which 
final communion with God includes and transfigures all man's 
relations with the world. So far in this sub-section we have seen 
the aspect of that final fulfillment which concerns the consummation 
and perfection of all man's natural relations; now we must turn to 
a passage which displays the inner connection between human activity, 
natural values, and the final communion which we are to enjoy directly 
with God: 
"Through ••• missionary activity God is fully 
glorified when men consciously and fully accept 
his saving work, which he accomplished in Christ. 
So, through this activity the purpose of God is 
fulfilled - the purpose which Christ obediently 
and lovingly served to the glory of the Father vJho 
sent him. It is that the entire human race should 
form one people of God, should come together in 
one body of Christ, and should be built into one 
temple of the Holy Spirit. This indeed corresponds 
to the deepest desires of all men, for it restares 
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brotherhood and peace. So at last the plan 
of the creator, who formed man in his ovvn 
image and likeness, will really be brought to 
completion, when all who share human nature, 
having been reborn in Christ through the 
Holy Spirit, will gaze together on God's 
glory and be able to say, 'Our Father'." (AG 7 .3) 
In this passage we see, clearly laid out before us, the connections 
between the glorification of God, human values of brotherhood 
and peace, the happiness of the entire race, and its full and 
conscious worship of the Father. These connections are finally to 
be established in the eschatological consummation, but the 
Church 1 s present mission, man's fragmentary longings, his striving 
for peace and brotherhood, his acceptance of salvation, and his 
earthly worship, all point to the kingdom already. It is clear that 
in these presentiments, as well as i? their fulfillment, the 
creator is glorified not only through the elements of conscious 
praise and worship, but also through men's substantial enjoyment 
of the life and grace Which transfigure and fUlfill their natural 
human aspirations. 
Before concluding what we have to say about the doctrine 
of God as creator as it appears in the documents of Vatican II, we 
must pay oome attention to the question of the witness which God 
gives concerning himself to men, through the things which he has 
made. 
We have already noted that DV 6.2 echoes the teaching of 
Dei Filius that "God, the principle and end of all things, can be 
known with certainty by the natural light of reason, from the things 
that he has made 11 • This passage (together with the affirmation of 
the metaphysical endeavour which is found in GS 15.1), suggests a 
process of inductive reasoning which is open to man, taking its 
starting point in the evidence of God to be found in the world. 
Vatican I envisaged the universe as something fundamentally stable, 
a dominion which God "protects and governs by his providence" (30), 
and therefore the evidences of God >Vhich would be found in a 
creation so conceived would have been unchanging facts or regularly 
recurring patternso When the passage is quoted at Vatican II it 
might equally refer to such evidences of stability and order. 
(30) Dei Filius, cap. 1, (Dz 1784/DzS 3003). 
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However, as we have seen, the Council also recognised that there 
is change and progress in the universe, particularly in the human 
sphere where men "develop the work of the creator" (GS 34. 2, see 
also 77.1). Is there, then, any corresponding indication that 
Vatican II attributed to processes of change and development a 
particular revelatory role? 
If there is, it is not a very clear indication. We ma;y, 
perhaps, locate it in GS 36.3, which deals with the continual 
dependence of all things upon their maker. This passage affirms 
that "all believers, of every religion, have always heard the voice 
and manifestation (of Go<{) in the language of his creatures". This 
statement might bear the weight of the idea that processes of change 
form the 'language' of creation, thus providing the evidences from 
which human intelligence may attain to knowledge of God. But there 
is, perhaps, something more important to be gathered from this 
passage: It suggests that we think of God not so much as an abstract 
idea accessible to inductive reasoning.. Rather, he is a living 
God who uses creation to carry on a continual dialogue with man. A 
similar point is made in DV 3: "God, creating and preserving all 
things by his Word, continually offers to men a testimony of himself 
in the things he has made. 11 Here, the divine witness, constantly 
given in creation, is presented as the first stage in a history of 
revelation W:lich has man's salvation as its end. 
We may say, then, that even if Vatican II did not 
explicitly incorporate the idea of a changing universe into its 
reaffirmation of the doctrine of natural revelation, it did 
nevertheless modify the doctrine by integrating it more closely with 
an epistemology of encounter, the growing and developing encounter 
of God with man, which opens out into the history of salvation. 
Conclusion 
The time has now come to answer the questions posed on 
p. 318. First of all we must say that the documents of Vatican II do 
consistently attach human dignity to human freedom, but it is only 
in Gaudium et Spes that the full philosophical and theological 
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synthesis is attained, when the dignity of freedom is explicitly 
located within the problematic of communion. In Dignitatis Humanae, 
on the other h!:!lld, we see only part of the final synthesis, for 
freedom is located within an argument about the nature of rationality. 
However, this argument, focus~ng. as it does on man's moral 
responsibility for the activity of his reason, coheres with the 
concept of communion as being the fulfillment of human moral activit.y. 
Secondly we asked, "do (the documentsJ consistently teach 
that the human person is open to God by the very structure of his 
nature?". To this we must give the answer that the doctrine of 
Vatican II was not totally consistent, for elements of an ontology 
of pure nature appear here and there, and the synthesis of this kind 
of formulation with transcendental personalism is not always smooth. 
Nevertheless, the general drift of the argument, both in its 
patristic and its biblical foundations, both in the idea of the image 
and in that of man's integral vocation, is such as to suggest that 
the passages which seem inconsistent should, nevertheless, be 
assimilated to the personalism of openness. 
Our third question concerned God's act of creation, and 
asked whether it was presented at Vatican II as an act radically 
orientated towards the attainment of loving communion with man. To 
this we may give the unequivocal answer, 'yes'; and to the fourth 
question, "in what do the documents locate the gloriP,:Lcation of God?", 
the reply must be that God's ultimate glorification will consist in 
the universal communion of men with him and with one another. In this 
communion they will fulfill their integral vocation, and refer all 
things to the creator in love and praise for the divine purpose in 
which they have had their share, and of which they have been the 
conscious focus. Thus all things will be summed up in Christ through 
the redemption of man, the "centre and summit" of everything on 
earth. 
We find, then, a substantial consistency between 
Vatican II's explicit doctrine of the foundational, created relation-
ship between God and man, and the doctrine M1ich is implicit in 
its ideal of Christian obedience. The documents' anthropology and 
doctrine of God show that it is because of the divine purpose in 
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creation that the Lord turns to us in an invitatory way, calling 
us to final communion in ·glory. It is because of this divine 
purpose for man's well-being and the Father's glorification that 
Christ's work for our salvation became necessary in view of human 
fallenness. It is to the subject of fallenness that we must now 
turn. 
B) Vatican II's Doctrines of God and Man in their Relationship 
as it is Conditioned by the Fallenness of Man 
So far we have examined the fundamental structure of 
man's existence as a creature of God, and the character of the 
creator. We must now move on to ask what are the concrete 
conditions of man's life in history, and how is the structure of sin 
and fallenness to be described. That is our first question in this 
section, and the second is this: Can men outside the Church achieve 
a real affinity to God through charity? Thirdly, how does God relate 
to man the sinner? And, finally, what is the divine intention 
regarding the general world of humanity as it exists outside the 
Church? We shall be looking back over some of the Council material 
which we have already studied, but in this section we shall focus 
on the areas of discontinuity between the Catholic ideal of 
obedience and other concepts of moral behaviour. Thus we should 
elucidate what the Council saw to be the difference between a 
redeemed pattern of life and a fallen one. We shall also study the 
documents' treatment of God's universal purpose in more detail than 
we have done hitherto, and consider its relation to the idea of 
judgement. 
Our approach in this section, as in the preceding one, will 
be to devote the first two sub-sections to drawing out the specific 
elements which concern us here from the anthropology and pictures 
of God which we derived from our initial study of Vatican II's idea 
of obedience. In the third and fourth sub-sections we shall analyse 
other parts· of the documents which deal with the divine-human 
relationship in histor,y. 
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1 A Closer Examination of the Doctrine of Fallen Man as it is 
Entailed in the Passages which we have so far Studied 
We have two questions to aslt concerning fallen man as he 
exists in histor,y: First, what does Vatican II's delineation of 
Christian obedience imply about the structure of sin and fallenness? 
Secondly, can men outside the Church achieve a real affinity to God 
through charity -an affinity which has a saving significance? 
Accordingly, the sub-section will fall into two partso 
a) What does Vatican II's delineation of Christian obedience imply 
about the structure of sin and fallenness? 
Vatican II' s treatment of the ways in which the actions 
and ideas of men outside the Church are discontinuous with the 
obedience of faith suggests that the morality of natural man is 
vitiated by ignorance; this is not a total ignorance of what is 
right, but an incomplete grasp of how things are. Unawareness of the 
human relation to God results in a misapprehension of what 
conscience is, and of what the full meaning of human personhood is. 
Outside the sphere of the Christian message man does not understand 
the redeeming work of God, nor the eschatological goal of his 
action; therefore human aspirations are foreshortened and distorted, 
and the scope of moral thinking is restricted to that which may 
be attained within this foreshortened perspective. This ignorance 
is bound to work out in misdirected actions, even when man strives 
to obey his conscience, for he is divided against his true self and 
fails to fulfill his full personhood. However, as we have seen, it 
seems that the possibility of following even a distorted conscience 
remains open to man as a source of dignity, and human freedom 
subsists as an outstanding mark of the divine image; the person 
can still be aware that the law of his heart needs to be fulfilled 
in charity. There is, then, no complete break between the state 
in which man was created and that in which he now finds himself, 
just as there is not a total discontinuity between secular moral 
insights and the teaching of the Church, the community of grace. 
I have suggested in Chapter IV (pp. 235-42) that much 
of Vatican II's theory of moral obedience stresses the continuity 
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between Church teaching and the 'new humanism' (GS 55) prevalent in 
much of the world. (31) We can add to this explicit continuity of 
thought the fact that the Council did not issue condemnations of 
modern thought-forms. Communism was not overtly condemned, although 
atheism was reproved (see GS 21.1) (32); indeed, there was an 
effort made to enter the mind of the atheist to track down the causes 
for his disbelief - causes which, to some extent, may show elements 
of protest of which the Church can approve, such as protest against 
the evil of the world, or against false images of God (see GS 19.2). 
Bad faith and malice was not attributed whole-scale to non-Christian 
man; rather, he appeared in quite a favourable light, as a possible 
ally in moral endeavour (see GS 16, 92.5, et passim). Does this 
mean that Vatican II underplayed the extent of human fallenness, and 
of man's need for grace? In order to approach an answer to this, 
we shall examine ~he traditional Catholic doctrine on the nature of 
fallenness, so that the Council's teaching may be measured against 
it. 
In the Tridentine picture of fallen man, he stands as 
one affected by the penalties attached to the first sin of Adam: 
(31) 
(32) 
(33) 
11 All men lost their innocence in the transgression 
of Adam, 'being made impure', and (as the 
Apostle says) 1by nature children of wrath' ••• 
so that henceforward 'they were servants of sin', 
under the power of the devil and death. Thus, 
the Gentiles could not free themselves or raise 
themselves from it by the strength of nature, nor 
could the Jews through the letter of the Law of 
Moses, even though free will was by no means 
destroyed in them, but weakened in its power and 
inclined towards evil." (33) 
See also Paul VI's speech at the last session of the Council: 
11The religion of the God who became man has met up with the 
religion • • • of man who makes himself God. What happened? A 
clash, a struggle, an anathema? That could have happened, but it 
did not ••• The discover,y of human needs absorbed the Council's 
attention. At least allow it this merit, you modern humanists who 
deny the transcendence of the greatest things, and recognise our 
new humanism: We too, we more than anyone else, possess the cult 
of man." (Quoted by G. Martelet in Les Idles Ma1tresses de 
Vatican II (Paris, 1969) p. 187.) 
It is true, however, that a final amendment to GS 21.1 added a 
footnote referring to earlier magisterial condemnations of 
connnunism on the religious plane. 
Cone. Trid. Seas. VI, Decree on Justification (de Justificatione) 
cap. 1 {Dz 793/DzS 1521). See also Cone. Trid. Seas. v., 
Decree on Original Sin (de Peccato or.ig.) caps. 1 and 2 (Dz 788f./ 
DzS 1511f.) 
I 
I 
I I 
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Here we see the classical acknowledgement of the weakness and 
malfunctioning of human will, which is coupled with the idea of 
moral ignorance to give the traditional picture of the fa,llen 
state which pre-exists any actual sin of the individual. So far in 
what we have seen of the teaching of Vatican II this issue of the 
weakness of the human will has not emerged. A reason may be that in 
our study of Christian obedience we have considered the question 
of ~ is reqUired, but we have not examined the theology of grace 
which would make it clear how membership of the Church makes it 
possible to obey. That is to say, we have considered harmony and 
discontinuity in moral theory, but we have not devoted attention to 
the question of moral ability. Nevertheless, it remains true that 
we have seen various indications of the idea that non-Christian man 
has the capacity to do certain things which are "of interest" to the 
kingdom of God (see GS 39.2, and Chapter IV, p. 212, and Chapter VI, 
p. 289). We may say-, then, that the Second Vatican Council 1 s 
picture of man in history is generally favourable, and leaves us 
with little explanation for the fact and depth of actual sin. 
If we have unearthed little explanation for the fact of 
concrete sinfulness as yet, we have, at least, acquired a picture 
of the morphology of such sinfulness. Sin is a refusal of the 
indications of conscience, whether those indications are understood 
in tenns of a law, or in terms of a divine dialogue with man. The 
sinner is the one who contravenes the moral knowledge which is 
available to him. At another level, he is the one who qoes not 
exercise his rationality properly; that is to say, he neglects 
to investigate the question of what is right and wrong, or he makes 
his conscience blind by overlaying it with the veil of habitual 
sin (see pp. 318f. and GS 16). We have seen that Vatican II tended 
to stress the character of moral responsibility as an activity 
of the inquiring mind rather than as fixed conformity to the ideal 
of objective law. The pattern of sin, therefore, appears as that 
of self-betrayal in moral action (or lack of it) and the concept of 
offence against God's law, as such, is reduced in significance and 
emphasis. 
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b) What does Vatican II's delineation of Christian obedience 
imply about the possibility that men outside the Church might 
achieve a real, saving affinity to God through charity? 
Non-Christian man lives with a restricted and distorted 
moral knowledge, and yet there is available to him in conscience the 
echo of God's voice, the possibility of discovering the law which 
is fulfilled in charity. I have suggested that human knowledge of 
this law should be taken with man's aspirations after brotherhood, 
etc., to indicate the conclusion that there is, in human nature, 
a desire for God and his charity, even though this desire may be 
implicit and inarticulate (see Chapter VI, p. 300). The picture 
which we have seen of the role of human action in the world, in 
relation to God's final glorification in the kingdom, confirms the 
fact that the Council saw mankind as living with an innate drive 
to serve the divine purpose, a purpose of loving communion. 
It does not necessarily follow that, because man has a 
natural desire and drive towards God, this desire and drive can be 
satisfied outside the communion of the Church. There are only 
suggestive indications (derived not so_much from our study of 
ecclesiastical obedience as from our considerations earlier in the 
present chapter) that the aspiration of human interiority for God 
is, apparently, matched by an immediacy of the divine presence to 
that interior desire in conscience and the heart. 
If we look back to the teaching of magisterial documents 
for the hundred years preceding Vatican II, we find that there has 
been acknowledged a possibility of salvation outside explicit member-
ship of the Church. Pius IX taught that, 
(34) 
"those who labour under an invincible ignorance 
of our religion, and who diligently keep the 
natural law and its precepts which are inscribed 
upon the hearts of all by God, being ready to 
obey God; and leading a good and honest life can, by 
virtue of the operation of divine light and grace, 
attain to eternal life. For God, who sees into all 
men's minds, spirits, and thoughts, would not, on 
account of his great goodness and mercy, allow 
anyone to be punished eternally who had not 
willingly incurred guilt." (34) 
Encycl. Quanto Conficiamur Moerore (10 August 1863) (Dz 1677/ 
DzS 2866); see also Pius IX, alloc. Singulari Quadam (9 Dec. 1854) 
Coll. Lac. VI, col. 845do 
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In this passage we see a stress on the objective keeping of the 
requirements of the natural law, and also a suggestion that the 
just man should be some kind of theist who is "ready to obey God" 
in so far as he knows his will and nature. (This latter point 
should not be pressed too hard, but it is unlikely that Pius IX 
would have attributed good faith to professing atheists, or 
allowed, concretely, that they might be in a condition to receive 
grace~) 
Moving on to the more recent teaching of the Magisterium, 
we find the Holy Office under Pius XII setting the problem of the 
salvation of non-Catholics in a more explicitely ecclesiological 
context: 
"It is not always required that someone who is 
to obtain eternal salvation should actually be 
incorporated as a member of the Church; but 
this, at least, is required - that he should 
belong to it by will and desire. Now, this 
desire does not always have to be an explicit 
one as it is in the case of catechumens; where 
a man labours under invincible ignorance God 
imputes an implicit desire as contained in the 
fact of a good spiritual disposition, whereby the 
man wishes his will to be confonned to the will 
of God • • • It is not to be supposed that just any 
desire to enter the Church will suffice for man's 
salvation. For it is required of the desire by 
which someone is ordered to the Church that it 
should be informed by perfect charity; and an 
implicit desire can have no effect unless the 
man has supernatural faith. 11 (35) 
In this case it seems even clearer that the individual who is to 
be saved should at least hypothetically concede that there might be 
a God to whose will his own should conform. We may also note 
that here the virtue of charity is mentioned as a necessary form 
of the grace which leads to salvation. 
From what we have seen so far of the teaching of 
Vatican II, we may surmise that the doctrine of earlier Popes is 
confirmed, but that the emphasis is moved away from the actual 
carrying out of specific requirements of the natural law (as though 
they might so easily be known), and perhaps also away from the 
necessity of acknowledging the existence of a God to whom one 
(35) Ep. s. Officii ad archiep. Bostoniensem (8 August 1949) 
(DzS 3870 and 3872). 
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wishes one's will to be conformed. Rather, the common experience 
of possessing a moral conscience comes into central focus, and 
emphasis is placed upon the activity of mind by Which a man 
sincerely seeks what is right, even if he does not always success-
fully locate it. The question, however, must remain unanswered as to 
whether actions which do not actually conform objectively to the 
moral law can yet be informed and filled by divine charity if they 
are carried out in good faitho 
To sum up, Vatican II's concept of proper ecclesiastical 
obedience has as its counterpart a picture of non-Christian man as 
one who has partial, but distorted, knowledge of what is right, and 
some real capacity to carry it out. Actual sin consists in a refusal 
to follow the indications of conscience, and in neglecting the 
quest for moral truth as an education for conscience. However, if an 
individual does not refuse nor neglect his conscience, his efforts 
may be met by the grace of God, for God awaits man alwa;vs in his 
interiority. Here, in an implicit dialogue, moral willingness may 
be transfigured by the gift of true charity, and a person 1 s 
relationship to his conscience may inarticulately express a relation-
ship of love with the creator. 
2 A Closer Examination of the Doctrine of God in his Relationship 
to Fallen Man as it is Entailed in the Passages which we have 
so far Studied 
On P•346 I articulated tvvo questions concerning God 1 s 
relationship to fallen man in history; they were, 'how does he relate 
to man the sinner?', and 'what is the divine intention regarding the 
general world of humanity as it exists outside the Church?' These two 
questions are really different sides of the same problem, that of 
how we are to harmonise God's universal w.ill to save with the fact 
of man's freedom to sin. Because the questions belong so intimately 
together we shall treat them organically in this sub-section, without 
division. 
We can speak of God's universal will to save because of the 
conclusion reached in Section A of this chapter- that God's full 
and ultimate glorification will consist in the universal communion 
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of men with him and with one another: This is God 1 s purpose, 
and because of this purpose Christ's work for man's salvation 
is necessary in view of human fallenness. 
The idea that God is necessarily turned towards mankind 
in a saving attitude -an attitude desiring the restoration of 
communion where it is broken -implies a universality in the work 
of grace; yet such a work of grace, which constantly reaches out, 
must nevertheless respect the liberty of man, since liberty is the 
essential condition of his self-giving in love. 
When we try to conceive a synthesis of universal grace with 
respect for human freedom, we arrive at a picture of God in which he 
appears as one who issues an invitation to all men. The reader will 
immediately recall that this invitatory pattern of divine love is 
reflected in the attitude which Vatican II enjoined upon those who 
represent God in the authority-structure of the Church. However, 
he will remember, too, that the invitatory quality of ecclesiastical 
authority did not detract from a final power to exclude from the 
Church. Does God's invitation, too, operate within the horizon of 
possible exclusion - in this case, exclusion from the communion of 
salvation? 
If such exclusion is a possibility in the thought of 
Vatican II, it would seem that the active refusal must come from 
the side of man, through his misuse of freedom, rather than from the 
act and decision of God. A concentration on the theme of God's 
universal saving will suggests that the loss of men to final communion 
should, in some sense, be viewed as a flaw in God's ultimate glorifi-
cation, and a partial negation of his purposes. Therefore, if 
Vatican II 1s doctrine of God and the last things is consistent with 
the indications which we have remarked in its concept of obedience, 
it should be marked with this sense of loss when it comes to threat 
of judgement and perdition. Moreover, judgement itself should appear 
as a statement of man's failure to turn to God in love, that is, his 
failure in attaining the fullness of his own personhood; it should 
appear as the manifestation of human self-betrayal. In so far as sin 
and rejection of God are to be tenned an 1 offence' against him, it 
should be clear that we are not talking of offence in the extrinsic, 
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legal, sense, but rather in the sense of a real wound against his 
love. The question, then, which we must bear in mind when we 
come to examine the doctrine of God contained in those parts of 
the documents which we have not already studied ia this: Where 
did the Council place emphasis in its presentation of the paradox 
of grace and freedom, of salvation and judgement? 
Vatican I.I' s Treatment of the Doctrine of Fallen Man in those 
Parts of the Documents Which we have not yet Studied 
We have seen that the Council presented a rather favour-
able view of man in those parts of its ecclesiology which relate to 
the question of obedience, and there was an increased stress upon 
the value of secular moral insights, and on respect for the human 
person. However, the Gospel was presented as something which is 
necessary to correct the foreShortening of humanit,y 1s moral vision 
and the distortion which results from it. The Church 1 s preaching 
and teaching sets those insights which are attainable to man outside 
the Church in the wider perspective of human personhood in its 
ultimate orientation towards God. Within this perspective, it becomes 
visible how morality relates to the attainment of full humanity, 
because it can be the means through which charity is expressed and 
developed. 
Classical Roman Catholic theology, however, goes beyond 
the assertion that man is ignorant, and teaches that fallenness has 
·' 
also weakened human will and inclined it towards evil while man is 
in servitude to sin, to death, and to the devil. Attached to the 
very state into which man is born there is a culpability which 
attracts the wrath of God. The death to Which man is in servitude 
is not simply physical death, but the death of the soul. (36) 
Some of these themes are taken up into the anthropology 
of Vatican II, although in certain cases the nuance seems to be 
different. The fact that man is a slave to sin is mentioned in 
(36) "If anyone asserts ••• that (Adani), through his sin of dis-
obedience, 'transmitted death' and punishment 'of the body 
only to the entire human race, but not sin, which is the death 
of the soul', anathema sit. 11 -(Gono. Trid.,sess. V', ~~2. 
orig., 2. (Dz 789/DzS 1512)). 
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GS 2.2, 13.2, and AG 8; death appears as the result of sin in 
LG 4.1 and GS 18.2, and the first of these two texts implicitly 
refers not simply to corporeal death, but to the death of the soul. 
However, it should be noted that death is not openly called a 
1penalty1 for sin, but rather appears as its natural result. We 
have already seen that GS 15.1 spoke of the obscurity which was left 
in human intelligence as a result of sin (see p~ 3~~9 ) and yet 
this is mentioned in a passage which is frankly optimistic about the 
capabilities of the human mind in its metaphysical quest: Finally, 
we must note that GS 17 does not speak, in the Tridentine style, of 
the weakness of man's free will, but rather of the wound Which sin 
has inflicted on human freedom. 
Is it significant that the term 'free will' was avoided in 
this context? We may see in the change, I believe, a reference to 
the Council's total theology of freedom, with its several layers of 
meaning. Sin doe~ not only weaken the will - the single faculty 
associated with free choice -but rather it wounds man's entire 
relationship to God. The truest, 
highest dignity, consists in the 
can enjoy with his creator. (37) 
highest freedom, like the truest, 
relationship of communion which man 
Every human faculty exists for 
this relationship, and so all exist for freedom. With the will 
wounded and werucened, man's capacity for self-donation in love is 
sapped, and thus the total freedom of the child of God is defaced. 
The depth of this tragedy is registered by the Council 1 s lapidary use 
(37) No fewer than six different meanings in the use of the word 
'liberty' by the Council were adduced by Bishop de Smedt in a 
relatio on Dignitatis Humanae. Three of these have a special 
interest for us: "Evangelical liberty; the liberty by which men 
are freed by the truth of the Gospel, and the grace of the Holy 
Spirit, from sin and personified evil; thus they live in holy 
company with God through Christ in the Spirit, until they finally 
achieve perfect liberty and glory. Physical liberty: free will 
itself, or the faculty of self-determination in acting ••• 
Moral liberty: (a) in its positive sense: the power of self-
determination in the fulfillment of the moral law in all its 
amplitude; (b) in its negative sense: the power freely to violate 
the moral law~. (Quoted by A. B. Lambino, in Freedom in Vatican II 
(Manila, 1974) p. 27). 
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of the term 'freedom' rather than 'free will'• GS 14.1 
expresses the same thought: "Man himself is wounded by sin11 (emphasis 
mine). 
The Council's theology of human freedom and dignity are 
bound up, RS we have seen, with its concept of man as a creature who 
is made for a divine destiny, a creature whose meaning and fulfill-
ment consist in his orientation towards that destiny. This funda-
mental idea determines the major point at Which Vatican II's 
theology of fallenness differs from that of the nee-scholastic 
school. The members of the latter group held that through Adam's 
sin mankind lost a 'primitive grace' by which it had been called 
supernaturally to Share in the divine nature, and to contemplate God. 
This primitive grace was identified with the 11 justice11 and 11h0liness" 
in which Adam was first founded, (38) but it was clearly a super-
addition to the capacities of pure nature. Other consequences of 
sin include disruptions and losses suffered within the sphere of 
nature itself, but these were conceptually distinct from the loss of 
primitive grace, even though a concrete connection might be seen 
between these different penal ties for stn, in ·that grace has consti-
tuted a privileged check upon the unruliness of man's bodily 
instincts. Its loss thus contributed to the wounding and disruption 
suffered within the sphere of the natural man, but in an extrinsic 
way. 
Since, in Vatican II's more integrated view, the human 
person is seen as being intrinsically and fundamentally defined by 
his potential openness to God, the fact that he is concretely, from 
his birth, inclined to turn away from God and goodness constitutes a 
radical cause of inner division and disruption. This is reflected in 
all his outward relationships; as GS 37.1 puts it, "the world thus, 
becomes no longer a zone of true brotherhood" (see also GS 10.1). 
The different goods of the world are marked by human sinfulness, 
as well as by God's blessing (see AG 8). The result is that the 
individual's tendency to sin is heightened because, from his birth, 
he is immersed in social conditions which turn him away from doing 
good and prod him.into doing evil. These social conditions may be 
(38) Cone. Trid. Sess. v., de Peccato orig., 1 (Dz 788/DzS 1511). 
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solidified in economic and political structures, but their 
fundamental origin is in the selfishness and pride of men (see 
GS 25.3). There is, then, a ewnulati ve effect in human sinfulness 
as it is mediated through the individual 1 s integral relationship 
with the world. 
It is in GS 13 that the theme of sinfulness is treated in 
its greatest detail. This article was inserted in response to com-
plaints that Gaudium et Spes, in particular, showed too optimistic a 
view of man. (39) It did not make a precise doctrinal distinction 
between original sin and its effects, and actual sin (although it is 
clear from passages such as GS 25 that the Council by no means denied 
the traditional idea that man is inclined to sin from the time of his 
birth). Instead of focusing on the doctrine of Romans 5, the Fathers 
of Vatican II concentrated attention on ideas drawn from Romans 1 and 
7, which throw into relief man's continual and active participation 
in sin, and its continually enslaving effects. The result is that 
GS 13 strongly conveys the sense in which sin is one and 
indivisible, (40) and the way was left open for later investigation 
of the precise meaning of the Tridentine picture of original sin. 
Sin, whether it is inherited or actual, represents closure 
against God and against the possibility of communion with him, and 
it results in the impairment of man's faculties for this communion. 
Men refuse to render glory to God, and their minds become darkened 
(GS 13.1, see Rom. 1. 21-25); they refuse to see in God their 
principle, and so break the pattern by which they are ordered to 
their final end, as well as the pattern of relationships between 
themselves, and with the rest of creation (GS 13.1). These human 
refusals bring in their train an inner division which has all the 
violence of a struggle between the powers of good and evil, and in 
this strife man finds himself unable to ward off the assaults of evil 
without aid. This is the root of his slavery (GS 13.2, see also 
(39) see Ratzinger in Vorgrimler, 5 p. 123 (especially note 5). 
(40) Ph. Delhaye says: "One is not to conclude that the Council 
bracketed a dogma, but that it invites us to make less separation 
between original and actual sin. Man is in a state of sin, both 
through his inheritance from Adam, and also through his personal 
transgressions." (art. cit. p. 351). 
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37.2). Because of the nature of the person as one who is ordered 
to God and to communion with him by his very definition, the inner 
contradiction of sin seems to be almost too weakly described as a 
1dimtnution 1 of man in GS 13o2. 
Vatican II, then, leaves the question of sin~ origin in 
the realms of mystery, but it presents a picture of its effects which 
goes well beyond the ascription of mere ignorance to man in his 
fallenness. Ignorance indeed exists (see AA 7.1, LG 16, GS 15.1), 
but it is grounded in something deeper, man's misuse of his liberty-
that is, man's culpable decision- from whose effects he cannot by 
himself escape. Restrictions on human knowledge of what is right 
compound the inclination to evil, but they do not create it in the 
first place. Indeed, man may have a partial knowledge of what is good, 
and a desire for it, and this only goes to make the state of sin a 
real experience of slavery and se~f-di vision: 11 Being weak and a sinner, 
it is not rare for him to do what he does not want, and to fail to do 
that which he does want" (GS 10o1i see Rom. 7. 14ff.). Manis 
engaged in a struggle against the powers of darkness both V'li. thin and 
without, in Which he must constantly strive to adhere to what is good; 
but it is not without great effort, and with the help of God 1s grace, 
that he can obtain unity within himself" ( GS 37. 2). 
Once again we have·seen that the burden of this part of 
Vatican II 1 s anthropology falls on Gaudium et Spes; elsewhere in the 
documents, references to human sinfulness are scattered and'.<Hist in'.a 
traditional mode. However, the Pastoral Constitution provides a point 
of synthesis from which sin, both original and actual, can be seen as 
closure against God, and thus as the disruption of personhood. This 
closure constitutes man's refusal of his vocation which, as we have 
seen, is grounded in God's choice of mankind in Christ. It is the 
revelation of Christ, then, which shows men the depth of their misery, 
simply because it is the same revelation which shows them the height of 
their vocation (see GS 13.3 and AG 8). But it is also in the revelation 
of Christ that there is victory over the "prince of this world" who 
"held 11 man in the slavery of sin ( GS 13. 2) • ( 41 ) 
(41) Ratzinger notes that in the final version of GS 13 "the slavery of 
sin is no longer characterized as present but, in relation to Christ, 
as already pasto The commission gave purely grammatical reasons 
cont. Po 359 
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It is in the next section of this chapter that we shall 
examine more closely the Christology of Vatican II, but it is still 
appropriate here to note that the Council did not feel it could 
develop the theme of human fallenness without immediate reference 
to Christ. 
We must now turn from questions relating to the nature of 
fallen man to the issue of whether men outside the Church might 
achieve a real, saving affinity to God through charity. All the lines 
of argument so far converge upon the conclusion that it must be 
possible for those outside the Church to be indwelt by the Holy Spirit 
and to have charity as the principle of their actions. We have just 
been reminded of the way in which the Council presented man's capacity 
for goodness as a real desire - a desire which qualifies his 
experience of fallenness as that of painful division and captivity. 
We have. seen, too, the Council's positive treatment of the entire 
endeavour of human activity as being that which corresponds to the 
purpose of Go~ and can be of interest to the kingdom; it was never 
suggested that the only valuable activity in this sphere was that of 
Christians only. Finally, conciliar anthropology presents human 
interiority as a place of direct encounter with God in the case of all 
men, and the location of significant decision. Together, these 
indications converge to suggest that Vatican II reaffirmed that the 
life of grace might be lived outside the structures of the Church. 
It remains for us now to study the specific treatment whiCh the 
Council gave to this topic in certain passages where it becomes the 
central point of focus. 
The major text bearing on this subject is LG 16: Here we 
find the same ecclesiological concern as that expressed by Pius XII 
(see p. 351 ) ; the passage does not speak in terms of an 'implicit 
desire' for the Church, but it does suggest that men (all men) are· 
in various ways ordered to the Church, and that this is the basis of 
their possj_bility of salvation. In particular we may note that the 
Council says that "divine providence does not deny the helps necessary 
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for the change ••• but at the same time it was acting on a 
whole intellectual attitude which in this case cannot be 
regarded as entirely above question." (op. cit. p. 126) 
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to salvation to those who, inculpably, have not yet arrived at 
an express recognition of God, but who strive (not without divine 
grace) to live a good life". This group of inculpable atheists 
join those who "seek God with a sincere heart and try, under the 
influence of grace, to fulfill his will actively as it is known to 
them in the dictates of their consciences" (loc. cit., see also 
DV 3). 
The treatment given by LG 16 to those who are outside the 
Church and may yet attain salvation, is such as to widen the con-
ceptual~ty derived from Pius IX and Pius XII. We saw, When we 
examined their teaching, that exactness in the fulfillment of the 
natural law seemed to be the condition for receiving grace according 
to Pius IX, while Pius XII spoke of the necessity for a disposition 
"whereby the man wishes his will to be conformed to the will of God". 
LG 16, by contrast, stresses sincerity in the act of seeking (cf. 
DH 3.1 and 2), rather than in the exactitude of conformity to moral 
truth, and it explicitly recognises the status of atheists of good 
faith. This is not to say that there cannot be culpable atheism 
(see GS 19.2 and 3), but that the measure of its culpability lies 
in the fact that conscience is rejected when men actively and 
willingly "eliminate God from the heart and strive to avoid religious 
questions" (GS 19.3).. Once again, the emphasis is shifted from 
achieved states of belief and behaviour, to the responsibility which 
man has to use his reason rightly in a quest after religious and 
moral truth. Conscience appears as an active faculty. 
In this context there is some ambiguity in a statement such 
as that of Cardinal Bea that "according to Catholic doctrine those 
who, without any fault on their part, do not know Christ, can be 
saved if they live according to a right conscience". (42) What is a 
1right conscience' if conscience is something which is constantly 
in flux and action? The term, 1a right conscience', seems ambi~ous 
to us in this context because it is easy, in some respects, for us to 
see conscience as St.Thomas did -something which is either right 
(42) "L' attitude de 1 1E lise envers les r~li ons non-ch!fetiennes" 
in DC no. 1468 3 April 1966 • 
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or wrong ('false') in its grasp of moral truth. (43) Some of the 
most modern ideologies, after all, while avoiding talk of 'conscience', 
nevertheless try to rid us of a 'false consciousness' in favour of 
one which corresponds to true praxis. Vatican II, by contrast, seems 
to locate 'rightness' of conscience and consciousness in sincerity 
and questing activity. Only God can be the judge of our diligence 
in exercising this dynamic faculty. 
It seems to remain open whether God gives grace to those 
whose actions do not correspond objectively to the moral law as it is 
known in the Church, or rather, whether those specific actions can 
themselves be the bearers of charity. However, there is a tendency 
within the thought of the Council to allow that the life of grace is 
not entirely cut off When men's concept of what is good differs from 
the Catholic view. Not only are seeds of goodness said to subsist 
among the nations as a secret presence of God, mixed with much else 
that is not so divine (s~e AG 9.2 and NA 2.2), but it is also 
acknowledged that members of otherChristian communities "do not 
always understand the Gospel message in moral matters in the same 
way that Catholics do, and do not admit the same solutions to the 
very difficult questions of modern society", yet, nevertheless, "no 
less than us they wish to adhere to the word of Christ as the fountain-
head of Christian goodness" (UR 23. 2). 1.Phe fact that other communions 
disagree with the Catholic Church on moral matters do,es not prevent 
them from giving access to the communion of salvation (see UR 3.3). 
Therefore it seems that moral disagreement with magisterial 
interpretation of divine and natural law does not deal death to the 
life of grace and charity. (44) 
(43) See Aquinas QD q. 17. a. 4, "Does a false conscience bind?"; also, 
a. 5, "Does conscience in indifferent matters bind more than the 
command of a superior?" (Vol. 2, pp. 331ff.) See also ST la 2ae, 
q. 19. a. 5. 
(44) This statement may be qualified by recognition that the kind of 
disagreements which UR 23 instances are those of complex appli-
cation of the moral law, rather than those dealing with first 
principles. As we have seen, Vatican II allows more liberty within 
the Church concerning the applications of moral principles. We 
cannot, then, take the indications of Unitatis Redintegratio as 
simple proof that the Catholic Church would allow that someone who 
carried out abortions with a sincere conscience, for example, 
might be acting from real motives of charity despite the 
objective moral falsity of his position. 
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4 Vatican II's Treatment of the Doctrine of God in his 
Relationship to Fallen Man in those Parts of the Documents 
which we have not yet Studied 
God's "purpose of salvation" ( 1 proposi tum salutis 1 ) is a 
constant theme of the documents of Vatican II, and it expresses the 
thought of I Timothy 2.4 that he "wishes all men to be saved and to 
come to the lmowledge of the truth". Indeed, this very text is used 
several times in the Council's argument (LG 16, SC 5.1, DH 11.2, AG 7.1, 
see also NA 1.2). It is also clear from other contexts that the 
divine saving purpose extends to all (see AG 3.1, 9.2, UR 2.2, LG 13.1, 
GS 45.1 and 2). We have seen that this purpose for manld.nd is 
co-extensive with God 1 s purpose for the Church, for "all men are 
called to become part of the people of God" (LG 13.1), and when 
LG 16 says that the purpose of God "embraces those who acknowledge a 
creator" it says this in the context of affinning that they are 
"ordered to the Church". The divine purpose is, then, to include 
all men in the Church, and the Church in Christ, in whom man was 
chosen from eternity. 
God's purpose is matched by phenomena in the sphere of 
man's historical life, such as all the elements of goodness and 
truth which are to be found among the nations and religions of the 
world (see LG 16, AG 9.2, NA 2.2). These are no mere accidents, but 
are given by God "who enlightens every man, so that he may finally 
have life" (LG 16). They are realities of grace as well as of 
truth (AG 9.2) and they may be seen as means of preparation for the 
Gospel (LG 16). However, at the same time the various religions must 
also be seen as the embodiment of man's own religious effort (AG 3.1), 
and they need to be enlightened and healed for they contain the 
effects of contact with evil and error (see loc. cit., and LG 16 
and AG 9. 2). It is only in Christ that men can find "the fullness 
of religious life", for in him "God has reconciled all things with 
himself". (NA 2. 2) o 
Just as God 1 s universal purpose for man's salvation is 
matched and witnessed by the seeds of goodness, truth, and grace 
which appear publicly in non-Christian religious and thought-forms, 
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so too, in man's interiority the divine purpose is matched by the 
possibility of being saved through grace by obedience to conscience. 
What, then, is the necessity which pushes the Church outwards in 
mission, if men can be saved without the concrete presence of the 
visible Christian community? Vatican II presents this necessity 
not only in terms of the healing and elevation of the religious 
truth which is available to non-Christians, but also in terms of 
the need for an epiphany of the divine purpose, and of its 
realisation in human history when Christ is rendered present in the 
Eucharist (AG 9.2). God's purposes have both inner and outer form, 
and the outward is necessary if the purposes are to be established 
in history as realities. This is true of God's saving will as it is 
expressed both in the Church and in the very incarnation of Christ 
(see AG 3.1). Although the inner power of these realities can be 
known apart from their outward manifestation, it is only in a 
fragmentary and uncertain way; the epiphany makes all things clear, 
and makes the purposes of God effective in a wider, public sphere 
as well. Therefore the Church is the 'soul' of society because it 
expresses already that which society is destined to be, and it is 
also the leaven within society (see GS 40.2), the "universal sacrament 
of salvation" (LG 48.2, GS 45.1, see also LG 1, 9.3, SC 26.1, AG 5.1, 
GS 42.3). 
The ecclesiological motif of epiphany or embodiment, which 
we have already seen come to the fore in the thought of Vatican II, 
is integrally connected, then, with the universality of God's purpose 
of salvation. Just as the central epiphany of the Church's life, 
found in the Eucharist, forms the focus of an openness to God in which 
all Christians Share in a more diffuse way, so too it forms the focus 
of an openness which subsists in all creation, and which is brought 
to personal consciousne.ss and action by men in their moral and 
religious capacities. As an epiphany, an embodiment, a sacrament of 
salvation, the Church is an invitatory sign for men; the representa-
tional side of Church life exists in order to serve this reality, a 
universal Church which opens out into the kingdom and the salvation 
of the entire human race (see GS 45.1). 
There is, then, in the theology of the Second Vatican 
Council, a 'wider ecclesiology' \Vhich is immediately correlated both 
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with its Christology and with its doctrine of God 1 s universal 
saving purpose. The Coo.ncil, which was very much concerned with 
the ecclesiological theme, treated it in both this 1wider 1 , and 
also in the 'narrower', sense. The unity of the wider and the 
narrower ecclesiologies is to be found in the concept of the 
Church as an epiphany, a sacrament of God's saving purpose, in 
which the mystery of God 1 s love towards man is both manifested 
and actualised at the same time (see GS 45.2). 
With the idea of the Church as a sacrament, we return 
to the theme of God 1 s invitation addressed to men. The reader will 
remember that the idea of invitation is the mediating link making 
sense both of God's universal saving will, and also of human 
freedom. On page 353 we posed the question whether the Council saw 
God's invitation operating within the horizon of a possible 
exclusion of man from the communi on of salvation. In order to 
answer this question we must first examine more closely the way in 
which the documents of the Council treated the theme of the divine 
invitation, and then turn to consider their treatment of the idea 
of judgement. 
The theme of invitation links up with that of man's 
vocation. In a 'passage which we have already considered, GS 19.1, 
God's call to man explicitly takes the form of an invitation - an 
invitation to dialogue (see p. 33'7). We may see, then, implied in 
the concept of vocation in passages such as GS 18.2 and 21.3, the 
quality of invitation. 
In GS 41.1 we are given a picture of the activity of the 
Holy Spirit within man which constitutes part of the experience of 
being called: "Man, who is incessantly urged on by the Spirit of 
God, can never be completely indifferent to religious problems." 
This same, interior impulse of the Spirit is mentioned again in 
AA 29.3, but in terms which show more clearly the orientation of 
the movement as one which corresponds to the inner structure of man's 
personhood; this passage says that the Spirit "urges all men to 
love God the Father, and to love the world and men in him". 
The idea of invitation takes up the themes of vocation 
(as it is written into man's being by the structure of his personhood) 
365 
and of the Spirit's inner and constant activity. It is an idea 
which takes up these themes and expresses them in such a way that 
the respect which God pays to human liberty becomes clear. 
Neither the structure of personhood, nor the incessant urging of 
the Spirit, overrules the real freedom of choice which belongs to 
man. The Christ who is lifted up from the earth to draw all men to 
him (Jn. 12. 32, cited in DV 17) is the same Christ who "invited and 
attracted his disciples in patience11 (DH 11 .1). In doing this, he 
fully manifested God, mo 11 addresses men as friends, and converses 
with than in order to invite them to companionship with himself, and 
to sustain them in it" (DV 2). 
God's invitatory relationship towards man is, therefore, 
expressed in the structure of their being as persons, in the 
interior impulse of the Holy Spirit, and in the outward revelation 
of Christ and the Church. In all these approaches God leaves man's 
freedom unimpaired, for freedom is of the essence of the communion 
to which man is invited: He "does not live fully according to the 
truth unless he freely recognises that love, and commits himself to 
his creator" (GS 19o 1, emphasis mine). The penalty for refusing the 
divine invitation, therefore, is a life Which is not 'true'; it is 
human self-be~rayal. And yet, in DH 11.1, the Council seems to imply 
that there is yet another penalty for refusing the invitation of 
God - there is a "vengeance" which is left to the Father. The 
concept of invitation appears, therefore, to stand in relation both 
to God's universal saving will, and also to a horizon of possible 
ultimate judgement, in the thought of the Council. It is to the 
mystery of judgement which we must now turn, bearing in mind the 
question which we posed on page351/. : Where did the Council place 
emphasis in its presentation of grace and freedom, of salvation and 
judgement? 
I have suggested that the possibility of final exclusion 
from communion with God is a necessary correlate of genuine human 
freedom. However, the theme of God's universal saving purpose 
which we have found to be amply illustrated in the theology of 
Vatican II, should modify the concept of judgement, and lead to the 
idea that it is man who actively excludes himself from the kingdom, 
while God's glory in some way sustains loss through the perdition of 
men by the misuse of their freedom. 
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These ideas are, of course, radical modifications to the 
concept of God's wrath and judgement whiCh has traditionally been 
elaborated through the doctrine of hell and eternal punishment. (45) 
Vatican II did not set out to alter the dogmatic basis of the 
Church's faith, and so it would have been unlikely that such radical 
modifications should have been explicitly adopted by the Council. We 
may, however, note a distinct shift of emphasis in its treatment of 
the idea of judgement - a shift which goes part of the way towards 
making this area of theology harmonise with its stress on the 
universality of God's saving will. 
The first sign of the shift is an omission: The Council 
never mentioned hell in relation to man's judgement. The only use 
of the word appears in SO 5.2, in speaking of Christ's descent into 
hell as part of the paschal mystery. In addition, we may note that 
the only explicit references to man's punishment appear in LG 48.4 
and DH 11.1; in both cases, the references are drawn almost verbatim 
from the New Testament, and the idea is not developed or interpreted 
by the Council. 
This paucity of attention paid to the idea of actual 
punishment is not matched by any scarcity of reference to the fact 
of our havj.ng to give account (see LG 48.4, DH 11.2, GS 16, 17, 45.2, 
93.1). The fact of being judged, therefore, is lodged within the 
thought of the Council, However, on two occasions we see that 
judgement is not carried out with reference to an arbitrary, extrinsic 
law, but with reference to the indications of an individual's own 
conscience (GS 16, DH 11.2). Twice, too, it appears that judgement 
is integrally linked to man's experience of his saviour, for "we 
shall all be laid bare 'before the judgement seat of Christ, so that 
he may render to each one good or evil, according to what he has 
done in the body' 11 (LG 48.4, citing II Corinthians 5.10). "The 
Word of God ••• became flesh so that, as perfect Man he might 
save all, and recapitulate all things •• , It is he whom the 
:E'ather raised from the dead, and exalted to sit at his right hand, 
(45) See, for examplet Cone, Florentinum, Decretum pro Graecis 
(Dz 693/DzS 1306). 
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making him judge of the living and the dead." (GS 45.,2) In both 
these cases it is Christ the judge, who is also Christ the saviour, 
before whom men are to come. It is in Christology that the 
tension between the themes of judgement and salvation are most 
acutely felt. 
Before we turn to the issue of the Council's Christology 
in the next section of this chapter, we should notice the attention 
which Vatican II paid to the inner experi.ence of human personhood 
as the criterion of loss when man turns away from God. Not only 
is there mention of the loss of dignity which results when men try 
to free themselves from all regulation by divine law (GS 41.3), but 
in LG 16 there is a moving passage which outlines the reasons for 
the Church's mission, focusing · on the "extreme despair" of those who 
live and die without God in this world. Finally, we should note 
that although SC 109 (b) calls sin an "offence against God", this 
traditional-sounding formulation was an addition to the commission's 
original version of the text. 
To sum up, the possibility of not being saved (see LG 14.1, 
AG 7.1) remains as a stated negation at the heart of Vatican II's 
affirmation of the universal saving will of God. Yet the nature of 
what it is that men ma;y not be saved 1!:2!!!. remains obscure, being the 
subject only of hints and symbols provided by the New Testament. 
There is a relative reluctance on the part of the Council to use the 
language of penalties, although its theology does not go so far as 
to state that man's refusal of salvation might constitute any loss 
to God. 
Conclusion 
In our examination of Vatican II's anthropology and 
doctrine of God, as it relates to the 'moment' of human fallenness, 
we have found in some areas that the Council was vdlling to expand its 
picture beyond the sketch which.is entailed as the groundwork of its 
idea of obedience, while in other areas it was rather reticent. 
Elaboration is most evident in the Council's picture of man, the 
sinner, and of the God who wishes all men to be saved, whilst 
reticence is noticeable in relation to the degree in which non-
Christian moral action can be the vehicle of true charity, and even 
more obviously in relation to the Council's treatment of God's 
~8 
judgement and punishment of recalcitrant men. We find, then, 
that the balance of elabor~tion and reticence falls in such a 
way that there is equal emphasis on both sides of the paradox 
of grace and freedom; God's love and call balance 1nan1s true 
freedom in the foreground of the Council's vision. In general, this 
balance is maintained in such a way that there is congruence between 
this paradox and the conditions of obedience which arise from the 
Church's role as an invitatory sign and as a structure of 
representational authority. 
C) Vatican II's Christology: The Relationship of God and Man 
in the Structure of Grace 
Over the preceding two sections of this chapter it has 
become clear that the anthropology of Vatican II is intimately 
linked with its doctrine of Christ, and that this, in turn, is 
connected to a 'wider ecclesiology' (see p. ;~G::1 ) which deals with 
the complete scope of the divine grace shown towards man in 
history. Now that we have considered the doctrines of God and man 
in the 'moments' of creation and fallenness, and before we turn to 
an examination of the divine-human relationship in its eschatological 
context, it is appropriate to pause and analyse more closely the 
Council's Christology, for it is the pivot around which the doctrines 
of God and man turn. When we considered the divine-human relation-
ship in the 'moments' of creation and fallenness we were looking 
'backwards', as it were, from our starting point in Vatican II's 
picture of the Church; when we come to consider eschatological 
dimensions of the relationship we shall be looking 'forwards' from 
the same point. In examining Christology, however, we are dealing 
with that integrated picture of the divine-human relationship which 
is most immediately correlated with any concept of the way in which 
the Church mediates grace to man in history. 
Although Christology now appears as the area of theology 
to be most immediately correlated with the concept of grace in the 
Church, the conclusions of Chapter II-V of the thesis were not 
formulated in strictly Christological terms. Only in Chapter III, 
when we considered the significance of the obedience of the Son as 
a model for the obedience of Christians, did we see a reflection of the 
crucial role which Christology plays in the overall scheme of 
Vatican II's doctrine of God and anthropology. This crucial role 
was to emerge more clearly in the first two sections of the present 
chapter, when we came to examine parts of the Council's documents 
not immediately concerned with teaching about obedienceo Because 
Christology did not appear largely in the conclusions of Chapters 
II-V, we shall not divide this section, as we did the preceding ones, 
into a review of conclusions drawn from the first part of the thesis 
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followed by an examination of new material. Rather, we shall 
analyse the Council's Christological statements as they stand, 
in relation to the overall scheme of anthropology and of teaching 
about the nature of God. First, we must briefly remind ourselves 
of the Christological indications of the first two sections of the 
present chapter. 
We have seen on p.321 that LG 3 takes up the theology 
of the first chapter of the epistle t6 the Ephesians, and gives a 
Christological basis to human existence from the outset. It is 
God's choice of man in Christ which is the grounds of the vocation 
through which man is called to communion with his creator. This is 
the major Christological reference arising out of Section A of this 
' 
chapter. In Section B we first noted a Christological perspective 
when we remarked upon the fact that Vatican II set.man 1s fallenness 
immediately in relation to Christ's victory over sin (seep. 359); 
later in the same section we noted the connections between salvation, 
God's purpose, and a 1wider ecclesiology', finding them all rooted 
in a Christological matrix see pp. 362-64 ). It is Christ's drawing 
of all men to himself that constitutes the inner meaning of the 
Church, and this inner meaning cannot ultimately be separated from 
an epiphany, or embodiment, in the public sphere. Thus the Council 
could claim that all men are 'ordered to the Church' in one way or 
another, for God has chosen them all 1in Christ'. 
We find then, that the thought of the Council directs us 
again and again to the Christology of the early chapters of 
Colossians and Ephesians. Within this pattern of ideas, there is 
an intrinsic link between the 'moments' of creation and redemption; 
it is because of the Father's choice of man in Christ that the 
human race is both created and redeemed. This inner unity in God's 
. 
approach to man must not be forgotten; nevertheless, it will prove 
convenient to treat the Christological basis to the doctrines of 
creation and redemption separately in the present section, and so 
to provide the ~ecessary groundwork for the final section of the 
chapter when we shall consider Vatican II's presentation of the 
eschatological 'moment' of the divine-human relationship. 
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1 Christology and Creation 
Each chapter of the first part of Gaudium et Spes ends 
with an article setting the doctrine of the preceding pages 
within a Christological perspective. It was regretted by some members 
of the Council that this device meant that the Christological basis 
to human dignity was not made fully explicit throughout the course 
of Chapter I. (46) It was only in GS 22 that the connection was 
shown between man's status as one made "after the image of God", and 
the fact that Christ, the Son and Word, is the "Image of the 
invisible God ••• who has restored to the sons of Adam the divine 
likeness" (GS 22.2). However we should note that the preamble to 
Part I of the constitution made it clear that the intention was to 
"illuminate the myster.v of man ••• in the light of Christ, the 
Image of the invisible God and the firstborn of all creation" (GS 10.2). 
Therefore, throughout every chapter of the first part of the Pastoral 
Constitution the cosmic, unitive Christo logy- of Colossians l is 
presupposed. (47) 
Colossians 1.15ff. is not the only New Testament passage 
referred to by the Council to Show the Christological basis of 
creation. Texts such as John 1.3 and 10, Hebrews 1.2, I Corinthians 
8.6, and, of course, Ephesians 1.4-5 and 10, are also adduced. In 
none of these passages did the biblical writers treat of the Son's 
role in creation as an individual, self-subsistent object of 
{46) See llatzinger 1s commentary in Vorgrimler, 5, p. 120. 
(47) The reason for keeping the Christology underlying Chapter 1 of 
Gaudium et Spes implicit for a greater part of the chapter's course 
was the Council's intention of entering into dialogue with men of 
other faiths and none, starting from bases which might be mutually 
comprehensible and acceptable. However, ultimately a personalism 
which pays attention to the human person's capacity for communion 
with God must come to specify explicitly the nature of the God it 
has in view, the character of man's communion with him, and the 
grounds of its possibility. This leads naturally into the realm 
of Christology, and so GS 22 is the appropriate culmination of 
what went before it. The very method employed by the Council in 
the construction of Chapter 1 of Gaudium et Spes illustrates the 
way in which Christian thought is both in harmony, and yet also 
discontinuous, with the ideas of other humanistic philosophies; 
it is finally the preached Gospel Which both completes and 
reorientates personalistic thinking about mano 
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speculation and belief. Rather, the concept appears as part of 
the elucidation of that fullness of salvation which was achieved 
through the Son's incarnation, death, and resurrection. This 
synthetic approach is reflected in the use which Vatican II makes 
of the New Testament texts, for the Council, too, treated the idea 
of creation in and through Christ in close conjunction with 
soteriological, ecclesiological, and eschatological themes. 
In DV 3 the idea that God created through his Word is 
introduced by an allusion to John 1.3; the idea grounds the entire 
article's message, Which concerns God's continual communicativeness, 
on a Christological basis (see p. 344 ) • It also serves to introduce 
the Christological theme at the beginning of a catalogue of God's 
acts on behalf of human salvation, and thus (as has been already 
suggested) there is the indication of an inner unity between creation 
an'd man's supernatural destiny - an inner unity grounded in Christ. 
In AG 3.1 there is a direct reference to Hebrews 1.2, and 
allusions are made to John 1.3 and 10, and I Corinthians 8.6. These 
scriptural references to the fact that God created the world through 
his Son are inserted into a text which would otherwise seem to 
indicate that the reconciliation of the world was essentially a 
separate and secondary decision of God. However, the insertion of 
the Christological-creation motif provides grounds for seeing creation 
and salvation as being all of. a piece within the movement of the God-
head towards mankind, and the paragraph ends with a glimpse of the 
Christ-centred consummation of this unified orientation of God to 
creation: "He has made him heir to all things, so that he might 
renew everything in him11 • 
It is from Colossians 1.15-20, above all, however, that 
Vatican II 1 s concept of Christ "in whom all things were created11 is 
derived. This passage synthesises the "Image" theme, the creation 
theme, the idea of the Church, and the message of the reconciliation 
of all things through the cross. The greater part of the passage 
is quoted in LG 7.4, in order to locate the Council's ecclesiology 
in its widest possible setting, but it is in Gaudium et Spes that 
the theology of the passage is particularly developed, and the focus 
of interest is the fact that Christ is "the Image of the invisible 
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God", as we have already seen in two citations taken from the 
Pastoral Constitution. 
This idea of the "Image" is the most concentrated point of 
union between the doctrines of creation and redemption; it provides 
a theme which runs in counterpoint throughout the history of man. 
He was chosen in the Son to be 11in the image and likeness of God"; 
when that "image" was defaced and robbed of its substance (the 
"likeness"), leaving only a bare and weakened structure of potenti-
ality for God, it was the Son who restored it through sharing our 
humanity, so that we might again share the divine Image in its full-
ness; this divine Image is the very divinity of the Son. The final, 
heavenly redemption will, therefore, appear when humanity is com-
pletely 'recapitulated' in him (see GS 22.2, 45.2). (48) This makes 
it clear that the universality of God's purpose of redemption is 
intrinsically bound up with the theology of the "Image 11 ; it is 
because texts such as Ephesians 1.4-5 are read in the light of the 
conceptuality of Colossians that they are used by the Council to provide 
a systematic basis for universalism in its doctrine of God's purpose. 
~men were created after the image of God; the redemption of the 
image, by him who is supremely the Image of the Father, is consequently 
a universal redemption. 
We find, then, that our consideration of the place of 
Christology in the doctrine of creation put forward by Vatican II 
leads directly to an examination of the Council's Christology of 
redemption; beyond that, we are pointed along the line of this theme 
to the doctrine of the final consummation. 
2 Christology and Redemption 
"By his incarnation the Son of God united himself in some 
way to every man" (GS 22. 2); this sentence stands at the point of 
transition between the universalist theology and soteriology of the 
"Image" theme, and a picture of Christ which focuses on the events 
(48) w'e s~ll not consider here the recapitulation of "all things 11 in 
Christ, because this is beyond the scope of our inquiry into the 
Council 1 s view of the relationship between God and ~· However, 
the reader will remember that the destiny of the ~qtural order 
is seen as being bound up with the vocation of man, who is its 
centre, its crown, and the point where it finds consciousness to 
praise its maker. 
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of his concrete, earthly life. The culmination of these events is 
seen in the paschal mystery, the fact that "he delivered himself 
over to death for all" (GS 32. 2), and rose again. It has been said 
that Gaudium et Spes "views the Incarnation as oriented to the 
paschal mystery. The life of Jesus, his earthly activity culminating 
in the passion and resurrection - all this is uniquely and irreplace-
ably important". (49) I should like to argue, however, that there 
is not a smooth subordination of the notion of the incarnation to the 
concrete account of the paschal. events in any part of the thought of 
Vatican II, but rather a tension between the two foci of Christological 
attention, each of which indicates different soteriological conse-
quences. Several times in the documents the two foci appear in the 
same passage, but their conjunction does not resolve the tension 
between them. 
The first focus is the cluster of ideas which we have just 
been examining- namely, the interconnected notions of God's purpose 
in creating, the "Image" as a key to understanding both creation and 
redemption, the 'wider ecclesiology' in which the Church appears as 
the "universal sacrament of salvation", and finally, the idea of the 
redemption of all men in conjunction with the recapitulation of all 
things. In tension with this cluster of ideas stands the second, 
concrete Christological focus; this has at its centre tbe events of 
the paschal mystery, and correlates these events with the reality 
of human servitude to sin, over which Christ has won the victory 
(see SO 5.2, GS 2.2, 13.2). The idea of sin is, however, intrinsically 
united to the concept of human freedom - and this freedom subsists 
as a reality even beyond the victory, to the extent that man can reject 
salvation. 
We find in several places that a concentration on the 
paschal myst;ery leads to a recognition of the concrete precarious-
ness in which the message of salvation is preached to men, to be 
accepted or rejected in freedom: There is a gap between "that which 
was accomplished once for the salvation of all" by Christ, and the 
"effect" which should be brought about in all, in the course of 
(49) Lambino, op. cit., P• 64 • 
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time (see. AG 3.3). This is a gap which is formally constituted by 
the structure of possibility:, "for since Christ died for all,- and 
since the human vocation is really one and divine, we must hold that 
the Holy Spirit offers to all men the possibilitl of associating 
themselves with this paschal mystery, in a way known to God alone" 
(GS 22.5, emphasis mine). Externally, this gap is filled by the 
manifestation of that possibility, in the preaching of the Church 
(see AG 3.3). Therefore, the concrete existence of the Church as a 
preaChing body belongs with the paschal mystery in the second 
cluster of ideas, as does the concept that there are real, historical 
non-Christian individuals who live by grace. But finally, we must 
also assign to this second cluster of ideas the dark side of the 
possibility which inheres in human freedom - that is, the possibility 
of judgement and loss through rejection of salvation. 
The reader will see that these two clusters of ideas 
represent, respectively, a set of concepts which is extra-historical, 
and a set which is concretely embodied in the events of human and 
Christian history. The paradox of grace and freedom begins to appear 
as a tension between God's intention and purpose, on the one hand, 
and 1what actually happens' on the other. This tension is left by 
the Council as an unresolved mystery; even when its two poles appear 
in the same passage there is no attempt at an explanatory solution. 
For example, we may take two passages, UR 2.1 and GS 45.2: 
"Herein has appeared the love which God has 
for us, for the only-begotten Son of God was 
sent into the world by the Father to be made 
man and gi. ve new birth to the entire human 
race through redemption, and to gather it 
into one. Before he offered himself on the 
altar of the cross as an unspotted victim, he 
prayed to the Father for those who believed in 
him." (UR 2.1) 
"The Word of God, through whom all things 
were made, himself became flesh so that, as 
perfect Man, he might save all and recapitulate 
all things. The Lord is the end of human 
history, the point upon which the desires of 
both history and civilization converge, the 
centre of the human race, the joy of all hearts, 
and the fullfillment of their aspirations. It 
is he whom the Father raised from the dead, and 
exalted to sit at his right hand, making him 
judge of the living and the dead." (GS 45. 2) 
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In both these cases there is a transition from ideas associated 
with the first focus or cluster (associated with the salvation of 
all) to ideas which belong in the second, more concrete cluster. 
In UR 2.1 we move from the loving purpose of God for universal 
redemption to the fact of the paschal death of Christ, before 
which he prayed for a restricted group - those who believe. In 
GS 45.2 we move from the concept of the Word through whom the 
universe was made, and in whom it finds its meaning, to the fact 
of the resurrection, which is associated here with the idea of 
judgement. 
In carrying out its Christologi.cal doctrine of salvation 
through both these clusters of ideas, Vatican II reflected a tension 
which is found in the New Testament itself, and which is not 
resolved there. The Council, then, maintained a fundamental 
paradox, as we have already noted 
Section B (P•367d· 
Conclusion 
in the conclusion to 
We have seen all the problems concerning the relationship 
of man and God concentrated upon the central issue of Christology; 
the doctrine of Christ has, in some ways, been a key to these 
problems, providing the point at which the Council could show that 
the Father's choice of man in Christ before the foundation of the 
world is, indeed, a choice of grace. Human salvation, then, remains 
a matter of Sheer gratuitousness, even though it corresponds to a 
structure of desire and openness which is written-in to the human 
person from the very beginning. This structure, this openness and 
finality, do not determine that God gives man the final gift of 
salvation; rather, "it is the free will of the giver which awakens 
the desire • • • But • • • it remains true none the less that once 
such a desire exists in the creature it becomes the sign, not merely 
of a possible gift from God, but of a certain gift. It is the 
evidence of a promise, inscribed and recognized in the being's yery 
self. 11 (50) the doctrine of Christ, then, gives a biblical grounding 
to the Council's almost complete rejection of the division between 
(50) H. de Lubac, The Mystery of the Su,E_ernatural (London 1 967) 
pp. 272f. 
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pure nature and the supernatural. Man was chosen in the Son for 
an integral destiny, and this choice, made before the foundation 
of the world, constitutes God 1 s promise and man 1 s vocation. 
Likewise, the doctrine of Christ's coming and victory 
explains why men's situation in face of sin can be viewed with a 
basic optimism, and grace can be seen as obtainable by all who 
strive to follow the indications of their consciences. The natural 
order, and even the fact that sin has been allowed, appear as the 
presuppositions of the universal redemption which God willed in 
Christ. Although the Council only indicates it indirectly, not only 
are nature and the supernatural united in a Christological perspective, 
but the orders of creation and redemption can also be seen as 
intrinsically one in the single choice of God: 
"This .world, in the concrete, which God has 
willed, and has willed as one thing (without our 
needing to imagine, anthropomorphically, a 
series of divine decrees all, from God's side, 
depending on each other) this world is a world 
in which God bas allowed sin and evit to exist 
and hence one in which the incarnation of the 
Word of God necessarily took place because of sin 
and for our salvation. But it is also a world in 
which this incarnation is the highest of the acts 
of God, to which all other entities essentially 
refer, and for whose sake everything else, 
including nature, the secular sphere and sheer 
matter, is willed by God.," (51) 
(51) K. Rahner, "The Order of Redemption within the Order of Creation" 
in Mission and Grace, 1 (London, 1963) pp. 75f. 
I have said that the radical unity of creation and redemption is 
only indicated in the documents; in fact, as we have seen, various 
of their statements seem to Show God's decrees concerning man as 
forming a series (creation, elevation, redemption, consummation 
in communion); it is in the Council's treatment of the recapitu-
lation of all things in Christ, upon which we have only touched 
briefly, that its theology comes nearest to affirming explicitly 
the radical unity of which Rahner writes. However, I argue 
that even when a series of decrees is presented (as in LG 2, DV 3, 
or AG 3.1) the Christological thread which unites them indicates 
that there is, indeed, a radical inner unity between them. 
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However, while Christology provides a key which unifies 
teaching about nature and supernature, creation and redemption, it 
also proves to be a point at which the paradox of grace and freedom, 
salvation and judgement, God 1 s universal purpose and the concrete 
particularities of history, is focusad as an insoluble problem. 
The reality of human freedom must be maintained, both because of the 
historical experience of the Church, in which those who accept the 
message of salvation are a restricted group over against the rest of 
the world, and also because of the very nature of salvation as 
supernatural communion, the fulfillment of man's freedom in self-
donation to the one who has first given himself for man: 
"If divinisation, if the perfect likeness is 
given us as something new, as something 'added' 
to the ordinary image, it is because it comes to us 
on the condition of our free acceptance • • • the 
subject of new life is man in as much as he is 
liberty embodied ••• the supernatural (gif{) can 
only be defined as the fulfillment of liberty." (52) 
Christology, then, focuses the tension between Vatican 
II 1s stress on the paschal mystery and the choice with which it 
faces man on the one hand, and, on the other, its stress on the 
universal purpose of God who chose man in Christ, and who restores 
his image to man through the incarnation of the divine Image for 
the purpose of universal redemption. 
D) Vatican II' s Doctrines of God and Man in the Eschatological 
'Moment' of their Relationshin 
In this section we do not only have to test the 
eschatological teaching of the Second Vatican Council against the 
conclusions drawn from our study of the Council's ideal of 
obedience; we must also gather up the threads of what we have 
unearthed in the previous sections of the present chapter, and 
follow them through into their eschatological development, in order 
to see whether Vatican II 1 s picture of the final consummation was 
consistent with all other features of its anthropology and doctrine 
(52) Henri Bouillard, "L' Idee du surnaturel et le 
in L'Homme devant Dieu M langes offerts a H. 
"Theol.pgie", no. 58, (Paris, 1964) PP• 159f. 
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of God. Because of the crucial place of Christo logy in the 
Council's concept of the divine-human relationShip, we Shall devote 
particular attention to the question of the relationship between 
Christ end the kingdom. This wi 11 form the subject of the first 
sub-section. It will be followed by a sub-section in which we 
re~nd ourselves of -the co~clusions which we drew from the Council's 
ideal of obedience, in so far as they related to the eschatological 
dimension; finally, we shall analyse what the documents had to say 
about the life of heaven, in order to test this teaching for 
consistency both with its doctrine of Christ and the kingdom, and 
also with the eschatological implications of the ideal of obedience. 
1 Christ and the Kingdom of God 
Within Christology we discovered a focus for the tension 
between God's intention, on the one hand, and the reality of human 
freedom worked out in history, on the other. There is a similar 
tension within the doctrine of the kingdom of God, and it is related 
to the tension within Christology in a tangential wey. The tension 
within the doctrine of the kingdom is this: The l(ingdom is inaugurated 
and active on earth 1already 1 , but it has 'not yet' been brought in, 
in its fUllness. This is a tension determined by time; there is hope 
for its resolution in the eschatological future - that Which is among 
us 'already' in history will find its fUlfillment, and the tens~on of 
the 'not yet' will be done away as time is superseded by eternity. 
The tension between God's universal, saving intention and the history 
of human freedom, on the other hand, seems to admit of no such 
fulfilling resolution, for if there were one it would not simply be 
time and its ambiguities which were abolished, but human liberty 
itself. Therefore, although the problem of the kingdom cuts across 
the same ground as the paradox of grace and freedom, the issues are 
not identical. Although we have found that Vatican II does not 
destroy the more acute paradox nor bring it to any solution, we may 
yet frUitfully trace the Christological question into the 
eschatological sphere by focusing on the doctrine of the kingdom - the 
doctrine in which there is a tension which~ admit of solution. 
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The kingdom relates to Christ in various ways; he it was 
whose earthly ministry inaugurated it (LG 3, DV 17, see also SG 9. 2); 
this came about not only through proclamation, but also through 
Christ's embodiment of the kingdom in his work, word, and presence 
(LG 5.1). It is the Church which. spreads the kingdom (LG 5.2, AA 2.1, 
AG 1.3, see also UR 4.6) and is, itself, the kingdom's "seed" (LG 5.2), 
its "secret presence" (LG 3); it forms the people in which the 
kingdom is introduced among the nations, and through which it gains 
its citizens (see LG 13.2). Yet this people has its destiny in a 
future reality which it does not yet fully know - the kingdom of God 
which will be consummated when Christ appears (LG 9.2). Until that 
time, the kingdom in its fUllness is a heavenly reality which is 
"sought" by the faithful (see LG 13. 2, 31. 2, GS 72. 2) or whose powers 
are "proclaimed" by them through the presence of these powers in their 
lives; they yet wait in hope for the life of blessedness which is to 
come (see LG 35.3, 44.3, PO 16.2, PC 12.1). This is the tension bet-
ween the 1already1 and the 'not yet' of the kingdom which Christ 
both inaugurated and proclaimed. 
When the kingdom is viewed in this perspective - as that 
which is already present and secretly at'work, but not yet fulfilled-
tbe Council uses the terms "kingdom of God", "kingdom of Christ", ani 
"kingdom of heaven" indiscriminatelyo It is the present reign of God 
over the hearts and minds of men which comes about through the 
proclamation of Christ, and through the activity of the Spirit in 
the Church. Yet, when the Council speaks of its final consummation, 
it markedly prefers to call it the "kingdom of God" (GS 39.2:~ 45.1, 
AG 9.1) - it is that which Christ will "deliver" to the Father at 
the end, when he subjects himself and all creation to God (GS 39.3, 
PO 2.5, see also LG 36.1). This will be the kingdom's fruition, the 
appearing of Christ through whom it was established, and through 
whose love it has grown on earth, (see DH 11.1), and the return, with 
him, of all things to the Father. 
We see here tha:t the motif of the kingdom was used by the 
Council as another way of talking about the fact that God's intention 
and purpose for the world is an intention and purpose "in Christ"; 
the kingdom's reality and possibility is grounded in the Father's 
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creation of all things in and through the Word, and his choice of 
mankind in the Son. Language about the kingdom is language about 
the outworking of this purpose, intention, and choice. The consum-
mation of the kingdom represents the recapitulation, or summing-up, 
of all things in Christ, which will be the fulfillment of God's 
purpose, and thus the subordination of all things to his will. The 
parallelism between the ideas can be seen very clearly by comparing 
the first sentences of the first two paragraphs of GS 45: 
"The Church • • • tends towards this single 
goal - that the kingdom of God may come and 
the whole human rae e be saved." ( GS 45. 1) 
"The Word of God • • • himself became flesh 
so that, as perfect Man, he might save all 
and recapitulate all things." (GS 45.2) 
By examining the theology of the kingdom we see, there-
fore, that there is a strict correspondence between the relationship 
of the Father, the Son, and the world, in ·the 'moments' of 
creation and eschatological consummation. The Father chose us in 
the Son before the beginning of the world, and with the world's 
fulfillment in the kingdom, the Son will return us to the Father. 
The history of the world, and particularly of the obedience of faith 
within the world, appears as the trajectory of that movement of 
return in love. It is now time, then, to pause and consider that 
obedience of faith again - the faith of the individual - for it is of 
such obedient individuals that the kingdom of heaven is formed. 
2 A Review of the Anthropology and Doctrine of God Entailed in 
Vatican II's Ideal of Christian Obedience, in Relation to the 
Eschatological Relationship of Man and God 
I argued in Chapter VI that, because Vatican II acknow-
ledged the extent to which man's ·intellectual, objective knowledge 
is necessarily mediated through historical transcendentals of 
understanding, we ~ draw the conclusion that such objectified 
knowledge Will be abolished when history andits conditions of 
understanding finally pass away (seep. 301). In connection with 
this, I also suggested that the Council brought more centrally into 
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view the possibility for m8l';l., even in this world, of being in 
immediate contact with the divine myster.;r through the unobjectified 
eXperience of affinity in charity. In the person who lives in 
the power of grace, the immediacy of the Spirit's presence to the 
heart and conscience is such as to become the root of a substantial 
affinity in action. Human acts become transfused and transfigured 
with the charity of the Spirit, Vvhic h is their principle and their 
fulfillment. From this basis I drew the conclusion that the form 
of man's final relationship with God will entirely be defined through 
the knowledge of love: Human lmowledge in the kingdom wi 11 not be 
rati anal knowledge - by which the saved might, theoretically, describe 
to one another objectively the essence of the divinity upon which they 
gaze - but it will be the inexpressible knowl~dge of love. The 
incomprehensibility of God will consist in his essential mysterious-
ness, and not simply in his inexhaustibility. 
The more rationalist line of thought in Catholicism's 
approach to the question of the finaL union of man w.ith God has 
attached itself to St. Thomas's concept of the beatific vision, in 
which the highest activity of the mind is involved; it is a direct, 
intuitive, intellectual vision of God, accompanied by the perfection 
of charity. The alternative line of thought, propounded by the 
Franciscan school of the middle ages, posits a union with God which 
is not merely accompanied by love, but rather is founded and formed 
by love (dilectio). (53) The pattern of my argument suggests that it 
is this latter line of thought which should be more strongly 
supported ty the teaching of Vatican II, if it is self-consistent. 
Do the passages which treat explicitly of the life of heaven bear 
this out in any way? .And how do they present the corporate aspect 
of the kingdom, the union with other men which is integrally bound 
up with loving communion with God? 
(53) One should note that St. Thomas's category of intellectual 
activity was wider than his category of rational activity. It 
was an impoverishment of his thought, then, which was 
expressed by those of his disciples who understood the beatific 
vision in primarily rationalist terms. 
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3 Vatican II' s Treatment of the Eschatological Relationship 
between Man and God in those Parts of the Documents which we 
have not yet Studied 
As we come to examine those passages of the Council 
documents which we have not yet studied in relation to eschatology, 
we must bear in mind two things: Firstly, the Council did not set 
out a systematic treatise on this subject more than on any other - in 
fact, rather less. The major passages on the life of heaven all 
occur within a pattern of argument whose major focus is elsewhere. 
Secondly, although these passages have not been under our consider-
ation in the first part of the thesis because they do not deal with 
ecclesiastical obedience, they are, nevertheless primarily 
ecclesiological passages. They take up the enphasis on the social 
nature of salvation which was central to the thinld.ng of many 
Fathers of the Church, and which has been lost for much of the 
modern era. (54) 
On examining the passages which relate to the nature of 
the heavenly life, two things strike the reader: First, the heavenly 
consummation is presented in terms of worship; and second, several 
passages stress the corporate state of communion of the blessed, 
through charity. These two facts are partly the result of the con-
texts in which the Council treated the subject; for example, the 
idea of the heavenly liturgy is introduced in SC 8, in order to show 
the fUll dimensions of earthly worship: 
(54) It was Henri de Lubac, above all, Ylho, in 1937, focus·ed upon the 
centrality of the idea of communion in the patristic concept of 
heavent in his book, Catholicisme, les Aspects So~ux du Dogme 
(Paris): 
"The Christian • • • sets out on his journey towards his last 
end. So does not a certain amount of individualism come back here 
into its own? How can we go on talking of the social character of 
a doctrine which teaches the survival of the individual soul, its 
immediate reward, and once the necessa:cy purification has. been 
undergone, its attaining the vision of the divine essence? 
Nevertheless we are compelled to do so. Everything here 
below. including the Church itself, is for the elect, but the elect 
are not isolated beings, much less so, indeed, than Christians 
on e~rth. 11 (Translation from the English edit ion (Catholicism 
(London, 1950) p. 51.) 
"In the earthly liturgy we share in that of 
heaven as a foretaste: It is being celebrated 
in the holy city, Jerusalem, to which we 
travel as pilgrims, where Christ is seated at 
the right hand of the Father as minister of the 
sanctuary and the true tabernacle. With the 
whole company of the heavenly army we sing a hymn of 
glory to the Lord; as we venerate the memory of 
the saints we hope to have a part and share with 
them; we are awaiting our Lord Jesus Christ until 
he comes as our life and we shall appear with him 
in glory." 
tiimilar pas sages appear in LG 4 9, 50 • 4, and 51 • 2, and 
in each case the Council was concerned to situate the liturgy of 
earth in relation to those who are already glorified. Indeed, 
the theme uniting LG 48-51 as a chapter is "the eschatological 
character of the pilgrim Church, and her union with the Church of 
heaven" (emphasis mine). The idea of the celestial liturgy there-
fore appears naturally, in order to demonstrate the point at which 
the Church on earth is most nearly in tune with the Church triumphant. 
Nevertheless, the consistency with which the concept of heavenly 
worship and praise is put forward indicates that it is a particularly 
apt way of describing the experience of life of heaven. To the 
passages already cited above we may add one which we have already 
studied in relation to the final glorification of God: 
"So at last the plan of the creator ••• will 
really be brought to completion, when all who 
share human nature, having been reborn in Christ 
through the Holy Spirit, will gaze together on 
God 1 s glory and be able to say, 'Our Father'." 
(AG 7.3) 
Once again, the life of heaven (and here it is heaven in its 
fUllest consummation, at the end of time when all are saved) is 
presented as a life directed towards the Father; we may take it 
that the words which are put into the mouth of the entire human 
race, "Our Father", appear in this context as an expression of praise 
and worship -the ultimate glorification of God when he is recog-
nised for what he truly is to the human race, a Father. 
We may say, then, that heaven is firstly characterised by 
worship; but secondly, as I have noted, it is also characterised 
by its corporate nature, as the blessed commune together in charity. 
Again, if we derive this idea from LG 49 ("we all • • • commune 
together in the same love of God and neighbour") we find that it is 
dictated by the point which the entire chapter of Lumen Gentium is 
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making - namely, that the Church on earth is united to that which 
is in heaven already. But the theme of corporate communion in love 
is constant, even outside this chapter; the reader \~ll remember 
that GS 39 stresses the fact that it is charity and all its works 
which are to remain into the final kingdom, and the human values of 
society which are to be transfigured. Even more strikingly the 
passage from AG 7.3 which has just been quoted lays great emphasis 
upon the corporate nature of the heavenly worship, both by the use 
and position which it gives to the word "unanimiter" (55) and also 
by the note which it attaches to the words, "our Father", in which 
St. Augustine is quoted: 
"Let us love that which can be led by us to 
those kingdoms where no one says 'My Father', 
but where all say to the only God, 'Our 
Father' •" (56) 
It is particularly notable that this stress on the corporateness of 
the heavenly communion of love is attached to that passage which 
most nearly refers to the doctrine of the beatific vision, far it is 
that doctrine which, in earlier years, had been associated with an 
individualism concerning the nature of salvation, concentrating as 
it did upon the perfection of the intellectual faculty, and on the 
act of gazing upon.the divine essence. 
\'.'e find, then, that the themes of worship and mutual love 
characterise Vatican II's picture of the heavenly life, showing it to 
be the life in which the Church itself, in its wiP,~f:\t dimensions, 
is consummated, rather than a reward given individually to the 
saints. Indeed, it is the Church as a body which has a vocation to 
the worship of heaven - a vocation to which it can respond partially 
on earth "in mutual charity and a single praise of the most Holy 
Trinity" (LG 50.2). Within this picture of worship, it is the note 
of love and praise which predominates, suggesting the union of men 
(55) "Sic tandem consilium Creatoris • • • revera adimpletur2 cum 
omnes qui humanam participant naturam, in Christo per · 
Spiri tum Sanctum regenerati 2 unanimi t er gloriam Dei speculante.s, 
dicere poterunt: 'Pater noster'." 
(56) De Serm:. Domini in Monte, I, 41 (lv'Iigne, PL 34, 1250). 
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with the divine mystery through the knowledge of love; where the 
idea of the beatific vision is hinted at, it is set in the context 
of corporate worship, and we are not told that the entire body 
of worshippers gazes upon the divine essence, but upon God's glory. 
Their recognition of God's nature is not expressed in the language 
of intellectual understanding, but in the language of loving 
communion - "Our Father". 
Conclusion 
We have found a remarkable consistency in Vatican II's 
treatment of the question of man's eschatological relationship to 
God. There is both an inner consistency, in the firm stress on the 
characteristics of worship and love which are the prime notes of the 
heavenly life, and there is also a consistency between this picture 
and the theology of other parts of the documents' teaching on man 
and God. The life of heaven appears as a life "in Christl', the life 
of a kingdom which is stored up in heaven now, yet Which is also 
already present on earth as a foretaste, a seed, of the reality 
which is to come. It will appear in its fullness when Christ comes 
at the end, and then the kingdom, its worship and values, will be 
consummated corresponding to the Father's pre-temporal purpose. 
There ~nll be the abolition of history and its transcendentals, but 
the fUlfillment and fruition of all the works of love which have 
their roots in history. Love will abide, and it will be the form 
of the divine-human relationship, because love alone - the love with 
which the Father purposed and chose the world - is the reality which 
transcends the conditions of time. The human race which was chosen 
by the Father "in the Son" will fulfill the Father's integral purpose 
for it; reborn in the Son it will be able to return in worship and 
loving communion to its creator, completing his glorification as 
it says, "Our Father". 
POSTSCRIPT 
I promised, in the Preface, to review the methods and 
results of this thesis briefly, in a Postscript. By this means 
. we may draw together the different threads of thought which have 
made up the argument, and assess their significance. 
The methods of the thesis were devised in view of its 
aims: The reader will remember that we set out with two major 
aims on the theological level, and a secondary interest in the 
interrelationship between theology and social factors. Our first 
major theological aim was to analyse Vatican II's presentation 
of the ideal pattern of Christian obedience which should be rendered 
in the Church. It was mai:nly in association with this analysis 
that our concern with the social plausibility of the Council's 
theology was worked out. Our second major aim - that of analysing 
how well th3 thought of the Council co-ordinated the idea of 
ecclesiastical obedience with the wider doctrines of God and man 
in their total relationship - was pursued in more purely theological 
categories. However, as I shall suggest, the degree of co- ' 
ordination which was achieved by the Council, as well as the areas 
in which consistency was not complete, give us grounds for posing 
an important question about the w~ in which social factors 
influence the development of theology in a body such as the Roman 
Catholic Church. Before we come to formulate these questions, how-
ever, we must first review the method which has been employed in 
the various parts of the thesis, and the conclusions which have 
been reached. 
In order to achieve our first major aim we studied the 
documents of Vatican II by reference to a ground-map, which was 
constituted by the first part of the typology of Chapter I. This 
typological map gave us guidance, as we elucidated the way in 
which Vatican II 1 s concept of the nature of authority in the Church 
represented a shift of emphasis away from the exclusive concen-
tration on one motif Which had characterised the ecclesiology of the 
preceding century. By reference to our map, too, we could see that 
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those who hold authority were set by the Council in a renewed 
relationship to other forms of God's presence and activity in ·the 
Church. We also discovered that the way in which authority is to 
be exercised was described in fresh patterns, which suggested that 
the shift in theological emphasis shoUld naturally bear fruit in a 
shift in practical attitudes and approaches. All this made up 
the set of conclusions reached in Chapter II; from this complex web 
of resUlts, we derived a new category ·by which pictures of authority 
might be characterised - the idea of an tinvitatory sign!. This idea 
integrates in a concrete way the motif-patterns which Vatican II 
emphasised in its concept of authority, and incorporates the 
Council's moral delineation of authority's proper exercise. 
Using the idea of authority's function as an 1invitatory 
sign', we then went on to examine the Council's description of the 
obedience vmich is due in the Church, asking whether the documents 
show a shift of emphasis in their ideal of obedience corresponding 
to the shift of emphasis which they display in their treatment of 
the nature of authority. (Although at this point we considered the 
Council's theory of authority mainly in the category provided by 
the idea of an 1invitatory sigd, we also went back to the underlying 
motifs belonging to our original typology, so as to have a variety 
of tools with which to open up the significance of Vatican II's 
teaching on the obedience which the Catholic should render in the 
Church.) In all our analysis of shifts of emphasis, we used examples 
drawn from magisterial teaching of the preceding hundred years to 
provide the backcloth against which the distinctive patterns of 
Vatican II 1s thought might be thrown into relief. The reader will 
remember that it was not our aim to give a fUll historical picture 
either of tae development of official Catholic thinking over that 
period, or of its immediate influence on the theology of Vatican II; 
texts from the past were simply used to provide the ground against 
which shifts of emphasis might be picked out. 
Official texts of the preceding century were used in a 
broadly similar way in the final part of the thesis, in which the 
second major aim of our study was pursued. As we examined the 
consistency between Vatican II's concepts of man and God in the 
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whole scope of their relationship throughout the course of 
salvation history, and its concept of the type of relationship 
between them which is mediated through proper obedience in the 
Church, we once more looked for shifts of emphasis, although this 
time, in the Council's anthropology and doctrine of God. In this 
latter part of the thesis we utilised the second and third parts 
of the typology of Chapter I, to map out the doctrines of God and 
man which should have been entailed in Vatican II's ideal of 
ecclesiastical obedience (Chapter VI); we then tested them against 
their actual presentation and treatment in other parts of the 
. Council documents than those we had previously studied. (This was 
the concern of Chapter VII, and was aided by the method of 
discovering shifts of emphasis, as already indicated.) Although 
our method of study largely operated upon the assumption that the 
Council documents may all be treated as a body, we did, in the 
final chapter, devote some pages to a particular study of one 
aspect of the anthropology of Gaudium et Spes; by doing this, we 
were able to exercise a control on the unified analysis of the 
rest of the chapter, and to demonstrate the soundness of our 
presupposition that the thought of the Council may indeed be seen 
appropriately as a single whole. 
What method was employed as the result of our concern 
with the social plausibility of Vatican II 1s concept of obedience? 
It must be admitted that the thesis did not approach this through 
the medium of rigorous sociological analysis. The answer to our 
questions was sought in an area of intermesh between shifts of 
teaching which were exemplified by Vatican II, and the underlying 
currents of post-Enlightenment, anti-authoritarian thought which, 
it may be generally assumed, have formed the social and philosophical 
context in which a great and significant section of the Homan 
Catholic Church exists during the second part of the twentieth 
century. 
I have argued that it is too simplistic to say that 
Vatican II made a crisis in the Church inevitable because it did not 
modify its concept of authority, in line with its modification of 
other theological ideas, through the use of a modern idea of 'the 
sign'. This idea is simplistic, because it overlooks the nuanced 
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shifts in the idea of authority and obedience Which the Council 
did present. These shifts had their own intrinsic significance, 
both theological and practical. Bur more than that, they also 
had significance because they contributed to the creation of an 
atmosphere in which yet more fundamental changes might be 
expected. The pattern of events which brought crisis to the 
Church after the Council followed the same course of events that 
is often noted in changes and crises in civil society: Outward 
pressures alone did not precipitate crisis immediately, but 
changes and problems came to a head after there had been inward 
relaxations, both in the theory and the practice of authority 
and obedience. 
Whilst the present study, being mainly theological, 
has concerned itself mostly with the inward shifts in concept and 
practice which Vatican II set forward, our interest in the social 
plausibility and effectiveness of these shifts has pointed to an 
area where further study of a more rigorously socielogical kind 
would be fruitful. Such a sociological analysis of the effects of 
the expectations and atmosphere fostered by the treatment of 
obedience at the Council would, however, on its part have to take 
account of a theological study of the kind which forms the greater 
part of this thesis. Theology (particularly the theology of the 
Church's official teachers) must be taken seriously as a social 
determinant, but its influence on social behaviour and expectations 
is not always that which its proponents might envisage or hope for. 
We must now turn from this secondary concern of the 
thesis to consider once more our major aims: Wh~t have been the 
results of our analysis of the inner consistency of Vatican II's 
theology, with respect to the relationship between its picture of 
ideal ecclesiastical obedience and its treatment of the whole sweep 
of the divine-human encounter, throughout salvation history? We 
may generally conclude that marked shifts of emphasis in the one 
field were reflected in the other, while tensions in the ecclesio-
logical area had their counterparts in wider co-ordinate doctrines. 
There is, however, one notable exception to this statement, which 
we shall see shortly. But first, the areas of correspondence and 
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consistency may briefly be catalogued. 
Bvery·thing which I have integrated within the idea of 
an 'invi t a tory sign{ ,as a way of designating the Counci 1 1 s concept 
of the primary function of authority in the Church, may be seen 
as forming a pattern which is a microcosm of Vatican II's concept 
of the primary purpose of the entire Church. The entire Church is 
a sacrament of salvation for the world - and so authority within 
the Church is correspondingly rooted in sacramental status and 
function; the whole Church is bound up in the mission of the Son 
and the Spirit - and so its officers succeed the Apostles in a 
taSk which is primarily that of mission. Beyond these correlations 
there stands the fact of God's universal purpose for the 
salvation of mankind, a purpose which must be worked out in respect 
for human freedom, and thus through the invi tatory means of 
sacrament and preaching; the Church, and holders of authority within 
it, exist as an epiphany of God's intention, attitude and action 
on behalf of men. 
Turning from the invitatory attitude of the hierarchy which 
Vatican II proposed, and the areas of doctrine which co-ordinate 
with it, we find that the Council's stress on the responsible and 
active obedience of members of the Church, whether lay or ordained, 
is to be correlated with the idea that men in general exist with an 
openness to God which is best manifested in their orientation towards 
the activity of charity. From his creation, and even in spite of 
sin, man aspires after the conditions of communion which can be 
attained through action which is inspired by the Holy Spirit. This 
grace of the Spirit can come out to meet the man who strives to obey 
his conscience, even when he does not have explicit faith; in 
addition, it even seems that this grace, which leads to eternal life, 
may meet men when their consciences are objectively wrongly informed, 
since human openness to God is displayed in the very fact of 
diligent moral search. Obedience in the Church, and fundamental 
obedience to God, therefore share the characteristics of initiative, 
responsibility and activity, rather than of conformity and 
passivity. 
This leads us to a third area of correspondence: Vatican 
II stressed the responsibility which all Christians share for the 
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development of the Church's faith and (implicitly) for the delimita-
tion of its moral boundaries. This capacity of even the laity 
is grounded in their inner experience of encounter with God. \Vhen 
we examined the Council's doctrine.:of man 1 s relationship to God 
in more general terms, we found a similar emphasis on inferiority, 
particularly in the doctrine of conscience. 
We move now from correspondence between similar shifts 
of emphasis to correspondence between similar areas of tension in 
the Council's theology. Firstly, we may instance the fact that 
behind the invitatory authority of the hierarchy there continues 
to exist the juridical and legal function, which gives the Pope and 
bishops power to exclude people from the Church. This capacity is 
quite clearly included in the Council's ecclesiology, and yet it is 
only with difficulty compounded with the picture of pastoral 
authority as being based on the ministerial activity of Christ and 
his saving self-giving for his flock. Yet the mention of Christ 
limnediately introduces us to the area of parallel tension in 
Vatican II's wider doctrine of the relations between God and man-
some men, :i:t seems, are to be excluded from the kingdom, and all 
men are to come before Christ's judgement seat. These are the 
consequences of human freedom, despite the universal saving will 
of God and Christ's redemption of humanity. We may note, however, 
that the Council fought more shy of expanding on the exclusi~e. 
character of the kingdom, and God's aspect as a judge, than it did 
of treating the boundaries of conscious Church membership, and the 
juridical functions of the hierarchy. However, because of its doctrine 
of conscience, and its 'wider ecclesiology1 , the exclusive features 
of Catholic church order are made to seem of less ultimate 
importance than previously for the individual who stands without. 
A second area of tension attached to the concept of 
ecclesiastical obedience is concerned with the status of the moral 
teaching of the Church. Vatican II did not make it entirely clear 
how far this should be seen as didactic instruction requiring con-
formity, and how far it should be seen as prophetic preaching of 
evangelical principles, by which men are invited to construct the 
future in responsibility. This tension was matched in the Council's 
delineation of the nature of the person, which is drawn up from 
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elements derived from the conceptualities of the Bible, the 
Fathers of the Church, the natural law theology of the scholastics, 
and the Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment eras. As a result, 
it is not entirely clear whether the criteria by which men are to 
judge their moral actions, are located in the 'given' structures 
of human nature, or in the future of communion which men strive to 
achieve. 
Finally, we reach an area of tension in Vatican II 1 s 
theory of due ecclesiastical obedience which is not reflected in 
its picture of the divine-human relationship in its wider scope: 
We have seen that the Council's concept of the authority of the 
doctrinal magisterium of the Pope and bishops includes the notion 
of infallible and irreformable teaching. The kind of assent which 
is said to be due to this teaching is described in terms which 
suggest that dogmatic language can be universally and trans-
histor±cal~y clear, or at least that problems of interpretation 
are safely adjudicated by the Magisterium, which preserves ever 
the same sense and meaning in the Church 1 s understanding of 
doctrine. However, we have also seen that the problem of the same 
sense and meaning is not easily settled, when once the variability 
of human cultures and philosophies is admitted, and when the 
critical effects of theology's dialogue with other disciplines, and 
its own absorption of critical principles, are allowed. Dogma 
appears to be a source of constant debate, rather than a source of 
constant objective certainty shared by all the Church. 
I say that this tension is not reflected in the wider, 
co-ordinate areas of doctrine, dealing with the whole scope of the 
divine-human relationship, because in Vatican II's treatment of 
this theme the fully historical nature of human representational 
knowledge seems implicitly to be accepted. I have even been able 
to argue that the Council's picture of man's relationship to God 
in heaven reflects an epistemology in which discursive representational 
knowledge passes away, because it depends upon the analogues 
provided by man's historical condition, rather than being formed 
by the direct impress of the essence of divine truth upon the human 
spirit. Within such an epistemology, the constant variability in 
man's historical expression, and means of apprehending the truth of 
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God, appears to be natural, end the guarantee that the Church 
holds to the same sense and meaning in her doctrine is to be 
located not in the external discipline of the IV!agisterium, but in 
the consistent witness of the faithful that the various expressions 
of doctrine cohere with their inner experience of encoll~mter with 
God - an experience and a knowledge which are not fully expressible 
in any objective terms. 
Although our excursus into the kind of epistemology 
implied in Vatican II's doctrine of the entire scope of the divine-
human relationship (and particularly its eschatological dimension) 
has had to be tentative, one important fact emerges with clarity. 
Areas of doctrine outside the range of ecclesiology were not ~ 
influenced by ideas emanating from the epochal change of the 
Enlightenment, but were, perhaps, affected with even more consis-
tency. Does this then suggest that one of the presuppositions with 
which we began was ill-founded; namely, that ecclesiology, and the 
doctrine of obedience in particular, is an area of theology which is 
most immediately likely to show shifts brought about through the 
pressure of ideas which originate outside Scripture and Tradition? 
It seems that philosophical ideas of the modern era have been 
adopted more thoroughly into Vatican II's anthropology and doctrine 
of God's relationship to us, than into its picture of the obedience 
which should ideally be rendered in the'Church. Is this because of 
the particularly conservative nature of Roman Catholic ecclesiology -
which is all the more conservative just because a particular 
doctrine of authority has become one of the major distinctive 
features of the Roman communion? Or is it because, in every system 
of theology, ecclesiology is an area resistant to change, because 
change in this field is so obvious when it comes about, whilst 
subtle shifts in the concept of man's relationship to God in wider 
spheres are less easily noticed, having less immediate concrete 
results? 
We find then, as I suggested on p. 3R7 , that the con-
clusions of this thesis concerning the consistency of Vatican II 1 s 
picture of ecclesiastical obedience with its doctrines of God and man 
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in the broader scope of their relationship, give rise to an 
important question about the way in which external, socially mediated 
factors, influence the development of different fields of theology. 
We may count the fact that this question has been brought into 
focus, among the major fruits of our study. Indeed, the view may be 
canvassed that in a discipline such as theology, the elucidation of 
a question which is of general interest, is of~ importance 
than conclusions which are reached in a restricted area of study. 
Whether this view is correct in relation to the foregoing arguments 
and analyses, I must leave for the reader to decide. 
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